Lecture 3-4: Modern Christology
목차 33
- Lecture 1-1: What "History of Doctrine" Is, and What Newman and Pelikan Add to It
- Lecture 1-2: Three Theories of How Doctrine Develops
- Lecture 1-3: How the New Testament Canon Was Formed
- Lecture 1-4: Creeds Before the Creeds — The Rule of Faith
- Lecture 2-1: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
- Lecture 2-2: From Nicaea to Constantinople — The Cappadocian Settlement
- Lecture 2-3: The Filioque and Medieval Trinitarian Theology
- Lecture 2-4: Post-Reformation Challenges and the Twentieth-Century Trinitarian Revival
- Lecture 3-1: Before Chalcedon: What Each Side Was Trying to Save
- Lecture 3-2: After Chalcedon: The Definition That Did Not End the Argument
- Lecture 3-3: Medieval to Reformation Christology
- Lecture 3-4: Modern Christology
- Lecture 4-1: The Pelagian Controversy
- Lecture 4-2: Grace in the Medieval Church
- Lecture 4-3: The Reformation and Justification by Faith
- Lecture 4-4: The Arminian Controversy
- Lecture 5-1: The Donatist Controversy and Augustine's Answer
- Lecture 5-2: Medieval Ecclesiology — Seven Sacraments and the Rise of Papal Primacy
- Lecture 5-3: The Reformation Splits Over the Lord's Supper
- Lecture 5-4: The Marks of the Church and Modern Ecumenism
- Lecture 6-1: Theopneustos — The Early Church's Doctrine of Inspiration
- Lecture 6-2: Scripture and Tradition in the Medieval Church — A Dispute About the Dispute
- Lecture 6-3: Sola Scriptura and Trent's Answer — What Each Side Actually Claimed
- Lecture 6-4: Scripture Under Modern Criticism, and the Contemporary Inerrancy Debate
- Lecture 7-1: The Earliest Millennium — Papias, Justin, and Irenaeus
- Lecture 7-2: Augustine and the Church-Age Reading
- Lecture 7-3: Puritan Hope and the Rise of Postmillennialism
- Lecture 7-4: Dispensationalism and the Modern Landscape
The modern period did not produce a new ecumenical council to condemn a new heresy the way the ancient and early medieval church had. What it produced instead was a set of questions the ancient categories had never quite had to face: what does it mean, once modern thought has a developed notion of consciousness and psychology, to say the eternal Son "limited himself" in the incarnation — did something change in God? What happens to Christology once historians start asking, with the tools of ordinary historical method rather than confessional assumption, what can actually be known about Jesus of Nazareth as a figure in first-century Palestine? And can theology still do justice to Chalcedon's ancient "from above" starting point — beginning with the eternal Word who takes on flesh — once serious theologians start insisting that any responsible modern Christology has to begin "from below," with the human, historical Jesus, and ask what it would mean for this particular life to turn out to be God's own self-revelation?
This lecture covers three intertwined developments — nineteenth-century kenotic theories, the various "quests" for the historical Jesus, and two influential twentieth-century responses to both, Wolfhart Pannenberg's Christology "from below" and Karl Barth's actualist rereading of Chalcedon — and asks you to test, one more time, whether this chapter's principle survives contact with genuinely new questions the ancient councils never had to answer directly.
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- Explain the kenotic theories' central move (grounding self-limitation in Philippians 2:7's "emptied himself") and the specific problem they were trying to solve: how the Gospels' Jesus can display ordinary human limits (not knowing the day or the hour, growing in wisdom) if he is also, without qualification, omniscient God.
- Describe, in outline, the successive "quests" for the historical Jesus (the nineteenth-century "old quest," Albert Schweitzer's critique of it, the mid-twentieth-century "new quest," and the "third quest") and what each stage judged historical method could and could not recover about Jesus.
- Explain why the historical Jesus question is a genuinely Christological question and not merely a historical curiosity: what is at stake for the doctrine of the incarnation if the "Jesus of history" and the "Christ of faith" turn out to be substantially different figures.
- Describe Pannenberg's Christology "from below" (beginning with the historical Jesus and his resurrection, and arguing toward his deity, rather than beginning with the eternal Word) and Barth's actualist rereading of Chalcedon (Christ's identity as an event of gracious divine self-determination rather than a static compound of two natures), and state what each does, and does not, change from the ancient categories.
who, existing in the form of God, didn't consider equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men." — Philippians 2:6-7
World English Bible
About the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying, 'Eli, Eli, lima sabachthani?' That is, 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?'" — Matthew 27:46
WEB
Both texts sit at the center of this lecture's controversies for the same reason: each has been read, at different points in the last two centuries, as evidence that something in the traditional doctrine needs to give. Philippians 2:7's "emptied himself" (ekenōsen, the verb that gives kenotic theology its name) becomes the biblical anchor for asking whether the Son laid something down, temporarily or really, in becoming man. Matthew 27:46's cry of dereliction becomes, for some questers after the historical Jesus, evidence of a man dying in real, unmitigated despair, and for others, precisely the moment the tradition's Christology has to be able to explain without either explaining it away or letting it dissolve the Son's continuing union with the Father.
1. Kenotic theories: what changes when the Word becomes flesh
By the middle of the nineteenth century, a cluster of Lutheran theologians — Gottfried Thomasius is the name most often credited with the classical statement — proposed a genuinely new answer to a problem the ancient categories had always managed but never fully dissolved: the Gospels plainly show Jesus not knowing certain things (Mark 13:32, on the day and the hour, known "not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father"), growing in wisdom as a child (Luke 2:52), and being genuinely tired, hungry, and limited in ordinary human ways. Classical Christology handled this with the discussed in the previous lecture: these limits belong properly to the human nature, and the divine nature, fully retaining every one of its attributes without diminishment, remains untouched by them even in the closest personal union. Thomasius and the kenoticists judged this answer, however logically consistent, existentially and spiritually thin — it risked making the a kind of costume the divine nature wore without truly, personally sharing in the limitation the human nature experienced, which is close to the very complaint that fueled ancient 's opposite mistake.
Their alternative, grounded in Philippians 2:7's "emptied himself," proposed that in becoming incarnate, the Son genuinely laid aside — for the duration of his earthly life, in the specifically classical kenotic versions — certain of the divine "relative" attributes: , , , retaining the "immanent" or essential attributes (holiness, truth, love, and the like) throughout. On this account, the incarnate Son really did not know the day or the hour, not merely "according to his human nature" as a technical qualification while remaining fully omniscient in his person, but really and simply did not know it, because he had genuinely, if temporarily, set that attribute aside.
The theory's appeal was pastoral and experiential: it let Christians say Christ really shared human limitation from the inside, rather than only from the outside of a nature he also, simultaneously and unaffectedly, transcended. Its cost, which critics on both the confessional Lutheran and the Reformed sides pressed hard, is a genuinely difficult metaphysical question: can God, whose omniscience and omnipotence are not accidental add-ons but constitutive of what it means to be God at all, coherently "set aside" those attributes and remain God during the interval? If the divine nature can lose an attribute, even temporarily, in what sense was it ever necessarily divine to begin with — and does the doctrine of divine , defended so carefully across the patristic controversies this chapter has already covered, survive the claim intact? Classical kenoticism largely faded as a mainstream option by the early twentieth century for exactly this reason, though the underlying pastoral concern it was trying to answer — how seriously the tradition can say the Son shared real human limitation — did not disappear, and resurfaces, in a more modest form, in some later twentieth-century Christologies that speak of the Son's incarnate life involving a genuine functional or experiential self-limitation without going as far as classical kenoticism's claim that a divine attribute itself was actually laid down.
2. The quest(s) for the historical Jesus
A separate, and in the end far more consequential, modern development began not from a doctrinal puzzle inside Christology but from outside it: the rise of applied, for the first time with real rigor, to the Gospels themselves. Hermann Samuel Reimarus, whose posthumously published fragments in the late eighteenth century are usually credited with opening what is now called the "old quest" for the historical Jesus, argued that the Jesus recoverable by ordinary historical method — a failed apocalyptic Jewish prophet — was substantially different from the divine Christ of church proclamation, which Reimarus judged to be a construction of the disciples after Jesus's death rather than a claim Jesus himself made. Across the nineteenth century, a long series of scholars — David Friedrich Strauss's mythological reading, Ernest Renan's romantic biography, and dozens of "lives of Jesus" attempting to reconstruct, behind the Gospels' theological overlay, a plausible historical figure — tried variations on the same basic project: strip away what each scholar judged to be later theological accretion, and recover the human Jesus underneath.
Albert Schweitzer's The Quest of the Historical Jesus (first published in German in 1906) delivered the old quest's most devastating internal critique, and it is worth taking seriously precisely because Schweitzer was not a defender of traditional orthodoxy trying to protect the tradition from historical criticism — he was himself a critical historian, arguing on critical grounds. Schweitzer's central charge was that a full century of "lives of Jesus" scholars had, one after another, produced a Jesus who looked suspiciously like a nineteenth-century liberal Protestant moral teacher — because each scholar had unconsciously read his own modern values back into the historical reconstruction, and then discovered, unsurprisingly, a Jesus who confirmed them. Schweitzer's own alternative reconstruction went the opposite direction: a genuinely strange, thoroughly first-century Jewish apocalyptic prophet, expecting the imminent end of the age, whose message is not readily domesticated into a timeless ethical teacher at all. Schweitzer's book effectively closed the old quest by showing that its method, applied honestly, produced a Jesus far less useable for liberal Protestant purposes than its practitioners had hoped, and for several decades afterward, serious scholarly energy for constructing a "life of Jesus" mostly went quiet, partly under the added influence of Rudolf Bultmann's mid-century skepticism about how much could be recovered behind the Gospels' proclamation () at all, and his corresponding judgment that faith should not be made to depend on the results of historical reconstruction in the first place.
A "new quest" began in the 1950s among some of Bultmann's own students (Ernst Käsemann's 1953 lecture is usually cited as its opening), arguing, against their teacher, that some continuity between the earthly Jesus and the church's later proclamation had to be recoverable and theologically necessary, even if the criteria for establishing it had to be far more cautious than the old quest's confident biographies. From the 1980s onward, a "third quest" — the label is now common though scholars dispute exactly when it began and who belongs in it — brought a wealth of new evidence and method to the table (Second Temple Jewish sources, archaeology, social-historical reconstruction of first-century Galilee) and produced a range of pictures of Jesus (apocalyptic prophet, Jewish reformist sage, social revolutionary, and others) considerably more diverse, and more firmly located within first-century Judaism rather than against it, than either the old or the new quest had managed.
3. Why this is a Christological question, not only a historical one
It would be a mistake to file the historical Jesus question under "New Testament studies" and consider it irrelevant to a course on doctrinal history. The stakes are exactly the stakes this whole chapter has traced from Apollinarius onward: can the object of historical inquiry — a first-century Jewish man, reconstructable in principle by the same methods historians use for any other ancient figure — be, without remainder, the same subject the church confesses as the eternal Son of God? If "the Jesus of history" turns out, on the best available critical reconstruction, to be a figure who never claimed anything like what the church's Christ claims, later Christology faces a version of the very problem Nestorius's critics thought they saw in his own language: two figures, loosely associated, rather than one. If, on the other hand, the church's confession and a defensible historical reconstruction of Jesus of Nazareth can be shown to cohere — not because historical method can prove the resurrection or the incarnation, which lie outside what historical method as such can adjudicate, but because the reconstructed Jesus is not straightforwardly incompatible with the church's claims about him — then the ancient conviction that the Redeemer really did live a genuine, particular, locatable human life gets a modern kind of confirmation the ancient councils never had access to, and never needed.
4. Pannenberg: Christology from below
Wolfhart Pannenberg, most fully in his 1964 work usually translated Jesus — God and Man, proposed a methodological reversal deliberately described as Christology "from below" rather than the traditional "from above." Classical Christology, from the patristic period through Aquinas and beyond, begins with the eternal Word — a claim about who this figure eternally is — and then works outward to explain how that eternal person could also live a genuine human life; the doctrine of the incarnation is, so to speak, the starting premise of the whole system. Pannenberg proposed instead beginning with what can actually be established about the historical Jesus of Nazareth — including, crucially, the resurrection, which Pannenberg treated as a genuine, arguable historical event rather than a pure article of faith immune to historical inquiry — and then asking what Jesus's identity as this particular historical figure, vindicated by God in the resurrection, shows about who he must, retrospectively, always have been. On Pannenberg's account, it is specifically the resurrection that discloses, after the fact, Jesus's eternal unity with the Father — not that Jesus became divine at the resurrection, but that the resurrection is the event through which his eternal identity is actually revealed and can be historically argued for, rather than simply assumed as a starting confessional premise.
Pannenberg's approach drew real criticism from more traditional quarters for seeming to make the doctrine of the incarnation dependent on the results of historical argument in a way that leaves faith more exposed to historical revision than classical Christology ever was, and for arguably reversing, rather than merely supplementing, the church's traditional order of theological reasoning. Its defenders respond that Pannenberg was not abandoning "from above" claims about Christ's eternal identity, only insisting that modern theology owes the modern historical consciousness an honest account of how those claims can be responsibly reached, rather than simply asserted from a confessional starting point historical method cannot itself access.
5. Barth: an actualist rereading of Chalcedon
Karl Barth, whose Trinitarian theology chapter 2 has already introduced, approached the same modern pressures from a strikingly different direction — not reversing the ancient order of "from above" and "from below," but reworking what "from above" itself means. Barth's Christology, developed at great length across the volumes of his Church Dogmatics, retains and explicitly affirms Chalcedon's substance — one person, two natures, without confusion or division — while insisting that the traditional language risks being heard as describing a static compound, two ready-made ingredients mixed together once and then simply sitting there as a finished fact. Barth's own emphasis is actualist: Christ's identity is not a static state but a living, ongoing event of gracious divine self-determination — God actively electing, in Jesus Christ, from eternity, to be God only ever as the God who is for humanity and united with humanity, so that the incarnation is not something that happens to an otherwise unrelated divine nature but is itself the concrete form God's own eternal self-determination takes. Barth's doctrine of , folding Christology and the doctrine of God's eternal decree together in a way earlier Reformed theology (including Calvin's own) had generally kept more separate, is one of the most discussed and most disputed features of his entire theology, and readers should know that this is very much a live and contested area of Barth interpretation, not a settled consensus even among Barth's admirers.
What Barth does not do, and this is worth stating clearly against a common misreading, is abandon two natures for one, or dissolve Christ's full deity or full humanity into pure event language with no stable content — he intends his actualism as a rereading of what Chalcedon's static-sounding formula was always actually describing (a real, concrete, personal union, not an abstract compound of properties), not as a replacement for it. Whether that intention succeeds, and whether Barth's own account remains recognizably Chalcedonian on close examination or quietly moves the doctrine somewhere Chalcedon's authors would not recognize, is itself argued among specialists, and this course does not attempt to settle that specialist argument for you.
6. What survives, across sixteen centuries and two very different kinds of question
Notice, closing this chapter, what has and has not changed between Apollinarius in the 370s and Pannenberg and Barth in the twentieth century. The ancient controversies argued in the vocabulary of nature, person, and will; the modern controversies argue in the vocabulary of consciousness, historical method, and event. But the underlying stakes have not moved: kenotic theology worried that classical Christology could not do justice to how fully Christ shared human limitation — the same worry, transposed, that drove Apollinarius to want one undivided subject rather than a partnership. The historical Jesus question worried that the church's Christ might turn out not to be, without remainder, the same figure a historian can locate in first-century Palestine — the same worry, transposed, that drove Nestorius's opponents to insist on one subject rather than two. Pannenberg and Barth, from different directions, both insisted that modern theology still had to say, in some form suited to its own century's questions, that the Redeemer must be exactly what needed redeeming — genuinely, humanly, historically there — and exactly able to redeem it — genuinely, truly, eternally God. The vocabulary changed across sixteen centuries. The claim both sides were protecting, every time, did not.
5. Going to the Sources
- Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus (1906; English translation 1910), especially the concluding chapter's assessment of the nineteenth-century "lives of Jesus" and Schweitzer's own sketch of Jesus as a first-century apocalyptic figure — the single most consequential critical verdict on the old quest, written by a working historian rather than a defender of traditional dogma. Freely available in English translation at archive.org.
핵심 요약
- Nineteenth-century kenotic theologians such as Thomasius read Philippians 2:7 to say the Son laid aside attributes like omniscience. Critics asked whether God can set aside attributes and stay God, and classical kenoticism faded.
- The quests for the historical Jesus began with Reimarus. Schweitzer, a critical historian, argued that scholars found a Jesus who matched their own values. The new quest and third quest followed.
- The question matters for doctrine: can the historian's Jesus be, without remainder, the Son of God the church confesses, or are they two different figures?
- Pannenberg began from below, with the historical Jesus and the resurrection, and argued toward his deity. Critics feared faith would depend on historical results.
- Barth kept Chalcedon but read it as an event of God's gracious self-determination, not a static compound. Specialists still dispute whether he stays Chalcedonian.
Topic: This lecture follows modern Christology through kenotic theories, the quests for the historical Jesus, and the responses of Pannenberg and Barth.
Remember: The modern questions use new words, but the claim being protected is the same: Christ is truly human and truly God.
Caution: Barth does not give up two natures, and Pannenberg does not say Jesus became divine at the resurrection. The lecture also does not settle the specialist disputes.
One line to carry into ministry: Honest historical questions about Jesus need not frighten us, but keep Christ both fully human and fully God.
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묵상 및 토론
- Kenotic theology was motivated by a real pastoral concern — that classical Christology could sound as though the divine nature never truly shared human limitation from the inside. Do you think the concern is legitimate, even if you are not persuaded by the classical kenotic solution? What alternative would you propose?
- Schweitzer's critique of the old quest was that each generation of scholars tended to find a Jesus who confirmed its own values. Is that danger unique to nineteenth-century liberal Protestant scholarship, or does every generation, including our own, risk the same thing when it reconstructs Jesus?
- Explain in your own words why the historical Jesus question is a genuinely Christological problem and not merely a question for New Testament specialists. What would be at stake for the doctrine of the incarnation if a defensible historical reconstruction of Jesus turned out to be flatly incompatible with the church's confession?
- Pannenberg argues from below, Barth reworks what "from above" means without abandoning it. Which approach do you find more persuasive as a way of speaking to a modern reader who takes historical method seriously, and why?