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BT610E Reading Ruth in Hebrew

Lecture 4-2: The Sandal, the Custom, and a Debated Law

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16 min

Right at the hinge of the book's legal climax, the narrator stops the story to explain a custom to the reader: "this was the custom in former time in Israel... to confirm all things: a man took off his shoe, and gave it to his neighbor." No other scene in Ruth pauses to explain itself this way. That pause is this lecture's first subject — what it tells us about when and for whom the book was written. Its second subject is harder, and the book gives no aside to help with it: exactly what law is being enacted when Boaz "redeems" Ruth along with the land, given that the levirate law of Deuteronomy 25 and the redemption law of Leviticus 25 are, on paper, two different institutions, neither of which quite matches what happens at this gate. This is the point of real, ongoing scholarly disagreement this course promised to give a fair hearing, and this lecture is where that hearing happens.

What these 16 minutes give you

  • Explain the sandal-removal custom of 4:7-8 as a legal symbol of transferred right, and state what the narrator's own explanatory aside suggests about the book's distance from the events it narrates.
  • State, fairly and without resolving it, the scholarly disagreement over how Ruth's redemption relates to Deuteronomy 25's levirate law and Leviticus 25's land-redemption law.
  • Identify the specific textual basis each side of that disagreement actually leans on, rather than only which conclusion each side holds.
  • Explain why no single reading of the go'el/levirate relationship is required to understand what happens in the rest of the chapter.

Now this was the custom in former time in Israel concerning redeeming and concerning exchanging, to confirm all things: a man took off his shoe, and gave it to his neighbor; and this was the way of attestation in Israel. So the near kinsman said to Boaz, "Buy it for yourself." He took off his shoe. — Ruth 4:7-8

World English Bible

1. A custom that needs explaining

וְזֹאת֩ לְפָנִ֨ים בְּיִשְׂרָאֵ֜ל עַל־הַגְּאוּלָּ֤ה וְעַל־הַתְּמוּרָה֙ לְקַיֵּ֣ם כָּל־דָּבָ֔ר נַעֲל֖וֹ וְנָתַ֣ן לְרֵעֵ֑הוּ

wə-zot lə-fanim bə-yisra'el... shalaf ish na'alo wə-natan lə-re'ehu — "and this [was] formerly in Israel... a man drew off his sandal and gave it to his companion"

(Hebrew text: Westminster Leningrad Codex (WLC), public domain.)

Notice what this sentence is doing before it tells you anything about sandals: it announces itself as an explanation. "This was the custom in former time" (לְפָנִים, lə-fanim, "formerly, in earlier days") is the narrator stepping fully outside the scene to address the reader directly — something Ruth does nowhere else in its eighty-five verses. A custom only needs this kind of explanation for an audience that no longer takes it for granted. If the book's earliest readers had watched their own fathers or grandfathers confirm a transaction this way, the aside would be unnecessary; the scene could simply narrate the sandal coming off and trust the reader to know exactly what that meant, the way it trusts the reader to know what a threshing floor is for in chapter 3 without explanation.

This is one of several arguments scholars use for dating the book's final written form later than the events it describes — commonly placed in the period of the Judges by the book's own opening verse (1:1), but written down, on this reasoning, at some real distance from that period, possibly as late as the monarchy or after. It is worth being precise about what this argument can and cannot carry on its own: a narrator explaining an obsolete custom shows only that some time had passed between the custom's living use and the book's composition — it does not by itself fix how much time, and other arguments for Ruth's date (its classical Hebrew style, its interest in David's ancestry, its placement in different positions in different ancient canons) point in more than one direction and are argued independently. Treat the sandal aside as one genuine piece of evidence in a larger, still-open question about the book's date, not as a conclusion on its own.

2. What the sandal does, legally

The mechanics are simple and the meaning is not obscure: the kinsman who declines his right removes his own sandal and hands it to Boaz, a physical, witnessed gesture that transfers — or, more precisely, publicly confirms the transfer of — the right of redemption from one man to the other. Whatever the sandal's deeper symbolic resonance (a claim to "walking on" land one now owns is one common suggestion, though the text does not spell out the symbolism any more than it explains why a sandal specifically, rather than some other object, carries this meaning), its function in the scene is unambiguous: it is the tangible act that makes an oral agreement legally binding and publicly undeniable, performing for an oral culture roughly what a signed document performs for a literate one. That the narrator has to explain it at all is itself the clue that later readers no longer had access to what the transaction's original witnesses could simply see.

3. This is a point where readers will not agree.

The harder question is not the sandal. It is the redemption itself. Deuteronomy 25:5-10 sets out Israel's levirate law in narrow terms: when brothers live together, and one dies childless, the surviving brother is to marry the widow, and the son of that marriage carries the dead brother's name forward. Leviticus 25:25-34 sets out a separate law: a kinsman-redeemer, go'el, has the right and, in some readings, the duty to buy back land a poor relative has had to sell, keeping the property within the family line. These are two different problems with two different solutions in the 's own text — one about an heir, one about land — and neither law, read narrowly, quite describes what happens in Ruth 4. Boaz is not Elimelech's brother; Deuteronomy 25's law, on its plain wording, does not apply to him at all. And Leviticus 25's redemption law says nothing about marrying the widow of the man whose land is being redeemed; it is a law about property, not about heirs.

Yet the scene plainly draws on both traditions at once: land is being redeemed (Leviticus's vocabulary and mechanism), and a marriage is happening explicitly "to raise up the name of the dead on his inheritance" (4:5, 4:10 — Deuteronomy's stated purpose, in Deuteronomy's own words, for the levirate marriage). Scholars who have worked closely on this passage do not agree on how to explain the overlap, and the disagreement runs along two real, defensible lines rather than one side simply being careless with the text.

One position treats land-redemption and levirate marriage as genuinely separate legal institutions in Israel's law that Ruth's narrative deliberately blends, or extends by custom, into a single combined transaction not spelled out as such anywhere in the Torah itself. On this reading, the book is showing a real Israelite family solving a real problem — an heirless, landless widow with no surviving brother-in-law to fulfill Deuteronomy's letter — by drawing analogically on two related bodies of law and custom that shared an underlying concern (keeping a dead man's name and inheritance alive within Israel) even though their written provisions did not, strictly, overlap. Ruth 4, on this account, is evidence of legal creativity within an inherited framework, not evidence that Deuteronomy 25 and Leviticus 25 were somehow always understood as one law.

A second position argues the opposite direction: that Israel's actual, lived legal practice was broader and more flexible than the narrow cases the written Torah happens to preserve, and that go'el obligations in practice regularly extended past land alone to cover a wider family responsibility, including marriage to a widow left without an heir, whether or not a surviving brother was technically available. On this reading, Ruth 4 is not the narrative bending or extending the law; it is ordinary legal custom, simply not fully documented elsewhere in the biblical text we happen to have. The written law codes, on this view, were never meant to be a complete record of every family-redemption custom Israel actually practiced — a gap this book, almost by accident, happens to fill in.

Both positions take the same textual evidence seriously: the genuine gap between Deuteronomy 25's narrow "brothers living together" case and Boaz's actual relationship to Elimelech; the genuine overlap between redemption vocabulary and levirate purpose in Boaz's own words at 4:5 and 4:10; and the fact that neither Deuteronomy nor Leviticus, read on its own, fully accounts for what the elders and the whole town at the gate treat, without objection, as an entirely legitimate transaction. Neither side is reading carelessly; they weigh the same gap differently — one as the narrative's own creative extension of the law, the other as evidence the law itself was broader in practice than its surviving written form suggests. No quiz question in this course requires you to decide between them.

Two Laws, One Transaction — a Disputed Fit Deuteronomy 25:5-10 Levirate law: a surviving brother living with the deceased marries the widow. Solves: no heir. Boaz is not Elimelech's brother. Leviticus 25:25-34 Redemption law: a go'el buys back a relative's sold land. Solves: land leaving the family. Says nothing about marrying a widow. Ruth 4 does both at once — land redeemed, marriage made, an heir named. This is a point where readers will not agree Reading A: two separate institutions, deliberately blended or extended by custom in the narrative — not one law, but a creative combination for a case the law did not cover. Reading B: Israel's lived legal practice was broader than the surviving written law — go'el duty regularly included marriage; Ruth 4 preserves practice, not an exception to it.

6. Try It Yourself

Reread Deuteronomy 25:5-10 (not printed in this lecture — look it up) and then reread Boaz's own words in Ruth 4:5 and 4:10. Try to state, in one or two sentences, the specific gap between what Deuteronomy 25 requires and what Boaz's actual family relationship to Elimelech is.

Check your answer

Deuteronomy 25:5 opens with a specific condition: "If brothers dwell together, and one of them dies, and has no son..." — the law is written for a surviving brother of the deceased, living in the same household. Boaz, so far as the text tells us, is a more distant relative of Elimelech (identified only as "our brother" in the loose, extended sense of clan kinship at 4:3, the same way "brother" is used of kinsmen generally elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible) — not Elimelech's actual brother, and not living with him. On the narrowest, most literal reading of Deuteronomy 25:5, its levirate obligation simply does not apply to Boaz at all. That gap — a real kinsman-redeemer acting in a role the levirate law, read narrowly, reserves for an actual brother — is exactly the textual fact both positions in section 3 are trying to account for, from two different directions.

In short

  • In 4:7-8 the narrator pauses to explain that a man once confirmed a deal by handing over his sandal. Explaining a custom suggests it was no longer practiced when the book was written.
  • That aside is one piece of evidence about the book's date, not a conclusion. Other arguments about date point in more than one direction.
  • The sandal was a physical, witnessed act that made an oral agreement binding, doing the work a signed document does today.
  • Deuteronomy 25 (levirate law, about an heir) and Leviticus 25 (land redemption, about property) are separate, and neither quite fits Boaz, who is not Elimelech's brother.
  • Scholars disagree. One view says Ruth blends two laws creatively. The other says real practice was broader than the written codes. No quiz requires you to choose.

Topic: The sandal custom of Ruth 4:7-8 and the scholarly debate over how Ruth's redemption relates to the levirate and land-redemption laws.

Remember: Both scholarly positions weigh the same evidence: the gap between Deuteronomy 25 and Boaz's actual kinship, and the overlap of redemption and levirate purpose.

Caution: Neither side is reading carelessly, and the sandal aside alone does not fix the book's date.

One line to carry into ministry: When trusted readers disagree about a law or a custom, teach both positions honestly and do not claim a certainty the evidence lacks.

Review every summary in this course →

Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • The narrator explains the sandal custom but never explains how redeeming land and marrying a widow fit together legally. Why might the book explain one gap in its readers' knowledge and simply narrate through the other?
  • Section 3 presents two positions without choosing between them. Which position did you find yourself drawn to, and can you now state the *other* position's strongest textual support without characterizing it unfairly?
  • If Israel's actual legal custom really was broader than what Deuteronomy and Leviticus preserve in writing, what does that suggest about how much of ordinary ancient Israelite life the Torah's law codes were ever meant to cover?

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What next

Definitions: Strong’s Concordance (1890/1894, public domain) · Morphology: MorphGNT/SBLGNT (CC BY-SA), Open Scriptures morphhb/WLC (CC BY 4.0)

The lecture ends here. What follows was written by its readers.