Lecture 3-4: Reformed Epistemology
Reformed epistemology says belief in God can be rational without an argument, as seeing a tree or trusting memory is.
Christian Apologetics
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Reformed epistemology says belief in God can be rational without an argument, as seeing a tree or trusting memory is.
Christian Apologetics
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Some beliefs are inferred from other beliefs, such as "the streets are wet, so it probably rained." Others arise directly from experience, such as seeing a tree. Philosophers call these basic beliefs. A basic belief is properly basic when a properly functioning faculty forms it reliably in the right conditions.
Belief in other minds is a favorite example, because almost no one arrives at it by argument. People simply find themselves believing it from ordinary interaction. Memory works the same way: a person trusts a clear memory of breakfast without first arguing for memory's general trustworthiness.
Plantinga builds on Calvin's sensus divinitatis, a God-given disposition of the mind and will. When it functions as designed, in circumstances such as the created world of Romans 1:19, it produces belief in God directly. A believer who finds herself believing through worship, Scripture or creation is not less rational than a philosopher who reaches the same belief by argument.
Reformed epistemology does not compete with the theistic arguments of chapter 4 so much as relativize their necessity. Those arguments can still strengthen an already-warranted belief, or help someone whose sensus divinitatis is not functioning as it should. Plantinga denies only that they are required for belief in God to be rational.
If belief in God can be properly basic without argument, what stops belief in the Great Pumpkin, or astrology, from claiming the same status? The category might become meaningless.
He separates whether a belief can be properly basic in principle from whether this belief actually is. There is no reason to think humans have a reliable Great Pumpkin faculty, unlike memory, perception or the sensus divinitatis.
Whether the reply closes the objection is debated even among philosophers sympathetic to Reformed epistemology. It requires granting, at least for the sake of argument, that Calvin's account of the sensus divinitatis is true. A skeptic has not yet accepted that premise.
They worry the model gives little to say to someone whose sensus divinitatis is not producing belief.
They share the rejection of a strict evidentialist requirement, but press their own claim that unbelief is an active suppression.
The lecture asks for an everyday belief that is not inferred from an argument.
What is one belief you hold that seems properly basic, and how is it like or unlike belief in God?
Plantinga says belief in God can be properly basic, formed directly by a properly functioning faculty, as with perception and memory. He does not say arguments are worthless, only that they are not required for rationality. His reply to the Great Pumpkin objection is still debated.