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ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God

Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms

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ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God
제 0 장 · Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
  1. Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: Prolegomena: Revelation, Religious Language, and the Knowledge of God
  1. Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
  2. Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
  3. Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
  4. Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: The Existence of God: Arguments and Their Critics
  1. Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
  4. Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
  5. Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: The Incommunicable Attributes of God
  1. Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
  2. Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
  3. Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
  4. Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
  5. Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
  6. Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: The Communicable Attributes and the Names of God
  1. Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
  2. Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
  3. Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
  4. Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
  5. Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
  6. Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: The Trinity I: Biblical Foundations and Historical Formation
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
  2. Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
  4. Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
  5. Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
  6. Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: The Trinity II: Orthodox Doctrine and Modern Debates
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
  2. Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
  3. Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
  4. Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
  5. Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
  6. Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: Contemporary Challenges to the Doctrine of God
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
  2. Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
  3. Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
  4. Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
  5. Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
  6. Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: Decrees, Creation, Providence, and Pastoral Application
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
  2. Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
  3. Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
  4. Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
  5. Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
  6. Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him

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21분

Before this chapter examines any specific argument for God's existence, it has to answer a prior question that the specific arguments usually skip past: what would it even mean to "prove" God exists, and why do Christians want such a proof in the first place? These are not the same question. A courtroom proof, a mathematical proof, and a scientific proof all mean something different by "prove," and arguments for God's existence have historically been offered as something closer to the first and third than the second — a cumulative case built from premises a reasonable person could grant, not a deduction with the certainty of "2 + 2 = 4." Keeping that distinction in view will matter for every lecture that follows, because a great deal of both overconfidence and dismissal in this area comes from expecting geometric certainty from an argument that was never built to deliver it.

The chapter also cannot proceed as though Christians have agreed that proof is even a good idea to attempt. Three positions are engaged in this lecture, each representing a live and serious Christian tradition, not a fringe view: Thomas Aquinas's confidence that unaided reason, without appeal to special revelation, can establish significant truths about God, including that he exists; Søren Kierkegaard's suspicion that the entire project of proof is a way of domesticating a decision that faith actually requires to be a leap, not a conclusion; and Alvin Plantinga's argument, developed in the late twentieth century, that belief in God can be rational without any argument supporting it at all, because it can be "properly basic" — grounded directly in experience the way belief in other minds or the reliability of memory is, rather than inferred from premises. Later lectures in this chapter (2-2 through 2-4) work in something like Aquinas's spirit; Lecture 2-5 will pick up a fourth position, Cornelius Van Til's, which rejects the whole framing of 2-2 through 2-4 for reasons of its own. This lecture does not adjudicate between these four; it makes sure you can tell them apart.

이 21분으로 얻는 것

  • Distinguish "proof" in the sense of deductive certainty from "proof" in the sense of a cumulative case built from reasonable premises, and explain why conflating the two produces both overconfident defenses of the arguments and dismissals that miss their actual claim.
  • State Aquinas's rationale for pursuing natural theology (arguments for God available to unaided reason) and locate it within his larger theological project.
  • State Kierkegaard's objection to natural theology as a category, distinguishing it from a claim that the arguments are merely logically flawed.
  • Explain Plantinga's "properly basic belief" alternative and why it changes what a critic of theism would need to show.

The fool has said in his heart, “There is no God.” They are corrupt. They have done abominable works. There is no one who does good." — Psalm 14:1

World English Bible

Without faith it is impossible to be well pleasing to him, for he who comes to God must believe that he exists, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him." — Hebrews 11:6

WEB

These two texts, read together, already frame the tension this lecture explores. Psalm 14:1 calls the denial of God folly — not merely a mistaken inference, but a moral and spiritual disorder ("the fool," Hebrew nabal, names someone practically and morally obtuse, not simply someone who reasons badly). That should make a reader cautious about treating this chapter's arguments as a religiously neutral philosophy seminar; Scripture itself does not treat disbelief in God as the default rational position that argument alone must dislodge. But Hebrews 11:6 complicates any purely presuppositionalist reading of the psalm just as quickly: it says the one who comes to God "must believe that he exists," using the ordinary language of belief formed on evidence and reason (the passage's broader argument, cataloguing Abel, Enoch, Noah, and Abraham, treats faith as reasoned trust in a specific, identifiable God, not blind assent). Neither text settles this lecture's dispute among Aquinas, Kierkegaard, and Plantinga by itself; both will be worth returning to once the specific arguments of 2-2 through 2-4 are on the table.

1. What a "proof" of God's existence would need to be

Ask a mathematician what a proof is and the answer is precise: a sequence of statements, each following necessarily from what came before or from an accepted axiom, ending in the conclusion. Deny the conclusion of a genuine mathematical proof and you are committed to a contradiction. Almost no one who has seriously defended an argument for God's existence has claimed that kind of proof is available — not Aquinas, not Anselm (2-4), not the contemporary defenders of the kalam (2-2). What they have claimed, in various ways, is something closer to what a good historical argument or a strong scientific case delivers: premises a reasonable, non-question-begging inquirer could accept, connected by valid or at least highly plausible inference, producing a conclusion that is more reasonable to accept than to reject, even though a determined critic can usually find some premise to dispute.

This distinction matters for how you read the rest of this chapter. When Lecture 2-2 presents Hume's objection to inferring a cause for the universe from our experience of causes within the universe, that objection does not need to reduce the cosmological argument to nothing in order to matter; it can lower the argument's force from "compelling" to "reasonable but contestable" and still be a serious objection worth taking seriously. Conversely, when a defender of one of these arguments claims it is "logically airtight" or "undeniable by any rational person," that overclaims what the argument's own structure can support — and the principle that an unqualified universal claim you cannot defend is a defect applies here with full force. The right posture toward every argument in 2-2 through 2-4 is neither "this proves God with mathematical certainty" nor "this proves nothing"; it is closer to a cumulative case, where several independently reasonable arguments, no one of them individually conclusive, together make theism a more reasonable position to hold than its alternatives. Whether that cumulative case is enough, and for whom, remains genuinely contested — which is exactly what the rest of this lecture examines.

2. Aquinas: reason can get you a considerable distance

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), writing in the Summa Theologiae, distinguished between truths about God that reason can establish on its own — that God exists, that he is one, that he is the first cause — and truths available only by revelation, chiefly the and the . His five ways (examined in detail in Lecture 2-2, which covers the first three) were not offered as a substitute for faith but as a demonstration that faith is not irrational — that natural theology and revealed theology occupy the same truth without contradiction, because God is the author of both nature and Scripture. For Aquinas, the project of proof matters because it shows that Christian belief is not a leap in the dark relative to what unaided reason can discover; it is continuous with, and confirmed by, what reason independently finds. This confidence in natural theology's reach is a live and contested point across this entire chapter (see the Contested Points note below), and it is worth noting here at the outset that it is not obviously "the Catholic view against the Protestant view" — many Reformed theologians, including Calvin in the Institutes (I.3-5), also affirmed a real, if limited and morally compromised, natural knowledge of God available to all people. The dispute is about how far that natural knowledge can be pressed into a formal argument capable of persuading a genuine skeptic, not about whether it exists at all.

3. Kierkegaard: proof as a way of avoiding the leap

Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), writing under pseudonyms like Johannes Climacus in works such as Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, mounted an objection to natural theology that is not, at bottom, a claim that the arguments contain logical errors. His objection is that the entire project of proving God's existence misunderstands what the object of faith is. To seek a proof, on Kierkegaard's account, is to treat God as an item within the world whose existence could in principle be settled the way we settle whether a particular species of beetle exists — by gathering enough evidence that a reasonable person is simply compelled to agree. But the God of Christian faith, for Kierkegaard, is not available on those terms: coming to faith is a decision, a "leap," made in the face of objective uncertainty, and it involves the whole self — will and passion, not merely intellect — in a way that a successful proof would actually short-circuit. If God's existence could be proved the way a theorem is proved, Kierkegaard's worry runs, then believing in God would require no more courage or commitment than accepting the Pythagorean theorem, and that is precisely not what New Testament faith looks like. This is a serious and still-influential objection, echoed in different forms by twentieth-century theologians uneasy with natural theology (Karl Barth's rejection of natural theology, previewed in Chapter 1 and developed fully in Chapter 6, shares some of this same instinct, though from a different starting point than Kierkegaard's). It is not a claim that reason is worthless or that the cosmological argument has a hidden flaw; it is a claim that even a flawless argument would be answering the wrong kind of question.

4. Plantinga: belief in God can be "properly basic"

Alvin Plantinga (b. 1932), an American analytic philosopher working in the Reformed epistemology tradition, offered a different kind of alternative to natural theology in the late twentieth century — not a rejection of proof as spiritually counterproductive (Kierkegaard's move), but an argument that proof was never actually required for belief in God to be rational in the first place. Plantinga's central claim, developed most fully in Warranted Christian Belief (2000) building on earlier work through the 1980s, is that belief in God can be "properly basic": a belief formed directly and non-inferentially by a properly functioning cognitive faculty responding appropriately to circumstances, the same way belief in the external world, belief in other minds, or trust in one's own memory are properly basic. No one demands a syllogism proving other minds exist before it is rational to believe your friend feels pain; Plantinga argued belief in God, arising from what he (following Calvin) called a sensus divinitatis — a natural, God-given faculty producing awareness of God under the right conditions — can be rational in exactly the same immediate way. This shifts the burden significantly: if Plantinga is right, the atheist cannot simply demand that the theist produce an argument on pain of irrationality; the atheist instead has to show that theistic belief is not, in fact, properly basic — a considerably harder task, and one most atheistic philosophy of religion in the analytic tradition has taken up directly rather than dismissing.

How far reason reaches

This is a point where readers will not agree. Natural theology's reach — how much unaided reason can establish about God, and whether trying to argue for God's existence at all concedes too much to a rationalist picture of faith — is contested throughout this chapter and into Chapter 3. Aquinas and the Catholic tradition, along with many Reformed theologians reading Romans 1 optimistically, hold that reason can establish significant truths about God's existence and some of his attributes. Cornelius Van Til's presuppositionalism (examined fully in Lecture 2-5) holds that there is no religiously neutral standpoint from which such an argument could even be assessed. Kierkegaard holds that the project itself misdescribes what faith is. Plantinga holds that the project, while not misguided, is simply unnecessary for rational belief. None of these four is a strawman standing in for "what people who disagree with natural theology think"; each is the considered position of thinkers who have shaped how later Christians in their own traditions approach this question.

5. Why this matters before 2-2 through 2-4

Holding these three (four, counting 2-5's Van Til) positions in view changes how you should read the specific arguments that follow. If you read Lecture 2-2's cosmological argument expecting Aquinas-style mathematical certainty, Hume's objection will look devastating. If you read it as a piece of a cumulative case — one strand among several, each carrying some evidential weight without needing to carry all of it alone — the same objection looks like a serious qualification rather than a refutation. And if you read it, as Kierkegaard would, as fundamentally answering a question faith was never asking, you may find the entire cosmological, teleological, and ontological project less central to what makes Christian belief reasonable than this chapter's structure might suggest. All three readings are represented among serious, believing Christians today, and this course does not pretend the matter is settled.


Three (and a Fourth) Views on Proving God Aquinas Reason reaches God's existence, oneness, first-causehood. Revelation adds what reason cannot reach (Trinity, Incarnation). Proof confirms faith, does not replace it. Kierkegaard Faith is a leap made under objective uncertainty. A successful proof would remove the very risk faith requires. Not "the arguments are wrong" — wrong question. Plantinga Belief in God can be "properly basic" — like belief in other minds. No inference required for rationality. Shifts the burden: critic must show belief is NOT properly basic.

(Van Til's fourth position — that no argument in 2-2 through 2-4 is religiously neutral to begin with — is examined fully in Lecture 2-5.)


5. Going to the Sources

  • Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part I, Question 2, Article 2 ("Whether the existence of God can be demonstrated") — Aquinas's own statement of why and how natural theology proceeds, immediately before the Five Ways in Article 3 (covered in Lecture 2-2).
  • Søren Kierkegaard (as "Johannes Climacus"), Philosophical Fragments (1844), Chapter 3, "The Absolute Paradox" — the fullest short statement of why Kierkegaard thinks reason cannot get you to the God of Christian faith by argument.
  • Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (2000), Chapter 6, "The Sensus Divinitatis" — Plantinga's own development of the properly-basic-belief position, including his account of Calvin's role in the idea.

핵심 요약

  • "Proof" of God's existence means a cumulative case built from premises a reasonable person could accept, not mathematical certainty. Expecting certainty leads to both overconfidence and dismissal.
  • Aquinas held that reason can establish that God exists, is one and is the first cause. The Trinity and Incarnation come only by revelation. Natural and revealed theology agree because God authors both.
  • Kierkegaard objected to the project itself. Proving God would treat him as an item in the world and would short-circuit the leap of faith, which involves the whole self.
  • Plantinga argued that belief in God can be "properly basic," formed directly like belief in other minds. Then a critic must show it is not properly basic.
  • Aquinas, Kierkegaard, Plantinga and Van Til each hold a serious position. The lecture does not choose between them. It only makes sure students can tell them apart.

Topic: This lecture asks what it would mean to prove God's existence and compares the views of Aquinas, Kierkegaard and Plantinga, with Van Til to follow.

Remember: Arguments for God were offered as a cumulative case, not as geometric proof, so judge them by that standard.

Caution: The lecture does not settle whether natural theology works. Calvin also affirmed a limited natural knowledge of God, so this is not simply Catholic against Protestant.

One line to carry into ministry: Do not promise doubters a knock-down proof, and do not dismiss reasoned arguments either.

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  • Psalm 14:1 calls the denial of God foolish, using moral rather than purely logical language. Does that suggest Scripture itself takes something like Van Til's or Plantinga's side against Aquinas's approach to natural theology — or is that reading more than the verse can bear? Defend your answer from the text.
  • Kierkegaard worries that a successful proof of God's existence would make faith too easy — a matter of assent rather than commitment. Do you find this worry persuasive? Is there a difference between believing a mathematical theorem and trusting a person that Kierkegaard's argument depends on?
  • If Plantinga is right that belief in God can be properly basic, does that make the arguments examined in Lectures 2-2 through 2-4 pointless? Or could a belief be properly basic and also supportable by argument, the two doing different work for different people?

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