Lecture 1-3: A History of Reading: Jewish, Patristic, Reformation, and Modern
Contents 37
- Lecture 1-1: What Torah and Pentateuch Mean, and Why the Difference Matters
- Lecture 1-2: The Shape of the Five Books: Narrative, Law, and the Seams Between Them
- Lecture 1-3: A History of Reading: Jewish, Patristic, Reformation, and Modern
- Lecture 2-1: Mosaic Authorship, Tradition, and the Rise of Source Criticism
- Lecture 2-2: The Documentary Hypothesis in Its Classic Form
- Lecture 2-3: After Wellhausen: Fragment, Supplement, and the Present Debate
- Lecture 3-1: Creation and Flood Accounts: Enuma Elish, Atrahasis, Gilgamesh
- Lecture 3-2: Law Collections: Hammurabi, Eshnunna, and the Covenant Code
- Lecture 3-3: Treaty and Covenant Forms: Hittite Vassal Treaties and Deuteronomy
- Lecture 4-1: Genesis 1 and 2: Two Accounts, One Creator
- Lecture 4-2: Genesis 3-5: Disobedience, Cain, and the Line of Seth
- Lecture 4-3: Genesis 6-11: Flood, the Noahic Covenant, and Babel
- Lecture 5-1: The Call of Abram and the Shape of the Promise
- Lecture 5-2: Covenant, Circumcision, and the Binding of Isaac
- Lecture 5-3: Jacob: Deception, Wrestling, and the Making of Israel
- Lecture 6-1: The Joseph Narrative as Literature
- Lecture 6-2: Providence, Human Evil, and Genesis 50:20
- Lecture 6-3: Jacob's Blessing, Judah, and the Bridge into Exodus
- Lecture 7-1: Oppression, the Midwives, and the Call of Moses
- Lecture 7-2: The Plagues and the Hardening of Pharaoh's Heart
- Lecture 7-3: Passover, the Sea, and Provision in the Wilderness
- Lecture 8-1: Sinai and the Decalogue
- Lecture 8-2: The Covenant Code and the Ratification of the Covenant
- Lecture 8-3: The Golden Calf, Intercession, and the Tabernacle
- Lecture 9-1: The Sacrificial System of Leviticus 1-7
- Lecture 9-2: Priesthood, Purity, and the Day of Atonement
- Lecture 9-3: The Holiness Code and What It Asks of a People
- Lecture 10-1: Census, Camp, and the Order of the Wilderness March
- Lecture 10-2: Rebellion, the Spies, and the Judgment on a Generation
- Lecture 10-3: Balaam, the Second Generation, and the Plains of Moab
- Lecture 11-1: Deuteronomy as Covenant Document and as Sermon
- Lecture 11-2: The Deuteronomic Code and the Question of Centralization
- Lecture 11-3: Blessing, Curse, and the Death of Moses
Nobody reads the Pentateuch for the first time. Every reader arrives with expectations about what these books are, what kinds of questions may be put to them, and who is entitled to say when an interpretation has gone wrong. Those expectations have a history, and the history is the subject of this lecture.
The usual way of telling that history is as a sequence of methods: the rabbis read closely, the Alexandrians read allegorically, the Antiochenes objected, the medievals systematized four senses, the Reformers recovered the literal sense, and then modern historical criticism arrived and changed everything. That sequence is not wrong, but told as a list of techniques it misses what actually changed. Allegory did not disappear when historical criticism arrived; historical questions were not invented in the eighteenth century — Origen, Jerome, and Ibn Ezra all asked them. What changed in the modern period was not primarily how the text was read but where the authority to settle a reading was located: in a community and its tradition, or in the trained individual applying a public method that any competent person, believing or not, could in principle check.
That is the thesis of this lecture, and it should be tested rather than accepted. We will work through the major stages, name representative interpreters, and at each point ask the same question: when this reader and that reader disagreed, what would have counted as settling it? We will finish with Baruch Spinoza, whose Tractatus Theologico-Politicus of 1670 is usually cited as the beginning of critical study of the Pentateuch's authorship, and with a Catholic contemporary, Richard Simon, who assembled much the same evidence and drew the opposite conclusion. The pair are instructive precisely because they show that the evidence did not dictate the outcome. The prior question of authority did.
What these 36 minutes give you
- Describe rabbinic reading of the Torah, distinguishing *peshat* (plain sense) from *derash* (applied or homiletical sense), and characterize Rashi's method.
- Explain what Philo and Origen were doing with allegory, why the Antiochene school objected, and what *theoria* was meant to preserve.
- State the four senses of medieval exegesis and explain why the *sensus literalis* recovered at the Reformation was not an invention of the Reformers.
- Summarize what the Council of Trent and the Protestant appeal to Scripture alone were each claiming about interpretive authority, and how that dispute bears on reading the Pentateuch.
- Explain Spinoza's argument about the composition of the Pentateuch, and use the contrast with Richard Simon to show that the same evidence supported opposite conclusions.
All the people gathered themselves together as one man into the broad place that was before the water gate; and they spoke to Ezra the scribe to bring the book of the law of Moses, which Yahweh had commanded to Israel. Ezra the priest brought the law before the assembly, both men and women, and all who could hear with understanding, on the first day of the seventh month. He read therein before the broad place that was before the water gate from early morning until midday, in the presence of the men and the women, and of those who could understand; and the ears of all the people were attentive to the book of the law. — Nehemiah 8:1-3
World English Bible
They read in the book, in the law of God, distinctly; and they gave the sense, so that they understood the reading. — Nehemiah 8:8
WEB
This book of the law shall not depart out of your mouth, but you shall meditate on it day and night, that you may observe to do according to all that is written therein: for then you shall make your way prosperous, and then you shall have good success. — Joshua 1:8
WEB
This is the earliest scene in the Bible of what we would recognize as biblical interpretation: a text read aloud to a gathered community, and then explained. Verse 8 is unusually precise about the two operations. The book is read, and then "they gave the sense, so that they understood the reading" — reading and interpretation are already distinguished, and interpretation is already necessary. The Hebrew phrase behind "distinctly" is disputed; ancient and modern interpreters have taken it to mean clearly articulated, or divided into portions, or translated — the last reading assuming an audience whose ordinary language had become Aramaic. Later Jewish tradition took this verse as the warrant for the Targum, the Aramaic rendering delivered alongside the Hebrew reading in the synagogue. Whichever reading is right, the verse establishes the point this lecture depends on: from the beginning, the community that received these books also received the task of explaining them, and appointed people to do it.
1. The oldest layer: interpretation inside the tradition
Before there were schools of interpretation there was the practice recorded in Nehemiah 8. A community assembles, the is read publicly, and designated people explain it. Two features of that scene shaped everything afterward.
First, the interpreter's authority is communal. Ezra does not read privately and publish conclusions; he reads to an assembly, with Levites moving among the people to explain. Interpretation is a public act performed by recognized persons on behalf of a community that will live by the result.
Second, interpretation is assumed to be necessary. Nothing in the passage treats explanation as a concession to weak readers. The text is read and then given sense, as a matter of course.
Both features persisted in Judaism, and they are the background to the rabbinic conviction that the written Torah came with an oral Torah — a body of transmitted interpretation without which the written text underdetermines practice. That conviction is a claim about the text as much as about the tradition: the written Torah, on this view, is not designed to be self-sufficient. It commands rest on the Sabbath without defining work; it commands slaughter "as I have commanded you" without recording the command. The gap is not a defect to be repaired but the space in which the tradition operates.
2. Rabbinic reading and Rashi
Rabbinic interpretation of the Torah is preserved in two large bodies of material. The Mishnah and the Talmuds are primarily legal, deriving and debating practice. The midrashim are commentaries following the biblical text, and they range from close legal derivation (midrash halakhah) to narrative expansion and homily (midrash aggadah).
Rabbinic reading operates at a level of verbal detail that can startle a modern reader. Repetitions, unusual spellings, apparently redundant particles, and the order of words are all treated as significant, on the assumption that a divinely given text contains nothing accidental. That assumption produces both extraordinary attentiveness and readings a modern historian would not accept, and the two are connected rather than separable.
The rabbis themselves developed vocabulary for different levels of reading. The most important distinction for our purposes is between peshat, the plain or contextual sense — what the words say in their own setting — and derash, the applied, expanded, or homiletical sense derived from them. The relationship between the two was itself debated; the Talmudic maxim that a verse never loses its peshat implies both that derash is legitimate and that it cannot abolish the plain sense.
Rashi — Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki of Troyes (1040-1105) — is the interpreter to know here, and remains the first commentary a traditionally educated Jewish student meets on the Torah. Rashi's commentary is compact almost to the point of terseness, and its method is a controlled mixture: he explains grammar and vocabulary, states the plain sense, and then selects from the vast midrashic inheritance the comments he judges to settle a difficulty in the text rather than merely to edify. He says as much in his comment on Genesis 3:8, where he declares his intention to give the plain sense of the verse together with the aggadah that fits it. He is not a peshat purist — his grandson Rashbam pressed the plain sense considerably further and occasionally corrected him for it — but he made the distinction operational, and the fact that his grandson could argue with him on those grounds shows the category was doing real work.
Rashi's influence reached beyond Judaism. Nicholas of Lyra, the fourteenth-century Franciscan whose Postilla was the most widely used Latin commentary of the later Middle Ages, drew extensively on Rashi, and Luther used Lyra. A line of Jewish grammatical and contextual reading therefore reached the Reformation through Christian intermediaries, which complicates any account of the sensus literalis as a purely Christian rediscovery.
3. Alexandria: Philo and Origen
Philo of Alexandria (roughly 20 BCE to 50 CE) was a Greek-speaking Jew who read the Pentateuch in the and who was persuaded that Moses had taught, in narrative form, what Greek philosophy taught in argument. His commentaries accordingly read the text on two levels: the literal narrative, which he did not deny, and an underlying meaning in which the figures and events represent the soul's movement toward virtue and toward God. Abraham's migration from Chaldea becomes the soul's departure from astrology and material things; the four rivers of Eden become four virtues.
It is important to see what Philo was and was not doing. He was not treating the literal sense as false — he defended the practice of the commandments against Jews who thought the allegorical meaning made observance unnecessary. He was arguing that the text has depth, and that its depth is philosophical.
Origen of Alexandria (roughly 185-254) developed a Christian version of the same conviction, with the addition of a hermeneutical . In On First Principles Book IV, Origen argues that Scripture, like a human being, has body, soul, and spirit: a literal sense, a moral sense, and a spiritual or allegorical sense. His argument for going beyond the literal is worth stating fairly, because it is more interesting than its caricature. Origen points to passages that he thinks cannot be meant literally — days before the sun exists, God walking in a garden — and concludes that Scripture itself contains deliberate difficulties designed to push the attentive reader to look deeper. On this account, allegory is not a device imposed on the text but a response to signals the text sends.
Origen also read the ritual law of Leviticus this way, and here the pressure on him was practical. A Christian community that did not keep the sacrificial law still read it as Scripture. Something had to be said about what those chapters were for. Allegory, and specifically allegory referring the sacrifices to Christ, was the answer available.
4. Antioch's objection, and what it was defending
The reaction came from the school associated with Antioch: Diodore of Tarsus (died c. 390), Theodore of Mopsuestia (c. 350-428), and, with a lighter touch, John Chrysostom. Their objection was not that Scripture has only one flat sense. It was that Alexandrian allegory cut the higher sense loose from the text's own historical reference, so that the narrative became a code and its historical claims became dispensable.
Their alternative was theoria — a Greek word meaning contemplation or insight, used here for a higher meaning that arises from the historical sense rather than replacing it. On this account a prophecy or an event may genuinely point beyond itself, but the pointing is grounded in what actually happened, and the historical reference is never left behind. Theodore, applying this strictly, rejected messianic readings of many psalms that the Alexandrian tradition took as straightforwardly christological, which is one reason his reputation suffered later.
The Antiochene position matters for a course on the Pentateuch because it is the ancient form of a question that will recur throughout: how much weight can the historical reference of these narratives bear, and what happens to a theological reading that no longer needs it?
It should be said that the neat contrast between "Alexandrian allegory" and "Antiochene literalism" is a textbook simplification. Origen wrote extensively on the literal sense and on ; Antiochene writers used figurative readings freely. The schools differed in emphasis and in what they were willing to license, not in whether they read figuratively at all.
5. The medieval four senses
Medieval Latin inherited both streams and organized them. The standard scheme, systematized from John Cassian onward, distinguished four senses: the literal or historical (what the text says happened), the allegorical (what it teaches about Christ and the Church), the tropological or moral (what it requires of the believer), and the anagogical (what it discloses about the last things). A widely circulated Latin couplet summarized it: the letter teaches events, allegory what you should believe, the moral sense what you should do, and the anagogical where you are going.
The scheme was not an invitation to invent. Thomas Aquinas, in the first question of the Summa Theologiae, insisted that the spiritual senses are founded on the literal and that no argument can be drawn from the spiritual senses which is not first available from the literal sense somewhere in Scripture. That constraint is often forgotten in summaries that present the four senses as unlimited license.
Nicholas of Lyra pressed the literal sense harder still, drawing on Hebrew grammar and on Rashi, and his commentary carried that emphasis into the sixteenth century.
6. The Reformation and the sensus literalis
The Reformers' hermeneutical program is often described as a recovery of the literal sense against medieval allegory, and this is broadly right, provided two qualifications are kept in view. First, as just noted, the literal sense had never been abandoned; Aquinas and Lyra had already given it priority. Second, the Reformers did not abolish figurative reading — Luther's christological reading of Old Testament texts is thoroughly figural.
Martin Luther (1483-1546) lectured on Genesis for a decade at the end of his life, and his approach to the Pentateuch is inseparable from his law-gospel distinction — the claim that Scripture speaks in two modes, one that commands and accuses and one that promises and gives. That distinction organizes his reading of the Torah: the ceremonial and civil legislation is understood as given to Israel and not binding on Christians, while the moral demand exposes sin and drives the reader to promise. Chapter 12 of this course takes up that framework, and the objections to it, in detail.
John Calvin (1509-1564) is in some respects the more instructive figure for the Pentateuch specifically, because of what he actually produced: a Commentary on the Last Four Books of Moses Arranged in the Form of a Harmony (1563), in which he broke the material out of its canonical order and regrouped the legislation topically under the headings of the Decalogue. That is an ambitious and revealing decision. It assumes the legal material is systematically coherent, and it subordinates the narrative sequence to that coherence. Calvin's treatment of the law's "third use" — the law as ongoing guide for the believer — gave the Torah's commandments a continuing positive function that Luther's framework was less inclined to emphasize, though the contrast between them is regularly overdrawn.
7. Trent, Scripture, and who decides
The Reformation dispute over authority reached the Pentateuch by a less direct route, but it reached it.
The , in its fourth session (1546), affirmed that saving truth is contained in written books and in unwritten traditions received from the apostles, declared the including the deuterocanonical books, designated the Latin Vulgate as the authentic edition for public use in the Church, and stated that no one should interpret Scripture contrary to the sense held by the Church or against the unanimous consent of the Fathers. Protestant confessions asserted, against this, the sufficiency and , and the principle that Scripture interprets Scripture.
Both positions are more careful than the slogans that represent them. Trent did not claim that tradition supplies doctrines absent from Scripture at will, and the Protestant position did not claim that individuals may read however they like — the Reformers were vigorous in disciplining interpretations they judged wrong, and they appealed constantly to the Fathers and the creeds.
What the dispute did was make the location of interpretive authority an explicit question for the first time in the Latin West. Once it was explicit, it could receive an answer neither side intended.
8. Spinoza, and the shift the evidence did not compel
Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) published the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus anonymously in 1670. Its seventh chapter proposes that Scripture should be interpreted by a method drawn from the study of nature: from the text itself, its language, its historical circumstances, and the record of its transmission, with no appeal to authority outside it. Its eighth chapter applies the method to the Pentateuch.
Spinoza's argument begins from a predecessor he names. Abraham ibn Ezra (1089-1164), the Spanish Jewish commentator, had noted in his commentary on Deuteronomy a series of passages that sit awkwardly with Mosaic authorship, and had done so in a famously guarded way — a cluster of allusive remarks, with the observation that one who understands will keep silent. The passages included Deuteronomy 1:1's "beyond the Jordan" (spoken as if from the western side), Genesis 12:6's note that "the Canaanite was then in the land" (implying a writer for whom that was no longer the case), and the account of Moses' own death and burial.
Spinoza took Ibn Ezra's hints, refused the silence, and added his own list — third-person references to Moses, the note that no one knows his grave "to this day," the report in Deuteronomy 34:10 that no prophet like Moses has since arisen. He concluded that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses but compiled long after him, and proposed Ezra as the compiler.
Two things about this deserve attention.
The first is that almost none of the evidence was new. Ibn Ezra had seen it in the twelfth century; rabbinic tradition had discussed the problem of Deuteronomy 34 much earlier, with the Talmud preserving both the view that Joshua wrote the last verses and the view that Moses wrote them in tears. The observations were available for centuries without producing Spinoza's conclusion.
The second is what Spinoza added, which was not evidence but a rule: that Scripture must be interpreted by Scripture and by the ordinary tools of historical and linguistic inquiry alone, with no interpretive authority permitted from outside. That rule, not the list of anomalies, is what made the conclusion follow. Ibn Ezra had the same data and worked inside a tradition that assigned authority elsewhere; the data therefore produced a marginal note rather than a thesis.
The clearest demonstration that the evidence did not compel Spinoza's conclusion is Richard Simon (1638-1712), a French Catholic priest whose Histoire critique du Vieux Testament appeared in 1678. Simon assembled the same kind of evidence — doublets, anachronisms, the traces of later hands — and argued from it in the opposite direction. If the text of Scripture is composite, edited, and transmitted through many hands, then Scripture is not self-interpreting, and a church with an authoritative tradition is exactly what a reader needs in order to use it. Simon was arguing against the Protestant principle of scriptural sufficiency, and he thought textual criticism was his best weapon. It did him little good: his book was suppressed, largely at Bossuet's instigation, and he was expelled from his congregation.
The pair make the point of this lecture better than any summary could. Spinoza and Simon looked at the same features of the Pentateuch. One concluded that the tradition's claims about the book were false; the other concluded that the tradition was indispensable. What separated them was not the evidence but the prior question of where the authority to settle a reading lies. That question is what the modern period made unavoidable, and it is still unavoidable.
Gain or loss?
This is a point where readers will not agree. How to evaluate the shift is contested along lines that run straight through this course's likely audience. One account treats the emergence of historical criticism as an emancipation: readings became publicly checkable, evidence became available to anyone competent regardless of confession, and claims that had rested on authority now had to rest on argument. A second account, argued from various directions by Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant scholars alike — and given a sharp historical form in Michael Legaspi's study of the eighteenth-century university Bible — treats it as a relocation rather than a liberation: the text was removed from the community that had read it as Scripture and given to a scholarly guild with commitments of its own, no less particular for being unstated. Jon Levenson's critique, discussed in lecture 1-1, belongs to the second family. A third position, which this course finds most defensible, holds that both descriptions are accurate about different things: the methods genuinely are publicly checkable and have produced knowledge that no confessional tradition could have produced alone, and the guild that practices them genuinely does have commitments it has not always examined. What is not defensible is the assumption that historical method is simply neutral, or that traditional reading is simply pre-critical. Both were assumptions of the nineteenth century, and neither survived it.
9. What this leaves us with
Chapter 2 will take up the composition question directly, and it will be easier to read fairly with this history in view. When we come to Wellhausen, the point will not be that he invented suspicion — Ibn Ezra was suspicious in the twelfth century — nor that his conclusions can be dismissed by noting his philosophical debts, since every reader in this lecture had philosophical debts. The point will be to ask, of each argument, what evidence it rests on and what it would take to change it. That question can be asked by a reader who believes Moses wrote these books and by a reader who believes he did not, and asking it honestly is most of what this course requires.
The timeline is arranged so that the two pairs of side-by-side boxes carry the argument. Alexandria and Antioch disagreed about method while agreeing about authority. Spinoza and Simon agreed about the textual evidence and disagreed about authority — and reached opposite conclusions from it. Read the diagram down the left margin and it looks like a history of techniques; read it across the pairs and it is a history of a single question.
6. Further Reading
- Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (3rd ed., Blackwell, 1983). Still the standard account of medieval exegesis, and unusually good on the Jewish sources behind Nicholas of Lyra.
- Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, 3 vols. (Eerdmans, 1998-2009; French original 1959-1964). A Catholic historian's defense of the fourfold scheme as something more disciplined than its reputation suggests.
- James L. Kugel, Traditions of the Bible: A Guide to the Bible As It Was at the Start of the Common Era (Harvard University Press, 1998). Shows in detail how ancient Jewish and Christian interpreters read the Pentateuch before either tradition had settled its methods.
- Baruch Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670), chapters 7-8, available in several English translations. Short, and better read than summarized.
- Michael C. Legaspi, The Death of Scripture and the Rise of Biblical Studies (Oxford University Press, 2010). The argument that modern biblical scholarship was constituted by removing the Bible from the church rather than by discovering better methods. Contested, and worth arguing with.
- John Sandys-Wunsch, What Have They Done to the Bible? A History of Modern Biblical Interpretation (Liturgical Press, 2005). A wide survey from the Renaissance onward, useful for placing Simon, Spinoza, and their contemporaries in the same frame.
- Avraham Grossman, Rashi (Littman Library, 2012). A scholarly life of Rashi, with substantial treatment of his exegetical method and of the peshat-derash question.
- Jaroslav Pelikan, Whose Bible Is It? A History of the Scriptures Through the Ages (Viking, 2005). A readable single-volume overview that keeps Jewish and Christian reading in view together.
In short
- Nehemiah 8:1-8 shows the oldest recorded pattern of biblical interpretation: the law read aloud to an assembly and then explained ("they gave the sense"), establishing from the start that interpretation is communal and necessary, not a concession to weak readers.
- Rashi (Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki, 1040-1105) held together peshat (plain sense) and derash (applied sense), stating on Genesis 3:8 that he would give the plain sense together with the aggadah that fits it — a distinction his grandson Rashbam later used to argue against him, showing the category did real work.
- Origen argued in On First Principles Book IV that Scripture has body, soul, and spirit (literal, moral, spiritual senses), pointing to passages he thought could not be meant literally (days before the sun existed, God walking in a garden) as deliberate signals to look deeper; the Antiochene school (Diodore, Theodore of Mopsuestia) countered with theoria, a higher sense growing out of history rather than replacing it.
- Abraham ibn Ezra noted in the twelfth century that passages like Deuteronomy 1:1 ("beyond the Jordan") and Genesis 12:6 ("the Canaanite was then in the land") sit awkwardly with Mosaic authorship, but stayed guardedly silent about the implication; Spinoza's 1670 Tractatus took the same evidence and concluded the Pentateuch was compiled long after Moses, proposing Ezra as compiler.
- Richard Simon's 1678 Histoire critique du Vieux Testament used the same kind of textual evidence as Spinoza (doublets, anachronisms) to argue the opposite conclusion — that a composite, edited text needs an authoritative church tradition to interpret it — showing the evidence itself did not dictate either outcome; his book was suppressed and he was expelled from his congregation.
If you remember nothing else from this lecture: Every stage of reading the Pentateuch — Ezra reading aloud in Nehemiah 8, Rashi holding peshat and derash together, Origen's allegory versus Antioch's theoria, the medieval four senses, the Reformation's sensus literalis, and finally Spinoza — answers the same underlying question: when readers disagree, what settles it? The clearest proof that evidence alone never settled it is the pair of Spinoza (1670) and Richard Simon (1678): both worked from the same anomalies Ibn Ezra had already noted centuries earlier (Deuteronomy 1:1, Genesis 12:6, the account of Moses' own death), yet Spinoza concluded the Pentateuch was a late compilation while Simon concluded a composite text proves exactly why an authoritative church tradition is indispensable. What changed in the modern period was not the discovery of new facts but where the authority to decide a reading was located — in a community's tradition, or in a public method anyone competent could check.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Nehemiah 8:8 distinguishes reading the text from giving its sense. If explanation was necessary even for the community that first received these books publicly, what follows for the idea that Scripture is clear enough to need no interpreter? Try to state the strongest version of both positions.
- Origen argued that Scripture contains deliberate difficulties designed to make the reader look for a deeper sense. Is that a claim that can be tested? What would count as evidence for or against it?
- The Antiochene school worried that allegory made the historical reference of the narratives dispensable. Where in the Pentateuch does that worry seem most pressing to you, and where does it seem least pressing?
- Aquinas held that no argument may be drawn from a spiritual sense that is not also available from the literal sense somewhere in Scripture. What work is that rule doing, and would it have prevented any of the readings discussed in this lecture?
- Calvin rearranged the last four books of Moses topically under the Decalogue rather than following their order. What does that decision assume about the material, and what does a reader lose by studying the legislation apart from the narrative it sits inside?
- Spinoza and Richard Simon drew opposite conclusions from the same textual evidence. Describe a disagreement you have encountered — in this subject or another — where the participants shared the evidence and differed about what would count as settling the matter.