Lecture 8-3: The Covenant That Could Not Give Certainty
목차 97
- Lecture 1-1: What "History of Christian Thought" Studies
- Lecture 1-2: Handling Sources — Primary, Secondary, and the Discipline of Context
- Lecture 1-3: The Researcher's Traps and Ethics
- Lecture 2-1: Origen's Life — Alexandria, Martyrdom, and Exile
- Lecture 2-2: On First Principles and the Alexandrian Reading of Scripture
- Lecture 2-3: Condemned Three Centuries Later — the Origenist Controversies
- Lecture 3-1: Life and Exile
- Lecture 3-2: On the Incarnation and Homoousios
- Lecture 3-3: Athanasius Against the World, Fact and Legend
- Lecture 4-1: Two Conversions, Two Convictions
- Lecture 4-2: Grace, Original Sin, and Two Councils
- Lecture 4-3: The Argument's Long Afterlife
- Lecture 5-1: Anselm's Life — Bec, Canterbury, and Two Kings
- Lecture 5-2: Faith Seeking Understanding — the Proslogion and Cur Deus Homo
- Lecture 5-3: Satisfaction Theory's Legacy — Dominance, Dissent, and an Honest Question
- Lecture 6-1: Clairvaux, Popes, and a Crusade
- Lecture 6-2: On Loving God and the Sermons on the Song of Songs
- Lecture 6-3: Abelard's Condemnation and Mysticism's Contested Place
- Lecture 7-1: Life and the Aristotle Crisis
- Lecture 7-2: The Summa Theologiae — Method and Central Moves
- Lecture 7-3: Thomism's Long Afterlife
- Lecture 8-1: Two Friars, Two Crises
- Lecture 8-2: Univocity, Voluntarism, and Two Kinds of Power
- Lecture 8-3: The Covenant That Could Not Give Certainty
- Lecture 9-1: Erfurt, Rome, and the Tower
- Lecture 9-2: Faith Alone, the Bound Will, and the Cross
- Lecture 9-3: Legacy — A Movement, a Failure, and a Dialogue
- Lecture 10-1: Noyon to Geneva — Calvin's Life
- Lecture 10-2: Union with Christ — the Institutes and Calvin's Method
- Lecture 10-3: Confessions, Kings, Capitalism, and Contested Ownership — Calvin's Legacy
- Lecture 11-1: Origins — Zurich, Zwingli, and Schleitheim
- Lecture 11-2: Core Convictions and a Divided Movement
- Lecture 11-3: Legacy — Mennonites, Hutterites, Amish, and Religious Liberty
- Lecture 12-1: Theodore Beza's Life and His Succession of Calvin
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Scholasticism and the Muller Debate
- Lecture 12-3: The Canons of Dort and Their Long Influence
- Lecture 13-1: John Owen's Life, from Oxford to Nonconformist Exile
- Lecture 13-2: Owen's Major Works — Mortification, Definite Atonement, and the Spirit
- Lecture 13-3: Puritan Theology's Shape and Its Twentieth-Century Recovery
- Lecture 14-1: Spener's Reform Program and Francke's Halle
- Lecture 14-2: The New Birth, the Collegia Pietatis, and Practical Christianity
- Lecture 14-3: Zinzendorf, Wesley, and the Warmth/Precision Tension
- Lecture 15-1: Jonathan Edwards — Life and Context
- Lecture 15-2: Jonathan Edwards — Religious Affections, Freedom of the Will, and the Beauty of God
- Lecture 15-3: Jonathan Edwards — Legacy, Slavery, and New Calvinism
- Lecture 16-1: Aldersgate and Fifty Years on Horseback
- Lecture 16-2: Prevenient Grace, Christian Perfection, and the Split with Whitefield
- Lecture 16-3: A Global Church, a Holiness Movement, and an Unfinished Reckoning
- Lecture 17-1: Schleiermacher's Life and the Speeches to the Cultured Despisers
- Lecture 17-2: The Christian Faith and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 17-3: Liberal Protestantism's Century and the Argument That Followed
- Lecture 18-1: Copenhagen, Regine, and the Attack on Christendom
- Lecture 18-2: Abraham, Despair, and the Stages on Life's Way
- Lecture 18-3: Existentialism, Neo-Orthodoxy, and an Unresolved Inheritance
- Lecture 19-1: Charles Hodge's Life and Princeton's Long Memory
- Lecture 19-2: Systematic Theology, Baconian Method, and the Doctrine of Inerrancy
- Lecture 19-3: Fundamentalism, Machen, and a Historians' Argument That Will Not Close
- Lecture 20-1: Kuyper's Life — From Parish to Parliament
- Lecture 20-2: Common Grace, Sphere Sovereignty, and Neo-Calvinism
- Lecture 20-3: Legacy — Bavinck, Worldview Evangelicalism, and an Honest Reckoning
- Lecture 21-1: Barth's Life — From Liberal Pastor to the Barmen Declaration
- Lecture 21-2: The Church Dogmatics and the "Nein!" to Natural Theology
- Lecture 21-3: Legacy — Claimed by Everyone, Debated on Election, Honest About Von Kirschbaum
- Lecture 22-1: Two Sons of the Secession — Bavinck's and Vos's Formation
- Lecture 22-2: Grace Restores Nature — Bavinck's System and Vos's Method
- Lecture 22-3: A Late Arrival — Bavinck in English and Vos at Westminster
- Lecture 23-1: From Lecture Hall to Underground Seminary to Conspiracy
- Lecture 23-2: Costly Grace and an Unfinished Ethics
- Lecture 23-3: A Legacy Claimed by Everyone, Resolved by No One
- Lecture 24-1: From Atheism to Christianity — Life and Friendships
- Lecture 24-2: Mere Christianity, Narnia, and Screwtape
- Lecture 24-3: Legacy, Popular Influence, and Honest Criticism
- Lecture 25-1: From Harley Street to a Mission Church
- Lecture 25-2: Logic on Fire
- Lecture 25-3: The Chair, the Call, and the Reply
- Lecture 26-1: Francis Schaeffer's Life and the Founding of L'Abri
- Lecture 26-2: The God Who Is There and How Should We Then Live?
- Lecture 26-3: Schaeffer's Legacy — Political Mobilization and Later Critique
- Lecture 27-1: Carl Henry's Uneasy Conscience
- Lecture 27-2: Packer, Fuller, the NAE, and the Chicago Statement
- Lecture 27-3: Fractures and the Contested Label
- Lecture 28-1: A Priest in Lima and a Bishops' Conference in Medellín
- Lecture 28-2: A Theology of Liberation and Its Central Claims
- Lecture 28-3: Rome's Caution, and a Family of Liberation Theologies
- Lecture 29-1: Two Formations — A Prisoner's Hope and a Historian's Discipline
- Lecture 29-2: Hope from the Cross, Revelation from the Future
- Lecture 29-3: Legacy — Political Theology, Faith and Reason, and Two Honest Objections
- Lecture 30-1: One Parish, One World
- Lecture 30-2: Basic Christianity, the Cross, and a Covenant
- Lecture 30-3: A Movement That Outlived the Room, and a Question Stott Left Open
- Lecture 31-1: Origins — E. P. Sanders and Covenantal Nomism
- Lecture 31-2: Development — Dunn, Wright, and the New Perspective Named
- Lecture 31-3: The Live Dispute — New Perspective and Traditional Response
This lecture follows nominalist theology's covenant framework from the last lecture's abstract distinction between God's two kinds of power into a concrete, practical soteriology — the actual theology of how a person is justified, taught in the schools and preached from pulpits across late-medieval Europe by the theological movement historians now call the via moderna, "the modern way." Its most influential systematic voice was Gabriel Biel, a fifteenth-century German theologian whose lectures on Peter Lombard's Sentences became the standard nominalist textbook of the generation after him. Biel's theology, worked out along exactly the lines the previous lecture traced, produced a slogan that sounds, on first hearing, genuinely encouraging: facere quod in se est, "to do what is in oneself." This lecture states what that slogan actually meant, states fairly why it was meant pastorally rather than cruelly, and then explains, as precisely as the sources allow, why it left at least one especially conscientious young monk unable to find in it anything but a locked door — because the theology this course covers next opens with exactly that monk's crisis.
이 17분으로 얻는 것
- State the meaning of *facere quod in se est* and explain how it follows from the *potentia ordinata* framework covered in the previous lecture.
- Explain Gabriel Biel's role in systematizing this covenantal soteriology for the generation that followed him.
- Identify, specifically, why *facere quod in se est* could not, even in principle, give a person certainty that its own condition had been met.
- Explain why this chapter's nominalist covenant theology counts as the direct theological background to Luther's crisis of conscience, rather than merely a distant intellectual ancestor of it.
For we have all become as one who is unclean, and all our righteousness is as a polluted garment: and we all fade as a leaf; and our iniquities, like the wind, take us away." — Isaiah 64:6
World English Bible
And be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own, that which is of the law, but that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is from God by faith." — Philippians 3:9
WEB
What a wretched man I am! Who will deliver me out of the body of this death? I thank God through Jesus Christ, our Lord! So then with the mind, I myself serve God's law, but with the flesh, the sin's law." — Romans 7:24-25
WEB
Nominalist did not deny that grace is ultimately God's gift; Biel and his school insisted on the point as firmly as anyone. What Isaiah 64:6 and Philippians 3:9 name, though — a righteousness that turns out, on inspection, to be a polluted garment, and Paul's own insistence that he wants to be found with a righteousness that is not his own — is precisely the question facere quod in se est left structurally unanswered: whether a person's own best moral effort, offered as the condition of God's covenanted response, could ever be known, from the inside, to have actually met that condition. Romans 7:24-25's cry of wretchedness followed immediately by thanksgiving through Christ is the text a young Augustinian friar would eventually read as the far more radical alternative to the theology this lecture describes — but that discovery belongs to the next chapter, not this one.
1. From covenanted power to covenanted salvation
The previous lecture's potentia absoluta / potentia ordinata distinction was, in itself, a fairly abstract claim about the structure of divine freedom. Applied to salvation, fourteenth- and fifteenth-century nominalist theologians reasoned as follows: God, by his absolute power, could in principle have chosen to save human beings on any terms at all, or on no terms, purely by unconditioned decree. But God has not, in fact, dealt with fallen humanity that way. By his ordained power, God has established a specific , a pactum, governing how grace and actually operate in the present order of things — and, crucially, this covenant is not a matter of strict metaphysical necessity (nothing in the structure of grace itself requires it to work this particular way) but of God's free, gracious self-binding, exactly like the covenant language of Hebrews 6 and Galatians 3 covered in the previous lecture.
The specific content nominalist theologians gave to this covenant, regarding how a sinner comes to receive justifying grace, is summarized in the Latin tag that gives this lecture its center: facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam — "to the one who does what is in them, God does not deny grace." The underlying logic ran like this: a person in a state of sin still retains, even without any prior grace, some natural capacity to love God above all things in a limited, imperfect way, using only their own natural moral powers — to do their best, to turn from sin as far as unaided nature allows, to seek God sincerely within the limits of what a fallen but not utterly ruined nature can manage. God has covenanted, by his ordained power, that he will not withhold the further gift of justifying grace from anyone who does this much — not because this natural, unaided effort earns grace in any strict sense of (nominalist theologians were careful, at least in their formal definitions, to deny that a person's own natural act could be a fully sufficient, condign merit for something as disproportionate as grace), but because God has freely bound himself, by covenant, to respond to this modest, genuinely achievable condition with grace that a person's own natural powers could never have produced or deserved on their own.
2. Gabriel Biel and the systematizing of the via moderna
Gabriel Biel, active in Germany through the middle and later decades of the fifteenth century, was not the originator of this theology — its roots run back through Ockham himself and through other fourteenth-century nominalist theologians such as Robert Holcot and Pierre d'Ailly — but he became its most thorough and influential systematizer for the generation that followed. His massive commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences, the Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum, along with his writings on the Mass, organized and restated via moderna theology in a form that became the standard textbook of nominalist theology at the German universities into the early sixteenth century — including at the University of Erfurt, where the next chapter's subject received his own theological training.
Biel presented facere quod in se est as genuinely good pastoral news: God's demand was not, on this reading, an impossible standard set only to condemn, but a modest, achievable condition — do your honest best, however imperfect, and God's covenanted promise guarantees the rest. Read charitably, and Biel deserves to be read charitably before this lecture states its objection, the doctrine was meant to encourage exactly the kind of sincere moral effort this course's earlier chapter on Pelagius showed Pelagius, too, was anxious to protect, while still insisting, more carefully than Pelagius had, that the resulting grace remained God's free gift rather than strict human merit.
3. The question the covenant could not answer
The difficulty, which this lecture states as precisely as the historical sources allow rather than as a rhetorical flourish against a theology already assumed to be wrong, is structural rather than a matter of Biel's or anyone else's bad intentions. Facere quod in se est makes God's gift of grace conditional on a person's own sincere moral effort, "doing what is in them" — but it supplies no reliable way for that same person to know, from the inside, whether their effort actually met the condition. Was a given act of contrition sincere enough, or still tainted by some undetected self-interest? Had a person truly done everything within natural capacity, or only what felt, subjectively, like enough? The theology offered a covenant whose human-facing terms were, in practice, unverifiable by the very person whose salvation depended on meeting them — and for anyone taking the doctrine with full seriousness, rather than treating it as comfortable background noise, that unverifiability could become not a comfort but a trap: an endlessly receding standard, since any fresh scrutiny of one's own motives could always turn up some further imperfection not yet addressed.
This is the specific, direct theological inheritance this chapter's principle points toward. A young Augustinian friar named Martin Luther, trained in exactly this via moderna theology at Erfurt under teachers steeped in Biel's textbooks, took facere quod in se est with a seriousness few of his contemporaries matched, and found in his own repeated, increasingly desperate self-examination no stable answer to the question the doctrine could not, in principle, supply: had he actually done what was in him? Later Reformation-era polemic sometimes flattened this into a caricature of medieval theology as crude works-righteousness, salvation earned by human effort with no place for grace at all — and that caricature is not accurate to what Biel's school actually taught, which insisted, formally and repeatedly, that the resulting grace remained God's free gift and not strict merit. The more precise and more damaging problem was not that nominalist covenant theology denied grace. It is that the theology made a person's assurance of having met grace's covenanted condition depend on an inward self-verification the theology itself gave no reliable way to complete. Luther's crisis of conscience, the subject the next chapter opens with, is not best understood as a reaction against a theology of bare human effort. It is better understood as the collision between an unusually honest, unusually thorough application of exactly this covenant theology's own logic, and the discovery that the logic, followed all the way through, could never produce the certainty it seemed to promise.
Diagram 1. The covenant's unanswerable question
5. Going to the Sources
Read Martin Luther's own retrospective account of this crisis in his Preface to the Complete Edition of Luther's Latin Writings (1545), a short autobiographical passage in which Luther describes, in his own later words, his years of anguish trying to satisfy a God he experienced as demanding an impossible righteousness, before his discovery of Romans 1:17's "righteousness of God" as a gift received rather than a standard achieved. It is freely available in English translation in Luther's Works, American Edition, volume 34, and widely reprinted; searchable excerpts are available at ccel.org under Luther's collected prefaces. Reading it here, before the next chapter takes up Luther's life in full, lets you hear how directly Luther traces his own crisis to a theology of exactly the kind this lecture has described — not naming Biel in this particular passage, but describing precisely the anguish this lecture's account of facere quod in se est predicts.
핵심 요약
- Late-medieval nominalist theologians, called the via moderna, applied God's ordained power to salvation. God, by covenant (a pactum), chose to work in a particular way, and was not forced to by necessity.
- The covenant's tag is "to the one who does what is in them, God does not deny grace." A sinner keeps some natural ability to love God, and God has promised to respond with grace.
- They denied that this effort strictly earns grace. Grace stays God's free gift, given because God bound himself to respond to a modest, achievable condition.
- Gabriel Biel did not invent this teaching but systematized it. His commentary on the Sentences became the standard textbook, including at Erfurt, and he meant it as good pastoral news.
- The flaw was structural: a person could not know from the inside that they had met the condition. Luther, trained on this theology, found no certainty, and this is the background to his crisis.
Topic: How nominalist covenant theology, shaped by Gabriel Biel, taught that God gives grace to those who do what is in them, and why it left conscience without certainty.
Remember: The problem was not that this theology denied grace. It made assurance depend on an inward self-check that the theology gave no reliable way to finish.
Caution: Do not call it crude works-righteousness. The lecture says Biel's school formally insisted that grace was a free gift and not strict merit, and that Biel meant it kindly.
One line to carry into ministry: Check whether a well-meant teaching leaves a sincere person certain or endlessly doubting, because good intentions can still produce the opposite of comfort.
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묵상 및 토론
- This lecture argues that nominalist covenant theology's problem was not that it denied grace, but that it gave conscience no reliable way to verify its own condition had been met. Does that distinction change how you would evaluate the theology, compared to the simpler charge that it taught salvation by works?
- Biel's doctrine was meant, in good faith, as pastoral encouragement. Can you think of a teaching or practice in a church tradition you know that is similarly well-intended but similarly capable of producing exactly the opposite of the reassurance it intends?
- Isaiah 64:6 calls even human righteousness "a polluted garment." How does that verse sit alongside *facere quod in se est*'s confidence that a sincere natural effort is achievable and sufficient to trigger God's covenanted grace?