Lecture 2-5: The Image of God in Bioethics and Disability Theology
목차 30
- Lecture 1-1: Anthropology in a Postmodern, Transhuman Age
- Lecture 1-2: Two Accounts, One Creation — Genesis 1 and Genesis 2
- Lecture 1-3: Origins, Evolution, and the Unity of the Human Race
- Lecture 1-4: The Historical Adam and Federal Headship
- Lecture 1-5: Creature, Not Creator — Dominion Rightly Understood
- Lecture 2-1: The Image of God — Biblical Foundation and Historical Development
- Lecture 2-2: Three Classical Views of the Image — Substantive, Relational, Functional
- Lecture 2-3: Christ as the True Image of God
- Lecture 2-4: The Image in the Fall and in Redemption
- Lecture 2-5: The Image of God in Bioethics and Disability Theology
- Lecture 2-6: Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, and the Image of God
- Lecture 3-1: Body and Soul — the Biblical Picture Against Its Rival
- Lecture 3-2: Is There a Soul at All? Physicalism and the Challenge of Neuroscience
- Lecture 3-3: Two Parts or Three? Dichotomy and Trichotomy
- Lecture 3-4: Where Does a Soul Come From? Pre-Existentianism, Creationism, and Traducianism
- Lecture 3-5: A Whole Person, Not a Soul in a Vehicle
- Lecture 3-6: The Intermediate State — What Happens Between Death and Resurrection?
- Lecture 4-1: Male and Female He Created Them
- Lecture 4-2: Marriage, Family, and the Question of a Trinitarian Analogy
- Lecture 4-3: The Gender Roles Debate — Complementarianism and Egalitarianism
- Lecture 4-4: Humanity as Social Beings and the Cultural Mandate
- Lecture 4-5: Work, Rest, and the Theology of the Sabbath
- Lecture 4-6: Contemporary Gender Discourse and Queer Theology
Lecture 2-2 already flagged the problem this lecture exists to address in full: a substantive account of the image that locates it in a currently exercised capacity — reason, self-awareness, moral agency — will struggle badly with any human being who does not, or does not yet, or no longer, exercise that capacity in the expected way. This lecture takes that problem out of the seminar room and into the two places it is least abstract: the bioethics of the beginning and end of life, and the lived theological reflection of the disability community, which has produced some of the sharpest recent critiques of how mainstream theology has actually talked about the image.
This lecture's first half applies the doctrine directly: if the image of God is a conferred status rather than a currently exercised capacity (Lecture 2-2's synthesis, defended at length there), then that status grounds the dignity of the unborn, the person with profound cognitive disability, the person in the final stages of dementia, and the dying, in exactly the same terms Genesis 9:6 already used for a murder victim whose capacities have just been ended. The second half engages disability theology directly and by name, because disability theologians have not merely applied the doctrine of the image from the outside — they have identified a real weakness in how much of the theological tradition, this course's earlier lectures included, has historically talked about the image, and that critique deserves to be heard on its own terms, not merely absorbed as a confirming illustration for a conclusion already reached.
이 19분으로 얻는 것
- Apply Lecture 2-2's "conferred status" synthesis of the image directly to the dignity of the unborn, the elderly, and the dying, using Psalm 139:13-16 as a textual anchor.
- State the core argument disability theologians such as Amos Yong and Hans Reinders make against grounding the image in cognitive capacity, in their own terms.
- Identify at least one way this lecture argues mainstream systematic theology (including some of what this chapter's earlier lectures argued) needs correction, not merely application, from disability theology's critique.
- Explain why "the image is a conferred status" is not, by itself, a fully sufficient answer to disability theology's concern, and what further move Yong and Reinders make.
For you formed my inmost being. You knit me together in my mother's womb. I will give thanks to you, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made. Your works are wonderful. My soul knows that very well. My frame wasn't hidden from you, when I was made in secret, woven together in the depths of the earth. Your eyes saw my body. In your book they were all written, the days that were ordained for me, when as yet there were none of them." — Psalm 139:13-16
World English Bible
This text is worth reading slowly rather than treating as a proof-text lifted from context. Its speaker (traditionally David) is not making an abstract argument about embryology; he is worshiping, overwhelmed that God's personal, attentive workmanship reached him at a point of his existence — "in my mother's womb," "in secret," "woven together" — before he had done anything, known anything, or exercised any capacity whatsoever. Verse 16's "when as yet there were none of them" underscores this: God's knowledge of this person, and God's purposeful forming of him, precede the days of his life being lived at all. Whatever this text is used to argue in bioethics, its own voice is doxological, not clinical — it is praising the God who made him, not primarily building a legal case, and this lecture's use of it should not lose that register.
1. Applying the doctrine: the unborn, the elderly, and the dying
Lecture 2-2 argued the is best understood as a permanent status conferred by God at creation, of which reason, relationship, and dominion are true but non-exhaustive descriptions — a status that does not fluctuate with what a human being can currently do. Apply that synthesis, without modification, to three cases bioethics actually has to address.
The unborn. Psalm 139:13-16 describes God's personal formation of a human being while still in the womb, using language ("knit me together," "woven together") that pictures deliberate, attentive craftsmanship rather than a gradual, impersonal biological process God merely observes from outside. If the image is a conferred status rather than a currently exercised capacity, there is no obvious developmental threshold — a particular week, a particular measurable brain function — at which image-bearing suddenly switches on; the more consistent theological reading, on this course's synthesis, is that the image is conferred with the beginning of the individual human life itself, which grounds the dignity this text celebrates from "in my mother's womb" onward. This course notes, without resolving the further question of exactly when human life begins biologically (a question this course leaves to embryology and to the ethics course where it more properly belongs), that Psalm 139 itself does not locate David's dignity at a developmental milestone he passed, but at God's own prior, purposeful act of forming him.
The elderly and those with dementia. Lecture 2-4's discussion of Alzheimer's disease previewed this case; return to it now with the whole chapter's argument behind it. A person whose reasoning, memory, and capacity for relationship have been severely diminished by age or disease has not, on this course's synthesis, lost any of the status Genesis 1:26-27 conferred — the status was never contingent on continuous exercise of the capacities Lecture 2-2 associated with it. This has direct pastoral and ethical weight: care for a person in this condition is not an act of charity toward a diminished remnant of a person, but honor owed to a full image-bearer whose current incapacity does not touch their standing.
The dying. The same logic applies at the end of life as at its beginning: dignity in dying, on this course's account, does not depend on a person's continued usefulness, lucidity, or capacity to communicate, and questions this course leaves properly to a course in Christian ethics (around end-of-life care, the withdrawal of extraordinary treatment, and euthanasia) should be argued on the basis of this settled anthropological ground rather than treated as though the image's presence were itself still an open question at that stage of life.
2. Disability theology's critique: Amos Yong and Hans Reinders
It would be a mistake, and a mistake of the kind this course tries to avoid, to treat disability theology as simply a friendly ally applying this chapter's conclusions to a set of hard cases. Disability theologians have made a sharper and more searching claim: that much of the theological tradition — including substantive accounts of the image going back through Aquinas to the patristic era, and including, this course should say honestly, the shape of Lecture 2-2's own initial presentation of the substantive view before its qualifications were added — has historically talked about the image in ways that implicitly, even if unintentionally, treat cognitive capacity as the paradigm case of full humanity, with disability then requiring special pleading to be included rather than being built into the doctrine's basic statement from the start.
Amos Yong, a Pentecostal theologian whose own brother has Down syndrome, argues in The Bible, Disability, and the Church (2011) and elsewhere that theology has too often constructed its account of the image "from the top down" — starting with an idealized, cognitively unimpaired human being and only afterward asking how to fit people with intellectual disabilities into that prior definition, typically by some version of "they still have the relevant capacity, just less of it" or "the capacity is latent even if not currently expressed." Yong argues this move, however well-intentioned, still concedes the disputed premise: that capacity is what fundamentally matters, with disability merely complicating its measurement. Yong's own constructive proposal draws on a specifically Pentecostal theology of the Spirit's gifting of every believer, arguing that people with intellectual disabilities are not incomplete instances of the image awaiting a fuller capacity, but are themselves bearers of particular and vocations within the body of Christ (drawing on 1 Corinthians 12's account of the body's members) that a capacity-centered theology has habitually overlooked rather than merely under-counted.
Hans Reinders, a Dutch theologian and ethicist, makes a related but distinct argument in Receiving the Gift of Friendship (2008), focused specifically on people with profound intellectual disabilities for whom even Yong's language of "" and "gifting" can seem to still smuggle in a capacity the person may not have in any recognizable form. Reinders argues the deepest ground for including such a person fully within the image cannot be any capacity at all, however minimally defined, but must instead be that such a person is capable of being loved and befriended — that they can be the object of another's self-giving attention and relationship, which for Reinders is closer to Barth's relational reading (Lecture 2-2) than to any substantive one, but pressed further than Barth himself pressed it: the relationship in view is not the disabled person's own achieved capacity for relating, but God's and the community's capacity and calling to relate to them, which does not require anything of the person being related to beyond their existence as someone capable of being addressed and loved.
3. Where this lecture's synthesis needs correction, not just application
Here is the honest self-critical move this lecture owes the material, remembering that a doctrine that connects too neatly to its intended conclusion should make you suspicious of your own structure. Lecture 2-2's synthesis — "a permanent status conferred at creation" — genuinely helps against the crudest version of a capacity-based account (the version that would say a person's image-bearing literally comes and goes with their measurable cognitive function). But Yong's critique lands somewhere Lecture 2-2's language did not fully anticipate: even calling the image a "status" can, if not stated carefully, still smuggle back in an implicit picture of what a "full" instance of that status looks like — one that unreflectively resembles an unimpaired adult — with disability then needing to be specially reconciled to a definition built without it in view from the start. Yong and Reinders are, in effect, asking this chapter to build the doctrine so that a person with profound intellectual disability was never an edge case requiring reconciliation to begin with, but was part of what the doctrine had in view from its very first formulation.
This course's judgment, stated plainly: Yong's and Reinders's critique should be accepted as a real correction, not merely a pastoral addendum bolted onto an otherwise unchanged doctrine. The image of God's grounding in God's own prior, gracious act — echoed in Psalm 139:13-16's language of God forming and knowing a person before they could do or be anything — combined with Reinders's specific point that being lovable and belonging within a community of address and relationship requires no antecedent capacity at all, together give this course a fuller answer than Lecture 2-2's "status" language alone provided. A human reviewer should look carefully at whether this section fairly represents Yong's and Reinders's own arguments rather than flattening them into a single, more convenient position — the two theologians, while allied in their basic concern, genuinely differ in emphasis (Yong toward positive spiritual gifting and vocation, Reinders toward the more minimal ground of being lovable), and this lecture's synthesis of them should not obscure that difference.
4. What this does not settle
This lecture has deliberately stopped short of resolving the specific bioethical policy questions its opening section gestured toward — the precise legal or medical threshold for personhood, end-of-life treatment decisions in particular cases, the ethics of prenatal genetic testing and selective termination for disability. Those questions belong to a course in Christian ethics applying this anthropological foundation, not to this course, which has done its proper work if it has established, as clearly as Lectures 2-1 through 2-4 and this lecture together have tried to, that the image of God is not a matter of degree, and that disability theology's critique of how that claim has often been stated deserves to reshape the doctrine's own language, not merely its pastoral application.
5. Going to the Sources
- Amos Yong, The Bible, Disability, and the Church: A New Vision of the People of God (Eerdmans, 2011) — read at least the introduction and the chapters directly on the image of God for Yong's argument in his own words.
- Hans S. Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics (Eerdmans, 2008) — the fullest statement of the "capable of being loved" argument summarized above.
- Psalm 139 in full — read the whole psalm, not verses 13-16 alone, to hear the psalm's own doxological voice this lecture noted should not be lost when the verses are used argumentatively.
핵심 요약
- If the image of God is a status God confers, not a capacity a person uses now, it grounds the dignity of the unborn, people with dementia, and the dying.
- Psalm 139:13-16 praises God's personal care in forming a person before birth. It is a worship text, so its use in bioethics should keep that voice.
- Amos Yong says theology often starts from an unimpaired adult and then adds disabled people as exceptions. Even "they have less of the capacity" keeps capacity as the measure.
- Yong points to the Spirit's gifts and vocations within the body of Christ (1 Corinthians 12). Hans Reinders grounds dignity in being loved and befriended, which needs no capacity at all.
- The lecture says this critique should correct the doctrine's wording, not only its pastoral use. The two thinkers differ in emphasis, and policy questions are left to Christian ethics.
Topic: This lecture applies the image of God to the beginning and end of life, and listens to disability theology's criticism of how the doctrine has been stated.
Remember: The image of God is not a matter of degree. It rests on God's prior, gracious act, not on what a person can currently do.
Caution: The lecture does not settle when human life begins, the legal threshold for personhood, or specific end-of-life and prenatal testing questions. It leaves these to Christian ethics.
One line to carry into ministry: Care for a person with severe disability or dementia is honor owed to a full image-bearer, not charity toward a diminished person.
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묵상 및 토론
- Restate, in your own words, why Lecture 2-2's "conferred status" language, while an improvement on a pure capacity-based account, might still not fully satisfy Yong's critique. What exactly is Yong asking the doctrine to do differently?
- Reinders grounds dignity in being "capable of being loved" rather than in any capacity the person themselves exercises. What does this move gain, and is there anything it risks losing, compared to Lecture 2-2's synthesis?
- Psalm 139:13-16 is a worship text, not originally a bioethics argument. What is gained, and what should a careful reader be cautious about, when a text like this is used to ground a specific ethical or legal claim?