Lecture 18-3: Existentialism, Neo-Orthodoxy, and an Unresolved Inheritance
목차 97
- Lecture 1-1: What "History of Christian Thought" Studies
- Lecture 1-2: Handling Sources — Primary, Secondary, and the Discipline of Context
- Lecture 1-3: The Researcher's Traps and Ethics
- Lecture 2-1: Origen's Life — Alexandria, Martyrdom, and Exile
- Lecture 2-2: On First Principles and the Alexandrian Reading of Scripture
- Lecture 2-3: Condemned Three Centuries Later — the Origenist Controversies
- Lecture 3-1: Life and Exile
- Lecture 3-2: On the Incarnation and Homoousios
- Lecture 3-3: Athanasius Against the World, Fact and Legend
- Lecture 4-1: Two Conversions, Two Convictions
- Lecture 4-2: Grace, Original Sin, and Two Councils
- Lecture 4-3: The Argument's Long Afterlife
- Lecture 5-1: Anselm's Life — Bec, Canterbury, and Two Kings
- Lecture 5-2: Faith Seeking Understanding — the Proslogion and Cur Deus Homo
- Lecture 5-3: Satisfaction Theory's Legacy — Dominance, Dissent, and an Honest Question
- Lecture 6-1: Clairvaux, Popes, and a Crusade
- Lecture 6-2: On Loving God and the Sermons on the Song of Songs
- Lecture 6-3: Abelard's Condemnation and Mysticism's Contested Place
- Lecture 7-1: Life and the Aristotle Crisis
- Lecture 7-2: The Summa Theologiae — Method and Central Moves
- Lecture 7-3: Thomism's Long Afterlife
- Lecture 8-1: Two Friars, Two Crises
- Lecture 8-2: Univocity, Voluntarism, and Two Kinds of Power
- Lecture 8-3: The Covenant That Could Not Give Certainty
- Lecture 9-1: Erfurt, Rome, and the Tower
- Lecture 9-2: Faith Alone, the Bound Will, and the Cross
- Lecture 9-3: Legacy — A Movement, a Failure, and a Dialogue
- Lecture 10-1: Noyon to Geneva — Calvin's Life
- Lecture 10-2: Union with Christ — the Institutes and Calvin's Method
- Lecture 10-3: Confessions, Kings, Capitalism, and Contested Ownership — Calvin's Legacy
- Lecture 11-1: Origins — Zurich, Zwingli, and Schleitheim
- Lecture 11-2: Core Convictions and a Divided Movement
- Lecture 11-3: Legacy — Mennonites, Hutterites, Amish, and Religious Liberty
- Lecture 12-1: Theodore Beza's Life and His Succession of Calvin
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Scholasticism and the Muller Debate
- Lecture 12-3: The Canons of Dort and Their Long Influence
- Lecture 13-1: John Owen's Life, from Oxford to Nonconformist Exile
- Lecture 13-2: Owen's Major Works — Mortification, Definite Atonement, and the Spirit
- Lecture 13-3: Puritan Theology's Shape and Its Twentieth-Century Recovery
- Lecture 14-1: Spener's Reform Program and Francke's Halle
- Lecture 14-2: The New Birth, the Collegia Pietatis, and Practical Christianity
- Lecture 14-3: Zinzendorf, Wesley, and the Warmth/Precision Tension
- Lecture 15-1: Jonathan Edwards — Life and Context
- Lecture 15-2: Jonathan Edwards — Religious Affections, Freedom of the Will, and the Beauty of God
- Lecture 15-3: Jonathan Edwards — Legacy, Slavery, and New Calvinism
- Lecture 16-1: Aldersgate and Fifty Years on Horseback
- Lecture 16-2: Prevenient Grace, Christian Perfection, and the Split with Whitefield
- Lecture 16-3: A Global Church, a Holiness Movement, and an Unfinished Reckoning
- Lecture 17-1: Schleiermacher's Life and the Speeches to the Cultured Despisers
- Lecture 17-2: The Christian Faith and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 17-3: Liberal Protestantism's Century and the Argument That Followed
- Lecture 18-1: Copenhagen, Regine, and the Attack on Christendom
- Lecture 18-2: Abraham, Despair, and the Stages on Life's Way
- Lecture 18-3: Existentialism, Neo-Orthodoxy, and an Unresolved Inheritance
- Lecture 19-1: Charles Hodge's Life and Princeton's Long Memory
- Lecture 19-2: Systematic Theology, Baconian Method, and the Doctrine of Inerrancy
- Lecture 19-3: Fundamentalism, Machen, and a Historians' Argument That Will Not Close
- Lecture 20-1: Kuyper's Life — From Parish to Parliament
- Lecture 20-2: Common Grace, Sphere Sovereignty, and Neo-Calvinism
- Lecture 20-3: Legacy — Bavinck, Worldview Evangelicalism, and an Honest Reckoning
- Lecture 21-1: Barth's Life — From Liberal Pastor to the Barmen Declaration
- Lecture 21-2: The Church Dogmatics and the "Nein!" to Natural Theology
- Lecture 21-3: Legacy — Claimed by Everyone, Debated on Election, Honest About Von Kirschbaum
- Lecture 22-1: Two Sons of the Secession — Bavinck's and Vos's Formation
- Lecture 22-2: Grace Restores Nature — Bavinck's System and Vos's Method
- Lecture 22-3: A Late Arrival — Bavinck in English and Vos at Westminster
- Lecture 23-1: From Lecture Hall to Underground Seminary to Conspiracy
- Lecture 23-2: Costly Grace and an Unfinished Ethics
- Lecture 23-3: A Legacy Claimed by Everyone, Resolved by No One
- Lecture 24-1: From Atheism to Christianity — Life and Friendships
- Lecture 24-2: Mere Christianity, Narnia, and Screwtape
- Lecture 24-3: Legacy, Popular Influence, and Honest Criticism
- Lecture 25-1: From Harley Street to a Mission Church
- Lecture 25-2: Logic on Fire
- Lecture 25-3: The Chair, the Call, and the Reply
- Lecture 26-1: Francis Schaeffer's Life and the Founding of L'Abri
- Lecture 26-2: The God Who Is There and How Should We Then Live?
- Lecture 26-3: Schaeffer's Legacy — Political Mobilization and Later Critique
- Lecture 27-1: Carl Henry's Uneasy Conscience
- Lecture 27-2: Packer, Fuller, the NAE, and the Chicago Statement
- Lecture 27-3: Fractures and the Contested Label
- Lecture 28-1: A Priest in Lima and a Bishops' Conference in Medellín
- Lecture 28-2: A Theology of Liberation and Its Central Claims
- Lecture 28-3: Rome's Caution, and a Family of Liberation Theologies
- Lecture 29-1: Two Formations — A Prisoner's Hope and a Historian's Discipline
- Lecture 29-2: Hope from the Cross, Revelation from the Future
- Lecture 29-3: Legacy — Political Theology, Faith and Reason, and Two Honest Objections
- Lecture 30-1: One Parish, One World
- Lecture 30-2: Basic Christianity, the Cross, and a Covenant
- Lecture 30-3: A Movement That Outlived the Room, and a Question Stott Left Open
- Lecture 31-1: Origins — E. P. Sanders and Covenantal Nomism
- Lecture 31-2: Development — Dunn, Wright, and the New Perspective Named
- Lecture 31-3: The Live Dispute — New Perspective and Traditional Response
Kierkegaard died in 1855 largely unread outside Denmark, his authorship written in a small Scandinavian language, deliberately indirect, and produced under a shifting cast of pseudonyms that even Danish readers found difficult to parse. It took the better part of half a century, and a decisive translation effort into German beginning around the turn of the twentieth century, before his work reached the wider European audience that would eventually make him one of the most cited names in twentieth-century philosophy and theology alike. What happened once that audience found him is the subject of this lecture, and it produced a genuine, still-unsettled inheritance dispute: philosophers with no interest in Christian faith and theologians committed to a specifically Christian confession have both claimed Kierkegaard as a direct ancestor, and both claims rest on real textual support rather than simple misreading.
This lecture traces that dispute in two directions — Kierkegaard's place at the headwaters of both secular and religious existentialism, and his more focused, traceable influence on twentieth-century neo-orthodox theology, especially the young Karl Barth — and closes by naming the ambiguity honestly rather than resolving it in either direction.
이 17분으로 얻는 것
- Explain why Kierkegaard is called a forerunner of existentialism, and identify at least one concept of his (anxiety, the leap, subjectivity, authentic existence) that a later existentialist philosopher directly reworked.
- Distinguish secular existentialism's use of Kierkegaard from religious existentialism's use of him, and state specifically what each tradition kept and what each set aside.
- Describe Karl Barth's debt to Kierkegaard, including the phrase Barth borrowed for the relationship between God and humanity, and explain why this made Kierkegaard a resource for early twentieth-century theologians reacting against the liberal Protestant tradition covered in chapter 17.
- State, in your own words, why the dispute over Kierkegaard's "true" heirs is a genuine scholarly ambiguity rather than a question with an obvious right answer.
So then, my beloved, even as you have always obeyed, not only in my presence, but now much more in my absence, work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God who works in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure." — Philippians 2:12-13
World English Bible
Philippians 2:12-13 closes this chapter where it opened it, and deliberately: the twentieth-century readers this lecture covers, whether they kept Paul's second clause ("it is God who works in you") or discarded it, all inherited from Kierkegaard the first — a demand that a self can only become itself through its own trembling, unshared exertion. Where secular existentialism took the individual's solitary task and the religious readers took the whole of Paul's sentence, both directions of Kierkegaard's afterlife trace back to the same insistence that no crowd, no institution, and no inherited identity can do this work for you.
1. Rediscovery in translation
Kierkegaard's authorship was almost entirely untranslated outside Denmark and Germany until the early twentieth century. A concentrated effort to render his major works into German, beginning in the years before the First World War and continuing through the 1920s, brought him to a European philosophical and theological audience for the first time at real scale, arriving just as that audience was searching, in the aftermath of a catastrophic war, for resources outside the confident, progress-oriented philosophical and theological systems of the previous century. English translations followed more slowly and unevenly across the twentieth century, which means much of the earliest and most consequential reception of Kierkegaard's thought happened first in German-language philosophy and theology before it reached the English-speaking world.
2. A forerunner claimed by secular existentialism
Twentieth-century existentialist philosophers found in Kierkegaard several ideas they could rework without retaining his Christian commitments. Martin Heidegger's Being and Time (1927) develops an extended analysis of anxiety (Angst) as a mood that discloses something about human existence ordinary, everyday absorption in the world conceals — an analysis that draws recognizably, if selectively, on Kierkegaard's earlier treatment of anxiety (in the pseudonymous The Concept of Anxiety, 1844) as a response to human freedom's own dizzying possibility, even though Heidegger relocates the analysis away from Kierkegaard's explicitly theological framing of sin and . Karl Jaspers, working independently of Heidegger, took up Kierkegaard's emphasis on the individual "existing" thinker, confronting genuinely limit-defining situations (death, suffering, guilt) that cannot be resolved by abstract system-building, as a founding move for what Jaspers himself called "Existenzphilosophie."
Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, writing after the Second World War and working in an avowedly atheistic framework, inherited from this line of thought Kierkegaard's insistence that existence precedes any general essence or category a system might impose on the individual, and his emphasis on radical, unaided individual choice against the pressure of an anonymous crowd — Sartre's account of "bad faith," a person's flight from the anxious freedom of their own choices into comfortable self-deception, echoes, at a considerable distance, Kierkegaard's account of aesthetic and defiant despair, even though Sartre explicitly rejects the God against whom Kierkegaard's entire analysis is oriented. In this line of reception, Kierkegaard becomes a philosopher of the isolated, anxious, radically free individual, and the God-relation that gives his own analysis its point is treated as a historically contingent framing that can be discarded while keeping the psychological and existential insight intact.
3. A forerunner claimed by religious existentialism
A second line of reception ran in almost the opposite direction, keeping Kierkegaard's theological commitments as the whole point rather than an outgrown husk. Gabriel Marcel, a French Catholic philosopher, developed an explicitly religious existentialism drawing on Kierkegaard's distinction between abstract, detached "problems" and lived, involving "mysteries" a person cannot stand outside of — a distinction close in spirit to Kierkegaard's insistence that truths about God cannot be held at arm's length as objective information. Within Protestant theology, as the next section details at length, an entire generation of dialectical and neo-orthodox theologians read Kierkegaard as recovering something Christian thought had lost, not something Christian thought needed to be liberated from.
Two ways to read him
The genuine ambiguity this lecture asks you to hold, rather than resolve, is this: both readings can point to real textual support in Kierkegaard's own authorship. His analysis of anxiety, despair, and the anxious freedom of choice really can be extracted and read as a general account of human existence, detachable from any specific claim about God — Kierkegaard's own indirect, pseudonymous method of communication arguably invites exactly this kind of extraction, since he wanted readers to appropriate the psychological truth for themselves rather than simply accept a theological conclusion on his authority. But his own explicit, repeated statements about his authorship's purpose — most directly in The Point of View for My Work as an Author, published only after his death — insist that the entire project was religious from the start, a strategy for making it harder, not easier, to become a Christian in the full sense he thought Christendom had cheapened. Serious Kierkegaard scholars today continue to disagree, with real evidence on both sides, about how much weight to give the pseudonymous, philosophically extractable surface of his work against his own later, more explicit account of its unified religious purpose.
4. Karl Barth and neo-orthodoxy
Kierkegaard's most direct and traceable theological influence runs through Karl Barth, whose second edition of his commentary on Romans (1922) marks, by wide scholarly consensus, the opening of what came to be called dialectical theology or — a movement chapter 17 already anticipated as the coming reaction against Schleiermacher's liberal Protestant legacy. Barth explicitly credited Kierkegaard with one of the commentary's central governing ideas, borrowing nearly verbatim Kierkegaard's phrase for the relationship between God and humanity: the "infinite qualitative distinction" (or "qualitative difference") between time and eternity, between the Creator and the creature. For Barth, as for Kierkegaard before him, this distinction meant that God cannot be reached by an upward extension of human religious feeling, moral striving, or cultural achievement — precisely the liberal Protestant strategy Schleiermacher had pioneered — but only by God's own downward, gracious address to humanity, an address that meets a person as a genuine crisis (krisis, judgment) rather than a comfortable confirmation of what that person already believed or felt.
Barth's early theology drew on Kierkegaard's polemic against Christendom as well as his doctrine of God: the same suspicion of a comfortable, culturally established church that Kierkegaard pressed against the Danish state church, Barth pressed, in a different key, against a German Protestant establishment whose theological leadership he judged had failed catastrophically when it endorsed the Kaiser's war aims in 1914 — the episode covered in chapter 21 as the direct radicalization of Barth's own theology. Other figures in the broader neo-orthodox and dialectical theology movement, including Emil Brunner and, at a greater and more critical distance, Rudolf Bultmann, drew on Kierkegaard's categories of paradox, decision, and the leap of faith in their own, sometimes sharply diverging projects. Barth himself, later in his career, grew more measured about how much of his early theological method he wanted to credit to Kierkegaard specifically, but the historical fact of the early debt — a Danish layman's polemic against his own state church, feeding directly into a Swiss pastor's polemic against his — is not seriously disputed by historians of the movement.
5. An inheritance this chapter will not resolve
Kierkegaard, then, stands at the source of two twentieth-century rivers that ran in different, sometimes openly hostile directions: an atheistic or agnostic existentialism that kept his psychology of anxiety and freedom while discarding his God, and a Christian dialectical theology that kept his God while, in Barth's case at least, eventually growing cautious about how much of the philosophical apparatus around him to keep. Readers on either side have sometimes claimed the other side simply misread Kierkegaard, and this chapter will not adjudicate that dispute for you, because the evidence genuinely supports reading him in more than one direction at once — a fact that says less about carelessness in his interpreters than about the deliberately indirect, unsystematic way Kierkegaard himself chose to write, refusing, to the end of his authorship, to hand any reader a single settled conclusion they could accept without doing the trembling work of appropriation themselves.
Diagram 1. One source, two rivers
5. Going to the Sources
Read the closing pages of The Point of View for My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard's own retrospective account of his authorship's purpose, published posthumously and freely available in English translation at ccel.org. Compare its explicit claim — that the entire pseudonymous authorship was, from the start, a religious strategy for making it harder to become a Christian in the full sense — against your own impression of Fear and Trembling or The Sickness Unto Death read on its own. Notice how much the retrospective account settles, and how much it still leaves for the reader to decide.
핵심 요약
- Kierkegaard died in 1855 largely unread outside Denmark. German translations from around the early 20th century brought him to a wide audience, just after a catastrophic war.
- Secular existentialists, including Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre and Camus, reworked his ideas on anxiety, individual existence and radical choice. They set aside his God-relation.
- Religious readers such as Gabriel Marcel kept the theological commitments as the whole point.
- Both readings have real textual support. His own The Point of View for My Work as an Author says the project was religious from the start, and scholars still disagree about how to weigh that.
- Karl Barth's 1922 Romans commentary borrowed Kierkegaard's phrase "infinite qualitative distinction" between God and humanity. Barth also shared his suspicion of a comfortable established church. Brunner and Bultmann drew on him differently.
Topic: This lecture traces how secular and religious thinkers in the 20th century each claimed Kierkegaard as an ancestor, and his influence on Barth and neo-orthodoxy.
Remember: Kierkegaard stands at the source of two rivers: existentialism that keeps his psychology of anxiety and freedom without God, and dialectical theology that keeps his God.
Caution: The lecture does not say which side is the true heir. His indirect, pseudonymous way of writing allows more than one reading, and Barth later grew more measured about the debt.
One line to carry into ministry: No crowd, institution or inherited identity can do the work of faith for another person, so invite people to answer God for themselves.
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묵상 및 토론
- Secular existentialists kept Kierkegaard's psychology of anxiety and freedom while discarding the God-relation that gave his own analysis its point. Do you think an idea can be genuinely preserved once the framework that gave it meaning has been removed, or does the extraction change the idea itself?
- Barth borrowed Kierkegaard's "infinite qualitative distinction" to argue God cannot be reached by an upward extension of human religious feeling or culture. How does that claim sit alongside chapter 17's account of Schleiermacher's project of grounding theology in the "feeling of absolute dependence"?
- This lecture declines to declare either secular or religious existentialism the "true" heir of Kierkegaard, arguing both readings have real textual support. Do you find that conclusion satisfying, or does it feel like an evasion of a question that should have a definite answer?
- Kierkegaard's own indirect, pseudonymous method of writing seems to have made both misreadings and legitimate divergent readings of him more likely. Was that a wise strategy for the truths he was trying to communicate, or did it cost him more clarity than it was worth?