Lecture 8-1: The Logical Problem of Evil
Plantinga's free will defense answers the claim that evil makes theism self-contradictory, but it answers only the logical problem.
Christian Apologetics
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Plantinga's free will defense answers the claim that evil makes theism self-contradictory, but it answers only the logical problem.
Christian Apologetics
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The logical problem of evil claims that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with an all-powerful, all-good God. If that were true, theism would be self-contradictory, like a squared circle, and no further evidence would be needed. This lecture is careful about what it claims. Solving the logical problem does not make suffering feel less terrible, and it does not answer why this much evil, which is the subject of 8-2.
The oldest version is attributed to Epicurus and survives because Lactantius quoted it in order to answer it. It runs through exhaustive alternatives: willing but not able, able but not willing, both, or neither. It looks as though there is no fourth option. Either God lacks power, lacks goodness, or evil should not exist.
The problem is sharpened into three statements said to be jointly inconsistent. An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists. Evil exists. A wholly good, omnipotent God would eliminate evil so far as he is able. If no possible circumstance could make all three true, theism would be necessarily false. That is stronger than the evidential claim that evil makes God's existence unlikely.
To show a strict contradiction, it is not enough to show that we cannot imagine God's reason for permitting evil. One must show that no possible situation could make all three statements true. Statement (3) does hidden work, because it assumes a good, powerful being would eliminate every evil it could, with no morally relevant trade-offs. That assumption needs its own defense.
Plantinga argues that a world with significantly free creatures is more valuable, because only free creatures can love. Such freedom is genuine only if it can be exercised wrongly. So it is possible that God could not create a world with moral good but no moral evil. Plantinga calls the further claim transworld depravity. This is not because God's power is limited, but because free creatures who never do wrong may not be a coherent object of creation.
It attempts to say what God's actual reason for permitting evil is.
It attempts only to show that theism is not logically self-contradictory, by describing a scenario that is merely possible. The scenario need not be true or even probable.
William Rowe wrote that most philosophers now recognize it is a mistake to say evil is logically inconsistent with theism. J. L. Mackie, a sharp defender of the logical problem, later conceded in The Miracle of Theism (1982) that the free will defense succeeds. What is granted is narrow: the combination is possible. Theism is not thereby shown probable, and the evidential question remains for 8-2.
The lecture says this verse is easy to misuse. It does not say every evil is good, or that its purpose will always be visible. Read in context, it is closer to a promise that evil will not have the final word.
We know that all things work together for good for those who love God, to those who are called according to his purpose. Romans 8:28
A defense needs only a possible scenario to show that God and evil are not logically contradictory. It does not claim to know God's actual reasons. Only the logical problem is answered, and the harder question of how much evil there is remains open.