Lecture 3-4: Erasmus and the Reformation — Alliance and Rupture
목차 85
- Lecture 1-1: The Avignon Papacy and the "Babylonian Captivity"
- Lecture 1-2: The Western (Papal) Schism, 1378-1417
- Lecture 1-3: Conciliarism and the Council of Constance
- Lecture 1-4: Popular Piety on the Eve of Reform
- Lecture 2-1: John Wycliffe and Dominion by Grace
- Lecture 2-2: The Lollards and the Wycliffite English Bible
- Lecture 2-3: Jan Hus at Prague
- Lecture 2-4: The Council of Constance and the Execution of Hus
- Lecture 3-1: Ad Fontes — The Renaissance Recovery of Languages and Its Christian Turn
- Lecture 3-2: Northern Christian Humanism as a Reform Movement — Reuchlin and Colet
- Lecture 3-3: Erasmus's Greek New Testament — Scholarship, Limits, and Consequences
- Lecture 3-4: Erasmus and the Reformation — Alliance and Rupture
- Lecture 4-1: The Printing Press and the Speed of an Idea
- Lecture 4-2: Cities, Guilds, and Universities as Carriers of Reform
- Lecture 4-3: The Holy Roman Empire and the Grievances of the German Nation
- Lecture 4-4: Europe Around 1500 — A Different Moment, Not a Destined One
- Lecture 5-1: An Unremarkable Beginning
- Lecture 5-2: The Vow at Stotternheim and Entry into the Cloister
- Lecture 5-3: Anfechtung and the Mentor Who Could Not Follow Where It Led
- Lecture 5-4: The Tower Experience, and What Luther's Memory May Have Compressed
- Lecture 6-1: What an Indulgence Actually Was
- Lecture 6-2: The Money Behind the Sermon — Albrecht, the Fuggers, and Rome
- Lecture 6-3: Reading the Theses Themselves
- Lecture 6-4: Heidelberg, 1518 — A Theology of the Cross
- Lecture 7-1: Leipzig and the Turn Toward 1520
- Lecture 7-2: Augsburg, 1518 — The First Interrogation
- Lecture 7-3: To the Christian Nobility and the Three Walls
- Lecture 7-4: The Babylonian Captivity and The Freedom of a Christian
- Lecture 8-1: Justification by Faith, Stated Precisely
- Lecture 8-2: The Scriptural Case — Romans, Galatians, and Abraham
- Lecture 8-3: Law and Gospel
- Lecture 8-4: The September Testament and the Word "Allein"
- Lecture 9-1: Karlstadt's Wittenberg and Luther's Return
- Lecture 9-2: The Zwickau Prophets and the Challenge of Spiritualism
- Lecture 9-3: The Invocavit Sermons and the Limits of Force
- Lecture 9-4: Adiaphora — Things Indifferent
- Lecture 10-1: The Twelve Articles of the Peasants
- Lecture 10-2: Thomas Müntzer and the Battle of Frankenhausen
- Lecture 10-3: Luther's Two 1525 Writings on the War
- Lecture 10-4: The Two Kingdoms Doctrine
- Lecture 11-1: The Diets of Speyer and the Protestation
- Lecture 11-2: The Augsburg Confession
- Lecture 11-3: The Schmalkaldic League and Its Defeat at Mühlberg
- Lecture 11-4: The Peace of Augsburg (1555)
- Lecture 12-1: Zwingli's Arrival in Zurich and the Rule of Worship
- Lecture 12-2: Zwingli's Formation — Humanist, Chaplain, Not a Monk
- Lecture 12-3: Sausages and Disputations — Authority Shifts to the Council
- Lecture 12-4: Rebuilding Zurich's Worship
- Lecture 13-1: Stating the Dispute — Real Presence Against Memorial Sign
- Lecture 13-2: The Exegetical Machinery — Communicatio Idiomatum and "The Flesh Profits Nothing"
- Lecture 13-3: The Marburg Colloquy — Fourteen Articles and One That Was Not
- Lecture 13-4: What Settled Out — Two Traditions, and Zwingli's Wars Ahead
- Lecture 14-1: The Swiss Brethren and the First Rebaptisms
- Lecture 14-2: A Capital Crime — Zurich, Rome, and the Drowning of Felix Manz
- Lecture 14-3: The Schleitheim Confession — A Church Fully Separated
- Lecture 14-4: Münster, Menno Simons, and a Movement's Two Faces
- Lecture 15-1: Calvin's Conversion and the First Institutes
- Lecture 15-2: French Evangelicalism and the Affair of the Placards
- Lecture 15-3: The Institutes Across Its Editions, 1536-1559
- Lecture 15-4: Calvin as Commentator and Preacher
- Lecture 16-1: Geneva Twice — Expulsion, Strasbourg, and Return
- Lecture 16-2: The Ecclesiastical Ordinances and the Consistory
- Lecture 16-3: Predestination — Calvin's Pastoral Doctrine and Beza's System
- Lecture 16-4: Michael Servetus and the Geneva Academy
- Lecture 17-1: Why the Genevan Model Traveled
- Lecture 17-2: The Huguenots — Organizing Under Persecution
- Lecture 17-3: The Dutch Reformation and Its Two Confessions
- Lecture 17-4: John Knox and Scottish Presbyterianism
- Lecture 18-1: The King's Great Matter
- Lecture 18-2: Royal Supremacy and the Dissolution of the Monasteries
- Lecture 18-3: Underground Currents — Lollardy and Tyndale's New Testament
- Lecture 18-4: The Six Articles — A Reformed Government, an Unreformed Creed
- Lecture 19-1: Edward's Prayer Book, Twice Revised
- Lecture 19-2: Mary's Restoration and the Smithfield Fires
- Lecture 19-3: Elizabeth's Settlement and the Idea of a Middle Way
- Lecture 19-4: Vestments, and a Reformation Left Unfinished
- Lecture 20-1: Reform Before Luther — Cisneros and the Oratory of Divine Love
- Lecture 20-2: New Orders as Reform Vehicles — Capuchins, Theatines, Ursulines
- Lecture 20-3: The Council of Trent
- Lecture 20-4: Ignatius of Loyola and the Society of Jesus
For several years after 1517, it was not obvious to anyone — including Luther and Erasmus themselves — that these two men stood on opposite sides of anything. Luther admired Erasmus's Greek New Testament and used it. Erasmus's own decades of satirizing clerical corruption, monastic laziness and superstitious piety had made him, in the eyes of many early reformers, a fellow traveler, maybe even the movement's natural intellectual father. Erasmus's early letters about Luther are, if anything, sympathetic: a monk saying necessary things too bluntly, perhaps, but saying them. That is the alliance half of this lecture's title, and it was real.
It did not last. By 1524 Erasmus had published a book against a central plank of Luther's theology, and Luther answered with one of the harshest, most theologically dense books he ever wrote. This lecture traces both halves of that trajectory — why the alliance looked plausible for as long as it did, and why it broke specifically over the question of whether the human will is free — and asks you to hold two things at once: Erasmus's reasons for refusing to become a reformer were serious reasons, not merely timidity, and Luther's fury at those reasons was not merely temperament either. Chapter 16 will need the doctrinal content of this argument again, in Calvin's Geneva; this lecture gives you its origin.
이 19분으로 얻는 것
- Describe the basis for Erasmus's early sympathy with reform, and explain what specifically he never criticized alongside what he did.
- Explain, in Erasmus's own terms, why he refused to break with Rome even after Luther's excommunication, and name more than one reason.
- State the core of Erasmus's argument in the *Diatribe on Free Will* (1524) and Luther's central objection to it in *The Bondage of the Will* (1525), distinguishing the theological disagreement from the deeper disagreement about certainty itself.
- Explain why this exchange is remembered as a rupture between two temperaments as much as between two doctrines.
- Engage the historiographical dispute over whether Erasmus's caution should be read as principled moderation or as a failure of nerve, and state each side's strongest form.
Now the natural man doesn't receive the things of God's Spirit, for they are foolishness to him, and he can't know them, because they are spiritually discerned." — 1 Corinthians 2:14
World English Bible
Now concerning things sacrificed to idols: We know that we all have knowledge. Knowledge puffs up, but love builds up." — 1 Corinthians 8:1
WEB
Both verses are placed here deliberately, and against each other. Luther could, and did, read 1 Corinthians 2:14 as evidence for his whole case: the natural man's mind cannot receive the things of the Spirit, which is exactly the incapacity he thought Erasmus's account of a freely cooperating will refused to take seriously enough. Erasmus, for his part, spent this whole controversy warning that theological certainty pursued without love — "knowledge puffs up" — divides the church over a question Scripture itself, in his judgment, leaves genuinely obscure. Neither man is wrong to reach for Paul here. That is close to the whole problem this lecture describes.
1. What the alliance was actually built on
Erasmus had spent decades before 1517 doing something that looked, from a distance, exactly like what reformers wanted done. His 1509 Praise of Folly — a satire narrated by Folly herself, praising in mock earnest the very things Erasmus meant to condemn — mocked indulgence-sellers, relic-hawking, scholastic hairsplitting, and monks who mistook the letter of their rule for holiness, in language sharp enough that readers across confessional lines still find it funny five centuries later. His 1503 Enchiridion Militis Christiani ("Handbook of the Christian Soldier") had already argued, well before Luther, for an inward, Scripture-formed piety over an externalized religion of ritual performance. When Luther's early writings began circulating, Erasmus's own correspondence shows real sympathy: in a 1519 letter to Elector Frederick of Saxony — Luther's own prince, and the man whose protection kept Luther alive after Worms — Erasmus wrote that Luther's chief offense seemed to be attacking the pope's crown and the monks' bellies, and that his personal life was blameless by comparison with his loudest accusers.
None of this made Erasmus a reformer in Luther's sense, and the distinction matters more than it looks. Erasmus attacked abuses — corrupt practice, ignorant preaching, greed dressed as piety. He did not, in these years or later, attack the structures those abuses grew inside: the papacy as an office, the sacramental system as such, the authority of church councils to define doctrine. A reader in 1518 could reasonably mistake "a witty critic of clerical corruption" for "a theological revolutionary," but those are two different jobs, and Erasmus never applied for the second one.
2. Why Erasmus would not break
Pressure to choose a side arrived from both directions almost immediately. Catholic critics — some of them convinced that Erasmus's mockery of monks and scholastics had prepared Luther's audience even if Erasmus never intended it to — pressed him to publish a clear condemnation. Reform-minded correspondents, including for a time Luther himself, pressed him just as hard to say publicly what his private letters implied: that he agreed. Erasmus refused both.
His stated reasons, scattered across a large correspondence in these years, are not reducible to one motive, and this lecture should not flatten them into one. First, a settled conviction that the church could and should be reformed from within, gradually, through better education, better preaching and better texts — the very program his own scholarship served — rather than through a public rupture that he expected, correctly as it turned out, to divide Western Christendom for good. Second, a genuine horror, informed by his classical training in rhetoric and by his own temperament, at pursuing any question by force or coercion rather than by argument and persuasion; Erasmus wrote more than once that he would rather see an issue left unsettled than settled by violence. Third, a frank concern for his own position: Erasmus had cultivated, over decades, a European network of patrons, printers and correspondents across every court and university that mattered, and an open break with Rome would have cost him standing, income and the freedom to move between courts that his work depended on. Erasmus himself denied that this last motive drove him, and no letter proves it did; a fair lecture states it as a plausible pressure among several, not a hidden confession.
3. The Diatribe: Erasmus states a case, reluctantly
By 1523, both sides had stopped accepting silence. Pressed directly — including, pointedly, by figures close to Rome who suggested that a clear stand against Luther on some specific doctrine was the price of continued good standing — Erasmus chose his ground carefully. He did not attack by faith, the , or Luther's view of the sacraments, any of which would have required him to defend positions he privately found at least partly persuasive. He chose the freedom of the will: whether a human being, after , retains any capacity to cooperate, even in the smallest way, with God's grace toward salvation.
His 1524 De Libero Arbitrio Diatribe seu Collatio ("A Diatribe or Discussion Concerning Free Will") is, by design, a modest and even evasive book — Erasmus says so himself in its opening pages, describing his distaste for "assertions" on matters he judges genuinely obscure in Scripture. His actual argument: Scripture contains real evidence on both sides (he cites, among other texts, Deuteronomy 30:19's command to "choose life," which he reads as presupposing a real power to choose), the are themselves divided, and where the evidence is this mixed, a modest, minimal freedom of the will — the will's small, unmerited capacity to turn toward or away from the grace God offers, contributing nothing to salvation's substance but something to its occasion — is both more defensible than Luther's flat denial and more pastorally survivable, since a will with no freedom at all seems, to Erasmus, to make God the author of sin and to remove any point to moral exhortation.
4. The Bondage of the Will: Luther answers the method, not only the doctrine
Luther's 1525 reply, De Servo Arbitrio ("The Bondage of the Will"), is long, furious and, by Luther's own later judgment, one of his two or three most important books — a striking claim from a man who also wrote the Ninety-Five Theses and the three great 1520 treatises. Its central theological claim is direct: apart from grace, the human will is not merely weakened but is bound entirely to sin, incapable of turning toward God by its own power in even the smallest particular; whatever good a converted will does, it does because grace has already remade it, not because an unaided freedom cooperated with an offer.
But Luther's deepest objection was not to Erasmus's specific of Deuteronomy 30:19 or any other single verse — it was to Erasmus's opening move, his professed reluctance to assert anything firmly on a question this consequential. Luther treated that reluctance itself as the real target: "the Holy Spirit is no skeptic," he wrote, and to treat Scripture's teaching on grace and the will as genuinely uncertain, rather than as clearly resolved once properly read, was for Luther a kind of unbelief prior to any specific error about free will. This is why the exchange is remembered as more than a doctrinal dispute. Erasmus's whole intellectual temperament — trained in classical rhetoric's comfort with weighing both sides of a question, suspicious of dogmatic certainty on contested matters, committed to concord over correctness where the two conflicted — was itself what Luther could not accept, independent of which position on free will turned out to be right.
5. What the rupture cost, and what it did not
The break was total and permanent. Erasmus spent his remaining years (he died in 1536) formally estranged from the reform movement he had once been mistaken for leading, while never being fully trusted by Rome either — his earlier satire of clerical abuses was not forgotten, and some of his works were eventually placed on later Catholic indices of prohibited books, after his death, even as he had refused every reformer's invitation to join their side. He continued his scholarly work, revising the Novum Instrumentum (Lecture 3-3) through further editions, until his death. Luther, for his part, never revised his verdict on the Diatribe; late in life he reportedly said that of all his books, only the catechisms and The Bondage of the Will deserved to survive.
Two views of Erasmus
This is a point where readers will not agree. Roland Bainton, whose biographies of both men remain widely read, presents Erasmus's caution sympathetically: a scholar who valued the church's unity and the limits of certain knowledge more than he valued being on the winning side of a historic argument, and who said so consistently rather than only when it became convenient. Johan Huizinga, in his classic study of Erasmus, reads the same evidence more critically: a brilliant mind who, faced with the one moment that demanded a costly personal commitment, retreated into qualification and let the argument be settled by braver, cruder men. Both readings agree on the facts recounted above. They disagree on what kind of virtue, if any, Erasmus's consistency actually was — and this course does not resolve that disagreement for you.
5. Going to the Sources
Erasmus's A Diatribe or Discussion Concerning Free Will (1524) is available in English translation and is short enough to read whole; look particularly at its preface, where Erasmus explains his own reluctance to assert rather than discuss, before he ever reaches a scriptural argument — that methodological move is at least as important to this lecture as his conclusion. Luther's The Bondage of the Will (1525) is much longer; read at minimum his response to Erasmus's preface near the opening of the work, where he states plainly that "the Holy Spirit is no skeptic," and his handling of Deuteronomy 30:19 later in the book, where he answers Erasmus's specific proof-text directly rather than only the general principle behind it.
핵심 요약
- Erasmus's satire and call for inward piety made reformers see an ally. Yet he attacked abuses, not the papacy, the sacramental system or the authority of councils.
- He refused to break with Rome for several reasons: reform from within, horror of force, and concern for his own position. Erasmus denied the last, and the lecture treats it only as a plausible pressure.
- His 1524 Diatribe on Free Will argued that Scripture and the fathers are divided, so a small, unmerited freedom of the will is the modest position.
- Luther's 1525 reply, The Bondage of the Will, taught that the will is bound to sin apart from grace. His deepest objection was Erasmus's reluctance to assert anything firmly: "the Holy Spirit is no skeptic."
- The break was permanent. Bainton reads Erasmus's caution sympathetically, Huizinga more critically, and the lecture does not choose between them.
Topic: This lecture traces how Erasmus and Luther moved from cautious alliance to permanent rupture over free will and over how certain theology can be.
Remember: The rupture was about method and temperament as well as doctrine: Erasmus weighed both sides and valued concord, while Luther treated doubt on this question as unbelief.
Caution: Do not call Erasmus merely timid or Luther merely bad-tempered. The lecture says both had serious reasons, and scholars disagree about Erasmus's caution.
One line to carry into ministry: When Christians disagree, ask whether the deeper dispute is the conclusion or how much certainty the evidence allows, and keep both truth and love in view.
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묵상 및 토론
- Erasmus attacked clerical corruption for decades before Luther but refused to attack the papacy, the sacraments, or conciliar authority as institutions. Is that a coherent position, or does sustained criticism of a system's practice eventually commit a critic to a verdict on the system itself?
- Erasmus's central complaint against Luther was as much about certainty as about free will specifically — that Luther asserted where Scripture, in Erasmus's judgment, left room for doubt. Can you think of a modern theological or ethical disagreement where the deeper argument is really about how much certainty the evidence allows, rather than about the conclusion itself?
- Having read both the Bainton and Huizinga readings of Erasmus's caution described in this lecture, which do you find more persuasive, and what in Erasmus's own conduct — not just his self-description — would you point to in support?