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ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God

Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence

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ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God
제 0 장 · Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
  1. Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: Prolegomena: Revelation, Religious Language, and the Knowledge of God
  1. Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
  2. Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
  3. Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
  4. Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: The Existence of God: Arguments and Their Critics
  1. Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
  4. Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
  5. Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: The Incommunicable Attributes of God
  1. Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
  2. Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
  3. Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
  4. Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
  5. Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
  6. Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: The Communicable Attributes and the Names of God
  1. Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
  2. Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
  3. Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
  4. Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
  5. Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
  6. Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: The Trinity I: Biblical Foundations and Historical Formation
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
  2. Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
  4. Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
  5. Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
  6. Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: The Trinity II: Orthodox Doctrine and Modern Debates
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
  2. Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
  3. Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
  4. Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
  5. Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
  6. Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: Contemporary Challenges to the Doctrine of God
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
  2. Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
  3. Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
  4. Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
  5. Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
  6. Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: Decrees, Creation, Providence, and Pastoral Application
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
  2. Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
  3. Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
  4. Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
  5. Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
  6. Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him

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20분

The ontological argument is the strangest and most controversial of the classical arguments for God's existence, because unlike the cosmological argument (which reasons from a feature of the observed world) or the teleological and moral arguments (which reason from order and moral obligation), it claims to reason from the very concept of God alone, with no empirical premise at all, to the conclusion that God must actually exist. This has struck many careful thinkers, across many centuries, as either a piece of remarkable philosophical insight or a kind of verbal sleight of hand, and this lecture takes both reactions seriously rather than resolving the dispute in advance.

The lecture traces the argument through three stages: Anselm of Canterbury's original 1078 formulation in the Proslogion, arguing from "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" to that being's necessary existence; Descartes's seventeenth-century restatement treating existence as a perfection God, as a supremely perfect being, must possess; and Alvin Plantinga's twentieth-century modal version, which restates the argument using the technical apparatus of possible-worlds semantics to avoid some of the classical objections. Two objections are then examined in full: Gaunilo of Marmoutiers's contemporary "perfect island" parody, and Immanuel Kant's influential claim that existence is not a real predicate — that adding "exists" to a concept does not add any content to it the way adding "omniscient" or "good" does.

이 20분으로 얻는 것

  • State Anselm's argument in the *Proslogion* in your own words, including what work the phrase "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" is doing.
  • Explain how Descartes's version differs from Anselm's by treating existence explicitly as a perfection.
  • State Gaunilo's "perfect island" objection and explain what it is trying to show about the argument's logical form.
  • State Kant's "existence is not a predicate" objection, and explain how Plantinga's modal version attempts to restate the argument in a form less vulnerable to it.

Before the mountains were born, before you had formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, you are God." — Psalm 90:2

World English Bible

Psalm 90:2 was also cited in Lecture 2-2, in connection with the 's conclusion; it is worth returning to here for a different reason. The cosmological argument reasons to a being of this kind from the world's dependency; the ontological argument attempts something more radical — to reason to a being of exactly this kind (one whose existence is not contingent on anything, "from everlasting to everlasting") from the very concept of such a being, without needing the world as a premise at all. Whether that more radical claim can actually be sustained by argument, or whether Psalm 90:2's confession is available only to faith and never to reason working from a concept alone, is precisely what this lecture's engagement with Gaunilo and Kant will test.

1. Anselm's original argument

Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), in his short work Proslogion (1078), offered an argument unlike any that came before it — famously composed, Anselm tells us, as a single, self-contained proof requiring no premise beyond the very definition of God, arrived at (he says) after much anguished searching for exactly this. Anselm's argument begins by defining God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" (id quo maius cogitari non potest) — not a description of any particular attribute, but a superlative placeholder for whatever the greatest possible being would be, however that turns out to be filled in. Anselm then argues: even someone who denies God's existence (he quotes Psalm 14:1's fool, discussed in Lecture 2-1, directly) must understand this concept when they hear it, and so this being exists at least in the understanding — as an idea in the mind. But, Anselm argues, a being that exists both in the understanding and in reality is greater than a being that exists only in the understanding. If "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" existed only in the understanding, then a greater being could be conceived — one just like it, but also existing in reality — which contradicts the definition, since nothing greater than "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" can be conceived by the argument's own starting definition. Therefore, Anselm concludes, "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" must exist in reality as well as in the understanding — and this being, he says, is what we call God.

The argument's peculiar power, and its peculiar vulnerability, both come from the same feature: it purports to derive existence from a definition alone, with no appeal to experience of the world whatsoever. If it succeeds, it is unlike every other argument in this chapter, since it would make God's non-existence not merely false but incoherent — a contradiction in terms, the way "a four-sided triangle" is a contradiction in terms. If it fails, the way it fails is instructive for why the appeal of pure conceptual argument in this territory should be treated with real caution (a caution consonant with, though not identical to, Kierkegaard's broader suspicion of proof from Lecture 2-1).

2. Descartes: existence as a perfection

René Descartes (1596-1650) restated a version of the ontological argument in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Meditation V, working from a somewhat different starting point than Anselm's superlative definition. Descartes begins from his own "clear and distinct" idea of God as a supremely perfect being — a being possessing every perfection to the highest possible degree. He then argues that existence is itself a perfection (a thing that exists is, other things equal, greater than a merely possible or non-existent thing with the same properties), and that a supremely perfect being, by definition, must possess every perfection, including existence. Just as it is part of the very idea of a triangle that its angles sum to 180 degrees, Descartes argues, it is part of the very idea of a supremely perfect being that it exists — to conceive of a supremely perfect being that lacks existence is as incoherent, on Descartes's view, as conceiving of a triangle whose angles do not sum to 180 degrees.

3. Kant's objection: existence is not a predicate

Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) contains what remains the most influential objection to both Anselm's and Descartes's versions, and it strikes at something both share: the assumption that "existence" functions as a predicate — a property that can be added to a concept the way "omniscient," "good," or "powerful" are added, making the concept richer or more complete. Kant denies this. To say "God exists" is not, Kant argues, to attribute a further property to the concept of God, the way "God is good" attributes goodness to God; it is instead to assert that the concept of God — with all of its properties already specified — is actually instantiated in reality, rather than being merely a concept. Kant's famous illustration: a hundred real thalers (an old European coin) contain not the slightest bit more content than a hundred merely possible thalers — the concept is identical either way; what differs is whether that concept describes my actual financial situation. If existence added no content to a concept, then Descartes's move — from "the concept of a supremely perfect being includes every perfection" to "therefore that concept includes existence, and so the being described by that concept must exist" — commits what Kant takes to be a basic category error, treating existence as though it were one more perfection sitting alongside and goodness in the concept's content, rather than the separate question of whether any concept, however fully specified, actually describes something real.

4. Gaunilo's parody: the perfect island

A more immediate objection, contemporary with Anselm himself, came from a fellow monk, Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, in a short response titled On Behalf of the Fool — deliberately taking up the position of the Psalm 14:1 fool Anselm's own argument had addressed. Gaunilo's strategy is a parody: he asks the reader to conceive of "the most perfect island" — an island than which no greater island can be conceived, surpassing every other island in every excellence an island could have. By Anselm's own reasoning, Gaunilo argues, this island must exist in reality, since an island existing in reality is greater than the same island existing merely in the understanding, and nothing could then be conceived greater than the most perfect island by the argument's own starting definition. Since no one seriously believes a "most perfect island" must exist somewhere in the Atlantic simply because we can conceive one, Gaunilo concludes that Anselm's argument, whatever precisely has gone wrong with it, proves too much — its form of reasoning would generate the necessary existence of any "most perfect" object we care to define, which cannot be right.

Anselm's own reply to Gaunilo, included in most modern editions of the Proslogion alongside Gaunilo's objection, is that the argument works specifically and only for a being whose greatness includes necessary existence as part of what makes it great in the first place — an island's greatness (however perfect) is made up of contingent features (climate, fertility, beauty) that do not include necessary existence as one of the perfections being maximized, whereas "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" specifically includes necessity of existence among the perfections it maximizes, since a being that exists necessarily is, all else equal, greater than a being that merely happens to exist contingently. Whether this reply actually rescues the argument from Gaunilo's parody, or merely relocates the same difficulty (why should we grant that necessary existence is a coherent perfection to build into a definition in the first place?), remains disputed, and this lecture does not pretend Anselm's answer to Gaunilo has satisfied every reader since.

5. Plantinga's modal version

Alvin Plantinga (introduced in Lecture 2-1 for his properly-basic-belief epistemology) also offered an influential restatement of the ontological argument in modal terms, in The Nature of Necessity (1974), using the technical framework of possible-worlds semantics developed in twentieth-century modal logic. Rather than reasoning from "the greatest conceivable being" understood loosely, Plantinga's version reasons about "maximal greatness" — a being with maximal excellence (omniscience, , moral perfection) in every possible world it exists in. Plantinga argues that if it is even possible that a maximally great being exists (that is, if there is at least one possible world in which such a being exists), then, given the logic of necessary existence across possible worlds, such a being exists in every possible world, including the actual one. This restatement is intentionally designed to be less vulnerable to Kant's "existence is not a predicate" objection, since it works with the modal notion of necessary existence across possible worlds rather than treating existence as a property added to a static concept. But Plantinga himself candidly acknowledged that the argument's crucial premise — that maximally great being is even possible — is exactly as contestable as the conclusion it is meant to support: anyone who doubts that God exists has just as much reason to doubt that God's existence is even possible in the relevant modal sense, so the argument, while logically valid, may not be dialectically effective at moving a genuine skeptic, only at showing believers their belief is not incoherent. Plantinga's own considered verdict, stated plainly in The Nature of Necessity, was that the argument is sound but not, by itself, a successful piece of natural theology capable of compelling assent from a doubter — a notably modest conclusion from the argument's own most sophisticated contemporary defender.

Is the argument convincing

This is a point where readers will not agree. Natural theology's actual reach is tested nowhere in this chapter more sharply than here: some readers, following Anselm's own confidence, will find the ontological argument's logical structure compelling once its key premises are granted; others, siding with Gaunilo's and Kant's instincts, will conclude the argument shows something interesting about the limits of pure conceptual reasoning rather than anything about God's actual existence. Plantinga's own modest verdict — sound, but not persuasive to a genuine skeptic — is one reasonable place to land, but it is not the only one serious philosophers of religion have reached.


The Ontological Argument Through Three Stages Anselm (1078) "That than which nothing greater can be conceived" exists in the understanding; existing in reality too would be greater — so it must. Objected to by: Gaunilo's "perfect island" Descartes (1641) God = supremely perfect being. Existence is a perfection. Therefore the supremely perfect being exists. Objected to by: Kant — existence is not a predicate/perfection Plantinga (1974) If a maximally great being is POSSIBLE (exists in some possible world), it exists in EVERY possible world. Plantinga's own verdict: valid, but the key premise is just as contestable as the conclusion it supports.

5. Going to the Sources

  • Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, Chapters 2-4, together with Gaunilo's On Behalf of the Fool and Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo — nearly all standard modern editions print all three together, which is the only fair way to read the argument.
  • René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Meditation V — Descartes's own statement of existence as a perfection, in the context of his broader argument for God's existence and reliability as a guarantee against radical doubt.
  • Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (1974), Chapter 10, "God and Necessity" — Plantinga's modal restatement and his own frank assessment of what the argument does and does not accomplish, in his own words.

핵심 요약

  • Anselm defines God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." Such a being exists in the mind. A being that also exists in reality is greater, so God must exist in reality.
  • Descartes treats existence as a perfection. A supremely perfect being must have every perfection, so it must exist, just as a triangle's angles must sum to 180 degrees.
  • Gaunilo's "perfect island" parody says the same reasoning would prove any "most perfect" thing exists. Anselm replied that necessary existence belongs to the greatness of God but not of an island.
  • Kant says existence is not a predicate: a hundred real thalers have no more content than a hundred possible ones. This strikes at Anselm's and Descartes's versions.
  • Plantinga's modal version avoids Kant's point, but depends on it being possible that a maximally great being exists. He judged it sound but not able to persuade a doubter.

Topic: This lecture examines the ontological argument, which tries to reach God's existence from the concept of God alone, and the objections of Gaunilo and Kant.

Remember: The argument claims to derive God's existence from a definition, with no premise from experience. That is both its power and its weakness.

Caution: Whether Anselm's reply to Gaunilo works is disputed. Readers differ, and Plantinga's own modest verdict is only one reasonable place to land.

One line to carry into ministry: Treat a "sound but unpersuasive" argument as a way to show believers their faith is coherent, not as a tool to force assent.

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  • State Gaunilo's "perfect island" objection in your own words, and then state Anselm's reply (that necessary existence is part of what makes "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" great, in a way it is not part of what makes an island great). Does Anselm's reply actually answer Gaunilo, or does it just relocate the difficulty one level down?
  • Kant's thaler illustration argues that "a hundred real thalers" contains no more conceptual content than "a hundred possible thalers" — existence adds no content, only asserts that the content is instantiated. Does this objection apply equally well to Anselm's version and to Descartes's version, or does one of the two survive it better than the other?
  • Plantinga concludes his own modal ontological argument is "sound" but not capable of persuading a genuine skeptic. Is a "sound but unpersuasive" argument still worth including in a course like this one? What work, if any, can such an argument do for someone who already believes?

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