FREE

Course certificates are free until March 31, 2027.

← Full lecture

ST1E · Chapter 3

Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity

God's attributes fall into two families, and the most demanding claim about them is that God is not made of parts.

Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God

14 cards 19 min full lecture

Swipe or use the arrow keys →

What you will learn
  • Explain the traditional communicable/incommunicable distinction, and state one reason a theologian might find the taxonomy imperfect.
  • State the doctrine of divine simplicity in its classical (Thomistic) form, including what it denies about God having "parts."
  • Explain Alvin Plantinga's central objection to simplicity, and why he thinks it makes God a property rather than a person.
  • Identify what is at stake pastorally and doctrinally if simplicity is abandoned, and what is gained philosophically if it is retained.
Two families

Communicable and incommunicable attributes

The traditional answer sorts God's attributes into two families. The communicable attributes have some real, if infinitely lesser, analogue in creatures: God is wise, and a person can be wise in a smaller way. The incommunicable attributes have no creaturely analogue at all: God is timelessly eternal, and no creature is eternal even a little.

Key idea This chapter takes the incommunicable attributes first.
Hold it loosely

A working map, not a scriptural rule

The Bible does not use the words communicable and incommunicable. The distinction is a later systematic tool for organizing biblical data, useful but not infallible. Some theologians organize the same data around attributes of greatness and attributes of goodness instead. The course adopts the scheme because it is the most widely used across the traditions it serves.

Key idea Keep the classification as a map, not a discovery.
Scripture

Why Exodus 3:14?

The lecture uses this verse because God's self-naming to Moses has served, since at least Aquinas, as a scriptural anchor for the intuition behind simplicity. The lecture also names that this reading is debated among biblical scholars.

God said to Moses, "I AM WHO I AM," and he said, "You shall tell the children of Israel this: 'I AM has sent me to you.'"" Exodus 3:14 · World English Bible
Scripture

Why James 1:17?

The lecture uses this verse because a God with whom there is no variation has a goodness that is fixed together with everything else God is, which is close to what simplicity tries to protect.

Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom can be no variation, nor turning shadow." James 1:17 · WEB
Divine simplicity

God is not composed of parts

Divine simplicity is the doctrine that God is not composed of parts of any kind, physical or metaphysical. God is not a substance that merely has wisdom, goodness and power the way a person has character traits. On the classical formulation worked out by Thomas Aquinas, they are the same single, undivided divine reality, considered from different angles by a finite mind. God does not have goodness; God is goodness.

Key idea Wisdom, goodness and power are one reality in God.
Aquinas's reasoning

Why parts would be a problem

If God were composed of parts, something would have to explain why those parts are combined in that way, and that principle would be prior to God. A composite being is also dependent on its parts for what it is. So simplicity follows from taking seriously that God is the uncaused first cause of everything else. The lecture notes that it appears across Reformed, Orthodox and Catholic theology, with differences in emphasis.

Key idea Simplicity is entailed by God being first and uncaused.
At a glance

Two pictures of God's attributes

Composite view (rejected)

Wisdom, power and goodness are separable parts a subject has. This would require a prior principle combining them, so God would not be first and most fundamental.

Simplicity (classical view)

Wisdom, goodness and power are one undivided reality, God's own being, described by many words.

A real debate

Plantinga and his respondents

Alvin Plantinga's objection

If God is identical with his wisdom and his goodness, then those are identical with each other. They look like properties, not persons, and a property cannot know, love or act.

Stump and Kretzmann's reply

The objection treats wisdom and goodness in God as the same kind of thing they are in creatures. In God, what would elsewhere be many properties is one concrete, personal reality.

What is at stake

Why the dispute matters

Simplicity stands behind the claim that God's goodness just is what he is, not a disposition layered on a more basic nature. If simplicity is abandoned, goodness becomes one attribute among several, which the lecture calls a real cost, not a neutral simplification. If it is kept in its strongest form, we must ask whether God is still recognizably a someone. The lecture does not resolve this tension.

Key idea Sit with the difficulty rather than reaching for the easiest formulation.
Think about it

Parts and dependence

Aquinas argues that a God made of parts would need something outside himself to explain how the parts were combined.

Can you restate this argument in your own words, and which step would a skeptic push back on hardest?

One card to remember

If you remember nothing else

Attributes are sorted into communicable and incommunicable, as a working map and not a scriptural rule. Divine simplicity says God has no parts: his wisdom, goodness and power are one undivided reality. Plantinga asks whether this makes God a property, and the debate remains open.

That is the outline, not the lecture.

These cards are a short preview. Your reading is recorded only when you read the full lecture, and the chapter quiz and the exams test what the full lecture teaches.

Read the full lecture →

1 / 14