FREE

Course certificates are free until March 31, 2027.

ST3E Systematic Theology III: Anthropology

Lecture 2-6: Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, and the Image of God

View as cards (3 min)
Contents 30
ST3E Systematic Theology III: Anthropology
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What Anthropology Is, and Why It Comes Third
  1. Introduction: What Anthropology Is, and Why It Comes Third
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Introduction to Anthropology and the Origin of Humanity
  1. Lecture 1-1: Anthropology in a Postmodern, Transhuman Age
  2. Lecture 1-2: Two Accounts, One Creation — Genesis 1 and Genesis 2
  3. Lecture 1-3: Origins, Evolution, and the Unity of the Human Race
  4. Lecture 1-4: The Historical Adam and Federal Headship
  5. Lecture 1-5: Creature, Not Creator — Dominion Rightly Understood
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: The Image of God (Imago Dei)
  1. Lecture 2-1: The Image of God — Biblical Foundation and Historical Development
  2. Lecture 2-2: Three Classical Views of the Image — Substantive, Relational, Functional
  3. Lecture 2-3: Christ as the True Image of God
  4. Lecture 2-4: The Image in the Fall and in Redemption
  5. Lecture 2-5: The Image of God in Bioethics and Disability Theology
  6. Lecture 2-6: Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, and the Image of God
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: The Constitution of the Human Person
  1. Lecture 3-1: Body and Soul — the Biblical Picture Against Its Rival
  2. Lecture 3-2: Is There a Soul at All? Physicalism and the Challenge of Neuroscience
  3. Lecture 3-3: Two Parts or Three? Dichotomy and Trichotomy
  4. Lecture 3-4: Where Does a Soul Come From? Pre-Existentianism, Creationism, and Traducianism
  5. Lecture 3-5: A Whole Person, Not a Soul in a Vehicle
  6. Lecture 3-6: The Intermediate State — What Happens Between Death and Resurrection?
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: Humanity as Relational and Social Beings
  1. Lecture 4-1: Male and Female He Created Them
  2. Lecture 4-2: Marriage, Family, and the Question of a Trinitarian Analogy
  3. Lecture 4-3: The Gender Roles Debate — Complementarianism and Egalitarianism
  4. Lecture 4-4: Humanity as Social Beings and the Cultural Mandate
  5. Lecture 4-5: Work, Rest, and the Theology of the Sabbath
  6. Lecture 4-6: Contemporary Gender Discourse and Queer Theology
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: The Covenant of Works and Humanity's Ultimate Purpose
  1. Lecture 5-1: Adam's Original Righteousness
  2. Lecture 5-2: The Covenant of Works
  3. Lecture 5-3: Adam's Free Will Before the Fall
  4. Lecture 5-4: The Origin of Sin and the Mechanism of the Fall
  5. Lecture 5-5: Humanity's Ultimate Purpose
  6. Lecture 5-6: An Eschatological View of Humanity

Jump to the key points ↓

19 min

Every earlier lecture in this chapter has tested the doctrine of the image against a human being whose capacities are diminished, not yet developed, or gone. This lecture tests it from the opposite direction: a machine whose measurable capacities — the specific things a substantive account of the image, examined critically in Lecture 2-2, has historically pointed to — may eventually equal or exceed a human being's, at least on some narrow, measurable tasks, while nothing else about the machine plausibly qualifies as image-bearing in the sense this chapter has developed. If reason or problem-solving capacity alone were sufficient for the image, an advanced enough artificial intelligence would have a claim to it; this lecture argues that possibility is exactly the reductio that shows why this chapter's whole argument — that the image is a relational, embodied, addressed status, not a raw capacity — was right for reasons beyond the disability cases of Lecture 2-5.

This lecture's second half engages transhumanism directly, primarily through the popularizing work of Ray Kurzweil, not as a fringe curiosity but as what this lecture will argue is a genuinely coherent rival eschatology — an account of human hope, salvation from limitation, and even a kind of resurrection, built without reference to God, and taken with full theological seriousness rather than dismissed as merely science fiction.

What these 19 minutes give you

  • State what, theologically, would and would not count as evidence that a machine bears the image of God, applying this chapter's relational, functional, and Christocentric material (2-2, 2-3) rather than a bare capacity test.
  • Explain why passing a test of intelligent behavior (such as a Turing-style test) is not, by this course's own synthesis, sufficient grounds for concluding a machine bears the image.
  • State Kurzweil's transhumanist vision in its own terms, including what it proposes as salvation and what it takes as sufficient for personal continuity.
  • Compare the transhumanist and Christian accounts of overcoming human limitation, identifying the specific theological point where they diverge.

for God knows that in the day you eat it, your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil." — Genesis 3:5

World English Bible

This is the serpent's own promise to Eve, not a neutral description — and its structure repays close attention for this lecture's purposes. The temptation is not "you will become a different kind of being"; it is "you will become like God" while remaining exactly what you already are, by seizing something (moral autonomy, "knowing good and evil" on your own authority) that was not given but taken. The serpent's proposal is the oldest version of a shape this lecture will trace again in Kurzweil's own project: transcendence of a limitation by human effort and technique, on human authority, rather than by gift.

1. What would count as a machine bearing the image?

Apply this chapter's own synthesis directly, rather than starting the question from scratch. Lecture 2-2 argued that the image is best understood as a permanent status conferred by God at creation, of which reason, relationship, and dominion are true but non-exhaustive descriptions; Lecture 2-3 located the image's fullest, undistorted instance in Christ, whose relational, incarnate, addressed existence — not merely his intelligence — was central to what "true image" meant; Lecture 2-5 argued, against a purely capacity-based reading, that being addressed and loved, not measured cognitive output, is closer to the doctrine's actual ground. Put these together and a machine's performance on tasks requiring reasoning, language generation, or problem-solving — however impressive, and current systems are already, by some measures, impressive — is simply not the kind of evidence this doctrine treats as decisive, because the doctrine was never, on this chapter's own account, fundamentally about that kind of capacity in the first place.

What, then, would actually bear on the question? This course suggests four criteria, each drawn directly from earlier material in this chapter rather than invented freshly for this lecture. Relationality: not merely processing input and producing responsive output (which a sufficiently advanced chatbot already does), but the kind of relationship Lecture 2-2's relational view and Lecture 2-5's Reinders both pointed to — a genuine capacity to be addressed by another as a "thou," in something like the sense Genesis 2:18-23 describes Adam recognizing Eve as "bone of my bones," not merely an interlocutor exchanging tokens. Moral agency: genuine responsibility for one's choices before God, of the kind Genesis 2:16-17's command to Adam presupposes — not merely a system trained to avoid outputs its designers labeled undesirable, which is optimization, not moral agency in the theologically relevant sense. Embodiment: this course's own working assumption, following Chapter 3's fuller argument (previewed here, developed there) that embodiment is not incidental to human nature but part of what being human, as created, actually is — a disembodied intelligence, however sophisticated, lacks the specific kind of creaturely existence Genesis 2:7's "dust... and breath" describes. Being addressed by God: the sharpest and most theologically loaded criterion — Scripture never depicts God addressing, commanding, covenanting with, or holding accountable anything other than human beings (and angelic beings, a separate category this course does not take up) among creation; nothing in Scripture suggests this could, or should, be expected to extend to a designed artifact, however capable.

An unqualified universal claim is a defect this course must avoid here specifically: this course does not claim to know with certainty that no possible future artificial system could ever meet these criteria, particularly the first three — that is a claim about the limits of technology this course, as a work of theology rather than computer science or philosophy of mind, is not equipped to make with confidence. What this course does claim is narrower and more defensible: current and foreseeable systems, built as statistical pattern-generators optimizing a training objective, do not meet these criteria on any plausible reading of what they are actually doing, and impressive linguistic output is not, by itself, evidence that they do.

2. Why a Turing-style test is not theologically decisive

Alan Turing's famous 1950 proposal — that a machine could be judged intelligent if a human interlocutor could not reliably distinguish its responses from a human's — is a test of behavioral indistinguishability, not of the four criteria above. A system could, in principle, pass such a test perfectly while having no relational capacity to be addressed as a "thou" rather than manipulated as an "it" (Martin Buber's I-Thou/I-It distinction is directly relevant here, though this course does not develop Buber's own philosophy further), no moral agency beyond optimized output, no embodiment, and certainly no standing as an addressee of God's own covenantal speech. This course's point is not that such a test is worthless for its own, narrower purpose (assessing linguistic and behavioral sophistication) — only that it was never designed to, and cannot, answer this chapter's actual question, and treating it as though it could is a category error this course wants its readers equipped to name.

3. Ray Kurzweil and transhumanism as a rival eschatology

Ray Kurzweil, an inventor and futurist, has become transhumanism's most widely read popularizer, particularly through The Age of Spiritual Machines (1999) and The Singularity Is Near (2005). His core claim is that technological progress, particularly in computing power, is accelerating exponentially rather than linearly, and will reach a "singularity" — a point at which artificial intelligence exceeds human intelligence so thoroughly, and so rapidly compounds its own further improvement, that the resulting transformation of human life becomes almost impossible to predict from the near side of it. Kurzweil's own hoped-for outcomes from this transformation include the effective conquest of biological aging and death (through nanotechnology-assisted repair of the body, and eventually the possibility of "uploading" human consciousness onto non-biological substrates that would not decay the way a biological brain does), and a merger of human and machine intelligence that Kurzweil frames, in explicitly hopeful and even religious-sounding language, as humanity's next evolutionary stage rather than its replacement.

This deserves to be engaged, per this chapter's own opening claim, as a serious rival eschatology, not dismissed as science fiction (stating the strongest form of an opposing position applies here as much as in any pastorally sensitive lecture). Kurzweil's vision answers, in its own terms, exactly the questions Christian eschatology answers: What happens to death? (It is defeated — by technology rather than resurrection.) What is salvation from? (Biological limitation — disease, aging, the constraints of an evolved brain — rather than sin.) What is the hoped-for future state? (A merged, enhanced, potentially digitally-instantiated intelligence unconstrained by biology, rather than a resurrected, glorified body in a renewed creation.) Structurally, this is a complete eschatology: an account of what is wrong with the human condition, what will fix it, and what the fixed state will look like — argued, notably, with real intellectual seriousness and real technical grounding in trends Kurzweil has tracked carefully, not merely asserted.

4. Where the two accounts actually diverge

The divergence is not, this course wants to be precise, primarily about whether biological limitation is worth overcoming — Christian theology has its own robust hope for the conquest of death and decay, articulated in 1 Corinthians 15 (which Lecture 5-6 will take up directly) and in Romans 8:21's hope for creation's own liberation "from the bondage of decay." The divergence is about the source, the mechanism, and the nature of what is overcome.

Source. Christian hope receives resurrection and as God's own gift and act, accomplished once for all in Christ's own resurrection and applied to believers by grace; transhumanist hope is achieved by human technological effort, on human authority and initiative — precisely the structure of Genesis 3:5's serpent, promising godlikeness seized rather than received.

Mechanism. Christian resurrection is bodily — Lecture 3-5's "theology of the body" and Chapter 5's closing material on the resurrection body both insist embodiment is not an obstacle to be engineered away but itself part of what is redeemed and glorified. Kurzweil's vision, at its most radical (the "uploading" scenario), treats the biological body as dispensable substrate, information to be preserved and transferred, not itself part of what is saved — a move this course's Chapter 3 will argue, on independent grounds, rests on an inadequate anthropology that identifies the person too closely with information pattern alone.

What is fixed. Christian salvation addresses sin, not merely mortality — death, in the Christian account (Romans 6:23, "the wages of sin is death"), is a consequence of a moral and relational rupture with God, and any solution that addresses only the biological mechanism of aging and decay without addressing that rupture has, on Christian terms, treated a symptom while leaving the actual disease untouched. Transhumanism, by its own account, has no category for sin as a moral or relational problem requiring anything other than better engineering; extending life indefinitely does not, on Christian terms, solve the deeper problem an unaugmented human being and an augmented one share equally.

5. A closing caution, not a dismissal

This lecture has tried to give Kurzweil's project its full seriousness rather than mocking it, per this chapter's own discipline. It is worth naming plainly, in closing, what is genuinely compelling about it: the desire to be free of disease, decline, and death is not a shallow or foolish desire — it is, on Christian terms, itself a distorted echo of a real and legitimate hope Scripture also holds out, which is exactly why transhumanism can sound, to many people including some Christians drawn to its promises, like good news rather than the serpent's offer restated in technical vocabulary. Naming that appeal honestly, rather than pretending only a fool would find transhumanism attractive, is itself part of taking Genesis 3:5 seriously: the original temptation worked, and still works, precisely because "you will be like God" describes something real and desirable, offered by the wrong means, on the wrong authority, without the cross standing anywhere in the picture.


Two Eschatologies of Overcoming Limitation Christian resurrection hope Source: God's gift in Christ's own resurrection, received. Mechanism: bodily resurrection — embodiment redeemed, not shed. Fixes: sin AND death together — the relational rupture, not only the biological mechanism. (1 Cor. 15; Rom. 8:21) Transhumanist hope (Kurzweil) Source: human technological effort, seized, on human authority. Mechanism: nanotech repair, possible mind-uploading — body as dispensable substrate. Fixes: biological limitation only — no category for sin. (The Singularity Is Near, 2005)

5. Going to the Sources

  • Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (Viking, 2005) — read at least the introduction and chapter 1 for Kurzweil's own statement of the exponential-progress argument and his hoped-for outcomes, in his own words rather than a summary.
  • Alan Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," Mind 59 (1950) — the original paper proposing what is now called the Turing test; short, freely available, and worth reading to see how narrow Turing's own claim actually was compared to how the test is often invoked today.
  • Noreen Herzfeld, In Our Image: Artificial Intelligence and the Human Spirit (Fortress Press, 2002) — a theologian's sustained treatment of exactly this lecture's question, applying relational anthropology (in conversation with Barth, Lecture 2-3) to artificial intelligence specifically.

In short

  • The lecture tests the image of God against machines. If reasoning ability alone were enough, an advanced AI would qualify. The lecture treats that result as a sign the capacity view is wrong.
  • Four criteria come from earlier lectures: relationality, moral agency, embodiment, and being addressed by God. Impressive language output is not decisive evidence for any of them.
  • The lecture does not claim to know no future system could ever qualify. It claims current and foreseeable systems do not meet these criteria.
  • A Turing-style test checks behavior that cannot be told from a human's. It was never built to answer whether a machine bears the image.
  • Ray Kurzweil's transhumanism is treated as a serious rival eschatology (an account of the last things). It differs from Christian hope in source, mechanism, and what is fixed: sin and death, not death alone.

Topic: This lecture asks what would count as a machine bearing the image of God, and compares Kurzweil's transhumanist hope with Christian resurrection hope.

Remember: The image of God is not a raw capacity. Skill at reasoning or language is not the kind of evidence this doctrine treats as decisive.

Caution: The lecture does not claim certainty about all future technology, and it does not mock Kurzweil. It says the wish to overcome death is a real hope, offered by the wrong means.

One line to carry into ministry: When a technology promises freedom from death, honor the longing behind it, then point to resurrection as God's gift that also addresses sin.

Review every summary in this course →

Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • This lecture argues a machine passing a Turing-style test would not, by itself, be evidence that it bears the image of God. Restate why, using at least two of the four criteria (relationality, moral agency, embodiment, being addressed by God) this lecture proposed.
  • Kurzweil's transhumanism is described here as a genuinely coherent rival eschatology rather than mere science fiction. What did you find, on reflection, genuinely compelling about the vision this lecture summarized, before considering where it diverges from Christian hope?
  • This lecture connects Genesis 3:5's serpent to transhumanism's structure: godlikeness seized by human effort rather than received as gift. Do you find this comparison illuminating or overstated? What would a sympathetic transhumanist say in response to being compared to the serpent's temptation?

Sign in to write and keep your answers

What next

The lecture ends here. What follows was written by its readers.