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STEL3E Advanced Systematic Theology

Lecture 1-1: Revelation and Theological Epistemology

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STEL3E Advanced Systematic Theology
제 0 장 · Introduction: What Is Advanced Systematic Theology, and Why Study It?
  1. Introduction: What Is Advanced Systematic Theology, and Why Study It?
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: Scripture, Revelation, and Authority
  1. Lecture 1-1: Revelation and Theological Epistemology
  2. Lecture 1-2: Inspiration and Inerrancy
  3. Lecture 1-3: Speech-Act Theory and Biblical Authority
  4. Lecture 1-4: The Sufficiency of Scripture and the Scripture-Tradition Question
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: The Holy Trinity
  1. Lecture 2-1: The Nicene-Constantinopolitan Settlement
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Filioque Controversy
  3. Lecture 2-3: Eternal Relations of Authority and Submission
  4. Lecture 2-4: Rahner's Rule, Social Trinitarianism, and the Church's Life
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: Providence, Sovereignty, and Theodicy
  1. Lecture 3-1: Divine Decree and Human Freedom — Compatibilism and Libertarian Freedom
  2. Lecture 3-2: Open Theism and Process Theology — Challenges to Classical Providence
  3. Lecture 3-3: Divine Impassibility — Classical and Revisionist Accounts
  4. Lecture 3-4: Theodicy at the Doctrinal Level — Privation and Soul-Making
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: Theological Anthropology — Image, Fall, and Nature
  1. Lecture 4-1: The Image of God — Structural, Relational, and Functional Readings
  2. Lecture 4-2: Original Sin and Federal Headship
  3. Lecture 4-3: The Bondage or Freedom of the Will After the Fall
  4. Lecture 4-4: The Soul-Body Question, and Transhumanism's Challenge
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: Christology and the Atonement
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Hypostatic Union and the Extra Calvinisticum
  2. Lecture 5-2: Kenotic Christology
  3. Lecture 5-3: Christ's Sinlessness and Obedience
  4. Lecture 5-4: The Extent of the Atonement
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: Salvation — Union with Christ and the Order of Salvation
  1. Lecture 6-1: Union with Christ as an Integrating Motif for Soteriology
  2. Lecture 6-2: Election
  3. Lecture 6-3: Justification and Its Contemporary Challenges
  4. Lecture 6-4: Sanctification and Perseverance
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: The Spirit and the Church
  1. Lecture 7-1: Christological Pneumatology and the Spirit's Cosmic Work
  2. Lecture 7-2: The Church's Identity and Marks
  3. Lecture 7-3: The Sacraments/Ordinances Across Traditions
  4. Lecture 7-4: The Church and Culture/Society
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: Eschatology — Already and Not Yet
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Hermeneutical Structure of Biblical Eschatology
  2. Lecture 8-2: The Intermediate State
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Millennium
  4. Lecture 8-4: The Resurrection of the Body and Final Judgment
  5. Lecture 8-5: Cosmic Renewal — The New Heavens and New Earth

핵심만 먼저 보기 ↓

23분

An introductory course establishes that God has made himself known in two distinguishable ways: general revelation, available in principle to every human being through creation, conscience, and the moral order (Psalm 19:1-6, Romans 1:19-20, Romans 2:14-15), and special revelation, God's more specific self-disclosure in his mighty acts, the prophetic and apostolic word, and supremely in Jesus Christ. That distinction is assumed here rather than re-established. What an introductory course typically does not have room for is the harder question this lecture takes up: once a claim to revelation has been made, what would it even mean to know it, and what entitles someone to believe it without first proving it by some independent, revelation-free method?

That question became sharper, not easier, after Immanuel Kant. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason argued that human knowledge is structured by the mind's own categories - space, time, causality - which apply only to the phenomenal world, the world as it appears to us through those categories. The noumenal world, reality as it is in itself apart from how our minds structure it, is in principle inaccessible to theoretical knowledge. God, freedom, and the soul, on Kant's account, cannot be objects of theoretical knowledge at all; they can, at most, be postulates required by practical (moral) reason. This course's companion course on modern theology traces Kant's argument and its reception in full; here the point is narrower and more directly relevant to systematic theology's own method: if Kant is right, then no revelation, however clearly given, could in principle be an object of theoretical knowledge, because revelation is a claim about how reality in itself actually is, and theoretical knowledge, on Kant's account, never reaches that far. Every serious account of revelation's epistemology written after Kant is, in some sense, a response to this challenge, whether it accepts Kant's framework, revises it, or rejects it outright.

Reformed epistemology, developed most influentially by Alvin Plantinga from the 1980s onward, is this lecture's central case study in a post-Kantian answer - a genuine option among several serious ones, not the field's only response and not presented here as simply correct. Plantinga's proposal reframes the question: instead of asking whether belief in God can be proven from more basic beliefs, he asks whether belief in God can be properly basic - rational to hold without being inferred from other beliefs at all, in the same way belief in the external world or in other minds is properly basic and yet not provable from anything more fundamental. On this account, when the "sensus divinitatis" (a Calvin-derived term for a natural sense of the divine) or the Holy Spirit's internal testimony produces belief in God under the right circumstances, that belief can be warranted - rational, justified, and (if true and produced by a properly functioning belief-forming process aimed at truth) knowledge - without first passing through an independent argument. This lecture states Plantinga's proposal in a form epistemologists sympathetic to it would recognize, together with the two most serious objections it has drawn, and situates it as one live position within a wider field this course does not attempt to settle.

이 23분으로 얻는 것

  • State the Kantian epistemological challenge to theological knowledge precisely enough to explain why it is a challenge to *any* claim of special revelation, not only to a specific doctrine.
  • Explain Plantinga's Reformed epistemology, including the technical sense in which a belief can be "properly basic" and "warranted," and distinguish it from a simple appeal to private feeling.
  • Name at least one serious objection to Reformed epistemology (for example, the "Great Pumpkin" objection or the problem of religious disagreement) and explain why its proponents consider it answerable rather than fatal.
  • Explain why this lecture presents Reformed epistemology as one live option rather than theological epistemology's settled answer.

because that which is known of God is revealed in them, for God revealed it to them. For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse.

But to us, God revealed them through the Spirit. For the Spirit searches all things, yes, the deep things of God. For who among men knows the things of a man, except the spirit of the man, which is in him? Even so, no one knows the things of God, except God's Spirit. But we received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is from God, that we might know the things that were freely given to us by God. Which things also we speak, not in words which man's wisdom teaches, but which the Holy Spirit teaches, comparing spiritual things with spiritual things. Now the natural man doesn't receive the things of God's Spirit, for they are foolishness to him, and he can't know them, because they are spiritually discerned.

Romans 1:19-20 (World English Bible)

Paul's claim here is a claim about 's availability, not about anyone's ability to reason their way to it unaided: what "is revealed in them" is revealed by God's own act ("God revealed it to them"), not discovered by an autonomous process of inference the creature performs from a neutral starting point. That distinction matters directly for this lecture's epistemological question. If general revelation's clarity is itself God's doing rather than a product of human argument succeeding on its own terms, then a theological epistemology that locates knowledge of God in a properly functioning, God-given cognitive process - rather than in a chain of independent proofs - has at least this text's support for treating revelation, not autonomous reason, as epistemically first.

1 Corinthians 2:10-14 (WEB)

Paul's analogy - "who among men knows the things of a man, except the spirit of the man" - is itself a piece of epistemology: some knowledge is available only from within a certain position, not by external inspection. Applied to knowledge of God, the passage claims that spiritual discernment is not an inference performed on neutral data available equally to everyone, but something the Spirit's presence makes possible, and that its absence explains why "the natural man" finds the deep things of God "foolishness" rather than simply unproven. This is not, on its own, a developed epistemology of properly basic belief; connecting it to one is this lecture's argument, not something the text states in Plantinga's terms. But the passage's structure - some knowledge is available only on the inside of a relationship to the Spirit, not from a neutral vantage point outside it - is exactly the structure Reformed epistemology's proponents point to when they argue that requiring theological belief to clear an independent, religiously neutral evidential bar begs the question against Christian belief's own account of how such belief actually comes to be held.

1. The challenge, stated precisely

It is worth being exact about what Kant's argument does and does not challenge, because a loose statement of it invites a loose response. Kant does not argue that God does not exist, or that religious belief is irrational in some ordinary sense. He argues something more specific: that theoretical reason, structured as it necessarily is by categories that apply only within possible experience, cannot produce knowledge of anything beyond possible experience - God included - because knowledge, on his account, requires both concepts and intuitions (sensory content the concepts organize), and no sensory intuition of God is available to structure a concept of him into knowledge. Belief in God can survive as a postulate of practical reason - something morality requires us to assume, even if theoretical reason cannot establish it - but this is a considerably weaker status than the classical claim that God can, in some sense, be known.

The force of this challenge for systematic theology is that it does not attack one doctrine; it attacks the entire enterprise's claim to be knowledge rather than practically useful postulation. If Kant is right without qualification, this course's remaining thirty-two lectures are, at best, an extended meditation on beliefs no one is in a position to know are true. That is a high stake for a single epistemological argument to carry, and it is precisely why every serious systematic theology written since Kant has had to take some position on it, even where that position is simply "Kant's framework itself rests on contestable philosophical commitments that need not be granted."

2. Plantinga's Reformed epistemology: the proposal

Plantinga's central move, developed across Warrant: The Current Debate, Warrant and Proper Function, and Warranted Christian Belief, is to attack a background assumption shared by Kant's challenge and by much of modern apologetics alike: classical foundationalism, the view that a belief is rational only if it is either self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible, or else properly inferred from beliefs that are. Plantinga argues classical foundationalism is self-referentially incoherent - the foundationalist thesis itself is neither self-evident, evident to the senses, nor incorrigible, nor inferred from beliefs that are - and that, once it is abandoned, a wide range of beliefs ordinary people hold without argument (belief in other minds, belief in the reliability of memory, belief in the external world) turn out to be rational without being inferred from more basic beliefs at all. These beliefs are properly basic: rationally held as starting points, not as conclusions.

Plantinga's further claim is that belief in God can likewise be properly basic, produced not by inference but by a cognitive faculty - Calvin's sensus divinitatis, functioning as designed - responding appropriately to circumstances (beauty, moral experience, guilt, a sense of God's presence in worship or Scripture) that reliably trigger it. Christian belief specifically (not mere theism) Plantinga grounds further in what he calls the "extended A/C model" (Aquinas/Calvin), on which the Holy Spirit's internal testimony, occasioned by reading or hearing the gospel, produces belief in the great truths of the gospel directly, rather than through an argument from premises to a conclusion. Crucially, "properly basic" does not mean "beyond criticism" or "arbitrary": a properly basic belief can still be warranted only if it is in fact produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly, in an environment for which they were designed, successfully aimed at truth - and it can be defeated by contrary evidence the believer cannot rationally ignore. Plantinga's account is therefore a claim about warrant's structure, not a license to believe anything without regard for evidence against it.

3. The two most serious objections

The "Great Pumpkin" objection, first pressed against Plantinga by Michael Martin and Philip Quinn, asks why, if theistic belief can be properly basic without argument, a belief in literally anything - the Great Pumpkin's annual visitation to the most sincere pumpkin patch, to borrow the Peanuts reference the objection is named for - could not equally claim properly basic status, since no argument would then be required to rule any belief out. Plantinga's response distinguishes proper basicality from mere claimed basicality: not every belief that a person sincerely holds without argument is thereby warranted: warrant requires the belief actually be produced by a properly functioning faculty aimed at truth in the right kind of environment, and Plantinga argues there is no serious reason to think a faculty producing belief in the Great Pumpkin meets that description, while there is a long tradition (Calvin's sensus divinitatis) arguing that a faculty producing belief in God does.

The second objection is harder to dismiss quickly: the problem of religious diversity. If Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian believers can each claim their own core convictions are produced by a properly functioning faculty responding appropriately to genuine religious experience, Plantinga's framework by itself supplies no internal way to adjudicate between them - it explains how a religious belief can be warranted for the person who holds it, given that religion's truth, but does not by itself show Christianity is the true one among the competitors making structurally similar claims. Plantinga's own response, most fully worked out in Warranted Christian Belief, is candid that his project's aim is narrower than it might first appear: he is defending Christian belief's rationality (that it is not intellectually deficient to hold it without an independent argument), given that Christianity is true, not offering a neutral argument that settles which religion is in fact true. Critics reasonably note that this leaves the hardest question - which tradition's account of its own properly-basic belief is correct - exactly where it was before the argument began.

4. Situating Reformed epistemology among its alternatives

This lecture has stated Reformed epistemology in enough detail to show why serious philosophers take it seriously, and it is worth being equally explicit about what has not been claimed: that it is theological epistemology's only serious post-Kantian option, or that this course adopts it as settled method. Evidentialist approaches (classical and cumulative-case apologetics, of the kind this track's own apologetics course develops) continue to argue that theistic and specifically Christian belief can and should be supported by independent argument and evidence, and regard Reformed epistemology's willingness to do without such argument as, at best, incomplete. Presuppositionalist approaches (associated with Cornelius Van Til) share Reformed epistemology's suspicion of religiously neutral starting points but draw a sharper conclusion: that every worldview, including secular ones, reasons from unprovable presuppositions, and that Christianity's presuppositions alone make sense of reasoning, logic, and morality being possible at all - a transcendental argument rather than Plantinga's warrant-based one. This course does not adjudicate among these three families of response to the post-Kantian challenge; each represents a serious, contemporary, non-fideist attempt to explain how theological knowledge remains possible, and a student's own tradition and training will likely have already inclined them toward one.

Three approaches compared

This is a point where readers will not agree. Evidentialists, Reformed epistemologists, and presuppositionalists each think the other two approaches concede too much or claim too little, and the disagreement runs through contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, not only through popular apologetics. A student who has only encountered one of these three approaches, presented as simply "how Christians answer skeptics," should recognize that the other two have serious, published, contemporary defenders.

Three post-Kantian answers to "can revelation be known?" Presented as live alternatives, not a ranking Evidentialism Theistic and Christian belief should rest on independent argument and evidence - cosmological, design, historical, cumulative-case. This course's companion apologetics course Reformed epistemology Belief in God can be properly basic - warranted without argument, if produced by a properly functioning faculty aimed at truth. Plantinga - this lecture's central case study Presuppositionalism Every worldview reasons from unprovable presuppositions; only Christianity's make reasoning and morality intelligible at all. Van Til - transcendental argument, not warrant claim All three answer the same challenge Kant: theoretical reason's categories apply only within possible experience, so God cannot be its object. This course states Reformed epistemology in depth because it is philosophically rich - not because the other two columns are less serious or less widely held.

6. Further Reading

  • Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press, 2000).
  • Kelly James Clark, ed., Philosophers Who Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers (InterVarsity Press, 1993), for accessible first-person accounts of Reformed epistemology's appeal.
  • Michael Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology (Ashgate, 2009), a sympathetic-but-critical study situating Plantinga within the wider Reformed tradition's ambivalence about natural theology.
  • William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 2nd ed. (Crossway, 2017), for the evidentialist alternative stated by two of its leading contemporary defenders.
  • John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (P&R Publishing, 1995), for presuppositionalism stated by a sympathetic interpreter.
  • Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust and Belief in Testimony (Oxford University Press, 2012), a philosophically rigorous non-Reformed treatment of when trusting testimony (including religious testimony) is rational.

핵심 요약

  • Kant argued that human knowledge is shaped by the mind's categories and cannot reach God as he is in himself. If so, no revelation could be theoretical knowledge, so the challenge touches every doctrine.
  • Plantinga attacks classical foundationalism, which says a belief is rational only if self-evident, evident to the senses, incorrigible, or inferred from such beliefs. He argues the rule fails its own test.
  • Belief in God can be "properly basic," held rationally without argument, if a properly working faculty aimed at truth produces it. Contrary evidence can still defeat it.
  • Two objections stand out: the Great Pumpkin objection and religious diversity. Plantinga defends the rationality of Christian belief, given that it is true. He does not offer a neutral proof of it.
  • Evidentialists, Reformed epistemologists and presuppositionalists (Van Til) give three serious answers to Kant. The course does not choose among them.

Topic: This lecture asks how revelation can be known after Kant, and examines Plantinga's Reformed epistemology beside two other serious answers.

Remember: Plantinga argues that belief in God can be rational without argument ("properly basic") if it comes from a properly working, God-given faculty aimed at truth.

Caution: The lecture does not say this is the only answer or the settled one. It does not claim that Plantinga proves Christianity true over other religions.

One line to carry into ministry: Honest faith does not need to win every argument first, but it should still listen to evidence and to serious objections.

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  • State, in your own words, exactly what Kant's argument challenges and what it does not challenge. Why does getting this distinction precise matter for evaluating any response to it?
  • Plantinga distinguishes a belief's being properly basic from its being beyond all criticism. Explain that distinction using an example other than belief in God.
  • Is the "Great Pumpkin" objection successfully answered by Plantinga's account of warrant, in your judgment? Defend your answer against the strongest form of the objection you can state.
  • The problem of religious diversity was presented as the harder of the two objections to Reformed epistemology. Do you think Plantinga's narrower aim (defending Christian belief's rationality *given* Christianity's truth, rather than proving Christianity true) is an adequate response, or does it concede too much? Explain.
  • Which of the three families of response - evidentialism, Reformed epistemology, presuppositionalism - most closely matches how your own tradition or training has approached the question of how theological knowledge is possible? Has this lecture changed how you would state that approach?

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