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ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God

Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism

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ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God
제 0 장 · Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
  1. Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: Prolegomena: Revelation, Religious Language, and the Knowledge of God
  1. Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
  2. Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
  3. Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
  4. Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: The Existence of God: Arguments and Their Critics
  1. Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
  4. Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
  5. Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: The Incommunicable Attributes of God
  1. Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
  2. Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
  3. Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
  4. Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
  5. Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
  6. Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: The Communicable Attributes and the Names of God
  1. Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
  2. Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
  3. Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
  4. Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
  5. Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
  6. Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: The Trinity I: Biblical Foundations and Historical Formation
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
  2. Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
  4. Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
  5. Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
  6. Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: The Trinity II: Orthodox Doctrine and Modern Debates
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
  2. Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
  3. Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
  4. Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
  5. Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
  6. Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: Contemporary Challenges to the Doctrine of God
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
  2. Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
  3. Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
  4. Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
  5. Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
  6. Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: Decrees, Creation, Providence, and Pastoral Application
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
  2. Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
  3. Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
  4. Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
  5. Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
  6. Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him

핵심만 먼저 보기 ↓

20분

This closing lecture of Chapter 7 takes up two challenges that, unlike the previous four, do not share classical theism's own premises at all. Postmodern philosophy questions whether any claim to universal, objective truth — including any claim about God — can be made honestly, given how thoroughly every truth-claim is shaped by the particular culture, power structure, and vocabulary of the person making it. The New Atheism, associated in its most publicly visible form with Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett, argues on more directly evidential and moral grounds that God does not exist and that religious belief is not merely false but actively harmful. This lecture engages both challenges in their strongest available forms, returning to and building on the apologetic groundwork Chapter 2 (2-5) laid with Van Til's presuppositionalism and its direct engagement with earlier atheistic arguments.

이 20분으로 얻는 것

  • State the postmodern critique of universal truth claims (drawing on Jean-François Lyotard's account of "incredulity toward metanarratives" and Michel Foucault's account of the relationship between knowledge and power) in a form its proponents would recognize as fair.
  • Explain more than one Christian response to postmodernism, including both a defense of truth's universality and an acknowledgment of what postmodern critique gets right about theology's own historical entanglement with power.
  • State the New Atheism's central moral and evidential arguments (the problem of evil, religiously motivated violence, and the argument from an apparently unnecessary hiddenness of God) in their strongest form, engaging real arguments rather than caricatures.
  • Connect this lecture's apologetic response back to Chapter 2's classical arguments (2-2 through 2-4) and presuppositional approach (2-5), showing how the whole course's apologetic material bears on these contemporary challenges.

But sanctify the Lord God in your hearts; and always be ready to give an answer to everyone who asks you a reason concerning the hope that is in you, with humility and fear." — 1 Peter 3:15

World English Bible

Be careful that you don't let anyone rob you through his philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the elements of the world, and not after Christ." — Colossians 2:8

WEB

These two texts hold together the two halves of this lecture's task. 1 Peter 3:15 commands both readiness to "give an answer" (the Greek apologia, the root of "apologetics") and the manner of giving it — "with humility and fear," not with the contempt for one's interlocutor that both postmodern critics and New Atheist writers sometimes (fairly) accuse Christian apologists of displaying. Colossians 2:8 warns against being "robbed" by a philosophy that answers to "the tradition of men" and "the elements of the world" rather than to Christ — a warning this lecture reads as applying to every totalizing philosophical system engaged in this lecture, postmodern and atheist alike, not as a blanket license to dismiss philosophy itself, since Paul's warning is precisely against philosophy "not after Christ," implying that some philosophical engagement can indeed be conducted after Christ.

1. The postmodern challenge, stated fairly

"Postmodernism" names a diverse and often internally disagreeing set of late-twentieth-century philosophical movements rather than a single position, but a common thread runs through its most influential figures relevant to theology. Jean-François Lyotard, in The Postmodern Condition (1979), famously defined the postmodern as "incredulity toward metanarratives" — deep suspicion of any grand, totalizing story (whether Marxist, Enlightenment-rationalist, or Christian) that claims to explain and give meaning to all of human history and experience from a single, supposedly neutral vantage point. Michel Foucault's work pressed a related point from a different angle: what counts as "knowledge" or "truth" in any given society is never simply discovered by neutral inquiry but is produced, in part, by structures of power — institutions, disciplines, and discourses that determine which claims get to count as true and whose voices get to make them. Applied to Christian theology, the challenge is not (in its most serious form) simply "there is no God," but something more unsettling for a course built entirely around careful argument: any claim to have discovered God's nature through careful reasoning from Scripture, tradition, or philosophical argument is itself a culturally and historically located act, shaped by the vocabulary, assumptions, and power structures of whoever is doing the theology — and Western, largely male, largely Euro-American Christian theology in particular has a long, documented history of presenting its own culturally specific conclusions as simply "what the Bible teaches," while marginalizing other readings. This is not a frivolous charge; the history of theology used to justify colonialism, or to silence minority readings within the church, gives it real evidential weight, and a course produced from within one particular tradition (as this course's introduction already conceded of itself) cannot dismiss it as merely an academic fashion.

2. More than one Christian response

This course does not offer a single, tidy answer to postmodernism, because serious Christian thinkers have responded in more than one direction, and both directions deserve to be named. One response, associated broadly with Reformed epistemology (Alvin Plantinga, previewed in Chapter 2, 2-1, and Nicholas Wolterstorff) and with a renewed classical natural theology, holds firm to the claim that some truths, including truths about God, really are universal and knowable across cultures, and that postmodernism's critique, if applied consistently to itself, is self-undermining: the claim "there is no universal truth" is itself either offered as a universal truth (in which case it refutes itself) or as merely one more culturally located perspective with no special claim on anyone else's assent (in which case it gives no one a reason to actually accept it over its alternatives). This is a real and, in this course's judgment, a genuinely forceful logical point, not a rhetorical trick, and it applies with particular force against the strongest, most totalizing versions of the postmodern claim.

A second response, associated with thinkers working in the tradition sometimes called "postliberal" theology (George Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine, 1984, is a landmark text) and with some strands of theological engagement with Foucault specifically, concedes more to the critique: theology has never been done from a culturally neutral vantage point, no theologian (including this course's own author, as the introduction already admitted) escapes his or her own social location, and Christian humility should include real self-suspicion about how much of what has been presented as simply "biblical" has, in fact, been shaped by unexamined cultural assumptions — the confession's own history of complicity in colonialism and in silencing minority voices within the church is real, not a postmodern fabrication. What this response does not concede is Lyotard's full skepticism about metanarratives as such: Christian theology can acknowledge its own historical and cultural embeddedness while still maintaining that the gospel itself is not merely one culturally local story among equally valid others, because the gospel's own claim is precisely that God has acted, publicly and historically, in events (supremely the resurrection) whose truth or falsehood does not depend on which culture is asking the question — a claim postmodern theory itself cannot rule out in advance without begging the very question at issue.

3. The New Atheism's arguments, stated fairly

The New Atheism refers loosely to a wave of best-selling atheist books published roughly 2004-2007 — Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion (2006), Christopher Hitchens's God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2007), Sam Harris's The End of Faith (2004), and Daniel Dennett's Breaking the Spell (2006) — distinguished from earlier academic atheism less by genuinely new arguments than by its combative public tone and its explicit claim that religious belief is not merely mistaken but actively, urgently dangerous. Stripped of rhetorical heat, its most serious arguments deserve to be engaged directly rather than dismissed as mere hostility. The evidential problem of evil, developed academically well before the New Atheism by philosophers such as William Rowe, argues that the sheer quantity and apparent gratuitousness of suffering in the world (a fawn dying slowly and pointlessly in a forest fire, to use Rowe's own famous example, unseen and unredeemed by any greater good anyone can identify) counts as genuine evidence against, even if it does not logically disprove, the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God — Chapter 8 (8-5) will engage this argument's theological responses directly. The argument from religiously motivated violence (Hitchens's central charge, extensively documented with historical examples ranging from the to sectarian conflict) argues that religion, and monotheistic religion in particular, has a specific and disproportionate causal role in human violence and oppression across history, not merely that violent people sometimes happen to hold religious beliefs. And the argument from divine hiddenness (developed most carefully by the philosopher J. L. Schellenberg, though echoed less formally by Dawkins and others) argues that a perfectly loving God who wanted relationship with every person would make his existence unmistakably evident to every reasonable, non-resistant seeker, and the fact that many careful, honest inquirers remain sincerely unconvinced is itself evidence against such a God's existence.

4. Responding to the New Atheism's strongest arguments

Each of these three arguments has received serious, extended theological and philosophical response, and this lecture states the shape of each response rather than claiming to have resolved arguments Chapter 8 and the wider literature address at far greater length. To the evidential problem of evil, the classical response (developed fully in 8-5) does not claim to identify the specific greater good served by every instance of suffering — a move called "skeptical theism" holds that human epistemic limitations give no reason to expect we could identify God's reasons even if they exist, which blunts, though does not eliminate, the inductive force of Rowe's argument; this course takes seriously enough to devote a full lecture to it rather than treating this brief mention as sufficient. To the argument from religious violence, the honest response has to concede real historical fact (professing Christians have committed real atrocities in religion's name) while also noting, with equal historical honesty, that the twentieth century's most lethal ideologically motivated violence (Stalinist, Maoist, and other explicitly atheist state projects) was carried out by regimes hostile to religion rather than in its name — which suggests the deeper cause of large-scale violence is more plausibly located in the human capacity for ideological zealotry and the abuse of power as such, present in both religious and explicitly atheist form, than in religious belief specifically as Hitchens's argument requires. To the argument from divine hiddenness, theistic philosophers (including Paul Moser and, from a different angle, Plantinga) have responded that a God whose primary purpose is not merely to be believed in but to be trusted, loved, and morally transformed by might have good reason to disclose himself in ways that require a genuine, existentially serious seeking rather than coercive, unmistakable displays that would produce mere intellectual assent without the moral engagement God actually seeks — a response Schellenberg has continued to press against in return, making divine hiddenness a genuinely live and ongoing philosophical conversation rather than a settled question either side has already won.

5. Returning to Chapter 2's groundwork

This lecture closes the loop Chapter 2 (2-5) opened. Van Til's presuppositionalism argued there that no reasoning, including atheistic reasoning, is actually neutral — every argument, including the New Atheism's own confidence in reason, evidence, and morality as reliable guides to truth, already presupposes a framework that, Van Til argued, only a theistic worldview can actually ground without borrowing capital from Christian assumptions it explicitly rejects (why should reason be trusted to track truth at all, on a purely naturalistic account of the mind as a product of unguided evolutionary pressures optimizing for survival rather than truth? why should any against God's goodness, like the problem of evil itself, carry weight, if the atheist's own worldview cannot ground objective moral value in the first place?). This is among Christianity's most forceful responses to atheism generally, including its contemporary form, because it turns the New Atheism's own confident use of reason and morality back on itself rather than merely trading evidence for evidence. Combined with 2-2 through 2-4's classical arguments (still live, still contested, and not withdrawn by this lecture) and this lecture's specific responses to evil, violence, and hiddenness, the course's apologetic material across Chapters 2 and 7 amounts to a sustained, multi-pronged case — not a single knockdown argument, because this course has been honest throughout that no such single argument commands universal Christian or philosophical agreement, but a considered case nonetheless, offered "with humility and fear" as 1 Peter 3:15 requires.


Two Challenges, Two Kinds of Response Postmodernism Claim: no neutral vantage point; all truth-claims are culturally, historically situated (Lyotard, Foucault) Response 1: self-refuting if applied to itself (Reformed epistemology) Response 2: concede real historical situatedness; keep the gospel's public, historical truth-claim (postliberal theology) The New Atheism Evidential problem of evil (Rowe) → full response in Chapter 8 (8-5) Religious violence (Hitchens) → concede real history; note atheist regimes' comparable violence Divine hiddenness (Schellenberg) → hiddenness may serve trust and moral engagement over bare assent Underneath all three: Van Til's presuppositionalism (2-5)

5. Going to the Sources

Read Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979; English translation, University of Minnesota Press, 1984), especially the introduction, for the "incredulity toward metanarratives" formula in its original context. For the Christian engagement, read James K. A. Smith, Who's Afraid of Postmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault to Church (Baker Academic, 2006), which argues for more common ground between postmodern critique and Reformed theology than is often assumed. For the New Atheism directly, read Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Houghton Mifflin, 2006), chapter 2, for the "God Hypothesis" argument in Dawkins's own words, alongside Alister McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath's direct response, The Dawkins Delusion? (SPCK, 2007). For divine hiddenness specifically, read J. L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Cornell University Press, 1993), and Paul K. Moser's reply in The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

핵심 요약

  • Postmodernism, following Lyotard and Foucault, doubts grand claims to universal truth. It argues that all knowledge is shaped by culture and power, and theology's history of colonialism gives this real weight.
  • One Christian response, from Reformed epistemology (Plantinga, Wolterstorff), says the claim "there is no universal truth" refutes itself if applied to itself.
  • A second response, postliberal theology (Lindbeck), concedes more about theology's cultural location, yet holds that the gospel rests on public events, supremely the resurrection.
  • The New Atheism (Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, Dennett) argues from evil, religious violence and divine hiddenness. Skeptical theism, the record of atheist regimes and Moser's reply offer answers, though Schellenberg presses back.
  • Van Til's presuppositionalism and Chapter 2's classical arguments sit beneath these replies. All are offered "with humility and fear" (1 Peter 3:15).

Topic: This lecture presents the postmodern and New Atheist challenges in their strongest forms and sets out several Christian responses.

Remember: Christians have answered postmodernism in more than one way, and the lecture offers a combined case rather than a single decisive argument.

Caution: These debates are not settled. The lecture admits that Christian theology has been tied to power, and that hiddenness remains a live conversation.

One line to carry into ministry: Give an honest answer with humility and respect, as 1 Peter 3:15 asks, and admit where critics are right.

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  • This lecture argues that the postmodern claim "there is no universal truth" may be self-refuting. State the self-refutation argument as precisely as you can, and then consider whether a postmodern thinker has any resource for escaping it — is there a way to state Lyotard's "incredulity toward metanarratives" that avoids applying to itself?
  • Hitchens argues that religion has a disproportionate causal role in human violence; this lecture responds by pointing to atheist state violence in the twentieth century. Does this response actually answer Hitchens's argument, or does it commit a "two wrongs" move that avoids the specific question he is asking? Explain your reasoning.
  • Schellenberg's divine hiddenness argument and Moser's response (that hiddenness may serve trust and moral transformation rather than bare intellectual assent) both appeal to what kind of relationship a loving God would most want with creatures. Whose account of that relationship do you find more persuasive, and why — and what would change your mind?

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