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CH403E Figures and Movements in Christian Thought

Lecture 5-2: Faith Seeking Understanding — the Proslogion and Cur Deus Homo

Contents 97
CH403E Figures and Movements in Christian Thought
Chapter 0 · Introduction: Why Study People and Their Ideas
  1. Introduction: Why Study People and Their Ideas
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: The Method of Studying Figures and Movements
  1. Lecture 1-1: What "History of Christian Thought" Studies
  2. Lecture 1-2: Handling Sources — Primary, Secondary, and the Discipline of Context
  3. Lecture 1-3: The Researcher's Traps and Ethics
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: Origen and the Alexandrian School
  1. Lecture 2-1: Origen's Life — Alexandria, Martyrdom, and Exile
  2. Lecture 2-2: On First Principles and the Alexandrian Reading of Scripture
  3. Lecture 2-3: Condemned Three Centuries Later — the Origenist Controversies
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: Athanasius
  1. Lecture 3-1: Life and Exile
  2. Lecture 3-2: On the Incarnation and Homoousios
  3. Lecture 3-3: Athanasius Against the World, Fact and Legend
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: Augustinianism and the Pelagian Controversy
  1. Lecture 4-1: Two Conversions, Two Convictions
  2. Lecture 4-2: Grace, Original Sin, and Two Councils
  3. Lecture 4-3: The Argument's Long Afterlife
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: Anselm
  1. Lecture 5-1: Anselm's Life — Bec, Canterbury, and Two Kings
  2. Lecture 5-2: Faith Seeking Understanding — the Proslogion and Cur Deus Homo
  3. Lecture 5-3: Satisfaction Theory's Legacy — Dominance, Dissent, and an Honest Question
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: Bernard and Medieval Mysticism
  1. Lecture 6-1: Clairvaux, Popes, and a Crusade
  2. Lecture 6-2: On Loving God and the Sermons on the Song of Songs
  3. Lecture 6-3: Abelard's Condemnation and Mysticism's Contested Place
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Thomas Aquinas and Thomism
  1. Lecture 7-1: Life and the Aristotle Crisis
  2. Lecture 7-2: The Summa Theologiae — Method and Central Moves
  3. Lecture 7-3: Thomism's Long Afterlife
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Scotus, Ockham, and Nominalism
  1. Lecture 8-1: Two Friars, Two Crises
  2. Lecture 8-2: Univocity, Voluntarism, and Two Kinds of Power
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Covenant That Could Not Give Certainty
Chapter 9 · Chapter 9: Martin Luther
  1. Lecture 9-1: Erfurt, Rome, and the Tower
  2. Lecture 9-2: Faith Alone, the Bound Will, and the Cross
  3. Lecture 9-3: Legacy — A Movement, a Failure, and a Dialogue
Chapter 10 · Chapter 10: John Calvin
  1. Lecture 10-1: Noyon to Geneva — Calvin's Life
  2. Lecture 10-2: Union with Christ — the Institutes and Calvin's Method
  3. Lecture 10-3: Confessions, Kings, Capitalism, and Contested Ownership — Calvin's Legacy
Chapter 11 · Chapter 11: The Anabaptists and the Radical Reformation
  1. Lecture 11-1: Origins — Zurich, Zwingli, and Schleitheim
  2. Lecture 11-2: Core Convictions and a Divided Movement
  3. Lecture 11-3: Legacy — Mennonites, Hutterites, Amish, and Religious Liberty
Chapter 12 · Chapter 12: Beza and Reformed Orthodoxy
  1. Lecture 12-1: Theodore Beza's Life and His Succession of Calvin
  2. Lecture 12-2: Reformed Scholasticism and the Muller Debate
  3. Lecture 12-3: The Canons of Dort and Their Long Influence
Chapter 13 · Chapter 13: John Owen and Puritan Theology
  1. Lecture 13-1: John Owen's Life, from Oxford to Nonconformist Exile
  2. Lecture 13-2: Owen's Major Works — Mortification, Definite Atonement, and the Spirit
  3. Lecture 13-3: Puritan Theology's Shape and Its Twentieth-Century Recovery
Chapter 14 · Chapter 14: Spener, Francke, and Pietism
  1. Lecture 14-1: Spener's Reform Program and Francke's Halle
  2. Lecture 14-2: The New Birth, the Collegia Pietatis, and Practical Christianity
  3. Lecture 14-3: Zinzendorf, Wesley, and the Warmth/Precision Tension
Chapter 15 · Chapter 15: Jonathan Edwards
  1. Lecture 15-1: Jonathan Edwards — Life and Context
  2. Lecture 15-2: Jonathan Edwards — Religious Affections, Freedom of the Will, and the Beauty of God
  3. Lecture 15-3: Jonathan Edwards — Legacy, Slavery, and New Calvinism
Chapter 16 · Chapter 16: John Wesley and Methodism
  1. Lecture 16-1: Aldersgate and Fifty Years on Horseback
  2. Lecture 16-2: Prevenient Grace, Christian Perfection, and the Split with Whitefield
  3. Lecture 16-3: A Global Church, a Holiness Movement, and an Unfinished Reckoning
Chapter 17 · Chapter 17: Friedrich Schleiermacher
  1. Lecture 17-1: Schleiermacher's Life and the Speeches to the Cultured Despisers
  2. Lecture 17-2: The Christian Faith and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
  3. Lecture 17-3: Liberal Protestantism's Century and the Argument That Followed
Chapter 18 · Chapter 18: Søren Kierkegaard
  1. Lecture 18-1: Copenhagen, Regine, and the Attack on Christendom
  2. Lecture 18-2: Abraham, Despair, and the Stages on Life's Way
  3. Lecture 18-3: Existentialism, Neo-Orthodoxy, and an Unresolved Inheritance
Chapter 19 · Chapter 19: Charles Hodge and Old Princeton
  1. Lecture 19-1: Charles Hodge's Life and Princeton's Long Memory
  2. Lecture 19-2: Systematic Theology, Baconian Method, and the Doctrine of Inerrancy
  3. Lecture 19-3: Fundamentalism, Machen, and a Historians' Argument That Will Not Close
Chapter 20 · Chapter 20: Abraham Kuyper
  1. Lecture 20-1: Kuyper's Life — From Parish to Parliament
  2. Lecture 20-2: Common Grace, Sphere Sovereignty, and Neo-Calvinism
  3. Lecture 20-3: Legacy — Bavinck, Worldview Evangelicalism, and an Honest Reckoning
Chapter 21 · Chapter 21: Karl Barth
  1. Lecture 21-1: Barth's Life — From Liberal Pastor to the Barmen Declaration
  2. Lecture 21-2: The Church Dogmatics and the "Nein!" to Natural Theology
  3. Lecture 21-3: Legacy — Claimed by Everyone, Debated on Election, Honest About Von Kirschbaum
Chapter 22 · Chapter 22: Bavinck, Vos, and Dutch Reformed Theology
  1. Lecture 22-1: Two Sons of the Secession — Bavinck's and Vos's Formation
  2. Lecture 22-2: Grace Restores Nature — Bavinck's System and Vos's Method
  3. Lecture 22-3: A Late Arrival — Bavinck in English and Vos at Westminster
Chapter 23 · Chapter 23: Dietrich Bonhoeffer
  1. Lecture 23-1: From Lecture Hall to Underground Seminary to Conspiracy
  2. Lecture 23-2: Costly Grace and an Unfinished Ethics
  3. Lecture 23-3: A Legacy Claimed by Everyone, Resolved by No One
Chapter 24 · Chapter 24: C. S. Lewis
  1. Lecture 24-1: From Atheism to Christianity — Life and Friendships
  2. Lecture 24-2: Mere Christianity, Narnia, and Screwtape
  3. Lecture 24-3: Legacy, Popular Influence, and Honest Criticism
Chapter 25 · Chapter 25: Martyn Lloyd-Jones and Expository Preaching
  1. Lecture 25-1: From Harley Street to a Mission Church
  2. Lecture 25-2: Logic on Fire
  3. Lecture 25-3: The Chair, the Call, and the Reply
Chapter 26 · Chapter 26: Francis Schaeffer and Cultural Apologetics
  1. Lecture 26-1: Francis Schaeffer's Life and the Founding of L'Abri
  2. Lecture 26-2: The God Who Is There and How Should We Then Live?
  3. Lecture 26-3: Schaeffer's Legacy — Political Mobilization and Later Critique
Chapter 27 · Chapter 27: Carl Henry, J. I. Packer, and Neo-Evangelicalism
  1. Lecture 27-1: Carl Henry's Uneasy Conscience
  2. Lecture 27-2: Packer, Fuller, the NAE, and the Chicago Statement
  3. Lecture 27-3: Fractures and the Contested Label
Chapter 28 · Chapter 28: Gustavo Gutiérrez and Liberation Theology
  1. Lecture 28-1: A Priest in Lima and a Bishops' Conference in Medellín
  2. Lecture 28-2: A Theology of Liberation and Its Central Claims
  3. Lecture 28-3: Rome's Caution, and a Family of Liberation Theologies
Chapter 29 · Chapter 29: Moltmann and Pannenberg
  1. Lecture 29-1: Two Formations — A Prisoner's Hope and a Historian's Discipline
  2. Lecture 29-2: Hope from the Cross, Revelation from the Future
  3. Lecture 29-3: Legacy — Political Theology, Faith and Reason, and Two Honest Objections
Chapter 30 · Chapter 30: John Stott and the Lausanne Movement
  1. Lecture 30-1: One Parish, One World
  2. Lecture 30-2: Basic Christianity, the Cross, and a Covenant
  3. Lecture 30-3: A Movement That Outlived the Room, and a Question Stott Left Open
Chapter 31 · Chapter 31: The New Perspective on Paul
  1. Lecture 31-1: Origins — E. P. Sanders and Covenantal Nomism
  2. Lecture 31-2: Development — Dunn, Wright, and the New Perspective Named
  3. Lecture 31-3: The Live Dispute — New Perspective and Traditional Response
Chapter 32 · Chapter 32: Korean Figures and Movements
  1. Lecture 32-1: The 1907 Pyongyang Revival and the Shrine-Worship Resistance
  2. Lecture 32-2: Minjung Theology and Its Relation to Latin American Liberation Theology
  3. Lecture 32-3: Growth, Global Mission, and Honest Reckoning

Jump to the key points ↓

22 min

Anselm wrote both works this lecture studies as a working abbot with monastic duties to attend to, not as a philosopher with unlimited leisure, and both open by stating the same rule of method: reasoning proceeds only after faith is already in place, and the reasoning may lean on nothing but itself once it starts — no citation of Scripture as a premise, no appeal to church authority to settle a step of the argument. That rule sounds austere, and it is meant to. Anselm is not trying to win over an unbeliever from neutral ground; the Proslogion's original title was Fides Quaerens Intellectum — "faith seeking understanding" — and he only changed it, at a friend's suggestion, to name the work after its own form: a proslogion, an address, since the whole thing is written as a prayer spoken to God, not a treatise aimed at a stranger.

That same rule shapes Cur Deus Homo even more consequentially. Anselm's stated project there is to show — to an imagined objector called Boso, standing in for real skeptics of his own day, both Christian and non-Christian — that the incarnation and the cross were not an arbitrary divine choice among several equally workable options, but the one course of action that a coherent picture of God, sin, and justice actually required. Whether he succeeds is a separate question from what, precisely, he argued, and this lecture's task is to get the second question right before the next lecture takes up the first.

What these 22 minutes give you

  • Reconstruct the ontological argument of the *Proslogion*, chapters 2-3, in your own words, using Anselm's own definition of God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived."
  • State Gaunilo's "Lost Island" objection and Anselm's reply to it accurately enough to explain why each side thought it had the stronger position.
  • Explain the specific logical steps of *Cur Deus Homo*'s satisfaction theory: what sin is, why it creates a debt, why the debt cannot simply be forgiven without satisfaction or punishment, why only a God-man can pay it, and how Christ's death does so.
  • Distinguish Anselm's own satisfaction theory from the "penal substitution" language later Protestant theology would build on top of it, noting at least one real difference between the two.

Since then the children have shared in flesh and blood, he also himself in the same way partook of the same, that through death he might bring to nothing him who had the power of death, that is, the devil, and might deliver all of them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage. For most certainly, he doesn't give help to angels, but he gives help to the seed of Abraham. Therefore he was obligated in all things to be made like his brothers, that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make atonement for the sins of the people." — Hebrews 2:14-17

World English Bible

This is one of the New Testament's own attempts to explain why the had to take the specific shape it did — flesh and blood, "made like his brothers" — rather than some other rescue God might have chosen instead. Anselm's argument in Cur Deus Homo is best read as an extended meditation on that word "obligated" (or, in some translations, "it behooved him"): why, exactly, was it fitting, even necessary, for the Son to become fully human in order to deal with sin, rather than simply forgiving it by decree from heaven? Hebrews states the conclusion; Anselm tries to supply the reasoning behind it.

1. The rule before the arguments: fides quaerens intellectum

Before either argument this lecture studies can be understood on its own terms, Anselm's rule of method has to be understood first, because reading past it is the single most common way modern readers misread him. In the Proslogion's own opening chapter, Anselm writes to God directly: "I do not seek to understand in order to believe, but I believe in order to understand." He is not describing two competing paths to the same destination, faith versus reason, and choosing the first because it is easier. He is describing a sequence: faith comes first, supplied by grace and the church's teaching, and only then does reason go to work, examining what has already been received, testing whether it holds together, seeing how far unaided argument can travel toward truths faith already possesses. A modern reader who expects the Proslogion to function like a philosophy paper aimed at converting an atheist reader from scratch will be looking for something Anselm never intended to write.

2. The Proslogion's argument, step by step

The Proslogion's definition

Anselm's definition of God, stated in Proslogion chapter 2, is not a description of God's attributes in the ordinary sense — not "all-powerful" or "all-knowing" — but a single formal marker: aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit, "something than which nothing greater can be conceived." Anselm's claim is that even someone who denies God's existence understands this concept the moment they hear it, in the same way anyone can understand the concept of a unicorn without believing one exists. He deliberately invokes the "fool" of Psalm 14:1 and Psalm 53:1, who "has said in his heart, there is no God" — not to insult an opponent, but to set up the sharpest possible test case: if the argument can move even the fool, understood on the fool's own terms, it has done real work.

The argument itself runs roughly as follows. The fool understands the concept "that than which nothing greater can be conceived," so that concept exists at least in the fool's understanding. But, Anselm argues, if that being existed only in the understanding and not in reality, one could conceive of a greater being — namely, the same being existing in reality as well as in the mind, since existing in reality is greater than existing only as an idea. That would mean the fool's "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" is not actually the greatest conceivable being after all, which contradicts the very definition being reasoned about. Therefore, Anselm concludes in Proslogion chapter 3, that than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot be thought not to exist — its non-existence is not merely false but, on Anselm's reading, incoherent, since a being whose non-existence could be conceived would not be the greatest conceivable being in the first place.

It is worth being honest about how strange this argument sounds to a first-time reader, because it has always sounded strange, and that reaction is not a failure of comprehension. The argument tries to derive a fact about reality — that something exists — from a fact about a concept, and philosophers ever since have disagreed sharply about whether that move is legitimate at all, independent of whether one already believes God exists.

3. Gaunilo's objection and Anselm's reply

The first recorded objection came during Anselm's own lifetime, from a fellow Benedictine monk named Gaunilo of Marmoutier, in a short piece usually titled On Behalf of the Fool — that is, taking up the fool's side against Anselm. Gaunilo's most famous move is the parody now known as the "Lost Island" argument: imagine, he says, the most excellent conceivable island, more excellent than any island that actually exists. By Anselm's own logic, Gaunilo argues, this island must exist in reality, since an island that existed would be more excellent than one that existed only in the mind — and since no one accepts that a perfect island must exist somewhere in the ocean simply because we can conceive of it, the same form of reasoning applied to God should be rejected too.

Anselm's reply, in his own Reply to Gaunilo, is that the parody does not actually parallel his argument, because it does not work for any object with a fixed, limited nature — an island is, by definition, a bounded, contingent thing, and no amount of adding excellent features to an island produces a being than which nothing greater can be conceived; you can always imagine a slightly better island. Anselm insists his argument works only, and specifically, for the unique case of a being defined as maximally great in an unqualified sense, where existence itself is part of what "greater" means. Whether that reply actually rescues the argument, or merely relocates the same difficulty, is a live question in philosophy of religion today, and this course does not need to settle it to state accurately what each side claimed.

4. Cur Deus Homo: the structure of the question

Cur Deus Homo, written after Anselm became archbishop and probably completed around 1098 during his first exile, is framed as a dialogue with a monk named Boso who raises, in his own voice, the objections real people of the period actually raised — including objections from Jews and from skeptics unpersuaded by an appeal to Scripture alone. Anselm's explicit goal, stated in the work's preface, is to show remoto Christo — "with Christ set aside," meaning without simply assuming the conclusion by quoting a proof text — that reason alone, working from an agreed picture of God's nature and the reality of human sin, arrives at the necessity of the incarnation and the cross. Book One works through why some other solution — for example, God simply forgiving sin by an act of will, with no incarnation or death required at all — will not do. Book Two builds the positive case for why the Redeemer had to be both fully God and fully human.

5. The logic of satisfaction

The argument's hinge, developed most directly in Book One, is Anselm's account of what sin actually is. Sin, for Anselm, is not primarily a violation of an abstract moral rule; it is a failure to render to God the honor that is his due — a disruption of the right order (rectitudo) that ought to hold between a creature and its Creator, comparable, in the honor-bound feudal world Anselm inhabited, to a vassal's failure to render the service and deference owed to a lord. Once that order is disrupted, Anselm argues, two options remain, and no third: either satisfaction is offered to restore the honor taken away, or punishment falls on the offender instead. God cannot simply overlook the debt, on Anselm's view, not because God lacks mercy, but because a universe in which sin against infinite honor carries no consequence at all would itself be a disordered, unjust universe — incompatible with a picture of God as perfectly just as well as perfectly merciful.

The satisfaction required, Anselm argues, has to be proportionate to what was offended: since the honor owed is owed to an infinite God, the debt itself is, in effect, infinite, and no finite creature — however sincere the effort — can supply an infinite satisfaction out of finite resources, especially since every obedience a creature could offer is already owed to God anyway and cannot double as extra payment for a prior debt. Only God has anything of infinite worth to offer. But the debt is owed by humanity, since it was humanity that sinned, and it would not satisfy justice for an obligation incurred by one party to be discharged entirely by another party unconnected to it. The conclusion Anselm draws from these two constraints together is the argument's central move: the one who pays the debt must be both fully God, to possess something of infinite value to offer, and fully human, to be the party who actually owed the debt in the first place. Only a God-man meets both conditions at once.

Christ's death completes the argument. As a sinless man, Christ did not personally owe death as a consequence of sin — death, for Anselm, is a consequence humans face because of sin, and a sinless man would have no debt of his own requiring it. His death was therefore entirely voluntary, freely offered rather than owed, and because the one offering it is also fully God, that voluntary gift carries infinite worth — more than sufficient to satisfy the debt owed by the whole of humanity. God's honor is restored, not by punishing humanity as the debt technically required, but by a gift that outweighs the debt entirely, offered by the very party from whom the debt was owed, made possible only because that party is also God.

6. What satisfaction theory is not

It is worth stating plainly, because later chapters and later Reformation-era developments will build directly on this point: Anselm's satisfaction theory is not identical to the fully developed "" language many readers already associate with the atonement — the idea that Christ was punished by God the Father in humanity's place, bearing the specific penalty sin deserved. Anselm's own argument works with the categories of honor, debt, and satisfaction offered voluntarily; he explicitly frames satisfaction and punishment as two distinct, alternative ways of resolving a disrupted order, and Christ's death functions in his account as satisfaction rendered, not punishment transferred. Later Reformed theologians, building on Anselm's basic architecture but shifting its center of gravity from honor to law and from feudal debt to judicial penalty, would develop the more explicitly penal account most Protestant readers know today. The next lecture takes up that development, and the criticisms of Anselm's own version, directly.


Diagram 1. The satisfaction argument's logical steps

Cur Deus Homo: the Shape of the Argument Why, Anselm argues, only a God-man could pay humanity's debt 1. Sin as debt Sin fails to render God his due honor, disrupting the order of creation. Satisfaction or punishment must follow. 2. Two constraints Only God has anything of infinite worth to pay an infinite debt. Only humanity owes the debt in the first place. 3. The God-man Only one who is fully God and fully human meets both constraints at once. His voluntary death pays a debt he did not owe. Note the categories: honor, debt, and satisfaction voluntarily offered — not, in Anselm's own text, punishment transferred from humanity to Christ. Anselm treats satisfaction and punishment as two distinct alternatives; later penal-substitution theology develops the argument in a different direction, recasting the debt in judicial rather than feudal-honor terms.

5. Going to the Sources

Read Cur Deus Homo, Book One, chapters 11 and 12, where Anselm defines sin as failing to render to God what is owed him and argues that it is not fitting for God to forgive sin without either satisfaction or punishment — the hinge on which the entire rest of the argument turns. Alongside it, read Proslogion, chapters 2 and 3, in full; both are short enough to read carefully in one sitting, and reading Anselm's actual Latin-to-English wording, rather than a paraphrase, is the only way to see how tightly he thought the argument was constructed, and where you may find yourself wanting to press back on a specific step rather than the conclusion as a whole.


In short

  • Anselm's method is "I believe in order to understand." Faith comes first, and reason then examines what faith has received. The Proslogion is a prayer, not an argument aimed at converting a stranger.
  • The Proslogion defines God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." It argues that such a being cannot exist only in the mind, since existing in reality is greater.
  • Gaunilo's Lost Island parody says the argument proves too much. Anselm replied that it works only for a being defined as maximally great. The lecture does not settle who is right.
  • In Cur Deus Homo, sin is failing to give God his due honor. Either satisfaction or punishment must follow, and only a God-man can pay: God for infinite worth, human for owing the debt.
  • Christ's voluntary death, not owed by a sinless man, pays that debt. Anselm's theory is not the same as penal substitution, which later Reformed theology developed.

Topic: The lecture explains Anselm's method of faith seeking understanding, the ontological argument and the reply to Gaunilo, and the satisfaction theory of Cur Deus Homo.

Remember: Anselm argues that sin is a debt of honor owed to God, and that only one who is fully God and fully human could pay it.

Caution: Anselm's satisfaction theory is not penal substitution. He treats satisfaction and punishment as two alternatives, and Christ's death is satisfaction offered, not punishment transferred.

One line to carry into ministry: Remember that Anselm reasons as a believer in prayer, and be careful not to read his arguments as if they were meant to win over an unbeliever.

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Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • Anselm's rule is "I believe in order to understand," not "I understand in order to believe." What difference does that order actually make to how you would evaluate his arguments?
  • State the ontological argument in two or three sentences to someone who has never heard it, in your own words, without looking back at this lecture. Where did you find yourself wanting to slow down?
  • Gaunilo's Lost Island objection tries to show the argument proves too much. Do you find Anselm's reply — that the argument only works for a being defined as maximally great without qualification — convincing, or does it feel like a special exception invented to save the argument?
  • Anselm frames sin as a debt to God's honor rather than, primarily, as a violation of law deserving punishment. What changes, practically, about how a Christian might think about sin and forgiveness if honor, rather than law, is the primary category?
  • Hebrews 2:14-17 says Christ was "obligated... to be made like his brothers." Having read Anselm's argument for why, do you find his reasoning fills in that obligation convincingly, or does something feel like it is missing?

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What next

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