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ST9E Systematic Theology IX: Christian Ethics

Lecture 4-1: Patristic and Medieval Ethics

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Contents 31
ST9E Systematic Theology IX: Christian Ethics
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What Christian Ethics Is, and Why It Comes Last
  1. Introduction: What Christian Ethics Is, and Why It Comes Last
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Foundations and Method in Christian Ethics
  1. Lecture 1-1: What Makes Ethics Distinctly Christian
  2. Lecture 1-2: Scripture, Natural Revelation, and Conscience — Frame's Triperspectival Method
  3. Lecture 1-3: Secular Ethical Theories — Utilitarianism, Deontology, and Virtue Ethics
  4. Lecture 1-4: Natural Law and General Revelation in Ethics
  5. Lecture 1-5: The Structure of Christian Moral Reasoning in Practice
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: Scripture and Redemptive-Historical Ethics
  1. Lecture 2-1: The Structure of Old Testament Law
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Sermon on the Mount as Ethical Vision
  3. Lecture 2-3: Paul and the Indicative-Imperative Pattern
  4. Lecture 2-4: The Unity of the Whole Canon's Ethics
  5. Lecture 2-5: Reading the Bible's Most Difficult Ethical Texts
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: Personal and Relational Ethics
  1. Lecture 3-1: Christian Freedom and the Law
  2. Lecture 3-2: Vocation and Work
  3. Lecture 3-3: Marriage, Sexuality, and the Body
  4. Lecture 3-4: Truth-Telling, Speech, and Digital Communication
  5. Lecture 3-5: Money, Possessions, and Contentment
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: The History of Christian Ethical Reflection
  1. Lecture 4-1: Patristic and Medieval Ethics
  2. Lecture 4-2: Reformation Ethics — Law, Gospel, and the Third Use
  3. Lecture 4-3: Modern Challenges — Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis
  4. Lecture 4-4: Twentieth-Century Christian Ethics — Bonhoeffer and the Limits of Otherwise-Clear Commands
  5. Lecture 4-5: Niebuhr's Christ and Culture and the Church-World Relationship
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: Social, Economic, and Political Ethics
  1. Lecture 5-1: Political Engagement and Civic Responsibility
  2. Lecture 5-2: Economic Justice and Poverty
  3. Lecture 5-3: War, Peace, and Just War Theory
  4. Lecture 5-4: Race, Immigration, and Reconciliation
  5. Lecture 5-5: Environmental Ethics and Creation Care
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: Contemporary and Emerging Ethical Frontiers
  1. Lecture 6-1: Bioethics at the Beginning and End of Life
  2. Lecture 6-2: Artificial Intelligence and Technology Ethics
  3. Lecture 6-3: Sanctity of Life in the Biotech Age
  4. Lecture 6-4: Public Theology and Faithful Presence
  5. Lecture 6-5: Living as Salt and Light

Jump to the key points ↓

20 min

Chapter 3 argued that most of the Christian life is lived in ordinary, recurring decisions, and Chapter 2 argued that Scripture's own ethical material unfolds across redemptive history rather than sitting flat on the page. Neither argument is new to this course. Both were already being worked out, in different vocabulary and against different pressures, by Christians many centuries before this course's readers were born. This lecture examines two of the most influential such attempts: Augustine's account of rightly and wrongly ordered loves, developed at length in City of God, and Thomas Aquinas's natural law synthesis, which built a rational, hierarchical account of law that shaped Catholic moral theology for the better part of a millennium and remains a live conversation partner today, including for readers in this course's own traditions.

Neither figure is presented here as a settled authority whose conclusions this course simply adopts. Both are presented as serious, still-influential attempts to answer a question this course has been asking from Chapter 1 onward: what makes moral reasoning distinctly Christian, rather than a species of philosophy with religious vocabulary layered on top? Augustine's answer runs through the will's proper object — what a person loves, and in what order. Aquinas's answer runs through reason rightly ordered toward the good God has built into creation itself. Reading them together shows two compatible but genuinely distinct emphases within the same broad Christian tradition, each still audible in later chapters of this course.

What these 20 minutes give you

  • State Augustine's distinction, in *City of God*, between the earthly city (loving self to the point of contempt for God) and the heavenly city (loving God to the point of contempt for self), and explain why he frames this as a matter of rightly or wrongly *ordered* loves rather than the mere presence or absence of love.
  • Explain Aquinas's fourfold hierarchy of law (eternal, natural, human, divine) and how each level relates to the others.
  • State what a rational creature's "participation" in the eternal law means for Aquinas, and why this makes natural law knowable in principle by reason apart from special revelation.
  • Compare Augustine's love-ordering framework and Aquinas's natural-law framework: where they agree on the basic claim that Christian ethics is not arbitrary, and where their characteristic emphases differ.
  • Identify at least one criticism each framework has received, and state why neither framework, on its own, has gone unchallenged even within the traditions that most rely on it.

Owe no one anything, except to love one another; for he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law. For the commandments, "You shall not commit adultery," "You shall not murder," "You shall not steal," "You shall not covet," and whatever other commandments there are, are all summed up in this saying, namely, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." Love doesn't harm a neighbor. Love therefore is the fulfillment of the law." — Romans 13:8-10

World English Bible

Paul does not say here that love replaces the law's specific commands, as though "love" were a vague sentiment that makes concrete obligations unnecessary. He says the specific commands are summed up in love — which is to say, rightly ordered love, aimed at the neighbor's actual good rather than at the self's convenience, already contains and motivates everything the individual commandments spell out one at a time. This is the bridge into Augustine's framework below: for Augustine, moral failure is at root a disordering of love — loving the wrong things, or loving the right things in the wrong order, or loving even a good thing (one's own life, one's own reputation) more than the neighbor's good or God's glory require. Romans 13:8-10 gives Augustine's later, more systematic account a text to stand on: love, properly ordered toward its true object, is not one virtue alongside others but the root from which the specific commandments Paul lists here already flow.

1. Augustine: two cities, distinguished by what they love

Augustine wrote City of God (completed around AD 426) in the aftermath of Rome's sack by Alaric's forces in AD 410 — a catastrophe some pagan critics blamed on Rome's abandonment of its traditional gods in favor of Christianity. The book's occasion is defensive, but its argument outgrows its occasion: Augustine uses the crisis to develop a sweeping account of human history as the story of two overlapping, intermingled communities, which he calls the earthly city and the heavenly city. The distinction between them is not primarily political, ethnic, or even institutional — Augustine is explicit that members of both cities live alongside one another, often within the same visible community, and that only the last judgment will finally separate them. The distinction is a distinction of love: "two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self."

That formula rewards slow reading. Augustine is not claiming that citizens of the earthly city love nothing but themselves in some crude, cartoonish sense, or that citizens of the heavenly city hate themselves. He is claiming that every love a person has stands in some order relative to every other love, and that this order — not the mere presence of the loves themselves — determines whether a life is rightly or wrongly directed. Self-love is not, for Augustine, intrinsically sinful; a right, subordinate self-love is part of loving one's neighbor "as yourself" (the standard the Romans 13 text above already assumes as a given). The earthly city's disorder is not that it loves itself, but that it loves itself to the point of contempt for God — meaning self-love has been promoted to the position properly belonging to the love of God, displacing what should have been first. The heavenly city, by contrast, loves God first, and everything else — including oneself — in its proper, subordinate place beneath that first love. "To the contempt of self" does not mean self-hatred; it means a self-love that yields, without resentment, whenever God's claim and the self's preference genuinely conflict.

This ordering language is not incidental vocabulary Augustine happens to use here. It is his consistent account of sin throughout his mature theology: sin is not the introduction of some positively evil substance into an otherwise neutral soul, but a disordering of loves that are each, in their proper place, good. Loving one's family, one's country, one's own body, one's own achievements — none of these loves is sinful as such. Each becomes sinful precisely when it is loved more than it should be relative to God, or pursued instead of a competing good it should have yielded to. This is a genuinely different diagnostic tool than a simple list of forbidden acts: it asks not only "did you do something forbidden" but "what did you love, and in what order, such that this act followed from it." A reader trained on Augustine's framework asks of any specific moral failure not just "which rule was broken" but "which love, in itself often a good one, was allowed to outrank a love that should have come first."

2. Aquinas: law as reason's participation in God's own ordering

Thomas Aquinas, writing eight centuries after Augustine in the Summa Theologiae (the "Treatise on Law," roughly 1265-1274), approaches the same underlying question — what makes an act right or wrong, and how can a rational creature come to know it — from a different angle, one shaped heavily by his engagement with Aristotle's newly recovered philosophical corpus rather than primarily by Platonic categories, as Augustine's thought had been. Where Augustine's central category is love's proper order, Aquinas's central category is law's proper hierarchy, and specifically four distinct but related kinds of law.

Eternal law is God's own rational plan for the whole of creation — the complete ordering, in the mind of God, of all things toward their proper ends. This is the highest and most comprehensive of the four categories; every other kind of law Aquinas describes is, in one way or another, a participation in or derivation from this one. is that portion of the eternal law a rational creature can grasp through reason alone, without needing : because human beings are rational, and because reason is capable of recognizing basic goods (self-preservation, procreation and the raising of children, life in society, the pursuit of truth, worship of God) and the basic principle that good is to be done and evil avoided, natural law is, in Aquinas's famous phrase, "the rational creature's participation in the eternal law." This is the level of Aquinas's system with the most direct bearing on Chapter 1's discussion of natural law and (1-4): Aquinas gives that discussion its classical philosophical form.

Human law is the specific, positive legislation particular societies enact — civil statutes, local customs with legal force — and for Aquinas it derives its genuine authority from natural law, either by direct conclusion (a law against murder simply specifies what natural law already forbids) or by more particular determination (which side of the road to drive on is not itself dictated by natural law, but some determination is needed, and human law supplies it). A human law that directly contradicts natural law, on Aquinas's account, is not truly law at all but a corruption of law — a claim with obvious, if double-edged, force: it grounds a basis for civil disobedience against manifestly unjust legislation, while also raising the hard question, which this course will meet again in 4-4's treatment of Bonhoeffer, of exactly how confident a private individual should be that a given law fails this test before disobeying it. Divine law, finally, is what Scripture reveals directly and that natural reason, on its own, could not fully discover or reliably sustain — chiefly, guidance toward humanity's supernatural end (eternal fellowship with God), which exceeds what unaided reason, however carefully exercised, is capable of working out for itself.

3. Where these two frameworks agree, and where they characteristically differ

Both Augustine and Aquinas agree on something this course has argued from its first lecture: Christian ethics is not arbitrary, and it is not merely a set of religiously flavored preferences layered onto conclusions reached independently by secular reasoning. For Augustine, moral order is grounded in the objective, right ordering of loves toward their true object, God himself; for Aquinas, moral order is grounded in reason's genuine, if partial, access to an objective rational structure God has built into creation. Neither treats "the good" as something human beings invent or merely negotiate among themselves.

Their characteristic emphases differ in a way worth naming carefully, because each has shaped a distinct strand within later Christian ethical reflection. Augustine's framework centers the will and its loves — ethics is, at root, about what a person is oriented toward, and rightly ordered affection matters as much as, or more than, correctly reasoned conclusions. This emphasis surfaces later in traditions (including many strands of Reformation piety, taken up in the next lecture) that are suspicious of purely rationalist accounts of virtue and insist that the heart's affections, not only right belief, must be transformed. Aquinas's framework centers reason and its capacity to grasp real moral structure in creation — ethics is, at root, about correctly perceiving an order that exists whether or not one currently loves it rightly, and moral formation is substantially a matter of training reason to see clearly and act on what it sees. This emphasis surfaces later in the natural-law tradition's confidence that careful moral reasoning, even among people who do not share Christian commitments, can arrive at real, if incomplete, moral truth — precisely the confidence Chapter 1's discussion of natural law (1-4) already engaged.

Neither framework has gone unchallenged, including within its own tradition. Augustine's love-ordering account has been criticized for being difficult to operationalize: telling a person to love God supremely and the neighbor rightly gives less specific guidance for a hard practical case than a rule-based system does, and critics have asked how a person is supposed to know, in the moment, whether a given love has become disordered before the wrongful act it produces has already been done. Aquinas's natural-law account has been criticized, including by later thinkers within the Reformed tradition this course's next lecture will engage, for underestimating how far sin's effects on reason itself — not just on the will — compromise a supposedly neutral rational faculty's ability to read creation's moral order accurately; Chapter 1's engagement with Romans 1:18-32's account of a suppressed moral knowledge (1-4) already raised exactly this concern. Both criticisms deserve to be taken seriously rather than resolved by simply preferring one framework's vocabulary to the other's; this course draws on both frameworks in later chapters without fully adopting either one's complete system.


Two Frameworks, One Claim: Christian Ethics Is Not Arbitrary Augustine: Ordered Loves Earthly city: self-love to the contempt of God Heavenly city: love of God to the contempt of self Sin = a good love wrongly ranked, not a substance introduced Centers the will and its affections Aquinas: Fourfold Law Eternal law — God's rational plan for all things Natural law — reason's participation in it Human law — positive legislation, valid if it derives from natural law Divine law — revealed, toward the supernatural end Centers reason and its grasp of real order Neither framework has gone unchallenged, including within its own tradition

5. Going to the Sources

Read Augustine, City of God, Book XIV, chapter 28 — the short chapter containing the "two loves" formula quoted above in full context. It is one of the most compact statements in the whole work of the claim this lecture has built on: that human history's deepest division runs not along political or ethnic lines but along the axis of what is loved first, and it is worth reading in Augustine's own, more extended phrasing rather than only in summary.

Read also the opening questions of Aquinas's "Treatise on Law" (Summa Theologiae I-II, Question 91, "On the Various Kinds of Law"), where Aquinas first lays out the eternal/natural/human/divine distinction this lecture has summarized. The Question's brief, numbered articles show Aquinas's characteristic method — stating objections fully and fairly before answering them — and are a manageable, representative sample of a much longer treatise.


In short

  • Augustine's City of God describes two cities formed by two loves: the earthly by love of self to the contempt of God, the heavenly by love of God to the contempt of self.
  • For Augustine, sin is a good love ranked wrongly, not an evil substance. The question is not only which rule was broken but which love was allowed to outrank another.
  • Aquinas gives four kinds of law: eternal (God's plan), natural (reason's participation in it), human (positive legislation) and divine (revealed, toward humanity's supernatural end).
  • Natural law is knowable by reason without special revelation. For Aquinas a human law that directly contradicts it is not truly law.
  • Both agree Christian ethics is not arbitrary. Augustine centers the will's loves, Aquinas centers reason, and each framework has drawn criticism.

Topic: Two influential Christian frameworks for ethics: Augustine's ordering of loves and Aquinas's fourfold account of law.

Remember: Augustine asks what a person loves and in what order. Aquinas asks how reason can perceive the moral order God built into creation.

Caution: The lecture adopts neither system fully. Augustine's is criticized as hard to apply, and Aquinas's as underestimating sin's effect on reason.

One line to carry into ministry: When someone fails, ask which good love was put in the wrong place, as well as which rule was broken.

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Reflection and discussion

  • Augustine says sin is a matter of loves wrongly *ordered*, not the presence of an evil substance. Choose an ordinary temptation and describe it in Augustine's terms: which two loves are competing, and which one is being wrongly promoted?
  • Explain in your own words why Aquinas calls natural law "the rational creature's participation in the eternal law." What work is the word "participation" doing in that definition?
  • Aquinas holds that a human law directly contradicting natural law is not truly law at all. What is attractive about this claim, and what makes it hard to apply responsibly in a specific, contested case?
  • This lecture named a criticism of each framework — Augustine's difficulty giving specific guidance, and Aquinas's optimism about unaided reason's access to creation's moral order. Which criticism do you find more serious, and why?

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