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STEL3E Advanced Systematic Theology

Lecture 3-4: Theodicy at the Doctrinal Level — Privation and Soul-Making

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STEL3E Advanced Systematic Theology
제 0 장 · Introduction: What Is Advanced Systematic Theology, and Why Study It?
  1. Introduction: What Is Advanced Systematic Theology, and Why Study It?
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: Scripture, Revelation, and Authority
  1. Lecture 1-1: Revelation and Theological Epistemology
  2. Lecture 1-2: Inspiration and Inerrancy
  3. Lecture 1-3: Speech-Act Theory and Biblical Authority
  4. Lecture 1-4: The Sufficiency of Scripture and the Scripture-Tradition Question
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: The Holy Trinity
  1. Lecture 2-1: The Nicene-Constantinopolitan Settlement
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Filioque Controversy
  3. Lecture 2-3: Eternal Relations of Authority and Submission
  4. Lecture 2-4: Rahner's Rule, Social Trinitarianism, and the Church's Life
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: Providence, Sovereignty, and Theodicy
  1. Lecture 3-1: Divine Decree and Human Freedom — Compatibilism and Libertarian Freedom
  2. Lecture 3-2: Open Theism and Process Theology — Challenges to Classical Providence
  3. Lecture 3-3: Divine Impassibility — Classical and Revisionist Accounts
  4. Lecture 3-4: Theodicy at the Doctrinal Level — Privation and Soul-Making
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: Theological Anthropology — Image, Fall, and Nature
  1. Lecture 4-1: The Image of God — Structural, Relational, and Functional Readings
  2. Lecture 4-2: Original Sin and Federal Headship
  3. Lecture 4-3: The Bondage or Freedom of the Will After the Fall
  4. Lecture 4-4: The Soul-Body Question, and Transhumanism's Challenge
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: Christology and the Atonement
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Hypostatic Union and the Extra Calvinisticum
  2. Lecture 5-2: Kenotic Christology
  3. Lecture 5-3: Christ's Sinlessness and Obedience
  4. Lecture 5-4: The Extent of the Atonement
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: Salvation — Union with Christ and the Order of Salvation
  1. Lecture 6-1: Union with Christ as an Integrating Motif for Soteriology
  2. Lecture 6-2: Election
  3. Lecture 6-3: Justification and Its Contemporary Challenges
  4. Lecture 6-4: Sanctification and Perseverance
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: The Spirit and the Church
  1. Lecture 7-1: Christological Pneumatology and the Spirit's Cosmic Work
  2. Lecture 7-2: The Church's Identity and Marks
  3. Lecture 7-3: The Sacraments/Ordinances Across Traditions
  4. Lecture 7-4: The Church and Culture/Society
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: Eschatology — Already and Not Yet
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Hermeneutical Structure of Biblical Eschatology
  2. Lecture 8-2: The Intermediate State
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Millennium
  4. Lecture 8-4: The Resurrection of the Body and Final Judgment
  5. Lecture 8-5: Cosmic Renewal — The New Heavens and New Earth

핵심만 먼저 보기 ↓

18분

The problem of evil is usually introduced philosophically: if God is all-powerful and perfectly good, why does evil exist? This course's companion apologetics course treats the problem in that philosophical register, including the free will defense and a philosophical version of soul-making theodicy. This lecture treats the same underlying question doctrinally — not primarily as a puzzle to be solved for a skeptical outsider, but as a question systematic theology has to answer coherently given what chapters 1 through 3 have already committed this course to about Scripture, God, and providence. Two classical theodicies, worked out at the doctrinal level long before modern philosophy of religion gave the problem its contemporary shape, remain the two most influential frameworks: Augustine's privation theory of evil, and Irenaeus's soul-making framework. This lecture states both, relates each to the free will defense and philosophical soul-making theodicy covered elsewhere, and returns one final time to this chapter's shared text, Genesis 50:20, to show how the whole chapter's threads meet in a single case.

이 18분으로 얻는 것

  • State Augustine's privation theory of evil precisely, including why it denies that evil is a substance or a created thing in its own right.
  • State Irenaeus's soul-making theodicy precisely, including why it treats moral and spiritual growth as requiring a world with real risk.
  • Explain how each classical theodicy relates to, without being identical to, the philosophical free will defense and soul-making theodicy this track's apologetics course covers.
  • Explain how 3-1's account of freedom, 3-2's account of providence, and 3-3's account of divine (im)passibility each bear on how a theologian can use these two theodicies.

As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save many people alive.

We know that all things work together for good for those who love God, to those who are called according to his purpose.

Genesis 50:20 (World English Bible)

Romans 8:28 (WEB)

1. The doctrinal shape of the question

Stated philosophically, the problem of evil asks whether the propositions "God is omnipotent," "God is perfectly good," and "evil exists" can be held together consistently. Stated doctrinally, the question is narrower and more specific to what a systematic theologian has already committed to: given the doctrine of creation (everything God made was pronounced good, Genesis 1:31), the doctrine of examined in 3-1 and 3-2, and whatever a theologian holds about divine from 3-3, how does evil enter and persist in a world this good, sovereign, and (on at least one reading) unaffected God governs? A doctrinal has to answer to the whole system, not only to the narrower philosophical consistency question — which is exactly why Augustine's and Irenaeus's frameworks, worked out as pieces of a comprehensive doctrine of creation and salvation rather than as freestanding philosophical arguments, remain distinct from, though related to, their philosophical counterparts.

2. Augustine's privation theory

Augustine's theodicy, developed most fully in the Confessions and City of God out of his own rejection of Manichaean dualism (which held that evil was a positive substance locked in cosmic struggle with good), holds that evil is not a substance, a created thing, or a positive reality of any kind, but a privation — a lack, corruption, or absence of a good that ought to be present in a nature God made good. On this account, a lie is not an added evil ingredient mixed into speech; it is truthful speech deprived of the truthfulness proper to it. A murderer's will is not evil in the sense of possessing some added evil substance; it is a will that has turned away from the good it was made to pursue and toward a lesser good disordered by that very turning. This move does real theological work: it lets Augustine affirm without qualification that everything God made, considered in itself, is good (since evil has no independent positive existence of its own to have been made), while still explaining how a wholly good creation contains real corruption — corruption is possible precisely because a good nature is capable of falling short of, or turning away from, the fullness of good proper to it, the way blindness is a real privation of a good (sight) without blindness itself being a created thing.

Privation theory's doctrinal payoff is directly connected to 3-1's freedom debate: Augustine locates the origin of evil specifically in a free rational creature's turning away from God (first the fallen angels, then Adam and Eve), a turning Augustine insists had no efficient cause outside the will itself — nothing made the will turn, since anything that could "make" a good will turn evil would itself need to already be evil, which returns the question rather than answering it. This is part of why Augustine's own later, more determinist-leaning theology of grace (examined in chapter 4) sits somewhat uneasily with his own earlier privation theory's insistence that 's origin cannot be traced to any prior cause at all — an internal tension in Augustine's own corpus worth naming rather than smoothing over.

3. Irenaeus's soul-making framework

Irenaeus of Lyons, writing in the second century, worked from a different starting point: rather than beginning from a perfect original creation later corrupted by a fall, Irenaeus held that Adam and Eve were created good but immature — like children, not yet fully developed into the moral and spiritual maturity God intended for them to grow into through their own experience, effort, and struggle. On this account, a world containing real risk, real temptation, real difficulty, and even the real possibility of falling short is not a design flaw introduced by sin, but a necessary feature of any world in which creatures could actually grow into the fuller likeness of God rather than being created already complete — much as a person cannot grow into courage without ever facing anything frightening, or into patience without ever having to wait. Irenaeus called the destiny of the human race growth from the "image" toward the fuller "likeness" of God (drawing on the distinction some interpreters find in Genesis 1:26's "image and likeness"), a process this framework treats as requiring precisely the kind of world scripture actually describes, with real risk built in from the start rather than introduced only afterward.

Where Augustine treats evil as a corruption of what should not have happened, Irenaeus's framework treats moral struggle, and even the possibility of falling into sin, as an intelligible and even necessary part of a world designed for growth — a difference in emphasis significant enough that the two theodicies are not simply restating the same point in different words. Irenaeus's framework has become newly influential in modern theology, especially through John Hick's philosophical development of it (which the apologetics course covers), but Irenaeus's own doctrinal version predates that development by roughly eighteen centuries and is not identical to Hick's more universalist-leaning philosophical elaboration of it.

4. Relating both to the free will defense and philosophical soul-making theodicy

This track's apologetics course covers the free will defense (evil results from the misuse of a good gift, libertarian free will, which God could not remove without removing a greater good) and a philosophical version of soul-making theodicy (a world with real difficulty is necessary for the development of genuinely virtuous character) as responses to the philosophical problem of evil's logical or evidential forms. Augustine's privation theory is related to, but not identical with, the free will defense: privation theory is a metaphysical account of what evil is (a lack, not a substance), while the free will defense is an account of why God permits the moral evil that results from creaturely choice; a theologian could hold the free will defense's account of why God permits evil while explaining what evil metaphysically is in a way that owes nothing to Augustine's specific privation framework, and Augustine's own account of privation is compatible with more than one account of why God permits the falling-away it makes possible. Irenaeus's framework and philosophical soul-making theodicy are closer, but not identical either: Irenaeus's version is embedded in a specific doctrine of humanity's created immaturity and eschatological destiny that a purely philosophical soul-making theodicy, aimed at defending God's existence to a skeptic rather than explaining creation's purpose to a believer, does not need to hold.

It is worth naming directly that Augustine's and Irenaeus's frameworks are not simply two paths to the same conclusion, nor are they straightforwardly compatible in every respect — Augustine's fall-centered account and Irenaeus's growth-centered account start from different pictures of what Adam and Eve's original condition actually was, and a theologian working carefully has to decide which starting point, or what combination, actually fits the biblical text best rather than assuming the two can be merged without remainder.

5. Returning to Genesis 50:20, and to the chapter as a whole

Genesis 50:20 has anchored every lecture in this chapter, and it is worth seeing why in a single place at the close. The brothers' act was genuinely evil — a privation of the brotherly good their relationship to Joseph ought to have had, on Augustine's account, or a genuine moral failure within a world of real moral risk, on Irenaeus's. Whether that act was rendered certain by God's decree while remaining genuinely theirs (3-1's compatibilist reading) or was genuinely open and merely foreknown and woven into God's plan afterward (3-1's libertarian reading) is a question this chapter has not resolved and does not need to resolve for the theodicy to work: both accounts of freedom can be joined to either theodicy of evil, and both can affirm, without contradiction, that "God meant it for good" — whether "meant" means God's power was persuasive rather than determining (a position 3-2 showed firmly rejecting) or God's sovereign decree stood behind the outcome from eternity (3-1's compatibilist claim) or God foreknew and providentially incorporated a genuinely free act (3-1's libertarian claim). And whether God stood entirely unaffected by the brothers' cruelty and Joseph's decades of suffering (3-3's classical claim) or was himself, in some sense, moved and afflicted by it (3-3's revisionist claim) is likewise a question this single verse does not settle. Romans 8:28's "all things work together for good" makes the same kind of claim at the level of a general Christian confession that Genesis 50:20 makes about one specific history — a claim every tradition surveyed in this chapter affirms, even while disagreeing, sometimes sharply, about exactly how it is true.

Which answer fits best

This is a point where readers will not agree about which theodicy, or which combination, best fits the biblical data — Augustinian and Irenaean instincts run through the whole history of Christian reflection on evil, often within the same tradition rather than cleanly dividing traditions from each other the way 3-1's and 3-3's debates do.

Theodicy at the doctrinal level Two classical accounts of evil, and their philosophical cousins Augustine: privation theory Evil = lack/corruption of a good nature, not a substance in its own right Origin: rational creature's free turning away from God, uncaused from outside Related to, not identical with, the free will defense (apologetics) Irenaeus: soul-making Adam and Eve: good but immature, made to grow toward likeness Real risk and struggle: necessary for genuine moral/spiritual growth Related to, not identical with, Hick's philosophical soul-making (apologetics) The chapter's shared text, one final time: Genesis 50:20 Freedom (3-1: compatibilist or libertarian?), providence (3-2: sovereign decree, not persuasion), and (im)passibility (3-3: affected or not?) all bear on this verse without a single combination being forced by the text itself. Not simply two versions of the same answer Augustine's fall-centered account and Irenaeus's growth-centered account start from different pictures of humanity's original condition. They are not straightforwardly compatible.

6. Further Reading

  • Augustine, Confessions, Book VII, and City of God, Book XI-XII, on the nature of evil.
  • Irenaeus of Lyons, Against Heresies, Book IV, on humanity's growth toward the divine likeness.
  • John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, rev. ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), for the philosophical development of Irenaean theodicy.
  • G. W. Leibniz-critical and constructive treatment: Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Eerdmans, 1974), for the philosophical free will defense this lecture relates to but does not restate.
  • David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami? (Eerdmans, 2005), an Orthodox theological response to theodicy after catastrophic suffering.
  • N. T. Wright, Evil and the Justice of God (InterVarsity Press, 2006).

핵심 요약

  • The lecture treats the problem of evil as a doctrinal question: how does evil exist in a world that God made good, under his providence? It uses two classical answers, from Augustine and Irenaeus.
  • Augustine, rejecting Manichaean dualism, taught that evil is a privation, a lack or corruption of a good nature, and not a substance. He traced its origin to a free creature's turning from God.
  • The lecture names a tension in Augustine's own writing between his privation theory and his later, more determinist theology of grace.
  • Irenaeus taught that Adam and Eve were created good but immature, made to grow from God's image toward his likeness. This growth needs a world with real risk.
  • The two theodicies are related to, but not the same as, the free will defense and Hick's soul-making theodicy. They start from different pictures of humanity's origin and cannot simply be merged.
  • Genesis 50:20 and Romans 8:28 can be joined to either theodicy and to either account of freedom. Every tradition affirms that God works for good, while disagreeing about how.

Topic: This lecture presents Augustine's privation theory and Irenaeus's soul-making framework as doctrinal answers to evil, and links them to the earlier chapter debates through Genesis 50:20.

Remember: Augustine says evil is a lack of good, not a created thing. Irenaeus says humans were made to grow, so a world with risk serves that growth.

Caution: The two theodicies are not two versions of one answer, and the lecture does not say which fits the Bible best. Augustinian and Irenaean instincts often appear within one tradition.

One line to carry into ministry: Speak of evil without making God its author, and confess with Romans 8:28 that God works for good, even where Christians explain how differently.

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  • State Augustine's privation theory in your own words. Why does Augustine insist evil cannot be a substance, and what theological problem is he trying to avoid by insisting on this?
  • State Irenaeus's soul-making framework in your own words. How does its picture of Adam and Eve's original condition differ from a picture in which they were created already morally mature?
  • The lecture claims Augustine's privation theory and the free will defense are related but not identical. Can you state the difference in your own words?
  • Reread Genesis 50:20 and Romans 8:28 together. Choose one specific combination of positions from 3-1 and 3-3 (for example: compatibilist freedom and classical impassibility) and explain how that combination would state what happened in Joseph's story.
  • Are Augustine's and Irenaeus's theodicies more compatible or less compatible than you expected before this lecture? What would it take to hold elements of both without contradiction?

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