Lecture 5-3: The Church and the State
Contents 31
- Lecture 1-1: What the Church Is — Ekklesia and the New Testament's Images
- Lecture 1-2: The Church's Old Testament Roots and New Testament Founding
- Lecture 1-3: The Visible and Invisible Church
- Lecture 1-4: The Marks and Attributes of the Church
- Lecture 1-5: Church Membership and Boundaries
- Lecture 2-1: Why Polity Is a Theological Question
- Lecture 2-2: Episcopal Polity
- Lecture 2-3: Presbyterian Polity
- Lecture 2-4: Congregational Polity
- Lecture 2-5: The Offices of Elder and Deacon
- Lecture 3-1: Sacrament or Ordinance? Framing the Question
- Lecture 3-2: Baptism — Meaning and Mode
- Lecture 3-3: The Lord's Supper — Four Views
- Lecture 3-4: Who May Come to the Table, and How Often
- Lecture 3-5: The Sacraments as Means of Grace
- Lecture 4-1: A Biblical Theology of Gathered Worship
- Lecture 4-2: The Regulative and Normative Principles of Worship
- Lecture 4-3: Preaching and the Ministry of the Word
- Lecture 4-4: The Elements of Corporate Worship
- Lecture 4-5: Worship Across Cultures
- Lecture 5-1: Evangelism and Social Action
- Lecture 5-2: The Church and Culture
- Lecture 5-3: The Church and the State
- Lecture 5-4: The Church and Social Justice
- Lecture 5-5: Global Mission and the Church's Sending Task
Few questions in this course carry higher real-world stakes for readers than this one. Some of this course's students live where the church has never had to negotiate its relationship with a hostile or indifferent state, because the state has long identified itself as Christian; others live where confessing Christ publicly carries genuine legal or social risk; still others live in officially secular states that treat religious commitment as a purely private matter with no claim on public life. All of these are, whether recognized as such or not, applications of one or another historic Christian model of how church and state ought to relate — models this lecture surveys not to declare one correct for all times and places, but so that readers can recognize which inherited framework is actually shaping their own instincts on the question.
Three models anchor the survey. The Constantinian settlement, beginning in the fourth century, brought church and state into close alliance, with the state actively favoring, funding, and sometimes enforcing Christian orthodoxy. Anabaptist separatism rejected that alliance root and branch, insisting the church must remain visibly distinct from, and refuse the coercive power of, any state — a position sometimes called the "peace church" tradition for its accompanying rejection of Christian participation in violence, including state violence. Luther's two-kingdoms framework charted a third course, distinguishing God's spiritual rule through the gospel from God's temporal rule through civil government, obligating Christians to both without collapsing either into the other — a framework later Reformed thinkers developed in importantly different directions. The lecture closes by connecting all three to the question of religious liberty, which, as history shows, has been defended by faithful Christians reasoning from more than one of these frameworks, not only from the model most associated with modern liberal democracy.
What these 22 minutes give you
- Describe the Constantinian settlement, its historical origin and rationale, and at least one major criticism of the church-state alliance it produced.
- State Anabaptist separatism's rationale for refusing coercive state power, including its "peace church" commitments, and name at least one document or figure associated with the position.
- State Luther's two-kingdoms distinction accurately, including what obligations it places on Christians toward each kingdom, and note at least one way later Reformed thought developed the idea differently than Luther himself did.
- Exegete Romans 13:1-7 and Matthew 22:15-22 well enough to state what each does and does not settle about the state's authority and its limits.
- Explain why religious liberty has been, and can be, defended from more than one of these three frameworks rather than belonging exclusively to one.
Let every soul be in subjection to the higher authorities, for there is no authority except from God, and those who exist are ordained by God. Therefore he who resists the authority, withstands the ordinance of God; and those who withstand will receive to themselves judgment. For rulers are not a terror to the good work, but to the evil. Do you desire to have no fear of the authority? Do that which is good, and you will have praise from the same, for he is a servant of God to you for good. But if you do that which is evil, be afraid, for he doesn't bear the sword in vain; for he is a servant of God, an avenger for wrath to him who does evil. Therefore you need to be in subjection, not only because of the wrath, but also for conscience' sake. For this reason you also pay taxes, for they are servants of God's service, attending continually on this very thing. Give therefore to everyone what you owe: taxes to whom taxes are due; customs to whom customs; respect to whom respect; honor to whom honor." — Romans 13:1–7
World English Bible
Then the Pharisees went and took counsel how they might entrap him in his talk. They sent their disciples to him, along with the Herodians, saying, 'Teacher, we know that you are honest, and teach the way of God in truth... Tell us therefore, what do you think? Is it lawful to pay taxes to Caesar, or not?' But Jesus perceived their wickedness, and said, 'Why do you test me, you hypocrites? Show me the tax money.' They brought to him a denarius. He asked them, 'Whose is this image and inscription?' They said to him, 'Caesar's.' Then he said to them, 'Give therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's.'" — Matthew 22:15–22
WEB
Paul's instruction in Romans 13 is addressed to Christians living under a pagan, at times actively hostile, Roman state, and it grounds civil authority's legitimacy in God's own ordination rather than in the ruler's own virtue or the state's religious character — a claim that, notably, applies to Nero's Rome as readily as to any later "Christian" government, which already complicates any reading of the passage as endorsing a particular arrangement between church and state rather than the state's authority as such. Jesus's answer in Matthew 22 is famously compact and has been read in sharply different directions: it can be heard as granting Caesar a real, legitimate sphere ("the things that are Caesar's") while insisting that sphere does not exhaust human obligation ("the things that are God's"), but the passage does not itself specify where that boundary runs, which is exactly the question the three historic models below answer differently.
1. The Constantinian settlement
When the Roman emperor Constantine, following his professed conversion, issued the Edict of Milan (313) establishing toleration for Christianity and began actively favoring the church with patronage, legal privilege, and eventually (under Theodosius I, 380) established Christianity as the empire's official religion, the church moved within roughly two generations from a persecuted minority to the empire's favored, then sole legally recognized, faith. The historian and theologian Eusebius of Caesarea, an early and enthusiastic chronicler of Constantine's reign, articulated what later scholarship calls a "Constantinian" political theology: the Christian emperor as God's chosen instrument, extending Christ's kingdom through imperial power, with church and state functioning as two aspects of a single Christian society. This settlement produced enormous, lasting institutional stability for the church — an end to persecution, resources for theological scholarship and the great ecumenical councils this course's earlier chapters have already discussed, and the eventual Christianization of much of Europe — and it produced correspondingly serious costs: religious coercion of dissenters and non-Christians, the church's own moral authority becoming entangled with, and at times captive to, state interests, and a habit of assuming "Christian society" and "the church" were nearly identical categories, a habit whose long afterlife shows up repeatedly across this course's later material (Lecture 5-4's discussion of Christendom-era social ethics, and Lecture 6-3's ecumenical material, both assume readers understand what this settlement was and is not).
2. Anabaptist separatism
The radical wing of the sixteenth-century Reformation drew the opposite conclusion from the same history: if Constantine's settlement had corrupted the church by fusing it with coercive state power, the remedy was not reform within that fusion but separation from it altogether. The Schleitheim Confession (1527), one of the earliest Anabaptist confessional statements, states plainly that "the sword is ordained of God outside the perfection of Christ" — meaning civil government and its coercive power belong to a fallen order God still permits and even uses, but true disciples of Christ, called to the "perfection of Christ," should not themselves wield it, whether as magistrates, soldiers, or judges imposing capital punishment. This produced the historic "peace church" tradition (Mennonite, Amish, Hutterite, and later Brethren communities), whose members have refused military service, civil oaths, and often direct political office as inconsistent with following a Christ who "did not resist evil" (an appeal to Matthew 5:39) and who told Peter to put away his sword (Matthew 26:52). John Howard Yoder's The Politics of Jesus (1972), already engaged in Lecture 5-2 for its critique of Niebuhr, extends this tradition's logic into a fully worked political theology: Jesus's crucifixion is itself, on Yoder's reading, evidence that Jesus's kingdom operates by suffering, nonviolent love rather than by the coercive power any state, however well-intentioned, ultimately relies on — which means the church's is to witness to a genuinely different politics, not to seize or sanctify the state's, however Christian the state's rulers profess to be.
3. Luther's two kingdoms, and later developments
Martin Luther charted a course between full alliance and full separation. His two-kingdoms doctrine distinguishes God's rule "on the right hand" — the spiritual kingdom, governed by the gospel, exercised through preaching and faith, addressed to believers as believers — from God's rule "on the left hand" — the temporal kingdom, governed by law and the sword, addressed to all people regardless of faith, restraining sin and preserving civil order through governments, courts, and even non-Christian rulers. Luther could therefore urge Christians to submit to civil authority (reading Romans 13 much as this lecture has presented it above) while simultaneously insisting the state has no authority to compel belief or coerce conscience in spiritual matters — a distinction that let Luther resist both a Constantinian fusion of the two kingdoms into one and an Anabaptist refusal to occupy civil office at all, since for Luther a Christian could serve as a magistrate, wielding the sword in the temporal kingdom's proper business, without thereby compromising the spiritual kingdom's separate, non-coercive character.
Many two kingdoms views
Later Reformed theology inherited Luther's basic distinction but developed it in directions Luther himself did not take, and it matters to name that this is a family of positions rather than one fixed doctrine. Some Reformed communities, particularly in the Calvinist tradition of Geneva and later Scotland and New England, pressed toward a model closer to Christendom than Luther's own — civil magistrates with a positive duty to uphold and even enforce true religion, reflected in confessional statements like the original Westminster Confession's chapter 23, "Of the Civil Magistrate," which assigned the magistrate authority to "take order" that unity and truth be preserved in the church, language most Presbyterian denominations have since revised or removed. More recently, a body of Reformed writers (sometimes grouped under a "two kingdoms" label of their own, drawing explicitly on Luther's terminology while working within Reformed theology) has argued the opposite direction, insisting the state has no competence in specifically religious or ecclesiastical matters at all and should be strictly limited to common, non-redemptive concerns like justice and order — a reading that sits closer to Luther's original distinction than the Westminster Confession's own historic language does. The name "two kingdoms" therefore covers a real spectrum, and readers encountering it should ask which version — Luther's own, the more Christendom-leaning Reformed appropriation, or the more strictly limited recent Reformed development — a given writer actually intends.
4. Religious liberty from more than one framework
It would be a mistake to assume religious liberty is simply the Anabaptist position's eventual historical vindication, as though only "peace church" separatism could ever ground a defense of freedom of conscience. The Baptist minister Roger Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony and an influential early advocate of religious liberty in the American context, argued from convictions with real affinities to Anabaptist separatism — a "wall of separation" (his own phrase, later borrowed by Thomas Jefferson) protecting the church's spiritual integrity from state entanglement, and protecting individual conscience from state coercion in religious matters. But religious liberty has also been defended from within frameworks much closer to the other two models surveyed here. Vatican II's declaration Dignitatis Humanae (1965), issued by a communion whose historic political theology sits far closer to a Christendom inheritance than to Anabaptist separatism, argued that the human person's dignity itself, and not merely prudential toleration of error, requires that no one be coerced in matters of religious conviction — a genuinely new development within Catholic teaching, defended from within a tradition that had not historically organized its political theology around separatist premises at all. Likewise, a two-kingdoms framework, properly applied, supplies its own independent argument for religious liberty: if the temporal kingdom's authority genuinely does not extend to compelling belief, because belief belongs to the spiritual kingdom's separate jurisdiction, then a two-kingdoms Christian can defend religious liberty as a direct entailment of Luther's own distinction, without needing to borrow Anabaptist or modern liberal premises to get there. The historical result is that religious liberty, as it exists in most contemporary legal orders, was not the achievement of a single Christian political theology defeating its rivals, but a point multiple, otherwise quite different, Christian traditions converged on from their own internal resources — a fact worth remembering by any reader tempted to think their own tradition's framework is the only one capable of producing it.
5. Reading Romans 13 and Matthew 22 without overreaching
Both texts are compact enough to be pressed into the service of whichever of the three models a reader already holds, and this lecture resists that overreach in both directions. Romans 13 grounds civil authority's legitimacy in God's ordaining will, but it neither identifies which model of church-state relationship God has ordained nor claims civil authority is beyond all limit — the same New Testament that contains Romans 13 also contains Peter and John's declaration before the Jewish council, "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29), which every one of the three models surveyed here accepts as a real, if rarely invoked, limit on Romans 13's scope. Matthew 22's "things that are Caesar's" and "things that are God's" is compact for a reason — Jesus declines to specify the boundary in the moment, precisely because answering the Pharisees' trap question directly (in either direction) would have handed his opponents exactly the political weapon they were fishing for. What the text supplies is the shape of an answer — Caesar has a real, legitimate claim, and God's claim is not thereby exhausted or subordinated to it — without supplying the detailed political theology needed to specify, case by case, where Caesar's legitimate claim ends. That specification is exactly the work the three historic models above, each in its own way, have tried to do.
5. Going to the Sources
The Schleitheim Confession (1527), Article VI, "Of the Sword," is the anchor primary document for the Anabaptist position: it states that the sword is "ordained of God outside the perfection of Christ" for punishing evil and protecting the good, but that this "does not befit a Christian," concluding that true believers should neither hold civil magisterial office nor use the sword themselves. Reading the article in full shows a position argued from a specific Christology (the church is called to "the perfection of Christ," a standard the author holds distinct from, and higher than, the standard God still applies to the wider fallen order) rather than from pacifism as a free-standing political preference — which matters for evaluating the position on its own terms rather than a simplified version of it.
In short
- Readers live under very different states, so the lecture surveys three historic models of church and state. It does not choose one for all times and places.
- The Constantinian settlement brought stability, resources for the councils and the Christianization of Europe. It also brought coercion of dissenters and a church entangled with state interests.
- Anabaptists, citing the Schleitheim Confession (1527), refused the sword, oaths and often office. John Howard Yoder argues that Jesus's kingdom works by suffering, nonviolent love.
- Luther's two kingdoms separate the gospel's spiritual rule from the temporal rule of law and sword. Later Reformed heirs developed this in both Christendom-leaning and strictly limited directions.
- Religious liberty has been defended from several frameworks: Roger Williams, Dignitatis Humanae (Vatican II), and two-kingdoms logic. No single tradition produced it alone.
- Romans 13:1-7 and Matthew 22:15-22 give the shape of an answer. Acts 5:29 limits civil authority, but none of the texts says where the boundary runs.
Topic: This lecture surveys the Constantinian, Anabaptist and two-kingdoms models of church and state, and shows that religious liberty has been defended from more than one of them.
Remember: Romans 13 and Matthew 22 give the shape of an answer, not the boundary. Each historic model tries to draw that boundary in its own way.
Caution: "Two kingdoms" names a spectrum of Reformed positions, not one doctrine. The lecture does not claim that one model is correct everywhere, or that one tradition alone gave us religious liberty.
One line to carry into ministry: Know which inherited model shapes your instincts about the state, and remember that "We must obey God rather than men" limits every model.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Which of the three models — Constantinian, Anabaptist separatist, or two kingdoms — most closely resembles the actual, lived relationship between church and state where you live? Is that resemblance the result of deliberate theological conviction in your tradition, or more a historical accident?
- Romans 13 was written to Christians under a pagan and, within a generation, actively persecuting empire. Does knowing that changes how you read its command to "be in subjection to the higher authorities"? Does it make the command harder or easier to accept?
- This lecture argues religious liberty can be defended from more than one of the three frameworks. Pick two of the three and state, in your own words, how each would ground a case for religious liberty using only its own internal resources.