Lecture 6-3: Sanctity of Life in the Biotech Age
Contents 31
- Lecture 1-1: What Makes Ethics Distinctly Christian
- Lecture 1-2: Scripture, Natural Revelation, and Conscience — Frame's Triperspectival Method
- Lecture 1-3: Secular Ethical Theories — Utilitarianism, Deontology, and Virtue Ethics
- Lecture 1-4: Natural Law and General Revelation in Ethics
- Lecture 1-5: The Structure of Christian Moral Reasoning in Practice
- Lecture 2-1: The Structure of Old Testament Law
- Lecture 2-2: The Sermon on the Mount as Ethical Vision
- Lecture 2-3: Paul and the Indicative-Imperative Pattern
- Lecture 2-4: The Unity of the Whole Canon's Ethics
- Lecture 2-5: Reading the Bible's Most Difficult Ethical Texts
- Lecture 3-1: Christian Freedom and the Law
- Lecture 3-2: Vocation and Work
- Lecture 3-3: Marriage, Sexuality, and the Body
- Lecture 3-4: Truth-Telling, Speech, and Digital Communication
- Lecture 3-5: Money, Possessions, and Contentment
- Lecture 4-1: Patristic and Medieval Ethics
- Lecture 4-2: Reformation Ethics — Law, Gospel, and the Third Use
- Lecture 4-3: Modern Challenges — Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis
- Lecture 4-4: Twentieth-Century Christian Ethics — Bonhoeffer and the Limits of Otherwise-Clear Commands
- Lecture 4-5: Niebuhr's Christ and Culture and the Church-World Relationship
- Lecture 5-1: Political Engagement and Civic Responsibility
- Lecture 5-2: Economic Justice and Poverty
- Lecture 5-3: War, Peace, and Just War Theory
- Lecture 5-4: Race, Immigration, and Reconciliation
- Lecture 5-5: Environmental Ethics and Creation Care
Lecture 6-1 argued that human dignity is grounded in the image of God rather than in developmental stage, cognitive capacity, or usefulness, and applied that doctrine to abortion and end-of-life care. This lecture takes the same doctrine — deliberately not a new one — into two further areas biotechnology has made newly urgent: genetic engineering, which can now edit a human genome directly, and reproductive technology, which can now create human life outside the process Scripture assumes as normative. Both areas present a genuine promise alongside a genuine peril, and this lecture tries to state each honestly rather than treating either the promise or the peril as the whole story.
Genetic engineering's promise is real: gene-editing tools can treat or prevent serious inherited disease in ways that were simply unavailable a generation ago. Its peril is equally real: the same tools that can correct a disease-causing mutation can, in principle, be used to select for traits that have nothing to do with disease, and the technology's development has already produced at least one documented case of genetically edited human embryos brought to birth outside any responsible ethical or regulatory framework. Reproductive technology's questions are related but distinct: assisted reproduction offers real compassion to couples experiencing the genuine grief of infertility, while raising serious questions about the embryos the process typically creates and about what a technology is actually doing when it separates conception from the marital act Scripture assumes; surrogacy raises further questions about what is being asked of the woman who carries the pregnancy and about the child's own relationship to the adults involved. This lecture engages both areas using the same dignity-of-every-human-life framework Lecture 6-1 established, because these are not, this lecture argues, a new topic requiring a new foundation — they are the same question asked at a different point of biotechnological possibility.
What these 19 minutes give you
- State the distinction between somatic and germline gene editing, and explain why most Christian ethicists draw a much sharper moral line around germline editing than around somatic editing.
- State genetic engineering's genuine promise (treating and preventing serious disease) and its genuine peril (eugenic uses, and the moral status of embryos in some editing and screening processes), using the He Jiankui case as a concrete example.
- Explain the ethical questions raised by assisted reproductive technology, including the moral status of embryos it typically creates, and state Oliver O'Donovan's distinction between "begetting" and "making" as a framework for evaluating it.
- State the specific ethical concerns surrounding surrogacy, and explain why this lecture treats both bioethical topics in this lecture as continuous with, rather than a departure from, Lecture 6-1's framework.
'Your hands have framed me and fashioned me altogether, yet you destroy me. Remember, I beg you, that you have fashioned me as clay. Will you bring me into dust again? Haven't you poured me out like milk, and curdled me like cheese? You have clothed me with skin and flesh, and knit me together with bones and sinews. You have granted me life and loving kindness. Your visitation has preserved my spirit.'" — Job 10:8-12
World English Bible
1. Genetic engineering: the distinction that governs everything else
Job's complaint to God, quoted above, pictures God as the one who directly "framed," "fashioned," and "knit together" a human body — language of careful, personal craftsmanship applied to ordinary human formation in the womb, the same theological ground Lecture 6-1 drew from Psalm 139. Gene-editing technology raises a new question this language does not directly answer: what should Christians make of human hands doing some of that fashioning, deliberately altering the genetic material that shapes a person's body?
The single most important distinction for reasoning carefully here, and one this lecture insists on before going further, is between somatic and germline gene editing. Somatic editing alters the genetic material of a specific patient's body cells — the cells of, say, a person's bone marrow or liver — to treat or prevent a disease in that individual; the change is not passed on to any children that person might have. Germline editing alters the genetic material of embryos, eggs, or sperm, meaning any change made is heritable, passed down to all of that person's descendants without their consent, indefinitely. Most Christian ethicists, along with a substantial majority of the broader bioethics community, treat somatic editing as morally comparable to other forms of medical treatment — using CRISPR-Cas9 technology to correct the mutation causing sickle cell disease in a patient's own blood-forming cells, for instance, raises the same kinds of ordinary medical-ethics questions (safety, informed consent, access and cost) that any novel therapy raises, without introducing a categorically new moral problem. Germline editing is far more contested, for reasons that follow directly from Lecture 6-1's argument: an edited embryo cannot consent to a permanent, heritable alteration of its genome, and neither can any of its future descendants who will carry the same alteration without ever having been asked.
2. Genetic engineering's peril: eugenics and embryo selection
The peril half of this lecture's promise-and-peril structure is not hypothetical. In November 2018, the Chinese biophysicist He Jiankui announced he had used CRISPR gene editing to alter the embryos that became twin girls, attempting to confer resistance to HIV — a germline edit performed without adequate scientific , without the ordinary safeguards of peer review and regulatory oversight, and without a transparent account of the risks to the children involved, who will carry an untested genetic alteration for the rest of their lives and pass it to any children of their own. The case drew swift and nearly universal condemnation from scientists and ethicists across religious and secular lines alike, and this lecture treats it as a concrete, real-world instance of exactly the peril germline editing raises in principle: technology capable of doing real good, applied to embryos who cannot consent, by a process with too little oversight and too much confidence in its own safety.
The deeper peril, of which the He Jiankui case is one instance, is a slide from treating disease toward selecting for traits — a form of what earlier generations called eugenics, though rarely under that name today. Genetic screening technologies already allow parents, in some jurisdictions, to select against embryos carrying conditions such as Down syndrome at very high rates before those embryos are ever implanted; genetic editing raises the further prospect of actively altering embryos for traits that are not diseases at all — height, intelligence, or other characteristics a parent might prefer. Lecture 6-1's doctrine of the speaks directly to this peril: if dignity does not depend on capacity or on meeting a preferred genetic profile, then a practice of selecting against or editing out embryos with disabilities implies that the disabled life being selected against is somehow less worth bringing into being — a conclusion this lecture's whole doctrine of the image of God was built specifically to resist. Naming a genuine medical benefit and a genuine eugenic risk in the same technology is not inconsistency; it is the honest posture the promise-and-peril structure of this lecture requires throughout.
3. Reproductive technology: begetting and making
In vitro fertilization and related assisted reproductive technologies exist because infertility is a real and often profound grief, one Scripture itself does not minimize — the narratives of Sarah, Rachel, and Hannah all treat childlessness as a genuine sorrow met, in each case, by God's own intervening compassion, and a pastorally serious Christian ethic of reproductive technology has to start from real sympathy with that grief rather than from a posture that treats every technological response to it with suspicion.
The Christian ethicist Oliver O'Donovan's Begotten or Made? (1984) supplies this lecture's governing framework for evaluating these technologies without either dismissing the grief they respond to or ignoring the questions they raise. O'Donovan distinguishes begetting — bringing a child into being as the fruit of an act of love between spouses, in which the child is the same kind of being as the parents and comes into existence as a gift rather than a product — from making — bringing something into being as an artifact of a technical process, in which the outcome is designed, evaluated against a specification, and in principle subject to quality control. His argument is not that every use of reproductive technology simply collapses begetting into making; it is that the more a reproductive process resembles manufacture — selecting among multiple embryos for the most desirable one, treating a resulting pregnancy as replaceable if it does not meet expectations, screening out embryos for non-disease traits — the more it treats a child as a product of technique rather than a gift received, in tension with a scriptural view of children as themselves a form of grace rather than an achievement.
Applied to standard in vitro fertilization, this framework raises a specific and serious question this lecture will not pass over: the process typically creates more embryos than will be transferred to the mother's uterus in any given cycle, and the resulting surplus embryos are then frozen indefinitely, donated for research (which typically ends their existence), or discarded. If Lecture 6-1's doctrine of the image of God applies to an embryo from the moment of its formation, as this course has argued, then the routine creation and eventual loss of surplus embryos is not a minor technical detail of the IVF process; it is the same moral question abortion raises, arrived at by an entirely different, and in most cases entirely well-intentioned, route. This lecture does not conclude that every Christian couple facing infertility is therefore forbidden every form of medical assistance; it concludes that the number of embryos created, and what happens to the ones not transferred, are not incidental questions a couple and their physician can set aside, but central ones this lecture's doctrine requires them to face directly.
4. Surrogacy
Gestational surrogacy, in which a woman carries a pregnancy conceived through IVF using another couple's or an intended parent's genetic material, raises questions distinct from IVF's embryo-status question, though it often occurs alongside it. This lecture names two specific concerns rather than treating surrogacy as either straightforwardly acceptable or straightforwardly forbidden. First, commercial surrogacy in particular raises a concern about the commodification of the surrogate's body and of the child she carries: a contractual arrangement, particularly one crossing significant economic disparities between the surrogate and the intended parents, risks treating the woman's reproductive capacity as a service purchased rather than as an act embedded in the personal, relational, and bodily significance Lecture 3-3 argued Scripture attaches to the body itself (1 Corinthians 6:19-20). Second, surrogacy complicates the relational structure a child is born into — a child may have a genetic mother, a gestational mother, and a rearing mother who are three different women, a fragmentation of motherhood this lecture treats as a serious pastoral and relational reality for the resulting child to navigate, not merely a legal technicality to be resolved by contract. Naming these concerns does not require concluding that every instance of surrogacy, including cases undertaken altruistically within a family with no commercial dimension, raises them with equal force; it requires taking the concerns seriously rather than treating the technology's availability as itself sufficient justification for its use.
5. Going to the Sources
Read the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's instruction Dignitas Personae ("The Dignity of a Person," 2008), a Catholic magisterial document addressing precisely the two subjects of this lecture together — assisted reproductive technologies (including the status of embryos created and not transferred) and genetic engineering and gene therapy (including a clear statement of the somatic/germline distinction this lecture relies on). It matters here as a document written specifically to keep pace with biotechnology's rapid development while applying a consistent doctrine of the embryo's dignity from the moment of its formation, the same doctrinal move this lecture makes in extending Lecture 6-1's framework into genetic engineering and reproductive technology rather than treating them as requiring a different foundation.
In short
- This lecture extends 6-1's doctrine of the image of God to genetic engineering and reproductive technology, each of which has a real promise and a real peril.
- Somatic editing changes one patient's body cells and is treated like other medicine. Germline editing is heritable, and the embryo and descendants cannot consent, so it is far more contested.
- The He Jiankui case (2018) shows the peril. The deeper danger is sliding from treating disease to selecting traits, which implies that disabled lives are worth less.
- Oliver O'Donovan contrasts begetting, a child as gift, with making, a child as product. IVF is judged by how closely it resembles manufacture, especially in its treatment of surplus embryos.
- Surrogacy raises concerns about commodification and about fragmented motherhood, though not every case raises them equally.
Topic: This lecture applies the dignity of every human life to gene editing, IVF, and surrogacy, naming both their promise and their peril.
Remember: The line between somatic editing and heritable germline editing governs the lecture, because future descendants cannot consent to a permanent change.
Caution: The lecture does not forbid every form of help for infertile couples. It says the number of embryos created, and what happens to those not transferred, cannot be set aside.
One line to carry into ministry: Meet infertility with real sympathy, and help couples face the questions about embryos and technique before they begin.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- This lecture draws a much sharper moral line around germline editing than somatic editing because germline changes are heritable and cannot be consented to by future descendants. Can you think of a case where a heritable, non-consensual change might nonetheless be widely judged acceptable (consider, for comparison, how societies already make heritable decisions on behalf of children in other domains)? Does that comparison hold up, or does gene editing raise a genuinely different concern?
- O'Donovan's distinction between begetting and making is a framework, not a strict rule that settles every case automatically. Where would you place a couple who create several embryos through IVF, transfer only the number recommended by their physician, and commit in advance to bringing every resulting embryo to term rather than selecting among them? Does this lecture's framework judge that case differently than routine embryo selection, and if so, why?
- This lecture names commodification and the fragmentation of motherhood as its two specific concerns about surrogacy, rather than treating the practice as flatly forbidden or flatly acceptable. What further facts about a specific surrogacy arrangement would most change your own assessment of it?