Lecture 2-2: Three Classical Views of the Image — Substantive, Relational, Functional
Contents 30
- Lecture 1-1: Anthropology in a Postmodern, Transhuman Age
- Lecture 1-2: Two Accounts, One Creation — Genesis 1 and Genesis 2
- Lecture 1-3: Origins, Evolution, and the Unity of the Human Race
- Lecture 1-4: The Historical Adam and Federal Headship
- Lecture 1-5: Creature, Not Creator — Dominion Rightly Understood
- Lecture 2-1: The Image of God — Biblical Foundation and Historical Development
- Lecture 2-2: Three Classical Views of the Image — Substantive, Relational, Functional
- Lecture 2-3: Christ as the True Image of God
- Lecture 2-4: The Image in the Fall and in Redemption
- Lecture 2-5: The Image of God in Bioethics and Disability Theology
- Lecture 2-6: Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, and the Image of God
- Lecture 3-1: Body and Soul — the Biblical Picture Against Its Rival
- Lecture 3-2: Is There a Soul at All? Physicalism and the Challenge of Neuroscience
- Lecture 3-3: Two Parts or Three? Dichotomy and Trichotomy
- Lecture 3-4: Where Does a Soul Come From? Pre-Existentianism, Creationism, and Traducianism
- Lecture 3-5: A Whole Person, Not a Soul in a Vehicle
- Lecture 3-6: The Intermediate State — What Happens Between Death and Resurrection?
- Lecture 4-1: Male and Female He Created Them
- Lecture 4-2: Marriage, Family, and the Question of a Trinitarian Analogy
- Lecture 4-3: The Gender Roles Debate — Complementarianism and Egalitarianism
- Lecture 4-4: Humanity as Social Beings and the Cultural Mandate
- Lecture 4-5: Work, Rest, and the Theology of the Sabbath
- Lecture 4-6: Contemporary Gender Discourse and Queer Theology
Lecture 2-1 showed that the church's greatest theologians have circled Genesis 1:26-27 for fifteen centuries without settling on one technical account of what the image positively is. This lecture organizes that history into the three answers systematic theology has actually given — not as a survey for its own sake, but because each answer, taken alone, explains some of the biblical evidence brilliantly and struggles with the rest, which is exactly the argument for treating all three together as this course will recommend by the end of the lecture.
Briefly stated: the substantive view says the image is something a human being has — a capacity or a set of capacities, most often reason or an immortal soul. The relational view says the image is not a possession at all but a relationship — with God, and derivatively with other human beings. The functional view (also called the "royal" or "vice-regent" reading) says the image is a role — humanity's commissioned position as God's representative ruler over creation, the reading Genesis 1:26's own grammar most directly supports, as Lecture 2-1 already noted. This lecture is written at full length: each view needs its own textual case, its best contemporary defenders, and an honest account of what it cannot explain on its own before the lecture can responsibly argue for holding all three together.
What these 21 minutes give you
- State the substantive view of the image, its typical textual support, and its principal historical and contemporary weakness.
- State the relational view of the image, associated significantly with twentieth-century theology, and its principal weakness.
- State the functional/royal view, its strong support in Genesis 1's own grammar and ancient Near Eastern background, and its principal weakness.
- Explain why this lecture argues the three views are better held together as complementary aspects of one doctrine than treated as mutually exclusive options to choose between.
- Apply this synthesis, at least provisionally, to a case the substantive view alone would struggle to answer.
God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the sky, and over the livestock, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.' ... God created man in his own image. In God's image he created him; male and female he created them." — Genesis 1:26-27
World English Bible
Notice how the single sentence contains material each of the three views below will claim as its own strongest evidence: "in our image" (which the substantive view reads as naming an internal endowment), "male and female he created them" (which the relational view reads as built-in sociality, humanity never created solitary), and "let them have dominion" (which the functional view reads as the image's actual content). This lecture's core argument is that the text does not force a choice among these three readings — it simply states them in the same breath, the way it stated "image" and "male and female" together in Lecture 2-1's observation.
1. The substantive view: the image as capacity
The oldest and, historically, most dominant view holds that the image consists in some property or set of properties a human being possesses — classically, reason (following a broadly Aristotelian anthropology absorbed into Christian theology through Aquinas), or, in some Christian Platonist strands, an immortal, rational soul as such. On this view, to bear the image is to have the kind of nature — rational, morally responsible, capable of abstract thought and self-reflection — that sets humanity apart from the rest of the animal creation. Thomas Aquinas, in the Summa Theologiae (Ia, q.93), gives the classical high-medieval statement: the image is found "chiefly in the mind," specifically in the intellectual nature that makes a human being capable of knowing and loving God, with the body participating only derivatively, insofar as its form is suited to serve that rational soul.
The substantive view's strength is considerable: it makes obvious sense of why humanity, and not the animals also made by God, is singled out as image-bearing in Genesis 1 — animals plainly do not reason, deliberate, or exercise moral responsibility in the way humans do, at least not in the same degree or kind. It also gives a clean answer to why the image survives death and the loss of the body (relevant to Chapter 3's discussion of the ): if the image is chiefly a property of the rational soul, the soul's survival is sufficient for the image's survival.
Its weakness, however, is exactly the weakness Lecture 2-5 will make the center of an entire lecture: if the image is a capacity — reason, self-awareness, moral agency — then it appears, on a strict reading, to come in degrees, to be absent in the unborn or the person in a persistent vegetative state, and to be diminished by cognitive disability. A substantive account that is not carefully qualified risks implying gradations of image-bearing that Genesis 9:6 gives no warrant for; that verse's force depends on every human being, without qualification, bearing the image sufficiently for their killing to be an offense against it. This course does not reject the substantive view — reason and moral capacity are real and important features of human nature the tradition was right to notice — but flags this weakness now so that Lecture 2-5 is not introducing a new problem, only returning to one this lecture has already named.
2. The relational view: the image as relationship
A significant twentieth-century development, associated above all with Karl Barth (whom Lecture 2-3 treats in more depth on a related but distinct point) and Emil Brunner, relocated the image away from a static internal property and into relationship itself. On this reading, "let us make man in our image... male and female he created them" is not two unrelated statements placed side by side by editorial accident; the is the argument. To bear the image is, most basically, to exist in relationship — with God, who addresses humanity and is addressed in turn, and with other human beings, beginning with the male-female relationship Genesis 1:27 names in the same sentence. Barth's technical term for this is the analogia relationis (analogy of relation): just as the persons of the exist in relationship with one another (a point this course assumes from ST1), so humanity, made in that God's image, is essentially, not accidentally, relational — a solitary human being, on this view, would be a contradiction of what "" means, not merely an unfortunate or lonely one.
The relational view's strength is that it takes seriously what Lecture 2-1 already flagged: Genesis 1:27's grammatical parallel between image and "male and female," and it resists the substantive view's tendency to locate humanity's worth in an isolated internal faculty that a person could, in principle, possess or exercise entirely alone. It also coheres naturally with the doctrine of the Trinity established in ST1 — a relational God whose image-bearers are themselves essentially relational is a tidier picture than a solitary abstract capacity borrowed from an otherwise unrelated deity.
Its weakness is that it risks making the image disappear, or at least become unstable, for a person who is, for whatever reason, isolated from human relationship — profound social isolation, certain forms of severe autism, or simply a person alone on a desert island — none of whom plausibly lose the image of God by virtue of their isolation. A relational account, like the substantive account, needs careful qualification: the capacity for relationship, or perhaps more precisely humanity's createdness-for relationship as a permanent feature of the kind of being a human is, rather than an actually and currently exercised relationship, is probably what the doctrine needs to say to avoid this problem — which is itself already a move toward treating "relational" as one aspect of a status rather than a moment-to-moment achievement.
3. The functional view: the image as royal role
The reading with the strongest direct support from Genesis 1's own grammar and its ancient Near Eastern background (introduced in Lecture 2-1) holds that the image simply is humanity's commissioned role: to represent God's rule over creation as God's vice-regents, exercising the "dominion" verse 26 names in the same sentence as "image." This reading has been argued forcefully by a number of recent Old Testament scholars — J. Richard Middleton's The Liberating Image (2005) is probably the fullest single contemporary defense — who point out that the ancient Near Eastern texts that used "image of god" language before Genesis did so almost exclusively of kings, set up as living statues to represent the god's authority and presence in a place the god himself was not bodily present. On this reading, Genesis 1 is a genuinely radical, almost democratizing move: it takes language that, everywhere else in the ancient world, applied to one man on a throne, and applies it to the whole human race.
The functional view's strength is that it best explains why "dominion" appears in the very same sentence as "image" in verse 26 — on this reading, that is not incidental context but the content of the doctrine itself. It also, like the relational view, avoids grounding dignity in an internal capacity that could vary between individuals: a royal commission is a status conferred by the one who commissions, not a property that could be more or less present in the commissioned party.
Its weakness is that a role can, in principle, be revoked, delegated away, or simply not exercised — an infant does not yet exercise dominion over anything, and neither does an elderly person in the final stage of dementia, yet neither has lost the image on any view this course wants to defend. If the image simply is the exercised role, the same problem the substantive view faced returns in a different form. The more careful functional theologians (Middleton among them) therefore tend to speak of the image as a permanent commissioned status — a standing appointment that does not depend on moment-to-moment exercise, comparable to how a king remains a king while asleep — which again pushes the doctrine toward something more like the synthesis this lecture is about to propose.
4. Toward a synthesis, not a choice
Notice the pattern: each of the three views, examined carefully, is pushed by its own best defenders away from "a capacity/relationship/role you currently have or exercise" and toward "a status conferred by God at creation that does not fluctuate with what you can currently do." That convergence is not an accident this course is imposing from outside; it is what happens when each view is pressed hard enough to answer Genesis 9:6's demand that the image ground dignity in someone who, at the moment the verse addresses, has had all of their capacities and relationships and functioning permanently ended by violence.
This course's own position, then, is not "pick the right one of the three" but this: the image of God names an entire way of being human, conferred as a status at creation, of which rational and moral capacity (substantive), essential relationality (relational), and a commissioned role over creation (functional) are three true and complementary descriptions, not three competing candidates for the single correct definition. Genesis 1:26-27 itself, read carefully, gives warrant for all three in a single sentence rather than favoring one over the others. This is a point where readers will not agree — a theologian working strictly within the substantive tradition (much of historic Catholic moral theology, for instance, still leans heavily on rational nature as the ground of dignity) may regard this synthesis as blurring a distinction their tradition has worked hard to keep precise, and a theologian committed to Middleton's functional reading as programmatically correct may regard folding in the substantive and relational elements as diluting the force of the "royal" reading's own argument. This course's synthesis is offered as this course's own constructive judgment, not as the only position a serious theologian in any of these traditions could hold.
5. A test case for the synthesis
Consider a human being in the final stage of Alzheimer's disease — reason substantially gone, incapable of recognizing family members or exercising anything resembling dominion over creation, and often withdrawn from relational engagement in ways that can look, to an observer, like the relational capacity itself has failed. A strict substantive account, pressed to its logical edge, would need real theological work to explain why this person still bears the image in the full sense Genesis 9:6 requires; the same is true, in different ways, of a strict relational or strict functional account pressed equally hard. The synthesis this lecture proposes answers more simply: this person was created, at conception, with a permanent, unrevoked status as God's image-bearer, and that status was never contingent on the reasoning, relating, or ruling remaining continuously exercised across a whole lifespan. Lecture 2-5 returns to exactly this kind of case, at much greater length and with named theological interlocutors, when it takes up bioethics and disability theology directly — this lecture has deliberately previewed the conclusion in miniature so that lecture does not need to build its basic theological grammar from nothing.
5. Going to the Sources
- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, question 93 ("The End or Term of the Production of Man") — the classical substantive statement, widely available in English translation online through the Dominican House of Studies' Summa project.
- J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Brazos Press, 2005) — the fullest contemporary defense of the functional/royal reading, including the ancient Near Eastern comparative material this lecture summarizes.
- Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III/1, §41.2, "Man as the Creature of God" — the primary text for the relational reading and the analogia relationis; dense but directly on point.
In short
- The substantive view says the image is something humans have, such as reason or a rational soul (Aquinas). Its weakness is that capacities vary, which could imply degrees of image-bearing.
- The relational view, linked to Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, says the image is relationship with God and others, like "male and female." Its weakness is that isolated people do not lose the image.
- The functional view says the image is humanity's royal role as God's vice-regents (J. Richard Middleton). Its weakness is that infants and people with dementia do not exercise dominion.
- Each view's best defenders move toward a permanent status conferred by God at creation, not a currently exercised capacity, relationship or role.
- The course holds the three together as complementary descriptions of one conferred status. Some Catholic and some functional-view theologians may disagree, and the lecture says so.
Topic: This lecture presents the substantive, relational and functional views of the image of God, and argues they are better held together than chosen between.
Remember: The image is a status God confers at creation, and reason, relationship and role are three true descriptions of it, none depending on present exercise.
Caution: The synthesis is the course's own judgment, not the only position a serious theologian could hold, and the lecture says so plainly.
One line to carry into ministry: A person's worth does not rise or fall with their abilities, even in the last stage of Alzheimer's disease.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Which of the three classical views did you, before this lecture, assume was simply "what the image of God means"? What in your own theological formation likely produced that assumption?
- This lecture argues each of the three views, pressed hard enough by its own best defenders, converges toward describing a *permanent status* rather than a *currently exercised property*. Restate that convergence in your own words, using one of the three views as your example.
- Consider a newborn infant, only minutes old. Walk through what the substantive, relational, and functional views would each say, on their own, about whether this infant fully bears the image of God — and then state what this lecture's synthesis says instead.