Lecture 8-2: The Evidential Problem of Evil
Rowe's evidential argument is about probability, and skeptical theism and soul-making theodicy are two live Christian replies.
Christian Apologetics
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Rowe's evidential argument is about probability, and skeptical theism and soul-making theodicy are two live Christian replies.
Christian Apologetics
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8-1 showed that evil does not make God's existence impossible. The harder question is whether theism is still probable given the specific evil we observe. That includes suffering that seems purposeless, falls on the innocent, or is prolonged. William Rowe's 1979 argument grants the logical point and moves the objection onto this different ground.
Rowe's premise is that some intense suffering could be prevented without losing a greater good. His illustration is a fawn badly burned in a natural forest fire, lying in agony for days, unseen by anyone. He does not claim to prove this suffering served no purpose. His claim is that such cases make it reasonable to believe that some suffering is gratuitous, which counts as evidence against theism.
Rowe did not regard his own argument as a proof of atheism. Later in his career he described his position as "friendly atheism," the view that a theist can hold belief rationally even while he believes the evidence weighs against it. The lecture says this signals the kind of argument it is: cumulative and probabilistic, not a knockdown proof like a logical contradiction.
Stephen Wykstra and William Alston developed skeptical theism. Wykstra's "noseeum" argument says that failing to see a reason is evidence there is none only if we would likely discern such a reason. Given the gap between an infinite mind and a finite one, we have little reason to expect that we would. The lecture compares this to a child who cannot see why a parent forbids something.
The standard criticism is pressed within Christian philosophy itself. If our moral perception is so unreliable about God's reasons, what confidence can we have in other moral judgments about what God would do? That includes the judgments that call God good in the first place. Skeptical theists reply by distinguishing our grasp of broad moral categories from our grasp of God's specific reasons.
John Hick offers a positive candidate reason, drawing on Irenaeus. A world with no real risk or cost attached to virtue could produce only a shallow, untested goodness. Soul-making requires distance from God, so that faith is a real act, and genuine hardship, so that virtue is exercised. Its objections are suffering that seems to destroy rather than build, and the scale and uneven spread of suffering.
Its strength is philosophical modesty. Its weakness is the worry that the same modesty undercuts other things we affirm about God's character.
Its strength is a positive account that a suffering person can be told. Its weakness is that it strains against suffering that looks like destruction.
When God answers Job in Job 38:1-4, the answer is a series of questions about the gap between Job's vantage point and God's, not a theodicy. Job is never told why he suffered, yet the book says he "spoke rightly" of God, and it commends honest lament over confident explanation. Isaiah 55:8-9 names a structural gap between infinite and finite understanding. The lecture says it is not a blank check to dismiss hard questions with "God's ways are mysterious."
The evidential problem is about probability, not contradiction. Thoughtful Christian philosophers disagree on whether to answer it by admitting what we cannot see or by naming a possible purpose. The lecture does not pick a winner between skeptical theism and soul-making theodicy.