Lecture 9-2: 1 Corinthians 6 and the Question of Litigation
목차 53
- Lecture 1-1: Order Is God's Own Concern
- Lecture 1-2: The Household Manager — Administration as Stewardship
- Lecture 1-3: Administration as a Spiritual Gift
- Lecture 1-4: What to Take from Secular Management Theory, and What to Leave
- Lecture 2-1: Jethro's Advice to Moses — Delegation, Capacity, and Choosing Leaders
- Lecture 2-2: The Wilderness Camp — Order Around a Theological Center
- Lecture 2-3: Temple Staffing and Levitical Organization — Building for the Long Term
- Lecture 2-4: Acts 6 — A Complaint, a Diagnosis, and a Change in Role
- Lecture 2-5: The Jerusalem Council — Deliberation, Evidence, and a Communicated Decision
- Lecture 3-1: The Office of Elder
- Lecture 3-2: The Office of Deacon
- Lecture 3-3: The Three Polity Families
- Lecture 3-4: Convergence and Divergence in Practice
- Lecture 4-1: The Governing Board — Purpose, Composition, and Limits
- Lecture 4-2: Bylaws and the Function of Writing Things Down in Advance
- Lecture 4-3: Legal Incorporation and Denominational Structure — The Basics
- Lecture 4-4: Committees and Delegated Authority
- Lecture 5-1: What Makes a Meeting Effective
- Lecture 5-2: Parliamentary Procedure
- Lecture 5-3: Consensus-Based Decision-Making
- Lecture 5-4: Discernment-Based Decision-Making
- Lecture 6-1: A Theology of Giving: Cheerful, Proportionate, and Voluntary
- Lecture 6-2: Budgeting as a Theological and Practical Discipline
- Lecture 6-3: Internal Financial Controls: Protecting Money and Integrity Together
- Lecture 6-4: Financial Transparency and Its Limits
- Lecture 6-5: Compensation and Conflicts of Interest
- Lecture 7-1: Hiring and Job Descriptions
- Lecture 7-2: Supervision and Staff Development
- Lecture 7-3: Volunteer Recruitment, Training, and Retention
- Lecture 7-4: Burnout in Staff and Volunteers
- Lecture 8-1: Facilities as Stewardship
- Lecture 8-2: Child Protection Policy
- Lecture 8-3: Risk Management and Insurance Basics
- Lecture 8-4: Emergency Preparedness
- Lecture 9-1: Matthew 18 and the Shape of a Fair Process
- Lecture 9-2: 1 Corinthians 6 and the Question of Litigation
- Lecture 9-3: Mediating a Dispute as an Administrative Leader
- Lecture 9-4: Formal Church Discipline
- Lecture 9-5: When and How to Involve Outside Help
- Lecture 10-1: Mission and Vision Are Not the Same Document
- Lecture 10-2: A Planning Cycle, and What Secular Frameworks Can and Cannot Do
- Lecture 10-3: What Gets Measured Is What Gets Pursued
- Lecture 10-4: Building a Plan a Congregation Will Actually Own
- Lecture 11-1: Leading Change: Two Models and What Each Misses
- Lecture 11-2: Managing Resistance Without Dismissing It
- Lecture 11-3: Organizational Culture: What Actually Forms It
- Lecture 11-4: Succession: Planning the Handoff Before It Is Forced
Few passages in this course carry as much weight in ordinary congregational life, or generate as much genuine, careful disagreement among faithful readers, as Paul's rebuke in 1 Corinthians 6:1-7. A member sues another member. A staff dispute ends up in front of a civil judge. A denomination is named in a lawsuit brought by one of its own congregations. In each case, someone will eventually quote this passage — and the honest answer to what it settles is narrower, and more situation-specific, than the passage is usually given credit for.
This lecture does two things. First, it reconstructs the specific dispute Paul is addressing, because the passage's force depends heavily on what kind of dispute is in view. Second, it states plainly — and this is one of two places in this chapter marked as a point of genuine disagreement among faithful traditions — what different traditions have concluded this passage does and does not require of a church administrator handling a real conflict today.
이 14분으로 얻는 것
- Reconstruct the situation Paul is addressing in 1 Corinthians 6:1-7 and identify what kind of dispute ("matters pertaining to this life") is in view.
- State the passage's own theological argument for why believers should be equipped to resolve such disputes internally.
- Explain why this course does not read the passage as forbidding, for example, reporting a crime to civil authorities, and distinguish that reading from the specific practice Paul addresses.
- Describe, fairly and in each tradition's own terms, at least two different real positions on how strictly this passage should govern litigation today.
Dare any of you, having a matter against his neighbor, go to law before the unrighteous, and not before the saints?
Don't you know that the saints will judge the world? And if the world is judged by you, are you unworthy to judge the smallest matters?
Don't you know that we will judge angels? How much more, things that pertain to this life?
If then, you have to judge things pertaining to this life, do you set them to judge who are of no account in the assembly?
I say this to move you to shame. Isn't there even one wise man among you who would be able to decide between his brothers?
But brother goes to law with brother, and that before unbelievers!
Therefore it is already altogether a defect in you, that you have lawsuits one with another. Why not rather be wronged? Why not rather be defrauded?
1 Corinthians 6:1 (World English Bible)
1 Corinthians 6:2 (WEB)
1 Corinthians 6:3 (WEB)
1 Corinthians 6:4 (WEB)
1 Corinthians 6:5 (WEB)
1 Corinthians 6:6 (WEB)
1 Corinthians 6:7 (WEB)
1. The dispute Paul is actually addressing
As with 1 Corinthians 14 in Chapter 1, Paul is not issuing an abstract legal theory. He is responding to a concrete, apparently ongoing practice in the Corinthian church: believers taking ordinary civil disputes — Paul's own phrase is "things that pertain to this life" (v. 3) and "matters of this life" implied throughout — before Roman civil courts, staffed by judges Paul calls "the unrighteous" (v. 1), meaning non-believers, not necessarily corrupt individuals. The word translated "unrighteous" here (adikoi) is best read as "unbelieving" or "outside the community," in contrast to "the saints" (v. 1) — it is a statement about who is judging, not necessarily an accusation that Roman courts were especially crooked, though Roman civil procedure of the period did in fact favor wealthier, higher-status litigants in ways that would have made "going to law" a genuinely unequal contest for many Corinthian believers. The dispute in view is civil, not criminal — property, contracts, and the kind of everyday economic disagreement that arises in any community doing business together, not physical violence, fraud rising to a criminal charge, or abuse.
2. The theological argument, not merely a prohibition
Paul's argument for internal resolution is not "lawsuits are inherently wrong" stated as a bare rule. It runs through a specific theological claim: believers who will one day "judge the world" and even "judge angels" (vv. 2-3) — an eschatological claim about believers' future role in God's final judgment — ought to be capable of resolving comparatively small, ordinary disputes among themselves now. The force of the argument is almost an appeal to consistency: if this future role is real, then having no one wise enough to arbitrate a present dispute is itself a "defect" (v. 7) in the church's actual maturity, not simply a procedural gap. Paul's rhetorical question in verse 5 — "isn't there even one wise man among you" — reads less like case law and more like Paul expressing genuine dismay that a congregation as gifted as Corinth's (see 1 Corinthians 1:4-7) could not produce a single person capable of mediating an ordinary dispute.
Verse 7 pushes further than mere procedure into personal posture: "why not rather be wronged? Why not rather be defrauded?" This is Paul asking whether pursuing one's legal rights to the full, even when in the right, is worth the cost to the church's witness and internal unity — a question about willingness to absorb a loss for the sake of peace, not a claim that pursuing a legitimate claim is itself sinful.
3. This is a point where readers will not agree
How strictly this passage should be applied to litigation today, and what kinds of disputes it actually covers, is a live and genuine disagreement among careful, faithful readers — not a settled question this course will resolve. Some in the conservative evangelical tradition, following writers such as Jay E. Adams, have argued the passage sets a strong, nearly categorical presumption against believers suing believers in civil court over ordinary matters, requiring internal church arbitration first and treating recourse to a civil suit as a last resort taken only after internal process has genuinely failed. Reformed and Presbyterian traditions have generally read the passage as directly informing their own use of internal ecclesiastical courts — sessions, presbyteries, and general assemblies — as the first venue for disputes among members, consistent with this course's Chapter 3 discussion of presbyterian , while still recognizing civil law's independent jurisdiction over crimes and matters outside the church's competence. The Roman Catholic tradition situates internal dispute resolution primarily within law's own tribunal system (the 1983 Code of Canon Law's judicial process, canons 1400 and following) for matters properly ecclesiastical, while operating with a clearer, longer-standing distinction than much evangelical writing draws between what belongs to church jurisdiction and what belongs to the state's — a distinction with deep roots in Catholic natural-law and two-kingdoms-adjacent thinking about civil authority's legitimate, God-ordained scope (compare Romans 13:1-2, taken up again in Chapter 12). Others — including some in traditions more skeptical of centralized internal courts, and legal scholars writing from within evangelical practice such as those associated with Christian conciliation ministries — read the passage as addressing a narrower category of dispute than is often assumed, and as compatible with recourse to civil courts wherever a genuine, serious harm or a matter beyond the congregation's competence is involved.
This course does not resolve which reading is correct. What it states plainly, because the text itself supports it and no serious tradition disputes it, is the narrower claim already noted above: this passage addresses disputes between believers over ordinary civil matters. It is not read by this course as forbidding a believer from reporting a crime to civil authorities, seeking a restraining order against genuine threat, or cooperating with a criminal investigation — situations 1 Corinthians 6 does not appear to have in view at all, and where a different set of obligations (addressed in Lecture 9-5 and again in Chapter 12) governs. An administrator who has internalized only the loudest, most categorical version of "Christians shouldn't sue each other" without this distinction has learned something the text does not actually teach, and has sometimes, in documented cases, discouraged a victim from reporting abuse or fraud on the mistaken belief that doing so violated this passage.
4. What this means for an administrator in practice
Practically, this passage functions less as a rule an administrator enforces on others and more as a standing challenge to build the kind of internal capacity — the "wise" person or persons Paul asks after in verse 5 — that makes internal resolution genuinely available before a dispute escalates to litigation. Lecture 9-3's treatment of mediation is this course's direct answer to that challenge: an administrator who has never developed, or helped a congregation develop, any real capacity for mediating disputes has left Paul's rhetorical question unanswered in exactly the way Corinth had.
핵심 요약
- In 1 Corinthians 6:1-7, Paul addresses believers taking ordinary civil disputes, such as property and contracts, before non-believing judges. The dispute in view is not criminal.
- His argument is theological. Believers will judge the world and angels, so a church should be able to settle small matters, and having no wise person is a defect.
- Verse 7 asks about posture: whether pressing even a legitimate claim is worth the cost to the church's witness and unity.
- Traditions differ on how strictly this governs litigation. The lecture names Jay E. Adams and conservative evangelicals, Reformed and Presbyterian church courts, Catholic canon law, and Christian conciliation ministries.
- This course does not read the passage as forbidding reporting a crime, seeking a restraining order, or cooperating with an investigation.
- The practical challenge is to build real capacity for mediation before disputes reach court.
Topic: This lecture explains what Paul's rebuke about lawsuits in 1 Corinthians 6:1-7 addresses and where faithful traditions disagree about applying it.
Remember: The passage concerns ordinary civil disputes between believers, and Paul's argument is that the church should be mature enough to resolve them.
Caution: The course does not say which tradition's reading is correct. It does state that the passage should not be used to discourage reporting abuse or fraud to civil authorities.
One line to carry into ministry: Do not quote "Christians should not sue each other" to silence a victim, and develop wise people who can mediate before disputes escalate.
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묵상 및 토론
- Verse 7 asks "why not rather be wronged?" — a question about posture, not procedure. Can you think of a real dispute where pursuing a legitimate legal claim to the full would cost the church's witness more than it would gain the claimant?
- This lecture names four different traditions' positions without declaring one correct. Which position's underlying concern (protecting internal witness, respecting church jurisdiction, protecting victims, respecting civil authority's proper role) do you find most persuasive, and why?
- Paul's rhetorical question in verse 5 assumes a congregation should be able to produce "even one wise man" capable of resolving disputes internally. What would it take, practically, for your own context to have that kind of capacity actually available before a dispute arises?
- Why might it matter, practically and not just academically, that an administrator clearly distinguish "an ordinary civil dispute between believers" from "a crime that should be reported"? What has this lecture argued goes wrong when that distinction is collapsed?