Lecture 18-2: Abraham, Despair, and the Stages on Life's Way
목차 97
- Lecture 1-1: What "History of Christian Thought" Studies
- Lecture 1-2: Handling Sources — Primary, Secondary, and the Discipline of Context
- Lecture 1-3: The Researcher's Traps and Ethics
- Lecture 2-1: Origen's Life — Alexandria, Martyrdom, and Exile
- Lecture 2-2: On First Principles and the Alexandrian Reading of Scripture
- Lecture 2-3: Condemned Three Centuries Later — the Origenist Controversies
- Lecture 3-1: Life and Exile
- Lecture 3-2: On the Incarnation and Homoousios
- Lecture 3-3: Athanasius Against the World, Fact and Legend
- Lecture 4-1: Two Conversions, Two Convictions
- Lecture 4-2: Grace, Original Sin, and Two Councils
- Lecture 4-3: The Argument's Long Afterlife
- Lecture 5-1: Anselm's Life — Bec, Canterbury, and Two Kings
- Lecture 5-2: Faith Seeking Understanding — the Proslogion and Cur Deus Homo
- Lecture 5-3: Satisfaction Theory's Legacy — Dominance, Dissent, and an Honest Question
- Lecture 6-1: Clairvaux, Popes, and a Crusade
- Lecture 6-2: On Loving God and the Sermons on the Song of Songs
- Lecture 6-3: Abelard's Condemnation and Mysticism's Contested Place
- Lecture 7-1: Life and the Aristotle Crisis
- Lecture 7-2: The Summa Theologiae — Method and Central Moves
- Lecture 7-3: Thomism's Long Afterlife
- Lecture 8-1: Two Friars, Two Crises
- Lecture 8-2: Univocity, Voluntarism, and Two Kinds of Power
- Lecture 8-3: The Covenant That Could Not Give Certainty
- Lecture 9-1: Erfurt, Rome, and the Tower
- Lecture 9-2: Faith Alone, the Bound Will, and the Cross
- Lecture 9-3: Legacy — A Movement, a Failure, and a Dialogue
- Lecture 10-1: Noyon to Geneva — Calvin's Life
- Lecture 10-2: Union with Christ — the Institutes and Calvin's Method
- Lecture 10-3: Confessions, Kings, Capitalism, and Contested Ownership — Calvin's Legacy
- Lecture 11-1: Origins — Zurich, Zwingli, and Schleitheim
- Lecture 11-2: Core Convictions and a Divided Movement
- Lecture 11-3: Legacy — Mennonites, Hutterites, Amish, and Religious Liberty
- Lecture 12-1: Theodore Beza's Life and His Succession of Calvin
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Scholasticism and the Muller Debate
- Lecture 12-3: The Canons of Dort and Their Long Influence
- Lecture 13-1: John Owen's Life, from Oxford to Nonconformist Exile
- Lecture 13-2: Owen's Major Works — Mortification, Definite Atonement, and the Spirit
- Lecture 13-3: Puritan Theology's Shape and Its Twentieth-Century Recovery
- Lecture 14-1: Spener's Reform Program and Francke's Halle
- Lecture 14-2: The New Birth, the Collegia Pietatis, and Practical Christianity
- Lecture 14-3: Zinzendorf, Wesley, and the Warmth/Precision Tension
- Lecture 15-1: Jonathan Edwards — Life and Context
- Lecture 15-2: Jonathan Edwards — Religious Affections, Freedom of the Will, and the Beauty of God
- Lecture 15-3: Jonathan Edwards — Legacy, Slavery, and New Calvinism
- Lecture 16-1: Aldersgate and Fifty Years on Horseback
- Lecture 16-2: Prevenient Grace, Christian Perfection, and the Split with Whitefield
- Lecture 16-3: A Global Church, a Holiness Movement, and an Unfinished Reckoning
- Lecture 17-1: Schleiermacher's Life and the Speeches to the Cultured Despisers
- Lecture 17-2: The Christian Faith and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 17-3: Liberal Protestantism's Century and the Argument That Followed
- Lecture 18-1: Copenhagen, Regine, and the Attack on Christendom
- Lecture 18-2: Abraham, Despair, and the Stages on Life's Way
- Lecture 18-3: Existentialism, Neo-Orthodoxy, and an Unresolved Inheritance
- Lecture 19-1: Charles Hodge's Life and Princeton's Long Memory
- Lecture 19-2: Systematic Theology, Baconian Method, and the Doctrine of Inerrancy
- Lecture 19-3: Fundamentalism, Machen, and a Historians' Argument That Will Not Close
- Lecture 20-1: Kuyper's Life — From Parish to Parliament
- Lecture 20-2: Common Grace, Sphere Sovereignty, and Neo-Calvinism
- Lecture 20-3: Legacy — Bavinck, Worldview Evangelicalism, and an Honest Reckoning
- Lecture 21-1: Barth's Life — From Liberal Pastor to the Barmen Declaration
- Lecture 21-2: The Church Dogmatics and the "Nein!" to Natural Theology
- Lecture 21-3: Legacy — Claimed by Everyone, Debated on Election, Honest About Von Kirschbaum
- Lecture 22-1: Two Sons of the Secession — Bavinck's and Vos's Formation
- Lecture 22-2: Grace Restores Nature — Bavinck's System and Vos's Method
- Lecture 22-3: A Late Arrival — Bavinck in English and Vos at Westminster
- Lecture 23-1: From Lecture Hall to Underground Seminary to Conspiracy
- Lecture 23-2: Costly Grace and an Unfinished Ethics
- Lecture 23-3: A Legacy Claimed by Everyone, Resolved by No One
- Lecture 24-1: From Atheism to Christianity — Life and Friendships
- Lecture 24-2: Mere Christianity, Narnia, and Screwtape
- Lecture 24-3: Legacy, Popular Influence, and Honest Criticism
- Lecture 25-1: From Harley Street to a Mission Church
- Lecture 25-2: Logic on Fire
- Lecture 25-3: The Chair, the Call, and the Reply
- Lecture 26-1: Francis Schaeffer's Life and the Founding of L'Abri
- Lecture 26-2: The God Who Is There and How Should We Then Live?
- Lecture 26-3: Schaeffer's Legacy — Political Mobilization and Later Critique
- Lecture 27-1: Carl Henry's Uneasy Conscience
- Lecture 27-2: Packer, Fuller, the NAE, and the Chicago Statement
- Lecture 27-3: Fractures and the Contested Label
- Lecture 28-1: A Priest in Lima and a Bishops' Conference in Medellín
- Lecture 28-2: A Theology of Liberation and Its Central Claims
- Lecture 28-3: Rome's Caution, and a Family of Liberation Theologies
- Lecture 29-1: Two Formations — A Prisoner's Hope and a Historian's Discipline
- Lecture 29-2: Hope from the Cross, Revelation from the Future
- Lecture 29-3: Legacy — Political Theology, Faith and Reason, and Two Honest Objections
- Lecture 30-1: One Parish, One World
- Lecture 30-2: Basic Christianity, the Cross, and a Covenant
- Lecture 30-3: A Movement That Outlived the Room, and a Question Stott Left Open
- Lecture 31-1: Origins — E. P. Sanders and Covenantal Nomism
- Lecture 31-2: Development — Dunn, Wright, and the New Perspective Named
- Lecture 31-3: The Live Dispute — New Perspective and Traditional Response
Between 1843 and 1849, writing under a rotating cast of invented pseudonyms he treated as genuinely distinct authorial voices rather than convenient pen names, Kierkegaard produced the body of work this lecture covers: Fear and Trembling, published under "Johannes de Silentio" in 1843; The Sickness Unto Death, published under "Anti-Climacus" in 1849; and, spread across several works including Either/Or (1843) and the book that gave the concept its most direct name, Stages on Life's Way (1845), an account of three fundamentally different ways a human life can be organized. None of these works reads like a conventional theology textbook or a conventional philosophy treatise, and that is deliberate: Kierkegaard believed the truths he was after could not be handed to a reader as settled information, only presented indirectly, so that the reader had to do the work of appropriating them personally or not at all.
This lecture takes the three ideas in turn — Abraham's binding of Isaac read as a test of ethics itself rather than a simple test of obedience, despair diagnosed not as a feeling but as a structural misrelation in the self, and a map of three "stages" or "spheres" a life can occupy, each reachable from the last only by something Kierkegaard calls a leap rather than a smooth development.
이 19분으로 얻는 것
- Explain what Johannes de Silentio means by the "teleological suspension of the ethical" in *Fear and Trembling*, and distinguish Abraham, the "knight of faith," from the "tragic hero" who sacrifices for a cause the community can understand and honor.
- State Anti-Climacus's definition of the self in *The Sickness Unto Death* and explain why despair, so defined, is a condition of the self's relation to itself rather than merely an emotion.
- Describe the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages on life's way, and explain why Kierkegaard insists the movement between them is a "leap" rather than a gradual maturation.
- Identify at least one place where these three works reinforce a single underlying claim: that becoming a genuine self before God is a task, not an inheritance.
After these things, God tested Abraham, and said to him, "Abraham!" He said, "Here I am." He said, "Now take your son, your only son, whom you love, even Isaac, and go into the land of Moriah. Offer him there for a burnt offering on one of the mountains which I will tell you of."" — Genesis 22:1-2
World English Bible
So then, my beloved, even as you have always obeyed, not only in my presence, but now much more in my absence, work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God who works in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure." — Philippians 2:12-13
WEB
Genesis 22:1-2 is the text this lecture's first major section is built around, in the exact wording Johannes de Silentio insisted readers actually confront rather than soften: God does not test Abraham by asking him to give up something evil, or something merely difficult, but his "only son," whom the text says plainly he "loves." Philippians 2:12's "fear and trembling," the phrase that gave the book its title, describes exactly the posture Johannes de Silentio takes toward Abraham throughout — not confident explanation, but a trembling refusal to explain the story away.
1. Fear and Trembling: a story made strange again
Fear and Trembling opens with a section usually translated "Exordium" or "Preliminary Expectoration," in which Johannes de Silentio retells the Akedah — the binding of Isaac — four different ways, each version subtly wrong, each showing what the story would have to look like if Abraham's faith could be explained by some more familiar human motive: resignation, duty, a father's private despair he conceals from his son. Having shown how easily the real story can be domesticated, de Silentio turns to what he insists Genesis 22 actually says, without the padding two thousand years of sermons have added to make Abraham comprehensible.
What the text says, on de Silentio's reading, is genuinely terrible: God commands a father to kill his own beloved son, and Abraham — without protest, without demanding an explanation, and without abandoning his conviction that he would somehow still receive Isaac back — sets out to obey. De Silentio's central technical term for what makes this different from ordinary heroism is the "teleological suspension of the ethical." The "ethical," in the vocabulary de Silentio borrows and reworks from Hegelian philosophy, means the universal moral order — the set of duties (a father's duty not to murder his son, most obviously) binding on everyone, knowable by reason, and validated by the community that shares them. A "teleological suspension" of that order means the ethical is not abolished but subordinated, for a higher purpose (telos), to something beyond it: Abraham's direct, singular relation to God, which requires him, in this one case, to do what the ethical order forbids, not because the ethical order is false, but because something higher than it has, in this instance, taken precedence over it.
De Silentio is careful to distinguish Abraham, on this reading, from what he calls the "tragic hero" — a figure like Agamemnon, who sacrifices his daughter Iphigenia for the sake of the Greek fleet and, in doing so, still acts within the ethical: he subordinates one duty (a father's love) to a higher expression of the same universal order (the nation's survival), and the community can understand, even honor, what he has done, because it can be justified in the ethical order's own terms. Abraham cannot be justified this way. Nothing in the universal ethical order explains or excuses child sacrifice; Abraham's act would be, on any ordinary moral accounting, straightforward murder, and no community watching him climb Moriah could recognize what he is doing as sanctioned heroism. De Silentio calls the figure capable of this act, sustained by faith that God will somehow still keep his promise even through the sacrifice, the "knight of faith" — and insists, provocatively, that this figure is finally beyond what ethics or philosophy, working only with universal categories, can approve, explain, or even fully see.
2. The Sickness Unto Death: despair as a relation, not a feeling
The Sickness Unto Death, published six years later under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus — a name Kierkegaard chose to signal a voice writing from a higher Christian standard than his own attained practice, unlike his earlier pseudonym "Climacus," who wrote from below it — opens with one of the densest single sentences in the whole authorship: the human self, Anti-Climacus writes, is "a relation that relates itself to itself," and this relation, in order to exist as a self at all, must have been established by another, which Anti-Climacus identifies as God. A self, on this account, is not a substance or a soul in the ordinary sense but an ongoing task: the work of relating rightly to one's own synthesis of the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, freedom and necessity — and doing so, ultimately, by relating that whole self rightly to the God who established it.
Despair, in this technical sense, is what happens when that relation goes wrong, and Anti-Climacus insists it is "the sickness unto death" not because it kills the body but because it is a sickness of the self that death itself, on Christian terms, cannot end. He distinguishes several forms: despair "in weakness," which is not wanting to be oneself — wishing to escape or dissolve the difficult, particular self one actually is — and despair "in defiance," the more advanced and more dangerous form, in which a person wants to be oneself, but on one's own terms, refusing the self God has given in favor of a self one has willed into being independently. Anti-Climacus's most unsettling claim is that despair, so defined, is nearly universal and frequently invisible even to the person suffering it — most people, he argues, live in despair without knowing it, precisely because ordinary life offers so many distractions from noticing the misrelation at all. The opposite of despair, on this account, is not mere composure or good feeling but faith: the self resting transparently in the God who established it, willing to be itself.
3. Three stages, and a leap between each
Across Either/Or (whose pseudonymous first volume, attributed to the aesthete "A," includes the notorious "Diary of a Seducer") and Stages on Life's Way, Kierkegaard maps three fundamentally different ways of organizing an entire life, sometimes called "stages" and sometimes "spheres of existence" across his corpus — a terminological looseness worth noting honestly rather than flattening into a single technical system.
The aesthetic stage organizes life around immediacy, pleasure, and the avoidance of binding commitment; its most extreme representative in Either/Or is the seducer, who treats even romantic pursuit as an aesthetic project to be enjoyed and then abandoned before it can bind him to anything lasting, but Kierkegaard is careful to show milder, more respectable versions of the same structure in people who simply drift from interest to interest, never committing to anything that could disappoint them. The ethical stage, represented in Either/Or's second volume by the pseudonymous Judge William, organizes life instead around commitment, duty, and the universal — marriage, , and civic responsibility taken up not as burdens to escape but as the very substance of a meaningful self, chosen and re-chosen rather than merely accepted. The religious stage, which Kierkegaard's later Postscript further divides into a "Religiousness A" (a more general, philosophically accessible relation to the eternal, not yet centered on the specifically Christian paradox) and a "Religiousness B" (the specifically Christian relation to the God-man, the paradox that the eternal has entered time in a particular historical person), organizes life around a relationship to God that can require — as Abraham's case in Fear and Trembling makes vivid — suspending even the ethical stage's own highest demands.
Kierkegaard insists the movement from one stage to the next cannot be a smooth, gradual maturation, the way a student might slowly grow more responsible. It requires what he calls a leap (Spring) — a genuine, non-derivable act of the will and of passion, not a conclusion reached by accumulating more information or more experience. Judge William cannot argue the aesthete into the ethical stage by pure logic; Abraham's faith cannot be derived from ethical reasoning at all, which is exactly why de Silentio calls it a suspension of the ethical rather than its fulfillment. The three works this lecture covers converge, from three different angles, on a single underlying claim: becoming a genuine self before God is not something that happens to a person by inheritance, drift, or cultural default. It is a task, undertaken in fear and trembling, that no one else can complete on another person's behalf — the same claim, framed personally here, that lecture 18-1 and lecture 18-3 will show Kierkegaard pressing publicly against an entire church that had, in his judgment, forgotten it.
Diagram 1. The three stages, and what moves you between them
5. Going to the Sources
Read Johannes de Silentio's "Preliminary Expectoration" in Fear and Trembling, freely available at ccel.org, alongside the section that follows it, "Problema I: Is There a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical?" Notice how de Silentio frames the question as genuinely open — he does not simply assert that Abraham was justified, but walks through, with real philosophical seriousness, why an ethics built entirely on universal categories has no way to approve what Abraham did.
핵심 요약
- Kierkegaard wrote through pseudonyms so that readers must make the truths their own. The lecture covers Fear and Trembling, The Sickness Unto Death and the three stages of life.
- In Fear and Trembling, Johannes de Silentio reads Genesis 22 as a "teleological suspension of the ethical": the universal moral order is placed under a higher purpose, Abraham's direct relation to God. He is a "knight of faith," not a "tragic hero."
- The tragic hero, like Agamemnon, acts within ethics and can be understood by the community. Abraham cannot be justified in ethical terms.
- Anti-Climacus defines the self as "a relation that relates itself to itself," established by God. Despair is a misrelation of that self, either in weakness or in defiance. Faith is its opposite.
- The aesthetic, ethical and religious stages are joined by a "leap," not gradual growth. All three works say that becoming a self before God is a task.
Topic: Three works by Kierkegaard: Abraham and the suspension of the ethical, despair as a problem in the self's relation to itself, and the three stages of life.
Remember: For Kierkegaard, becoming a genuine self before God is a task, not an inheritance. It is undertaken in fear and trembling, and no one else can do it for you.
Caution: The lecture notes that "stages" and "spheres" are used loosely across his writing. De Silentio treats the question about Abraham as genuinely open, and does not simply assert that Abraham was justified.
One line to carry into ministry: Do not explain away the hard parts of Scripture, and remember that spiritual growth may come through a personal decision, not only through steady maturing.
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- De Silentio distinguishes Abraham, the "knight of faith," from Agamemnon, the "tragic hero," because a community could understand and honor what Agamemnon did but not what Abraham did. Do you find that distinction persuasive, or does it prove too much — could it be used to justify any act a person claims God commanded?
- Anti-Climacus claims most people live in despair without recognizing it, precisely because ordinary distractions keep them from noticing the self's misrelation to itself. Is that a claim you can evaluate from the inside, or does it seem designed to be unfalsifiable — true no matter what a person says about their own state?
- Kierkegaard insists the movement between the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages is a "leap," not a gradual development. What would change about how a pastor or counselor approaches someone's spiritual growth if that claim is right, compared to a model of gradual maturation?
- This lecture argues that Abraham's story, the doctrine of despair, and the three stages all converge on one claim: becoming a self before God is a task no one else can complete for you. Where else in Christian teaching have you encountered that same claim stated differently?