Lecture 8-2: Univocity, Voluntarism, and Two Kinds of Power
Contents 97
- Lecture 1-1: What "History of Christian Thought" Studies
- Lecture 1-2: Handling Sources — Primary, Secondary, and the Discipline of Context
- Lecture 1-3: The Researcher's Traps and Ethics
- Lecture 2-1: Origen's Life — Alexandria, Martyrdom, and Exile
- Lecture 2-2: On First Principles and the Alexandrian Reading of Scripture
- Lecture 2-3: Condemned Three Centuries Later — the Origenist Controversies
- Lecture 3-1: Life and Exile
- Lecture 3-2: On the Incarnation and Homoousios
- Lecture 3-3: Athanasius Against the World, Fact and Legend
- Lecture 4-1: Two Conversions, Two Convictions
- Lecture 4-2: Grace, Original Sin, and Two Councils
- Lecture 4-3: The Argument's Long Afterlife
- Lecture 5-1: Anselm's Life — Bec, Canterbury, and Two Kings
- Lecture 5-2: Faith Seeking Understanding — the Proslogion and Cur Deus Homo
- Lecture 5-3: Satisfaction Theory's Legacy — Dominance, Dissent, and an Honest Question
- Lecture 6-1: Clairvaux, Popes, and a Crusade
- Lecture 6-2: On Loving God and the Sermons on the Song of Songs
- Lecture 6-3: Abelard's Condemnation and Mysticism's Contested Place
- Lecture 7-1: Life and the Aristotle Crisis
- Lecture 7-2: The Summa Theologiae — Method and Central Moves
- Lecture 7-3: Thomism's Long Afterlife
- Lecture 8-1: Two Friars, Two Crises
- Lecture 8-2: Univocity, Voluntarism, and Two Kinds of Power
- Lecture 8-3: The Covenant That Could Not Give Certainty
- Lecture 9-1: Erfurt, Rome, and the Tower
- Lecture 9-2: Faith Alone, the Bound Will, and the Cross
- Lecture 9-3: Legacy — A Movement, a Failure, and a Dialogue
- Lecture 10-1: Noyon to Geneva — Calvin's Life
- Lecture 10-2: Union with Christ — the Institutes and Calvin's Method
- Lecture 10-3: Confessions, Kings, Capitalism, and Contested Ownership — Calvin's Legacy
- Lecture 11-1: Origins — Zurich, Zwingli, and Schleitheim
- Lecture 11-2: Core Convictions and a Divided Movement
- Lecture 11-3: Legacy — Mennonites, Hutterites, Amish, and Religious Liberty
- Lecture 12-1: Theodore Beza's Life and His Succession of Calvin
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Scholasticism and the Muller Debate
- Lecture 12-3: The Canons of Dort and Their Long Influence
- Lecture 13-1: John Owen's Life, from Oxford to Nonconformist Exile
- Lecture 13-2: Owen's Major Works — Mortification, Definite Atonement, and the Spirit
- Lecture 13-3: Puritan Theology's Shape and Its Twentieth-Century Recovery
- Lecture 14-1: Spener's Reform Program and Francke's Halle
- Lecture 14-2: The New Birth, the Collegia Pietatis, and Practical Christianity
- Lecture 14-3: Zinzendorf, Wesley, and the Warmth/Precision Tension
- Lecture 15-1: Jonathan Edwards — Life and Context
- Lecture 15-2: Jonathan Edwards — Religious Affections, Freedom of the Will, and the Beauty of God
- Lecture 15-3: Jonathan Edwards — Legacy, Slavery, and New Calvinism
- Lecture 16-1: Aldersgate and Fifty Years on Horseback
- Lecture 16-2: Prevenient Grace, Christian Perfection, and the Split with Whitefield
- Lecture 16-3: A Global Church, a Holiness Movement, and an Unfinished Reckoning
- Lecture 17-1: Schleiermacher's Life and the Speeches to the Cultured Despisers
- Lecture 17-2: The Christian Faith and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 17-3: Liberal Protestantism's Century and the Argument That Followed
- Lecture 18-1: Copenhagen, Regine, and the Attack on Christendom
- Lecture 18-2: Abraham, Despair, and the Stages on Life's Way
- Lecture 18-3: Existentialism, Neo-Orthodoxy, and an Unresolved Inheritance
- Lecture 19-1: Charles Hodge's Life and Princeton's Long Memory
- Lecture 19-2: Systematic Theology, Baconian Method, and the Doctrine of Inerrancy
- Lecture 19-3: Fundamentalism, Machen, and a Historians' Argument That Will Not Close
- Lecture 20-1: Kuyper's Life — From Parish to Parliament
- Lecture 20-2: Common Grace, Sphere Sovereignty, and Neo-Calvinism
- Lecture 20-3: Legacy — Bavinck, Worldview Evangelicalism, and an Honest Reckoning
- Lecture 21-1: Barth's Life — From Liberal Pastor to the Barmen Declaration
- Lecture 21-2: The Church Dogmatics and the "Nein!" to Natural Theology
- Lecture 21-3: Legacy — Claimed by Everyone, Debated on Election, Honest About Von Kirschbaum
- Lecture 22-1: Two Sons of the Secession — Bavinck's and Vos's Formation
- Lecture 22-2: Grace Restores Nature — Bavinck's System and Vos's Method
- Lecture 22-3: A Late Arrival — Bavinck in English and Vos at Westminster
- Lecture 23-1: From Lecture Hall to Underground Seminary to Conspiracy
- Lecture 23-2: Costly Grace and an Unfinished Ethics
- Lecture 23-3: A Legacy Claimed by Everyone, Resolved by No One
- Lecture 24-1: From Atheism to Christianity — Life and Friendships
- Lecture 24-2: Mere Christianity, Narnia, and Screwtape
- Lecture 24-3: Legacy, Popular Influence, and Honest Criticism
- Lecture 25-1: From Harley Street to a Mission Church
- Lecture 25-2: Logic on Fire
- Lecture 25-3: The Chair, the Call, and the Reply
- Lecture 26-1: Francis Schaeffer's Life and the Founding of L'Abri
- Lecture 26-2: The God Who Is There and How Should We Then Live?
- Lecture 26-3: Schaeffer's Legacy — Political Mobilization and Later Critique
- Lecture 27-1: Carl Henry's Uneasy Conscience
- Lecture 27-2: Packer, Fuller, the NAE, and the Chicago Statement
- Lecture 27-3: Fractures and the Contested Label
- Lecture 28-1: A Priest in Lima and a Bishops' Conference in Medellín
- Lecture 28-2: A Theology of Liberation and Its Central Claims
- Lecture 28-3: Rome's Caution, and a Family of Liberation Theologies
- Lecture 29-1: Two Formations — A Prisoner's Hope and a Historian's Discipline
- Lecture 29-2: Hope from the Cross, Revelation from the Future
- Lecture 29-3: Legacy — Political Theology, Faith and Reason, and Two Honest Objections
- Lecture 30-1: One Parish, One World
- Lecture 30-2: Basic Christianity, the Cross, and a Covenant
- Lecture 30-3: A Movement That Outlived the Room, and a Question Stott Left Open
- Lecture 31-1: Origins — E. P. Sanders and Covenantal Nomism
- Lecture 31-2: Development — Dunn, Wright, and the New Perspective Named
- Lecture 31-3: The Live Dispute — New Perspective and Traditional Response
Three ideas hold this lecture together, and they build on each other in a specific order. Scotus's univocity of being asks what we actually mean when we use the same word for God and for a creature, and answers, against Aquinas, that we mean literally the same thing, only possessed in an infinitely different way. Scotus's voluntarism, and Ockham's more radical nominalism about universals, both press further in a direction univocity opens up: if God's being is not a wholly different kind of thing that reason can only reach by analogy, then what actually determines how the world is — the order of intellect, reasoning out what is fitting, or the order of will, simply choosing? Ockham's answer, more thoroughly than Scotus's, puts the weight on will, and the last piece of this lecture, the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power, is the doctrine of God's will and covenant working itself out into a theology of how God actually relates to the world he has freely chosen to govern in a particular, promised way rather than by unpredictable whim.
What these 20 minutes give you
- State Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being and explain what theological work it was meant to do, in contrast with Aquinas's analogy of being.
- Explain voluntarism (the primacy of will over intellect) as Scotus and Ockham each held it, and why it matters for how each thinker understood both God's freedom and human freedom.
- Define Ockham's nominalism about universals and explain why he denied that a universal like "humanity" has any real existence outside particular minds and particular things.
- Distinguish *potentia absoluta* from *potentia ordinata* and explain why the distinction is meant to describe God's covenanted reliability, not his capriciousness.
In this way God, being determined to show more abundantly to the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed with an oath; that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have a strong encouragement, who have fled for refuge to take hold of the hope set before us." — Hebrews 6:17-18
World English Bible
Brothers, speaking of human terms, though it is only a man's covenant, yet when it has been confirmed, no one makes it void, or adds to it." — Galatians 3:15
WEB
Both texts describe the same structure that the potentia absoluta / potentia ordinata distinction is trying to put into philosophical language: a genuinely free agent — God in Hebrews, an ordinary human party to a in Galatians — who was under no prior necessity to bind himself, and who, having freely bound himself, can now be relied upon precisely because the binding was real and not merely a temporary posture. Hebrews 6:17-18 makes the theological point directly: God's oath is not offered because God's bare word was somehow insufficient, but "that we may have a strong encouragement" from the doubled certainty of promise plus oath. Galatians 3:15 makes the same point from the human side, using ordinary covenant law to argue, in its own context, that God's earlier covenant with Abraham cannot be annulled by a later law. Nominalist theology took this same basic logic and applied it, more systematically than any theology before it had done, to nearly every question about how God relates to the created order.
1. Univocity of being: why Scotus thought Aquinas's analogy could not do the job
Aquinas had taught, as the previous chapter covered, that no word applies to God and to creatures in exactly the same sense. When Scripture or theology calls both God and a human being "good," the word is used analogically: creaturely goodness is really related to divine goodness, as an effect bears the mark of its cause, but the two are not instances of one identical concept of goodness applied twice. Aquinas thought this was required by how radically different God's mode of existence is from a creature's — God does not merely have goodness as one attribute among others the way a creature does; on the classical doctrine of , God simply is his goodness, without composition, in a way nothing created could be.
Scotus did not dispute divine simplicity, but he thought analogy, taken as a complete account of religious language, produced an unacceptable result: if there is no concept of "being" or "goodness" that applies in a genuinely identical sense to God and to creatures, then every attempt at natural theology — every argument that starts from what we know about creatures and reasons toward a conclusion about God — is built on a hidden equivocation, using the same word in two different senses at two different points in the same argument and the result valid. Scotus's proposed solution, defended at length in his Ordinatio, is that "being" (ens) is a univocal concept: one and the same concept applies to God and to a creature, differing not in what the concept itself means but only in the mode in which each possesses it — God possesses being infinitely and necessarily, a creature possesses it finitely and contingently, but "being," said of each, is not a different word wearing the same spelling. Without at least this much shared, univocal ground, Scotus argued, the human mind could not even begin to reason its way toward God at all; it would have no stable concept to reason with.
This is a technical point with a pastoral payoff worth stating plainly: Scotus was not trying to make God smaller or more manageable by making divine and creaturely being the same kind of thing. He was trying to preserve theology's ability to say anything meaningful about God using ordinary human concepts, against what he considered analogy's risk of collapsing all God-talk into an elegant-sounding but ultimately empty gesture toward an unreachable difference.
2. Voluntarism: will before intellect, in God and in the human person
A second Scotist theme runs alongside univocity and reaches its fuller development in Ockham: voluntarism, the claim that will, not intellect, has priority — in God's own inner life, and, by extension, in the human person made in God's image. Earlier medieval theology, following Aquinas's broadly intellectualist reading of Aristotle, had generally held that the intellect first perceives something as good, and the will then follows and chooses the good the intellect has presented to it; will is a real power, but a power that operates in response to what reason has already judged desirable. Scotus reversed the priority. For Scotus, the will is free in a stronger sense: it is not simply moved by the intellect's judgment of the good the way a stone is moved by gravity, but retains genuine self-determination even in the face of a clear intellectual judgment, and this is what makes both divine and human freedom real freedom rather than a more sophisticated form of natural necessity.
Applied to God, voluntarism means that many features of the created order that earlier theology had treated as flowing necessarily from God's nature (this is the only kind of world a perfectly good and wise God could have made) are, for Scotus and even more so for Ockham, the product of God's genuinely free choice among real alternatives God could equally well have chosen instead — constrained only by the requirement that God not will a strict logical contradiction. This is the theological soil in which the next section's distinction grows.
3. Ockham's nominalism: universals are names, not things
Aquinas, and behind him a long tradition running back through Boethius to Aristotle and, more distantly, to Plato, had held some form of realism about universals: a universal concept like "humanity" corresponds to something real, whether (on a strong Platonic reading) an eternal Form existing independently of particular things, or (on Aristotle's and Aquinas's more moderate reading) a real common nature genuinely shared by every individual human being, existing in each of them and abstracted by the mind rather than invented by it.
Ockham denied this, more thoroughly than any major theologian before him. Applying his principle that explanatory entities should not be multiplied beyond what the evidence actually requires, Ockham argued that only individual, particular things actually exist — this human being, that human being, never "humanity" itself as some further, additional thing standing behind or within them. A universal term like "human" is a name (nomen) — a mental concept and, correspondingly, a spoken or written word — that the mind uses to signify many individual, similar things at once, because it is useful and economical to think and speak that way, not because the word picks out some further real thing that the many individuals all somehow share. This is nominalism in its strict sense: universals exist only as names, in the mind and in language, not as realities in the created order itself, still less as archetypes in the mind of God.
The stakes of this dispute are not merely logical. A great deal of earlier medieval theology, including arguments for the reality of a common human nature that Christ could assume in the , or the reality of a shared human nature transmitting Adam's guilt to all his descendants, had leaned on some form of realism about universals to make its case work. Nominalism did not force theologians to abandon these doctrines, but it did force them to explain such teachings without appeal to a really existing common nature standing behind individual human beings — a genuine shift in the tools available for doing theology at all, and one later Reformation-era thinkers, trained in nominalist logic themselves, inherited without always noticing how much it had reshaped their instincts.
4. Two kinds of power: God's absolute capability and God's covenanted reliability
The potentia absoluta / potentia ordinata distinction, developed by Ockham and other fourteenth-century nominalist theologians (the underlying distinction has earlier roots, but Ockham's generation gave it its most influential theological use), applies voluntarism directly to the question of how God relates to the created order. Potentia absoluta, God's absolute power, names everything God could do considered purely in himself, restricted by nothing except the law of non-contradiction — God is not bound by anything outside his own nature, including the specific order he has, in fact, chosen to establish. Potentia ordinata, God's ordained power, names the specific, actual order God has freely chosen to establish and has bound himself, by his own promise and covenant, to uphold — the laws of nature, the sacramental economy, the covenant of grace, all the actual arrangements by which God has committed to deal with the world he made.
Not random power
The crucial point, easy to misread and important to get right, is that this distinction was not meant to make God's actual behavior unpredictable or arbitrary. Ockham's nominalist theologians insisted, in the same breath as they affirmed God's absolute power, that God does not in fact act by his absolute power apart from his ordained power — the two are not two different ways God actually behaves, alternating without warning, but one way of naming what God's freedom made possible in principle (absolute power) and a second way of naming what God has actually, reliably committed himself to (ordained power), given that he freely chose this particular covenant rather than some other one he could equally well have chosen. Hebrews 6:17-18's account of God's oath fits this structure precisely: God was under no external necessity to bind himself by promise at all, and yet, having done so, his reliability is now more certain, not less, because a real commitment has been made. The distinction, rightly used, was meant to protect exactly that kind of confidence — that God's promises can be trusted because they are covenant, not because God lacks the power to have done otherwise.
Where this distinction became genuinely dangerous, as the next lecture has to show, is in how it was applied to the specific covenant nominalist theologians believed God had established for human salvation — a covenant stated, on their reading, in terms that left the human party permanently unsure whether its own side of the bargain had actually been met.
Diagram 1. Two kinds of divine power
5. Going to the Sources
Read Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, distinction 3, part 1, questions 1-2, on the univocity of the concept of being — available in English translation in Allan B. Wolter, Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings (Hackett Publishing). Alongside it, read William of Ockham's own treatment of the two powers of God in Quodlibetal Questions, Quodlibet VI, question 1, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley (Yale University Press). Reading the two side by side lets you see how directly Scotus's technical point about a shared concept of being and Ockham's technical point about God's twofold power both trace back to the same underlying conviction: that God's freedom and God's intelligibility to creaturely reason are things a careful theologian has to hold together, not trade one for the other.
In short
- Aquinas taught analogy: words like "good" apply to God and creatures in related but not identical senses. Scotus feared this made natural theology rest on a hidden equivocation, using one word in two senses.
- Scotus argued that "being" is univocal, meaning one concept for God and creatures. They differ only in mode: God has being infinitely and necessarily, a creature finitely and contingently.
- Voluntarism gives will priority over intellect. Scotus held that the will is free even against a clear judgment of the intellect. Ockham pressed this further, so that much of creation reflects God's free choice.
- Ockham's nominalism says only individual things exist. A universal like "human" is a name the mind uses for many similar things. This changed how doctrines about shared human nature had to be explained.
- Potentia absoluta is all God could do. Potentia ordinata is the order he has freely chosen and bound himself to keep. The distinction aims to show God's covenanted reliability, not caprice, as Hebrews 6:17-18 describes.
Topic: Scotus's univocity of being, voluntarism, Ockham's nominalism, and the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power.
Remember: God's freedom and his reliability fit together: having freely bound himself by covenant, God can be trusted because he promised, not because he lacked power to do otherwise.
Caution: The two powers are not two ways God actually behaves. Nominalist theologians said God does not act by absolute power apart from his ordained power. Scotus also did not mean to make God smaller.
One line to carry into ministry: God's promises are sure because he freely bound himself in covenant, so you can teach confidence in his word without teaching that he is arbitrary.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Scotus worried that analogy alone leaves theology unable to reason about God at all. Aquinas's defenders would say univocity makes God too much like a creature, only bigger. Which risk seems more serious to you, and why?
- Voluntarism puts the emphasis on will; the earlier intellectualist tradition put it on reason perceiving the good. Does this distinction change how you would explain, to someone else, why God commands what he commands?
- Hebrews 6:17-18 and Galatians 3:15 both describe covenant as something that makes a free party's future behavior more, not less, reliable. Can you think of a modern relationship or institution where a formal, binding commitment functions the same way?