Lecture 3-3: Medieval to Reformation Christology
목차 33
- Lecture 1-1: What "History of Doctrine" Is, and What Newman and Pelikan Add to It
- Lecture 1-2: Three Theories of How Doctrine Develops
- Lecture 1-3: How the New Testament Canon Was Formed
- Lecture 1-4: Creeds Before the Creeds — The Rule of Faith
- Lecture 2-1: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
- Lecture 2-2: From Nicaea to Constantinople — The Cappadocian Settlement
- Lecture 2-3: The Filioque and Medieval Trinitarian Theology
- Lecture 2-4: Post-Reformation Challenges and the Twentieth-Century Trinitarian Revival
- Lecture 3-1: Before Chalcedon: What Each Side Was Trying to Save
- Lecture 3-2: After Chalcedon: The Definition That Did Not End the Argument
- Lecture 3-3: Medieval to Reformation Christology
- Lecture 3-4: Modern Christology
- Lecture 4-1: The Pelagian Controversy
- Lecture 4-2: Grace in the Medieval Church
- Lecture 4-3: The Reformation and Justification by Faith
- Lecture 4-4: The Arminian Controversy
- Lecture 5-1: The Donatist Controversy and Augustine's Answer
- Lecture 5-2: Medieval Ecclesiology — Seven Sacraments and the Rise of Papal Primacy
- Lecture 5-3: The Reformation Splits Over the Lord's Supper
- Lecture 5-4: The Marks of the Church and Modern Ecumenism
- Lecture 6-1: Theopneustos — The Early Church's Doctrine of Inspiration
- Lecture 6-2: Scripture and Tradition in the Medieval Church — A Dispute About the Dispute
- Lecture 6-3: Sola Scriptura and Trent's Answer — What Each Side Actually Claimed
- Lecture 6-4: Scripture Under Modern Criticism, and the Contemporary Inerrancy Debate
- Lecture 7-1: The Earliest Millennium — Papias, Justin, and Irenaeus
- Lecture 7-2: Augustine and the Church-Age Reading
- Lecture 7-3: Puritan Hope and the Rise of Postmillennialism
- Lecture 7-4: Dispensationalism and the Modern Landscape
It is easy to assume the medieval and Reformation periods mostly argued about grace and the sacraments, and left Christology settled at Chalcedon and Constantinople III. That assumption misses two of the most consequential Christological moves in the church's whole history, both hiding in plain sight inside arguments usually filed under other headings. Anselm of Canterbury's Cur Deus Homo ("Why God Became Man"), read today mostly as an atonement theory, is built entirely on a Christological argument: it asks not "how does Christ save," but "what must Christ be, in his very person, for any of this to be possible at all" — and answers that question before it ever gets to the mechanics of satisfaction. And the sixteenth-century argument that split Lutheran and Reformed Protestants over the Lord's Supper — a dispute chapter 5 will cover from the sacramental side — actually turns on a Christological question first: what happens to Christ's human nature when it is united to his divine nature, and can a human body be, in some sense, everywhere at once?
This lecture also gives Thomas Aquinas his due as the medieval period's most systematic Christological mind, less because any single argument of his was as controversy-generating as Anselm's or the Reformation debate, but because his Summa Theologiae organized and stabilized Chalcedonian and post-Chalcedonian Christology into the form most subsequent Western theology, Catholic and Protestant alike, would build on or react against.
이 20분으로 얻는 것
- Explain why Anselm's satisfaction theory in *Cur Deus Homo* is a Christological argument before it is an atonement theory: why the one who satisfies must, in Anselm's logic, be both fully God and fully man, and could be no one else.
- Describe the basic shape of Aquinas's Christology in the *Summa Theologiae* — his treatment of the hypostatic union, Christ's human knowledge, and Christ's human will — as a systematic ordering of Chalcedonian categories rather than a new departure from them.
- Define the *communicatio idiomatum* ("communication of properties") as the classical Christological principle that properties of either of Christ's natures may be predicated of the one person, and explain why this principle, agreed by all sides, still produced a Reformation-era Lutheran/Reformed split.
- State the specific disagreement over Christ's bodily presence and ubiquity that divided Lutheran and Reformed Christology, and how it fed directly into the Lord's Supper controversy this course covers again in chapter 5.
As they were eating, Jesus took bread, gave thanks for it, and broke it. He gave to the disciples, and said, 'Take, eat; this is my body.' He took the cup, gave thanks, and gave to them, saying, 'All of you drink it,'" — Matthew 26:26-27
World English Bible
Every Christological question in this lecture eventually has to answer to this text, because the Reformation's sharpest Christological argument was fought entirely over how to read four words: "this is my body." Anselm never had to settle that question; Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin could not avoid it, and each side's answer depended directly on a prior, more basic claim about what kind of body the risen and ascended Christ now has, and what the union of his two natures allows that body to do.
1. Anselm: a satisfaction theory that is really a Christology
Anselm of Canterbury wrote Cur Deus Homo around 1098, framing it as an answer to a question unbelievers of his day were actually asking: by what right, and by what necessity, does God become man to save sinners — could God not simply forgive, the way a human ruler might simply pardon a debt by decree? Anselm's answer builds a chain of argument that modern readers usually remember only for its conclusion (Christ's death "satisfies" the offense sin causes against God's honor), but the chain's load-bearing joint is Christological, and it comes before the atonement mechanics: only one who is both fully God and fully man could possibly do what needs doing.
Anselm's reasoning runs, in outline, like this. Sin against an infinite God incurs an infinite debt — a debt no finite creature, however hard it tries, could ever discharge, because everything a creature is and does already belongs to God as its due; there is no surplus a mere human being could offer beyond ordinary obedience to cover an extra debt. So the payment must come from someone with resources beyond any creature's — which means the payer must be God. But the debt is specifically a human debt, incurred by human sin, and Anselm judges it fitting — not logically forced, but fitting to the structure of the problem — that the same nature that incurred the debt should be the one that pays it. So the payer must also be man. Put the two requirements together and Anselm's famous formula falls out: the debt "ought to be paid by man, and only God can pay it — hence it is necessary for a God-Man to pay it." Anselm's argument, notice, is not simply "God became man in order to atone." It is: the very identity of the one Christological figure, one person who is both fully God and fully man, is a logical requirement, not a contingent detail, of the doctrine of the atonement. Read Cur Deus Homo as a Christological argument disguised as a soteriological one and it stops being a strange medieval legal fiction and starts being a direct descendant of the Chalcedonian claim that one person, in two complete natures, is doing the saving.
Anselm's "satisfaction" language, borrowed from the penitential and feudal-honor vocabulary of his own century, is itself a place where different traditions have taken the argument in different directions since — Reformation theologians would later sharpen "satisfaction" into a more explicitly penal and forensic register (satisfying not offended honor but violated justice, and specifically bearing a penalty in the sinner's place), while Eastern Orthodox theology has generally been cooler toward the whole satisfaction framework, preferring the older and -oriented ways of describing what Christ's and death accomplish. This is a point where readers will not agree, and it will recur when chapter 4 covers the history of atonement and in more detail; the note to hold onto here is narrower and less contested: whatever a reader thinks of the satisfaction framework's adequacy as a full theory of the atonement, Anselm's underlying Christological point — that no one less than the God-Man could do what needed doing — is a claim nearly every tradition covered in this course affirms in some form.
2. Aquinas: systematizing a settled Christology
Thomas Aquinas, writing his Summa Theologiae in the 1260s and 1270s, was not trying to reopen any of the questions Chalcedon and Constantinople III had closed. His contribution to Christology is best understood as architectural rather than innovative: he took the settled conciliar categories — one person, two natures, two wills, without confusion or division — and built out a complete, internally consistent structure around them, asking and answering an enormous number of careful, subordinate questions the councils themselves had never needed to address directly. Does Christ's human soul have direct, immediate knowledge of God (the "beatific vision"), alongside ordinary acquired human knowledge gained through experience? Aquinas answers yes to both, distinguishing several kinds of knowledge in Christ operating at once without confusing them. Does Christ's human will, as Constantinople III required, remain genuinely free even though it is also, by grace, incapable of sinning? Aquinas works through exactly how and genuine human freedom can coexist without one canceling the other. None of this is a new Christology; it is Chalcedonian and post-Chalcedonian Christology given its most exhaustive Western scholastic treatment, and it became the reference framework — accepted, modified, or explicitly reacted against — for essentially every subsequent Western Christological discussion, Catholic and Protestant alike, including the Reformation dispute this lecture turns to next.
3. The communicatio idiomatum: one principle, one Reformation-era fight
Communication of properties
Every Chalcedonian theologian, medieval or Reformation, Lutheran or Reformed or Catholic, accepts a principle called the — the "communication of properties" or "exchange of properties." Because Christ is a single person in two natures, properties belonging strictly to one nature may be truthfully predicated of the one person, even though those properties do not thereby transfer into the other nature itself. This is not a controversial or late invention; it is simply Cyril's Christology, worked out in careful sentences. It licenses saying, without contradiction, that "God suffered" (the person who suffered is God, even though suffering belongs properly to the human nature, not the divine) and that "a man is worshipped as Lord of glory" (the person worshipped is a genuine human being, even though "Lord of glory" belongs properly to the divine nature). Both statements are true of the one person; neither implies that the divine nature itself became capable of suffering, or that the human nature itself became, by its own resources, omnipotent.
Where the Reformation-era dispute begins is a further, much more specific question the ancient councils had never needed to resolve: does the communicatio idiomatum permit — or require — the human nature of Christ, specifically, to receive and now really possess certain divine attributes, such as , as a genuine property of that human nature itself, rather than merely being true statements one can make about the person who has that nature?
Martin Luther, arguing against Zwingli's more symbolic reading of "this is my body" (covered fully in chapter 5), needed Christ's actual human body to be genuinely present, everywhere the Supper is celebrated, at the same time. His Christological grounding for that claim is a doctrine usually called the genus majestaticum: because of the personal union, Christ's human nature really does receive, and now really possesses, certain divine attributes — including a form of omnipresence — as its own property, communicated to it through its union with the divine nature, without the human nature thereby ceasing to be genuinely human. On this basis, Christ's glorified human body can be, and according to his own promise is, truly present "in, with, and under" the bread and wine wherever the Supper is rightly celebrated, without needing to leave heaven or be multiplied into many separate bodies.
John Calvin and the Reformed tradition, without denying the communicatio idiomatum as a general principle, rejected this specific application of it, arguing that Luther's genus majestaticum effectively erased the human nature's own proper, creaturely limits — a human body, by definition, is a body precisely because it is located in one place, and a "human nature" that has become omnipresent is a human nature that has stopped being recognizably human in the way Chalcedon meant it. Calvin's alternative, sometimes called the extra Calvinisticum (a label originally used by opponents, though Reformed theologians came to embrace it), holds that the eternal Word, even after and during the incarnation, continues to exist and act also "outside" or "beyond" (extra) the confines of the assumed human nature — the divine Word is never contained by the humanity the way the whole ocean is never contained by a cup, even while genuinely present within it. On this view, Christ's human body remains, as any real human body must, located in one place (now, seated at the Father's right hand in heaven), and the Supper's reality is not the local presence of Christ's physical body on many altars at once, but believers being spiritually lifted by the Holy Spirit to feed on the true body and blood of the ascended Christ — what Reformed theology calls a "spiritual ," genuinely real but not spatially local to the elements.
This is the same live dispute chapter 5 will name again from the sacramental side, and it is worth stating plainly here, in Christological rather than sacramental terms, exactly what divides the traditions, so that no reader mistakes this for a dispute about how seriously each side takes Christ's presence — every position covered here, Lutheran, Reformed, and (waiting until chapter 5 for the fourth position) Zwinglian and Catholic alike, intends to honor Christ's own words and Christ's own reality in the Supper. The disagreement is a genuinely Christological one, about what the personal union does and does not do to the properties of Christ's human nature — and a reader who is Lutheran, Reformed, Catholic, or Zwinglian should each be able to recognize their own tradition's position stated fairly in the paragraphs above.
5. Going to the Sources
- Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo, Book Two, chapters 6-7 — the passage where Anselm states the argument this lecture builds on: that the one who satisfies for sin must be able to give something greater than everything that exists apart from God, which no mere creature can do, and yet the debt is properly man's to pay, "so unless one who is very God pays what is owing... man cannot be saved." Freely available in English translation at ccel.org.
핵심 요약
- Anselm's Cur Deus Homo is a Christological argument before it is a theory of atonement. Sin is an infinite debt, so only God can pay it, yet man owes it, so the payer must be both.
- Traditions differ on "satisfaction." Reformation theologians made it penal, while Eastern Orthodox theology is cooler toward it. Nearly all agree that only the God-Man could do what was needed.
- Aquinas did not add a new Christology. His Summa Theologiae arranged Chalcedonian categories, including Christ's human knowledge and will, into a full system that later Catholic and Protestant theology used or answered.
- All sides accept the communicatio idiomatum: properties of either nature may be said of the one person. So "God suffered" is true, though the divine nature itself did not suffer.
- Luther said Christ's human nature really holds divine attributes such as omnipresence. Calvin said a body stays in one place, and the Word also acts beyond it. This shaped the Lord's Supper dispute.
Topic: This lecture shows how medieval and Reformation thinkers developed Christology, through Anselm, Aquinas, and the Lutheran and Reformed split over Christ's human nature.
Remember: The communicatio idiomatum lets us say true things of the one person. Lutherans and Reformed agree on it but differ on whether the human nature itself holds divine attributes.
Caution: The Lutheran and Reformed split is not about who takes Christ's presence more seriously. Both intend to honor his words. The lecture does not declare a winner.
One line to carry into ministry: When Christians disagree about the Supper, first ask what each side believes about Christ's human nature, and state their view fairly.
스스로 확인해 보세요
읽었는지가 아니라 설명할 수 있는지를 묻는 것입니다. 체크는 이 기기에만 저장됩니다.
묵상 및 토론
- Anselm's argument concludes that a "God-Man" is logically necessary for salvation, not merely a fitting or convenient choice God happened to make. Do you find that stronger claim persuasive, or does it try to prove more than the doctrine actually requires?
- Aquinas's Christology is often described as systematizing rather than innovating. Is there value in a theologian whose main contribution is order and completeness rather than a new argument? What might be lost if every generation instead tried to start over?
- State, as fairly as you can, why a Lutheran believer finds the genus majestaticum necessary to honor Christ's own words at the Supper, and why a Reformed believer finds the extra Calvinisticum necessary to honor what a real human body is. Which concern would you have prioritized if you had been present at Marburg in 1529?
- This lecture argues that a sixteenth-century sacramental dispute is, underneath, a Christological dispute about the human nature's properties. Can you think of a modern theological disagreement that might likewise turn out, on inspection, to rest on a more basic and less-discussed Christological question?