Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
목차 46
- Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
- Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
- Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
- Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
- Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
- Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
- Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
- Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
- Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
- Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
- Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
- Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
- Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
- Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
- Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
- Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
- Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
- Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
- Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
- Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
- Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
- Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
- Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
- Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
- Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
- Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
- Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
- Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
- Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
- Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
- Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
- Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
- Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
- Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
- Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
- Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
- Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
- Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
- Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
- Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
- Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
- Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
- Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
- Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
- Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him
Every sentence this course writes about God uses words first learned in reference to creatures — "good," "wise," "father," "rock," "king." If God is genuinely unlike anything in creation (a claim Chapter 3 will develop at length under the heading of the incommunicable attributes), a hard question follows immediately: how can creaturely words say anything true of him at all? This lecture works through the classical answer given by Thomas Aquinas — that religious language functions neither univocally (the exact same sense as ordinary use) nor equivocally (an entirely unrelated sense, making the word meaningless when applied to God) but analogically, meaning it points to a real likeness while preserving real difference. It then sets that answer alongside the apophatic, or negative, theological tradition associated with Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and carried forward strongly in Eastern Orthodox theology, which insists that the truest thing theology can say about God is often what cannot be said — that language, even used as carefully as Aquinas proposes, never captures God exhaustively.
이 15분으로 얻는 것
- Distinguish univocal, equivocal, and analogical predication and explain why Aquinas rejects the first two options for religious language.
- Explain Aquinas's doctrine of analogy (specifically the analogy of proper proportionality, and the "analogy of attribution") using at least one worked example.
- Describe the apophatic (negative) theological method associated with Pseudo-Dionysius and its emphasis in Eastern Orthodox theology.
- State why this course cannot avoid using creaturely language about God, while still holding that no such language captures God exhaustively.
'For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways,' says Yahweh. 'For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.'" — Isaiah 55:8-9
World English Bible
God said to Moses, 'I AM WHO I AM,' and he said, 'You shall tell the children of Israel this: "I AM has sent me to you."'" — Exodus 3:14
WEB
These two texts anchor the lecture's two halves. Isaiah 55:8-9 states, in Yahweh's own first-person voice, the qualitative gap between divine and human thought that any doctrine of religious language has to reckon with — not a difference of degree ("my ways are somewhat higher") but a difference the text illustrates with the largest available image, the heavens above the earth. Exodus 3:14 supplies the opposite half of the picture: God does give himself a name, in response to a direct question, and that name — traditionally read as "I AM WHO I AM," related to the divine name Yahweh (YHWH) itself — is simultaneously a real answer and, on nearly every reading across the theological tradition, a name that resists being fully pinned down, gesturing toward self-existent being itself rather than toward any created analogy that could exhaust it. God speaks; and what God says about himself both reveals and holds something in reserve.
1. The problem stated
Theology cannot avoid using words. Every claim this course makes — that God is good, wise, powerful, loving, holy — borrows a word whose first and most familiar meaning was learned from creaturely experience: human goodness, human wisdom, human power. If those words apply to God in exactly the sense they apply to creatures (univocally), then God turns out to be simply a very impressive version of a creature, differing in degree but not in kind — which the doctrine of the incommunicable attributes (Chapter 3) will insist is false. But if the words apply to God in a completely unrelated sense (equivocally), with no real connection to their ordinary meaning, then theological language collapses into meaninglessness: to say "God is good" would tell the reader nothing at all, since "good" in that sentence would share nothing in common with "good" as used of a good meal or a good friend. Aquinas judged both options unacceptable and proposed a third.
2. Aquinas's doctrine of analogy
Aquinas's answer, developed in Summa Theologiae I, Question 13, is that religious language functions analogically: a word like "good" applies to both God and creatures neither in the exact same sense nor in a wholly unrelated sense, but in a sense that preserves a real relationship while preserving real difference. Aquinas actually distinguishes more than one type of analogy, but the most important for this purpose is the analogy of attribution (sometimes discussed alongside the related idea of analogy of proper proportionality): creaturely goodness and divine goodness are not identical, but creaturely goodness derives from, and points back to, divine goodness as its source and standard. When Scripture calls God "good," it is not borrowing a human standard and stretching it upward; it is naming, imperfectly and from the creature's vantage point, the very goodness that is the source of every lesser, creaturely good the word "good" was first used to describe.
Sarah and God are wise
A worked example makes the structure clearer. To say "Sarah is wise" and "God is wise" does not use "wise" in two unrelated senses (equivocation) nor in an identical sense as though God's wisdom were simply Sarah's wisdom scaled up (univocation). Rather, Sarah's wisdom is a real, creaturely participation in and reflection of a perfection that exists in God without limit, without composition, and without the possibility of increase or failure — the very reality Sarah's wisdom imperfectly resembles. The word "wise" genuinely applies to both, which is why the sentence is not meaningless, but it applies to each according to a different mode appropriate to each subject's nature, which is why the sentence does not make God merely a bigger version of Sarah.
3. The apophatic tradition: what cannot be said
A second major strand of the tradition approaches the same problem from the opposite direction. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (the name given to an anonymous late-fifth or early-sixth-century Christian writer, once mistakenly identified with the Areopagite converted by Paul in Acts 17) argued, particularly in his treatise The Mystical Theology, that the highest theological method is not the careful, positive statement of what God is (cataphatic, or affirmative, theology) but the disciplined negation of every creaturely predicate as ultimately inadequate to God (apophatic, or negative, theology). On this method, the most accurate thing a theologian can eventually say is not "God is good" but something closer to "God is beyond goodness as creatures understand it" — not because goodness fails to apply to God, but because ordinary, creaturely goodness is so far exceeded by whatever goodness actually is in God that continuing to speak positively risks domesticating God into a merely superlative creature.
This apophatic emphasis has remained a distinctive and load-bearing feature of Eastern Orthodox theology, carried forward influentially by writers such as Gregory Palamas (fourteenth century), and continues to shape Orthodox worship and theological method to the present day — the sense that God in his essence remains fundamentally beyond comprehension even while God truly communicates himself through his uncreated energies (a distinction Orthodox theology draws that Western theology has generally not adopted in the same form). Where Western theology (both Catholic, following Aquinas's analogy, and Protestant) has generally been comfortable making relatively extensive positive, cataphatic claims about God's attributes — the entire structure of Chapters 3 and 4 of this course, in fact — Eastern Orthodox theology has tended to hold those positive claims more provisionally, always subordinated to the reminder that God's essence exceeds every positive description.
Two styles of speech
This is a point where readers will not agree, though it is less a flat contradiction than a difference of theological temperament and emphasis. Aquinas's analogical predication and the broader Western tradition are confident that careful positive statements about God's attributes convey real, if imperfect, knowledge — this course's own structure (Chapters 3-4 devoted to positive description of the divine attributes) follows that confidence. The apophatic tradition, strongest in Eastern Orthodoxy but present in Western mystical theology too (it influenced medieval writers such as the anonymous author of The Cloud of Unknowing), holds that this positive project, however careful, must be held together with a persistent negation — that after every attribute has been named, the honest theologian must add that God exceeds even that description. A course written entirely in Aquinas's cataphatic mode, without ever pausing to say what it cannot say, risks precisely the overconfidence apophatic theology warns against.
4. Why this course proceeds the way it does anyway
Given both concerns, this course could not simply fall silent — a course that refused all positive predication of God would have nothing to teach and no textbook to write. Its working commitment, following the analogical tradition, is that careful positive language about God (Chapters 2 through 8) is possible and valuable, while treating this lecture's warning as a standing qualification rather than a one-time disclaimer: every subsequent chapter's positive claims about God's existence, attributes, and triune life should be read as analogical statements pointing toward a reality that exceeds full linguistic capture, not as exhaustive descriptions that have said everything there is to say.
5. Going to the Sources
- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, Question 13 ("The Names of God"), especially Article 5 ("Whether What Is Said of God and of Creatures Is Univocally Predicated of Them?") — Aquinas's own careful statement of the doctrine of analogy.
- Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, The Mystical Theology, a short treatise (a few pages in most translations, such as Colm Luibheid's in the Classics of Western Spirituality series) that is the classic primary statement of the apophatic method — read at least its opening chapter.
- Exodus 3:13-15 in full — read past verse 14 to see God immediately follow "I AM WHO I AM" with the more historically anchored self-identification "Yahweh, the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob" (v. 15), holding together, in two consecutive verses, both the name's resistance to capture and its concrete, covenantal specificity.
핵심 요약
- Every word we use of God was first learned from creatures. If it means exactly the same (univocal), God becomes a bigger creature. If it means something unrelated (equivocal), the words say nothing.
- Aquinas offers a third way, analogy: a word applies to God and creatures with real likeness and real difference. Creaturely goodness comes from, and points back to, divine goodness.
- Pseudo-Dionysius stressed apophatic (negative) theology, which denies that any creaturely word fits God fully. Eastern Orthodoxy, for example through Gregory Palamas, carries this strongly.
- Western theology, Catholic and Protestant, has been more at ease with positive (cataphatic) claims. The lecture calls the difference one of temperament and emphasis, not flat contradiction.
- The course keeps positive language but treats the apophatic warning as a standing qualification. Its claims are analogical, never exhaustive.
Topic: This lecture asks how words learned from creatures can say anything true of God, and compares Aquinas's analogy with the apophatic tradition.
Remember: Words about God are neither the same as nor unrelated to their ordinary meaning. They point to a real likeness while real difference remains.
Caution: The lecture does not say theology should fall silent. It also warns that a course written entirely in positive language risks overconfidence.
One line to carry into ministry: Speak about God with confidence and humility, remembering that he is always greater than the words we use.
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묵상 및 토론
- Try restating one sentence from Chapter 1's earlier lectures that describes God (for example, from 1-2's discussion of Calvin) as an explicitly analogical claim — what would you need to add or qualify to make the analogical structure visible?
- Isaiah 55:8-9 says God's thoughts and ways are "higher" than human thoughts and ways, using a spatial image (heavens above earth). Is a spatial analogy itself subject to the same limits Aquinas and Pseudo-Dionysius describe? Why or why not?
- This lecture claims the apophatic tradition and Aquinas's analogical predication are complementary rather than strictly opposed. Do you agree, or do you think one method should have the final word over the other?