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ST9E Systematic Theology IX: Christian Ethics

Lecture 1-3: Secular Ethical Theories — Utilitarianism, Deontology, and Virtue Ethics

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ST9E Systematic Theology IX: Christian Ethics
제 0 장 · Introduction: What Christian Ethics Is, and Why It Comes Last
  1. Introduction: What Christian Ethics Is, and Why It Comes Last
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: Foundations and Method in Christian Ethics
  1. Lecture 1-1: What Makes Ethics Distinctly Christian
  2. Lecture 1-2: Scripture, Natural Revelation, and Conscience — Frame's Triperspectival Method
  3. Lecture 1-3: Secular Ethical Theories — Utilitarianism, Deontology, and Virtue Ethics
  4. Lecture 1-4: Natural Law and General Revelation in Ethics
  5. Lecture 1-5: The Structure of Christian Moral Reasoning in Practice
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: Scripture and Redemptive-Historical Ethics
  1. Lecture 2-1: The Structure of Old Testament Law
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Sermon on the Mount as Ethical Vision
  3. Lecture 2-3: Paul and the Indicative-Imperative Pattern
  4. Lecture 2-4: The Unity of the Whole Canon's Ethics
  5. Lecture 2-5: Reading the Bible's Most Difficult Ethical Texts
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: Personal and Relational Ethics
  1. Lecture 3-1: Christian Freedom and the Law
  2. Lecture 3-2: Vocation and Work
  3. Lecture 3-3: Marriage, Sexuality, and the Body
  4. Lecture 3-4: Truth-Telling, Speech, and Digital Communication
  5. Lecture 3-5: Money, Possessions, and Contentment
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: The History of Christian Ethical Reflection
  1. Lecture 4-1: Patristic and Medieval Ethics
  2. Lecture 4-2: Reformation Ethics — Law, Gospel, and the Third Use
  3. Lecture 4-3: Modern Challenges — Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis
  4. Lecture 4-4: Twentieth-Century Christian Ethics — Bonhoeffer and the Limits of Otherwise-Clear Commands
  5. Lecture 4-5: Niebuhr's Christ and Culture and the Church-World Relationship
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: Social, Economic, and Political Ethics
  1. Lecture 5-1: Political Engagement and Civic Responsibility
  2. Lecture 5-2: Economic Justice and Poverty
  3. Lecture 5-3: War, Peace, and Just War Theory
  4. Lecture 5-4: Race, Immigration, and Reconciliation
  5. Lecture 5-5: Environmental Ethics and Creation Care
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: Contemporary and Emerging Ethical Frontiers
  1. Lecture 6-1: Bioethics at the Beginning and End of Life
  2. Lecture 6-2: Artificial Intelligence and Technology Ethics
  3. Lecture 6-3: Sanctity of Life in the Biotech Age
  4. Lecture 6-4: Public Theology and Faithful Presence
  5. Lecture 6-5: Living as Salt and Light

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17분

This course's readers will meet these three frameworks constantly outside a theology classroom — in public policy debates, in professional codes of ethics, in the ordinary moral vocabulary of colleagues and neighbors who have never studied Christian ethics and would not frame a question the way Lecture 1-1 or 1-2 did. This lecture takes utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics seriously on their own terms, stating what each one gets genuinely right before naming what each gets wrong, because a Christian ethicist who can only caricature these positions will be unpersuasive to anyone who actually holds one, and will also miss real insight a fair reading of each tradition offers.

The lecture closes with Alasdair MacIntyre's diagnosis, in After Virtue (1981), of why these three frameworks so often talk past each other in contemporary moral argument: MacIntyre argues that modern secular moral discourse inherited fragments of an older ethical vocabulary — "virtue," "duty," "the good" — after discarding the shared teleological framework, a common account of what a human life is for, that once made those fragments cohere into a single intelligible system. Without that shared framework, MacIntyre argues, moral arguments between different theories are not really arguments toward a shared conclusion at all, but the trading of incommensurable premises past one another. This lecture treats MacIntyre's diagnosis as a genuine strength of the chapter's overall argument: a coherent teleology — an account of what human beings are for — is exactly what Lecture 1-1 argued only theology proper can finally supply.

이 17분으로 얻는 것

  • State utilitarianism's central claim and name one genuine insight and one serious weakness in it.
  • State deontology's central claim, including Kant's categorical imperative, and name one genuine insight and one serious weakness in it.
  • State virtue ethics's central claim and name one genuine insight and one serious weakness in it.
  • Explain MacIntyre's argument that fragmented modern moral discourse results from the loss of a shared teleological framework, and connect this diagnosis back to Lecture 1-1's argument about the need for theology proper.

If I speak with the languages of men and of angels, but don't have love, I have become sounding brass, or a clanging cymbal. If I have the gift of prophecy, and know all mysteries and all knowledge; and if I have all faith, so as to remove mountains, but don't have love, I am nothing. If I dole out all my goods to feed the poor, and if I give my body to be burned, but don't have love, it profits me nothing." — 1 Corinthians 13:1-3

World English Bible

1. Utilitarianism: consequences and the shape of its insight

Utilitarianism, in its classical form associated with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, holds that an act is right to the extent that it maximizes aggregate welfare or well-being across everyone affected by it, and wrong to the extent that it fails to. Its genuine insight is not trivial: outcomes matter, and an ethical theory with nothing to say about the actual, foreseeable effects of an action on real people's welfare would be missing something Scripture itself does not ignore — the is full of attention to consequences, and Proverbs repeatedly commends actions precisely because of the good they produce and warns against actions because of the harm they bring. A Christian ethics that treated consequences as morally irrelevant, out of an overcorrection against consequentialism, would be departing from Scripture's own pattern of reasoning, not defending it.

Utilitarianism's weakness is equally real, and it is a structural weakness rather than a matter of degree. Because the theory evaluates acts solely by aggregate outcome, it has, in principle, no resource for objecting to serious harm done to an individual or a minority if that harm produces a greater aggregate benefit for the larger group — the familiar problem of justifying the sacrifice of the innocent for the many. A consistent utilitarian calculus could, in a sufficiently constructed scenario, endorse framing an innocent person for a crime to prevent a riot, or harvesting one healthy person's organs to save five dying patients, provided the aggregate welfare math worked out favorably. That most utilitarians recoil from such conclusions and add further principles to rule them out is itself telling: it suggests the theory's own internal logic does not, on its own terms, protect the individual the way an adequate ethical theory needs to.

2. Deontology: duty, respect for persons, and its besetting difficulty

Deontology, most influentially in Immanuel Kant's formulation, holds that rightness is determined by duty and adherence to rule rather than by consequences — an act is right if it conforms to a duty that could be willed as a universal law, and Kant's categorical imperative demands, among its several formulations, that persons always be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means to some other end. This is deontology's genuine insight, and it is a significant one: treating persons as ends in themselves, never as mere instruments for someone else's calculated benefit, corrects exactly the weakness utilitarianism cannot correct from within its own resources. A Christian ethicist has independent theological reason to affirm this insight, since it maps closely onto the dignity Scripture grounds in the — a dignity that does not fluctuate with a person's usefulness to an aggregate calculation.

Deontology's weakness surfaces when two duties that both seem absolute come into genuine conflict. Kant's own famous, hard case — whether it is permissible to lie to a murderer asking the location of an intended victim — exposes the difficulty starkly: if truth-telling is an exceptionless duty, deontology in its strict Kantian form has no principled way to rank it beneath the duty to protect innocent life when the two collide, and Kant himself notoriously concluded that the duty not to lie held even in that extreme case. Most deontologists since have modified the theory to allow duties to be ranked or qualified in genuine conflicts, which is itself an admission that pure rule-based reasoning, applied without remainder, produces results even committed deontologists find unacceptable.

3. Virtue ethics: character, habituation, and its limits

, retrieved from Aristotle by contemporary philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Philippa Foot, holds that rightness is a matter of character rather than of isolated acts or rules: the central question is not "what rule applies here" or "what outcome maximizes welfare," but "what would a person of genuinely excellent, habituated character do, and how does repeated right action itself form such a character over time." Its insight resonates with a great deal of Scripture's own emphasis — the wisdom literature's sustained interest in the shape of a whole life and a settled disposition, not merely in isolated rule-compliance, and Paul's own language of the describes settled character traits rather than a checklist of discrete obligatory acts.

Virtue ethics's weakness is that "excellence" or "flourishing" cannot be defined without some prior account of what a human being is actually for, and Aristotle's own account of that "for" — a rational, social, political animal aiming at a self-sufficient earthly happiness — is not obviously available to a secular virtue ethicist who has set aside the teleological metaphysics Aristotle assumed while trying to keep the ethical apparatus built on top of it. A virtue theory that cannot say, on its own terms, what a virtuous life is actually aimed at risks becoming a description of admired character traits within a given culture rather than a genuine account of human excellence as such — and which traits a given culture happens to admire is exactly the kind of question virtue ethics was supposed to settle, not presuppose.

4. 1 Corinthians 13 as an implicit critique of all three, divorced from character

Paul's language in 1 Corinthians 13:1-3, quoted above, was written to address a specific pastoral situation in Corinth, not as a philosophical intervention into later ethical theory, and this lecture does not claim otherwise. But the passage's structure is worth noticing as an implicit critique of exactly the failure mode all three secular theories risk when practiced without character: a person can perform an outwardly impressive act — eloquent speech, comprehensive knowledge, faith that moves mountains, radical self-sacrifice even to the point of giving one's body to be burned — and have it "profit me nothing" if it is not the expression of love. Rule-following without love (a deontological failure mode), calculated generosity without love (a utilitarian failure mode dressed as charity), and even heroic self-sacrifice without love, all fall under the same verdict. Paul is not offering a systematic ethical theory here, and this lecture does not force the text to be one. But the passage does supply a genuine biblical resource for the point MacIntyre will make on independent philosophical grounds below: an act's moral worth is not settled by its rule-conformity or its calculated outcome alone, but by the character — Paul's specific word is love — out of which it proceeds.

5. MacIntyre's diagnosis: fragments without a shared teleology

Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981) argues that modern secular moral discourse is in a state of disorder that its participants rarely recognize as disorder: competing theories like the three surveyed above use overlapping vocabulary — "duty," "virtue," "the good," "rights" — while having discarded the older, shared teleological framework, chiefly Aristotelian, within which those terms once formed a single coherent picture of human life aimed at a definite good. Once that shared "what humans are for" is gone, MacIntyre argues, between rival theories is no longer really argument toward a common conclusion; each theory reasons validly from its own premises, but the premises themselves are no longer shared, so disputes between a utilitarian and a deontologist tend to end in mutually unpersuasive assertion rather than genuine resolution. This lecture treats MacIntyre's diagnosis as correct as far as it goes and connects it directly to Lecture 1-1's argument: if MacIntyre is right that ethical coherence requires a shared teleology, and Lecture 1-1 is right that a coherent account of human purpose requires theology proper — an account of who made human beings and for what end — then the fragmentation MacIntyre diagnoses in secular moral philosophy is not a problem Christian ethics happens to avoid by coincidence. It is a direct consequence of Christian ethics retaining exactly the resource, a purposive Creator with a definite intention for human life, that MacIntyre argues modern secular ethics lost.


Three Theories, Each With a Genuine Insight and a Real Weakness Utilitarianism Insight: consequences and welfare matter. Weakness: can justify harm to the few for the many's benefit. Deontology Insight: persons as ends, never mere means. Weakness: no principled way to rank absolute- seeming duties in conflict. Virtue Ethics Insight: character and habituation, not just acts. Weakness: needs a prior account of what humans are for — undefined alone. MacIntyre: fragments without a shared teleology talk past each other Each theory reasons validly from its own premises — but the premises are no longer shared. A purposive Creator (Lecture 1-1) is the shared teleology MacIntyre argues secular ethics lost.

5. Going to the Sources

MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981), especially its central chapters on the "Enlightenment project" and its failure, functions here as this lecture's primary source to send readers to directly, despite not being a confessional or ancient document: it is the single modern text most responsible for popularizing the diagnosis this lecture has relied on, that fragmented modern moral vocabulary results from discarding a shared teleological framework. A reader who wants to see the argument in its original, fuller philosophical form, including MacIntyre's own proposed recovery of an Aristotelian-influenced account of tradition-constituted rationality, should read those chapters directly rather than relying on this lecture's summary of them.


핵심 요약

  • Utilitarianism (Bentham, Mill) judges acts by their overall good results. It rightly values consequences, but it can justify harming an innocent person if the total benefit is greater.
  • Deontology (Kant) judges acts by duty and treats persons as ends, never merely as means. It struggles when two seemingly absolute duties collide, such as truth-telling and protecting life.
  • Virtue ethics focuses on formed character. It fits Scripture's wisdom and fruit of the Spirit, but it needs an account of what humans are for.
  • First Corinthians 13:1-3 shows that impressive acts profit nothing without love. The lecture does not claim Paul was writing a theory.
  • MacIntyre argues modern moral debate uses fragments of an older shared framework. The lecture links this to the need for a purposive Creator.

Topic: This lecture examines utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics fairly, then presents MacIntyre's claim that modern moral argument lost its shared sense of human purpose.

Remember: Each theory sees something true and misses something. Moral worth depends on the character, in Paul's word love, out of which an act comes.

Caution: The lecture does not say Paul offered an ethical theory, and it calls MacIntyre's diagnosis correct only as far as it goes.

One line to carry into ministry: Listen for what is true in a neighbor's moral framework before you show where it falls short.

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묵상 및 토론

  • State one genuine strength and one serious weakness for each of utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, in your own words.
  • Read 1 Corinthians 13:1-3 again. In what sense is Paul's warning relevant to a person practicing any of the three secular theories surveyed in this lecture without love — even a theory, like virtue ethics, that puts character at its center?
  • Do you find MacIntyre's diagnosis — that modern moral disagreement is often not real argument, because the underlying premises are no longer shared — persuasive? Can you think of a public moral debate you have observed that fits, or does not fit, this description?

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