Lecture 1-1: The Avignon Papacy and the "Babylonian Captivity"
목차 85
- Lecture 1-1: The Avignon Papacy and the "Babylonian Captivity"
- Lecture 1-2: The Western (Papal) Schism, 1378-1417
- Lecture 1-3: Conciliarism and the Council of Constance
- Lecture 1-4: Popular Piety on the Eve of Reform
- Lecture 2-1: John Wycliffe and Dominion by Grace
- Lecture 2-2: The Lollards and the Wycliffite English Bible
- Lecture 2-3: Jan Hus at Prague
- Lecture 2-4: The Council of Constance and the Execution of Hus
- Lecture 3-1: Ad Fontes — The Renaissance Recovery of Languages and Its Christian Turn
- Lecture 3-2: Northern Christian Humanism as a Reform Movement — Reuchlin and Colet
- Lecture 3-3: Erasmus's Greek New Testament — Scholarship, Limits, and Consequences
- Lecture 3-4: Erasmus and the Reformation — Alliance and Rupture
- Lecture 4-1: The Printing Press and the Speed of an Idea
- Lecture 4-2: Cities, Guilds, and Universities as Carriers of Reform
- Lecture 4-3: The Holy Roman Empire and the Grievances of the German Nation
- Lecture 4-4: Europe Around 1500 — A Different Moment, Not a Destined One
- Lecture 5-1: An Unremarkable Beginning
- Lecture 5-2: The Vow at Stotternheim and Entry into the Cloister
- Lecture 5-3: Anfechtung and the Mentor Who Could Not Follow Where It Led
- Lecture 5-4: The Tower Experience, and What Luther's Memory May Have Compressed
- Lecture 6-1: What an Indulgence Actually Was
- Lecture 6-2: The Money Behind the Sermon — Albrecht, the Fuggers, and Rome
- Lecture 6-3: Reading the Theses Themselves
- Lecture 6-4: Heidelberg, 1518 — A Theology of the Cross
- Lecture 7-1: Leipzig and the Turn Toward 1520
- Lecture 7-2: Augsburg, 1518 — The First Interrogation
- Lecture 7-3: To the Christian Nobility and the Three Walls
- Lecture 7-4: The Babylonian Captivity and The Freedom of a Christian
- Lecture 8-1: Justification by Faith, Stated Precisely
- Lecture 8-2: The Scriptural Case — Romans, Galatians, and Abraham
- Lecture 8-3: Law and Gospel
- Lecture 8-4: The September Testament and the Word "Allein"
- Lecture 9-1: Karlstadt's Wittenberg and Luther's Return
- Lecture 9-2: The Zwickau Prophets and the Challenge of Spiritualism
- Lecture 9-3: The Invocavit Sermons and the Limits of Force
- Lecture 9-4: Adiaphora — Things Indifferent
- Lecture 10-1: The Twelve Articles of the Peasants
- Lecture 10-2: Thomas Müntzer and the Battle of Frankenhausen
- Lecture 10-3: Luther's Two 1525 Writings on the War
- Lecture 10-4: The Two Kingdoms Doctrine
- Lecture 11-1: The Diets of Speyer and the Protestation
- Lecture 11-2: The Augsburg Confession
- Lecture 11-3: The Schmalkaldic League and Its Defeat at Mühlberg
- Lecture 11-4: The Peace of Augsburg (1555)
- Lecture 12-1: Zwingli's Arrival in Zurich and the Rule of Worship
- Lecture 12-2: Zwingli's Formation — Humanist, Chaplain, Not a Monk
- Lecture 12-3: Sausages and Disputations — Authority Shifts to the Council
- Lecture 12-4: Rebuilding Zurich's Worship
- Lecture 13-1: Stating the Dispute — Real Presence Against Memorial Sign
- Lecture 13-2: The Exegetical Machinery — Communicatio Idiomatum and "The Flesh Profits Nothing"
- Lecture 13-3: The Marburg Colloquy — Fourteen Articles and One That Was Not
- Lecture 13-4: What Settled Out — Two Traditions, and Zwingli's Wars Ahead
- Lecture 14-1: The Swiss Brethren and the First Rebaptisms
- Lecture 14-2: A Capital Crime — Zurich, Rome, and the Drowning of Felix Manz
- Lecture 14-3: The Schleitheim Confession — A Church Fully Separated
- Lecture 14-4: Münster, Menno Simons, and a Movement's Two Faces
- Lecture 15-1: Calvin's Conversion and the First Institutes
- Lecture 15-2: French Evangelicalism and the Affair of the Placards
- Lecture 15-3: The Institutes Across Its Editions, 1536-1559
- Lecture 15-4: Calvin as Commentator and Preacher
- Lecture 16-1: Geneva Twice — Expulsion, Strasbourg, and Return
- Lecture 16-2: The Ecclesiastical Ordinances and the Consistory
- Lecture 16-3: Predestination — Calvin's Pastoral Doctrine and Beza's System
- Lecture 16-4: Michael Servetus and the Geneva Academy
- Lecture 17-1: Why the Genevan Model Traveled
- Lecture 17-2: The Huguenots — Organizing Under Persecution
- Lecture 17-3: The Dutch Reformation and Its Two Confessions
- Lecture 17-4: John Knox and Scottish Presbyterianism
- Lecture 18-1: The King's Great Matter
- Lecture 18-2: Royal Supremacy and the Dissolution of the Monasteries
- Lecture 18-3: Underground Currents — Lollardy and Tyndale's New Testament
- Lecture 18-4: The Six Articles — A Reformed Government, an Unreformed Creed
- Lecture 19-1: Edward's Prayer Book, Twice Revised
- Lecture 19-2: Mary's Restoration and the Smithfield Fires
- Lecture 19-3: Elizabeth's Settlement and the Idea of a Middle Way
- Lecture 19-4: Vestments, and a Reformation Left Unfinished
- Lecture 20-1: Reform Before Luther — Cisneros and the Oratory of Divine Love
- Lecture 20-2: New Orders as Reform Vehicles — Capuchins, Theatines, Ursulines
- Lecture 20-3: The Council of Trent
- Lecture 20-4: Ignatius of Loyola and the Society of Jesus
In 1300, Pope Boniface VIII declared a jubilee year and stated, in the strongest terms any medieval pope had yet used, that submission to the Roman pontiff was necessary for every human being's salvation. Five years later, his successor's successor moved the papal court out of Rome and never brought it back — not for five years, but for sixty-eight. This lecture asks how a papacy that had just made its highest claim to universal authority could, within a single lifetime, become widely seen as a captive of the French crown. The answer matters beyond one century of church administration: it is the first of several moments this course will return to, in which the medieval church's claims to authority and its lived reality pulled sharply apart, and ordinary believers were left to decide which one to trust.
이 19분으로 얻는 것
- Narrate the sequence from Boniface VIII's conflict with Philip IV of France through Clement V's election and the settlement of the papal court at Avignon in 1309.
- Explain concretely what "Avignon papacy" changed and did not change — administration, taxation, and appointments, against the more limited claim that popes there were simply French puppets.
- State why Petrarch's label "Babylonian Captivity" was a rhetorically loaded comparison, and what about it was fair and what was exaggeration.
- Explain Walter Ullmann's argument that medieval papal authority was a historically constructed legal and political claim rather than a self-evident, unchanging fact — and why that reframing matters for reading the rest of this course.
But Jesus summoned them, and said, "You know that the rulers of the nations lord it over them, and their great ones exercise authority over them. It shall not be so among you, but whoever desires to become great among you shall be your servant. Whoever desires to be first among you shall be your bondservant, even as the Son of Man came not to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many."" — Matthew 20:25-28
World English Bible
This lecture is not an argument that the papal office as such was illegitimate — Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant readers of this course will each reach their own conclusion about that question elsewhere in this course, and it is not this lecture's place to settle it. But every reader can weigh the Avignon papacy's critics and defenders against a standard Jesus himself named for his own followers' leadership: not the exercise of authority "the rulers of the nations" way, but service. Whatever else is true of the seven Avignon popes, most of them able and hardworking administrators, this is the standard the century's harshest critics — including faithful Catholics like Catherine of Siena, who begged Gregory XI to return to Rome — were implicitly invoking. Keep that standard in view, rather than a purely political one, as this lecture proceeds.
1. Boniface VIII and the highest claim of the medieval papacy
To understand why the Avignon papacy felt like such a fall, you have to see the height it fell from. In 1302, Pope Boniface VIII issued the bull Unam Sanctam in the course of a bitter dispute with King Philip IV of France over whether the French crown could tax clergy without papal consent and whether a French bishop could be tried in a royal court. Unam Sanctam did not merely defend the church's interests in that dispute; it stated the medieval theory of papal authority in its most absolute form, using the image of "two swords" — spiritual and temporal — both ultimately in the church's hand, the temporal sword to be used "for" the church even if wielded by kings, and closing with the sentence that later readers quote most often: that it is "altogether necessary for salvation" for every human creature to be subject to the Roman pontiff.
Philip IV's response was not theological but physical. In 1303 his minister Guillaume de Nogaret, together with an Italian noble family hostile to Boniface, seized the elderly pope at his residence in Anagni, reportedly struck or threatened him, and held him for several days before local townspeople freed him. Boniface died within weeks, and near-contemporaries linked the "outrage of Anagni" directly to the shock of his death. The lesson a French crown could draw from this was blunt: even a pope who claimed universal authority over kings could be physically overpowered by one king's agents, in his own home, with no army arriving to stop it.
2. From Bordeaux to Avignon
Boniface's immediate successor, Benedict XI, reigned only months. The conclave that followed split for nearly a year between Italian and French factions before electing Bertrand de Got, Archbishop of Bordeaux, who took the name Clement V. De Got was not simply installed by the French crown — he was a Gascon churchman with his own career and his own caution about the two powers, and the conclave's own genuine deadlock, not French coercion alone, is why a compromise candidate from outside Italy could win. But he had never held office in Rome, was crowned at Lyon rather than in Italy, and never once, in his eleven-year pontificate, set foot in Rome. In 1309 he settled the papal court in Avignon, a small city in the county of Venaissin — papal territory, not French royal territory, a distinction later defenders of the Avignon popes emphasized — but on the Rhône, within easy reach of the French court, and inside a broader region whose political weather was set by Paris.
Six more popes followed Clement V at Avignon before the papacy returned to Rome for good: John XXII, Benedict XII, Clement VI, Innocent VI, Urban V, and Gregory XI, spanning 1309 to 1377. All seven were French by birth. This is the single fact that most fed the charge of French capture, and it deserves to be stated plainly rather than softened: of the twenty-four cardinals John XXII created, for example, the overwhelming majority were French, and the pattern continued under his successors. A conclave dominated by French cardinals reliably elected French popes, and French popes reliably filled vacancies with more French cardinals. Whether this reflected calculated French royal pressure at every step, or simply the self-perpetuating logic of any electoral body drawing from a geographically concentrated pool, the practical effect on how the rest of Christendom perceived the papacy was the same either way.
3. What actually changed, and what did not
Not just decline
It would be a mistake — and a common one — to treat "Avignon papacy" as a byword for simple decline. Administratively, several Avignon popes were highly effective: they built a far more centralized and efficient system of papal taxation and provision (the direct appointment of clergy to benefices across Europe, bypassing local ), constructed the massive Palais des Papes that still stands in Avignon today, and ran a curia widely regarded, even by critics, as more orderly than what Rome itself had managed in the chaotic decades before 1305. Rome in 1305 was not a safe or governable seat: the city was fought over by rival noble families, its ancient basilicas in poor repair, its population a fraction of its classical size. A pope who wanted a functioning government in the early fourteenth century had real reasons, independent of French pressure, to prefer Avignon's stability.
What did change, decisively, was the appearance of independence. A papacy that had just claimed, in Unam Sanctam, that every temporal power was ultimately subordinate to it now conducted its business from a city in the shadow of one particular temporal power, for seven decades, while that power's kings went to war with England, taxed their own clergy more heavily than before, and found the popes of this period consistently reluctant to rule against French interests in disputes that mattered to Paris. You do not need to believe every Avignon pope was a French puppet to see why contemporaries across the rest of Europe — English, German, Italian — increasingly did believe it, and why that perception alone did real damage to a claim of universal, disinterested authority.
4. Petrarch's label, and how fair it is
The phrase most students encounter first, "the Babylonian Captivity of the Church," was coined not by a theologian but by the poet and humanist Francesco Petrarch, writing from Avignon itself in the 1340s with evident personal disgust at the city's luxury and corruption. The comparison reaches back to the Old Testament exile of Judah to Babylon (2 Kings 25), a genuinely forced deportation under conquest, and the seventy years the prophet Jeremiah names for it (Jeremiah 25:11) — a number later writers noted, with heavy irony, comes remarkably close to the sixty-eight years the papacy actually spent at Avignon.
The comparison is evocative, and it stuck for exactly that reason. It is also, on close inspection, an overstatement in at least two ways worth naming rather than passing over. First, the Avignon popes were not deported captives; Clement V and his successors made a series of choices, for reasons that included their own administrative convenience, and no army marched them out of Rome the way Nebuchadnezzar's army marched Judah's elite to Babylon. Second, the papacy at Avignon continued to function, to legislate, to send missionaries as far as China, and to be recognized as the legitimate papacy by the overwhelming majority of Western Christendom throughout this period — this was a papacy operating under a cloud of perceived compromise, not a papacy in chains. Petrarch's phrase is worth knowing because it is the label history kept, but a careful student should be able to say exactly where the comparison holds (dependence on one power's goodwill, prolonged absence from the traditional seat) and where it does not (no forced captivity, no interruption of normal governance).
5. Ullmann and the papacy as a built claim, not a given
The twentieth-century historian Walter Ullmann built much of his scholarly career on a single reframing that this lecture asks you to sit with: that the extraordinary claims of medieval papal authority — culminating in documents like Unam Sanctam — were not simply a plain reading of what Christ or the apostles had said, waiting in the New Testament to be discovered, but a legal and political theory constructed gradually, across centuries, by lawyers and popes responding to specific disputes with specific emperors and kings. Ullmann traced a "descending" theory of authority (power flows downward from God through the pope to lesser rulers) developed in deliberate competition with an "ascending" theory in which legitimate authority arises from the community it governs — and he argued that the high medieval papacy's claims represent the descending theory's most fully worked-out form, not an eternal constant of church teaching suddenly under attack for the first time in the fourteenth century.
You do not have to accept every detail of Ullmann's account, which later medievalists have qualified and in places contested, to take his central point seriously: the authority Boniface VIII asserted in 1302 was itself the product of a history, built claim by claim, bull by bull, dispute by dispute, over the preceding two and a half centuries — not a timeless fact the Avignon popes merely failed to live up to. This matters for everything that follows in this course. When Luther, two centuries later, challenges papal authority, he is not the first person to treat that authority as historically contingent rather than self-evidently absolute — he is challenging a claim that even a sympathetic modern historian of the medieval papacy describes as having been built, not simply given. Seeing papal authority this way does not settle whether it was rightly built; it only means the question of its foundation was already a live one, inside the church's own history, long before the Reformation made it urgent.
5. Going to the Sources
Read Unam Sanctam itself (1302) — it is short, a single page in most translations, and widely available online as a primary source in English translation from any collection of medieval papal documents. Pay particular attention to its closing sentence, which states that submission to the Roman pontiff is "altogether necessary for salvation for every human creature." Ask yourself, before Lecture 1-3 introduces the conciliarist challenge to exactly this kind of claim, what would have to be true about the church's authority for a sentence like that to be right — and what would have to be true for it to be an overreach.
핵심 요약
- In 1302 Boniface VIII's bull Unam Sanctam stated the highest medieval claim of papal authority. In 1303 agents of Philip IV of France seized him at Anagni, and he died soon after.
- Clement V, elected after a deadlocked conclave, settled the papal court at Avignon in 1309. Seven French popes ruled there until Gregory XI returned to Rome in 1377.
- Avignon brought efficient administration and taxation, but also the appearance of French control. Rome was unsafe, so not every motive was French pressure.
- Petrarch's "Babylonian Captivity" is fair about dependence and long absence from Rome. It is exaggerated because the popes were not deported and governance continued.
- Walter Ullmann argued that papal authority was a legal and political claim built over centuries. Later scholars qualify him, and this does not settle whether it was rightly built.
Topic: This lecture explains how the papacy, after its highest claim to authority in 1302, spent sixty-eight years at Avignon and came to look like a captive of the French crown.
Remember: Avignon changed the appearance of papal independence more than the working of the papacy, and that appearance did real damage to its claim to universal authority.
Caution: The lecture does not say the papal office was illegitimate, and it does not say the Avignon popes were simply French puppets. Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant readers will judge the office differently.
One line to carry into ministry: An institution can be well run and still lose trust if it looks dependent, so guard how your authority appears as well as how it works.
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묵상 및 토론
- Petrarch called Avignon a "Babylonian Captivity." Having read this lecture's account of where that comparison holds and where it breaks down, would you defend a different label, or defend Petrarch's? Give your reasons.
- Several Avignon popes were administratively effective even while their independence was widely doubted. Can an institution be well run and yet still be in crisis? What does this lecture's account of Avignon suggest about the difference between competence and legitimacy?
- Ullmann argues that papal authority was a historically built legal claim rather than a self-evident given. Does treating a church's authority as "historically built" necessarily weaken it, or could a claim be both historically constructed and still true? Explain your reasoning.