Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
Contents 46
- Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
- Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
- Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
- Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
- Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
- Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
- Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
- Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
- Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
- Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
- Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
- Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
- Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
- Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
- Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
- Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
- Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
- Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
- Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
- Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
- Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
- Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
- Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
- Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
- Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
- Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
- Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
- Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
- Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
- Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
- Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
- Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
- Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
- Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
- Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
- Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
- Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
- Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
- Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
- Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
- Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
- Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
- Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
- Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
- Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him
Before this course can say anything about what God is like, it has to answer a prior, more structural question: what kind of thing is an "attribute" of God, and how many kinds are there? The traditional answer sorts God's attributes into two families. The communicable attributes have some real, if infinitely lesser, analogue in creatures — God is wise, and a person can be wise too, in a smaller and derivative way. The incommunicable attributes have no creaturely analogue whatsoever — God is timelessly eternal, and no creature is eternal even a little. This chapter takes the incommunicable attributes first (Chapter 4 takes up the communicable ones), and this lecture opens with the most basic and most philosophically demanding claim in the whole set: divine simplicity, the doctrine that God is not composed of parts, including attribute-parts, but simply is his own wisdom, goodness, and power.
This taxonomy itself is not beyond dispute, and this lecture says so up front rather than presenting it as a settled grid handed down from Scripture itself. The Bible does not use the words "communicable" and "incommunicable" attribute; the distinction is a later systematic tool for organizing biblical data, useful but not infallible, and some theologians question whether every attribute actually sorts cleanly into one bin or the other. Holiness, for instance, will resurface in Chapter 4 as a communicable attribute with an incommunicable core — God's people are called to be holy (Leviticus 19:2), yet God's holiness as transcendent otherness is not something creatures share by degree. Keep the classification as a working map, not a metaphysical discovery on the same footing as the attributes it organizes.
What these 19 minutes give you
- Explain the traditional communicable/incommunicable distinction, and state one reason a theologian might find the taxonomy imperfect.
- State the doctrine of divine simplicity in its classical (Thomistic) form, including what it denies about God having "parts."
- Explain Alvin Plantinga's central objection to simplicity, and why he thinks it makes God a property rather than a person.
- Identify what is at stake pastorally and doctrinally if simplicity is abandoned, and what is gained philosophically if it is retained.
God said to Moses, "I AM WHO I AM," and he said, "You shall tell the children of Israel this: 'I AM has sent me to you.'"" — Exodus 3:14
World English Bible
Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom can be no variation, nor turning shadow." — James 1:17
WEB
God's self-naming to Moses as simply "I AM WHO I AM" has functioned, since at least Aquinas, as a scriptural anchor for the intuition behind simplicity: God's name is not a description borrowed from some feature he happens to have, but an assertion of sheer, self-grounded being itself — God does not merely have existence among his other properties, he is existence, without remainder. That reading of Exodus 3:14 as a metaphysical claim about being (rather than, say, a Hebrew idiom evading the question, closer to "I will be what I will be") is itself debated among biblical scholars, and this lecture will name that debate rather than treat the traditional reading as obviously correct. James's language is more directly usable for the doctrine of in the next lecture, but it belongs here too: a God "with whom can be no variation, nor turning shadow" is a God whose goodness is not one attribute alongside others that could in principle shift independently of the rest — it is fixed together with everything else God is, which is close to what simplicity is trying to protect.
1. Why classify the attributes at all
Scripture does not present God's nature as a numbered list. It presents a God who acts, speaks, judges, and loves, and systematic theology's task is to draw out, from that narrated and propositional data, what can be said about God's nature as such. The communicable/incommunicable distinction is one long-standing way of organizing that material, tracing at least to Reformed scholastic theology (it appears, for instance, in Herman Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics) though the underlying instinct — some things said of God have no creaturely counterpart at all, others do — goes back much further, into the patristic and medieval periods. The distinction earns its keep by doing real theological work: it is precisely because wisdom, goodness, and love have some creaturely analogue that Chapter 4 has to work so hard to keep them from being flattened into human virtues merely magnified. The incommunicable attributes taken up in this chapter exist partly to prevent exactly that flattening, by insisting that whatever else is true of God, he is not merely a very large, very good version of us.
The taxonomy has real limits, and a careful reader should hold it loosely. Some theologians organize the same data differently — around God's attributes of greatness (power, knowledge, presence, eternity) versus attributes of goodness (holiness, righteousness, love, mercy), a scheme that cuts across the communicable/incommunicable line rather than tracking it. Others question whether "incommunicable" is even the right word for attributes like eternity or , since in a qualified, creaturely, participatory sense a redeemed creature is promised something like unending life (though never uncreated, self-existent eternity itself). This course adopts the communicable/incommunicable scheme because it is the most widely used organizing tool across the traditions this course serves, not because it is scripturally mandated in that precise form.
2. What divine simplicity claims
Divine simplicity is the doctrine that God is not composed of parts of any kind — not physical parts (God has no body to divide), but also not metaphysical parts: God is not a substance that merely has wisdom, goodness, and power the way a person has various character traits that could, in principle, be pulled apart and considered separately. On the classical formulation, most rigorously worked out by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae (Part I, Question 3), God's wisdom, God's goodness, and God's power are not three attributes God possesses; they are the same, single, undivided divine reality, considered from different angles by a finite mind that cannot grasp that reality all at once. God does not have goodness; God is goodness, and his wisdom, power, and goodness are, in God, strictly identical with each other and with God's own existence.
The argument for this claim in Aquinas is not an isolated speculation; it follows from a chain of prior commitments developed earlier in the same treatise. If God were composed of parts, something would have to explain why those particular parts are combined in that particular way — some principle of composition prior to and more fundamental than God himself, which would mean God is not, after all, the first and most fundamental reality. A composite being is also, in principle, decomposable, dependent on its parts for what it is, which conflicts with the taken up directly in the next lecture. Simplicity, on this reasoning, is not an isolated doctrine to be accepted or rejected on its own; it is entailed by taking seriously that God is the uncaused, non-dependent first cause of everything else that exists. This is also why simplicity has never been a distinctively Catholic or distinctively Thomistic curiosity: it appears, with variations in emphasis, in Reformed confessional theology (the Westminster Confession of Faith 2.1 describes God as "without body, parts, or passions"), in Eastern Orthodox theology (though developed there partly through the distinct essence/energies framework, a nuance worth flagging without pursuing it fully here), and across the bulk of the classical Christian tradition east and west.
3. The contemporary objection: does simplicity make God a property?
This is a point where readers will not agree. Alvin Plantinga, in a widely discussed 1980 lecture later published as Does God Have a Nature?, mounted one of the sharpest contemporary philosophical objections to divine simplicity. If God is strictly identical with his own wisdom, and strictly identical with his own goodness, then — by the transitivity of identity — God's wisdom is identical with God's goodness, which is identical with God's power, and so on down the whole list. But wisdom, goodness, and power look, on the face of it, like different kinds of things: properties, not persons, and properties of a certain sort at that (abstract, not concrete particulars). Plantinga's worry is that pressed to its logical conclusion, simplicity does not exalt God above ordinary predication so much as it collapses God into a property — and a property, however exalted, is not the kind of thing that can know, love, or act. A worshiper prays to a person, not to an instantiated abstract object, and Plantinga argues that classical simplicity, taken with full philosophical seriousness, cannot actually deliver a personal God at all.
Defenders of simplicity (this lecture will name Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann's influential 1985 response, "Absolute Simplicity," as a serious rejoinder worth reading in full) respond that Plantinga's objection trades on treating "wisdom" and "goodness" as though they name the same kind of entity in God that they name in creatures — abstract universals that a subject participates in or instantiates. But that, they argue, begs the question against simplicity from the start: the entire point of the doctrine is that in God, and only in God, what would elsewhere be a plurality of instantiated properties is, without remainder, a single concrete, personal, self-identical reality that human language can only approach piecemeal, through many words for what is actually one thing. On this response, the appearance of incoherence comes from importing ordinary property-talk into a case where it was never meant to apply in the first place — which invites the further question of whether that response can be stated without falling into the apophatic move that Lecture 1-4 already flagged as, itself, controversial in how far it can be pushed. Neither side of this exchange has persuaded the other, and a reader should not expect this lecture to settle what four decades of analytic philosophy of religion have not.
4. What is actually at stake
It would be easy to file this dispute as a technical disagreement among philosophers with no bearing on ordinary Christian life, but that undersells it. Simplicity is one of the doctrines standing behind the claim, developed further in the next lecture, that God does not have a "good mood" and a "bad mood" that could, even in principle, come apart — his goodness just is what he is, all the way down, not a disposition layered on top of a more basic nature that could in principle have gone the other way. Abandon simplicity outright, and a worshiper is left with a God whose goodness, however reliable in practice, is one attribute among several rather than identical with the whole of what God is — which is not, by itself, heretical, but is a real cost, not a neutral simplification. Retain it in its strongest Thomistic form, and a worshiper has to reckon honestly with Plantinga's question about whether the God being described is still recognizably a someone. This course does not resolve that tension in this lecture; it flags it as exactly the kind of place where getting the doctrine of God right requires sitting with real difficulty rather than reaching for whichever formulation feels most immediately usable.
5. Going to the Sources
- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, Question 3 ("The Simplicity of God"), especially Article 3 ("Whether God is the same as his essence or nature?") and Article 4 ("Whether essence and existence are the same in God?"). Any standard English edition (the Blackfriars or the Benziger translation) carries this at the same location, since the Summa's question-and-article numbering is fixed across editions.
- Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Marquette University Press, 1980), the Aquinas Lecture that raised the modern analytic objection engaged above — read at least the chapter directly addressing simplicity.
- Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Absolute Simplicity," Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 4 (1985), the most cited direct reply to Plantinga's argument, useful for seeing how a contemporary Thomist actually engages the objection rather than restating the medieval doctrine unchanged.
In short
- Theology sorts God's attributes into communicable ones, which creatures share in a lesser way, and incommunicable ones, which no creature shares. The lecture calls this a working map, not a scriptural rule.
- Divine simplicity says God has no parts. His wisdom, goodness and power are not three traits he has. They are one undivided reality seen from different angles.
- Aquinas argues that a God made of parts would need something before him to join the parts. Then God would not be the first reality.
- Alvin Plantinga objects that simplicity turns God into a property, and a property cannot know, love or act.
- Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann reply that Plantinga applies ordinary talk about properties to God, where it was never meant to apply. Neither side has convinced the other.
- If simplicity is dropped, God's goodness becomes one attribute among several. If it is kept in its strongest form, we must ask whether God is still a someone.
Topic: This lecture sorts God's attributes into two families and examines divine simplicity, the claim that God is not made of parts.
Remember: In the classical view, God does not have goodness, wisdom and power as separate parts. He simply is them, as one undivided reality.
Caution: The communicable and incommunicable sorting is a useful tool, not a teaching of Scripture. Plantinga's objection to simplicity is also unresolved, so do not treat the question as closed.
One line to carry into ministry: When you say God is good all the way down, you are using simplicity, so be ready to say that thoughtful Christians still debate how to explain it.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Aquinas argues that if God were composed of parts, something outside God would have to explain how those parts came to be combined. Restate this argument in your own words, and identify the step someone skeptical of the whole project might push back on hardest.
- Plantinga worries that simplicity makes God's wisdom, goodness, and power identical with each other in a way that turns God into a property rather than a person. Do you find the Stump-Kretzmann response — that this objection wrongly imports ordinary property-talk into a case where it does not apply — persuasive? Why or why not?
- This lecture claimed simplicity is entailed by, not separate from, the doctrine of aseity taken up in the next lecture. Before reading 3-2, try to state in your own words why a composite God would be a dependent God.