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BT601E The Pentateuch

Lecture 3-2: Law Collections: Hammurabi, Eshnunna, and the Covenant Code

Contents 37
BT601E The Pentateuch
Chapter 0 · Introduction: Why Study the Pentateuch
  1. Introduction: Why Study the Pentateuch
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Reading the Pentateuch - Name, Shape, and Scope
  1. Lecture 1-1: What Torah and Pentateuch Mean, and Why the Difference Matters
  2. Lecture 1-2: The Shape of the Five Books: Narrative, Law, and the Seams Between Them
  3. Lecture 1-3: A History of Reading: Jewish, Patristic, Reformation, and Modern
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: The Composition Question
  1. Lecture 2-1: Mosaic Authorship, Tradition, and the Rise of Source Criticism
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Documentary Hypothesis in Its Classic Form
  3. Lecture 2-3: After Wellhausen: Fragment, Supplement, and the Present Debate
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: The Ancient Near Eastern World of the Pentateuch
  1. Lecture 3-1: Creation and Flood Accounts: Enuma Elish, Atrahasis, Gilgamesh
  2. Lecture 3-2: Law Collections: Hammurabi, Eshnunna, and the Covenant Code
  3. Lecture 3-3: Treaty and Covenant Forms: Hittite Vassal Treaties and Deuteronomy
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: Genesis 1-11 - Creation and the Primeval History
  1. Lecture 4-1: Genesis 1 and 2: Two Accounts, One Creator
  2. Lecture 4-2: Genesis 3-5: Disobedience, Cain, and the Line of Seth
  3. Lecture 4-3: Genesis 6-11: Flood, the Noahic Covenant, and Babel
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: Genesis 12-36 - The Ancestral Narratives
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Call of Abram and the Shape of the Promise
  2. Lecture 5-2: Covenant, Circumcision, and the Binding of Isaac
  3. Lecture 5-3: Jacob: Deception, Wrestling, and the Making of Israel
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: Genesis 37-50 - Joseph and the Descent into Egypt
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Joseph Narrative as Literature
  2. Lecture 6-2: Providence, Human Evil, and Genesis 50:20
  3. Lecture 6-3: Jacob's Blessing, Judah, and the Bridge into Exodus
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Exodus 1-18 - Deliverance
  1. Lecture 7-1: Oppression, the Midwives, and the Call of Moses
  2. Lecture 7-2: The Plagues and the Hardening of Pharaoh's Heart
  3. Lecture 7-3: Passover, the Sea, and Provision in the Wilderness
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Exodus 19-40 - Sinai, Covenant, and Tabernacle
  1. Lecture 8-1: Sinai and the Decalogue
  2. Lecture 8-2: The Covenant Code and the Ratification of the Covenant
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Golden Calf, Intercession, and the Tabernacle
Chapter 9 · Chapter 9: Leviticus - Holiness, Sacrifice, and Priesthood
  1. Lecture 9-1: The Sacrificial System of Leviticus 1-7
  2. Lecture 9-2: Priesthood, Purity, and the Day of Atonement
  3. Lecture 9-3: The Holiness Code and What It Asks of a People
Chapter 10 · Chapter 10: Numbers - Wilderness and the Failed Generation
  1. Lecture 10-1: Census, Camp, and the Order of the Wilderness March
  2. Lecture 10-2: Rebellion, the Spies, and the Judgment on a Generation
  3. Lecture 10-3: Balaam, the Second Generation, and the Plains of Moab
Chapter 11 · Chapter 11: Deuteronomy - The Law Preached
  1. Lecture 11-1: Deuteronomy as Covenant Document and as Sermon
  2. Lecture 11-2: The Deuteronomic Code and the Question of Centralization
  3. Lecture 11-3: Blessing, Curse, and the Death of Moses
Chapter 12 · Chapter 12: The Theology of the Pentateuch and Its Afterlife
  1. Lecture 12-1: Covenant, Land, and Blessing: The Theology of the Whole
  2. Lecture 12-2: Law and Gospel: How Christians Have Read the Torah
  3. Lecture 12-3: The Pentateuch in Judaism, in the New Testament, and in the Church Today

Jump to the key points ↓

36 min

In December 1901 a French archaeological team working at Susa, in what is now western Iran, uncovered a black diorite stele more than two metres high, carved with a relief of a king standing before a seated god and covered below with some three hundred rulings in Akkadian. The stele had been looted from a Babylonian city by an Elamite king centuries after it was made. It was the Laws of Hammurabi, promulgated by the king of Babylon in the eighteenth century BC, and within a year of its publication scholars were setting it beside Exodus 21-23. They found the comparison uncomfortable, and it has stayed interesting ever since.

Hammurabi's is not the only such text, and it is not the oldest. The Laws of Ur-Namma, from about 2100 BC, and the Laws of Lipit-Ishtar, from about 1930 BC, are both Sumerian and both older; the Laws of Eshnunna, in Akkadian, come from roughly a generation before Hammurabi. The Middle Assyrian Laws, from around the eleventh century BC, come from a different kingdom and a noticeably harsher legal culture. Israel's collections — the Covenant Code of Exodus 21-23, the priestly legislation of Leviticus, and the Deuteronomic Code of Deuteronomy 12-26 — sit within this same broad literary tradition of writing down rulings.

This lecture places the Covenant Code beside its neighbours and asks two connected questions: what kind of document is this, and where does Israel's version stand out? The first question is easy to skip and important not to. A modern reader assumes that a text full of legal rulings is a statute book that judges applied. There are strong reasons to doubt that this is what a Mesopotamian law collection was, and if it is not, then the comparison with Exodus has to be adjusted accordingly. The second question yields four sharp results — the balance between two forms of legal phrasing, the treatment of social class, the penalties attached to property offences, and the law of slavery — and one contested principle, lex talionis, "eye for eye," which is regularly misread in both directions.

What these 36 minutes give you

  • Describe the shape of a Mesopotamian law collection (prologue, rulings, epilogue) and state the main scholarly views on what such a text was actually for.
  • Explain Albrecht Alt's distinction between casuistic and apodictic law, apply it to Exodus 21-23, and state the main criticisms of the distinction as Alt drew it.
  • Compare the Covenant Code and its neighbours on social class, property offences, and slave law, giving specific rulings on each side.
  • Explain the argument that `lex talionis` functions as a limit on retaliation, and state what that argument does and does not settle.
  • Summarise Raymond Westbrook's account of these collections and name a substantive objection to it.

But if any harm follows, then you must take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, and bruise for bruise. — Exodus 21:23-25

World English Bible

If a bull gores a man or a woman to death, the bull shall surely be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the bull shall not be held responsible. But if the bull had a habit of goring in the past, and it has been testified to its owner, and he has not kept it in, but it has killed a man or a woman, the bull shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death. — Exodus 21:28-29

WEB

If the bull gores a male servant or a female servant, thirty shekels of silver shall be given to their master, and the ox shall be stoned. — Exodus 21:32

WEB

You shall not wrong an alien, neither shall you oppress him, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt. “You shall not take advantage of any widow or fatherless child. If you take advantage of them at all, and they cry at all to me, I will surely hear their cry; and my wrath will grow hot, and I will kill you with the sword; and your wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless. — Exodus 22:21-24

WEB

These passages have been chosen because each has a close counterpart in the comparative material and each diverges from it in an instructive way. The goring-ox rulings are the single most famous case of near-identical legal content across the corpus. The talion formula is shared, and its function is disputed. The protection of the alien, the widow, and the orphan has parallels in royal prologues — and a difference in who is speaking that repays attention.

1. What a law collection was

The Laws of Hammurabi are framed. A long prologue in elevated language recounts how the gods called Hammurabi to bring justice to the land, listing the cities and sanctuaries he has honoured. Then come the rulings, several hundred of them, almost all in the form "if a man does X, he shall Y." Then a long epilogue in which Hammurabi describes himself as the king of justice, invokes blessings on any future ruler who preserves the stele and elaborate curses on any who effaces it, and instructs the wronged man to have the stele read to him so that he may find his case and be reassured.

That frame is not decoration, and it is the reason many specialists doubt the collection was a statute book. Several observations point the same way. Thousands of Mesopotamian court records survive, and they do not cite the collections; a judgement is given, but it is not justified by pointing to a written provision. The collections are incomplete in obvious ways, treating some situations at length and omitting others entirely. They circulated in scribal schools as copying exercises, which is how most of our copies come to us. And Hammurabi's rulings sometimes differ from the practice attested in contemporary documents from his own reign.

Several accounts have been offered. One treats the collections as royal propaganda: monuments to the king's justice rather than instruments of it. Another treats them as scientific or academic literature — collections of exemplary cases in the same intellectual family as the omen lists and medical texts, which share the same "if... then" phrasing and the same habit of extending a series into hypothetical variations for completeness. Raymond Westbrook, in a body of work culminating in his edited A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (2003), argued that they record the customary law actually in force, expressed as illustrative cases within an unwritten legal tradition that judges knew and applied without needing to cite a text. On Westbrook's account the collections are neither propaganda nor pure academic exercise: they are a written window onto a real and largely oral common law shared across the region.

Westbrook's position is influential and it is not unopposed. Critics have pressed him on the degree of unity he attributes to ancient Near Eastern law across some fifteen hundred years and several distinct cultures, arguing that he flattens real differences between periods and kingdoms in order to describe a single system. Bernard Jackson, among others, has questioned whether the collections can be read as reflecting practice so directly, and has argued that the relation between the written cases and any actual court is looser and more literary than Westbrook allows. The dispute matters here for a practical reason: if these texts are literary and scholastic rather than statutory, then the Code's similarity to them is a similarity of genre, and the comparison should be run at the level of what kind of text this is, not only at the level of individual rulings.

Whatever their function, one feature of the Mesopotamian frame is unlike anything in Exodus. Hammurabi's laws are the king's. He receives his commission from the god Shamash, but the rulings are given in his own voice and his name is on them. In the Covenant Code the rulings are given as the speech of God to Moses, and no king appears anywhere in them. A collection whose authority is royal can be revised by the next king; a collection whose authority is divine is a different sort of thing, whatever happens to it in practice.

2. Two forms: casuistic and apodictic

In 1934 Albrecht Alt published Die Ursprünge des israelitischen Rechts ("The Origins of Israelite Law"), and it remains the starting point for the formal comparison. Alt observed that Israelite law comes in two clearly distinguishable shapes.

Case law form

Casuistic law — from Latin casus, "case" — is case law: it states a circumstance and attaches a consequence. "If a bull gores a man or a woman to death, the bull shall surely be stoned." It is impersonal, third-person, conditional, and it is the dominant form in Exodus 21:1-22:17. It is also, almost exactly, the form of Hammurabi, Eshnunna, and Lipit-Ishtar. Compare the phrasing of Hammurabi's ruling that if a man's ox was known to gore and the man did not blunt its horns and it killed a free man, the owner shall pay half a mina of silver. The two texts are speaking the same legal dialect.

Direct command form

Apodictic law — from Greek apodeiktikos, "demonstrative," used here for law that simply declares — is direct command or prohibition, usually second person and unconditional. "You shall not wrong an alien." "Whoever strikes a man so that he dies shall surely be put to death." It names no circumstance and offers no negotiation. The Decalogue is its most familiar instance, and it appears in the Covenant Code particularly in Exodus 22:18-23:19.

Alt argued that the casuistic material was Canaanite in origin, absorbed by Israel along with settled agricultural life, while the apodictic form was distinctively Israelite and rooted in covenant proclamation at a cultic assembly. The observation that the two forms are distinct has held up well. Alt's historical explanation has held up much less well. Apodictic-style formulations have since been identified outside Israel — in treaty stipulations, in Hittite instruction texts for temple officials, and elsewhere — so the form is not uniquely Israelite. And the sharp separation of the two forms into two sources with two settings is more than the evidence carries; the Covenant Code interweaves them.

What survives the criticism is a difference of proportion and placement, and it is a real difference. Casuistic law is shared with the neighbours in both form and often in content. Apodictic law is far more prominent in Israel's collections than in the Mesopotamian ones, and it puts the addressee in a different position: not a party whose case will be adjudicated, but a person addressed directly by the one issuing the command. Exodus 22:21 does not say what happens if a man wrongs an alien. It says "you shall not," and then gives a reason drawn from the addressee's own history: "for you were aliens in the land of Egypt."

3. Social class and the price of a person

Hammurabi's collection distinguishes three broad classes: the awilum (a free man of standing), the mushkenum (a dependent or lower-status free person), and the wardum (a slave). Penalties vary accordingly. If an awilum destroys the eye of another awilum, his own eye is destroyed. If he destroys the eye of a mushkenum, he pays a fixed sum of silver. If he destroys the eye of a slave, he pays half the slave's value to the owner. The same act carries a physical penalty, a moderate fine, or a property compensation depending entirely on who was injured. The Middle Assyrian Laws are, if anything, more stratified and considerably more brutal in their physical penalties, particularly toward women.

The Covenant Code's talion formula of Exodus 21:23-25 is not graded by class. The passage arises from a specific case — men fighting, a pregnant woman struck — but the formula is stated without qualification as to the standing of either party. Moshe Greenberg, in a widely discussed essay from 1960, argued that this points to a distinct underlying postulate: that in Israelite law human life is not commensurable with property, and cannot be priced.

Greenberg's argument has been criticised, and the criticism deserves to be heard. Bernard Jackson argued that Greenberg was building a systematic principle out of a small number of rulings, and that Israelite law is neither as consistent nor as systematically distinct as the argument requires. The critique has force at one specific point, and Exodus 21:32 is where. If a bull gores a male or female slave, the owner pays thirty shekels to the master — a fixed price, and a price for a person. The Covenant Code does distinguish by status here, and a strong claim that it never prices a person cannot survive that verse. The defensible version of Greenberg's point is narrower and still worth having: the Covenant Code applies a uniform standard to free persons where its neighbours grade, and it declines to substitute money for a free person's serious injury.

4. Property, and whether it can cost a life

Hammurabi's collection imposes death for a substantial list of property offences: theft from a temple or palace, receiving stolen goods, looting at a fire, burglary through a breached wall, and several others. The Middle Assyrian Laws are comparable. The severity is not unusual by the standards of pre-modern legal systems generally.

The Covenant Code does not do this. Its property provisions run on multiple restitution — the thief restores double, or four or five times over for a slaughtered animal (Exodus 22:1-4) — and a thief who cannot pay is sold into service to work off the debt (22:3). The one place where a death occurs in a property case is the burglar killed while breaking in at night (22:2), and the very next verse limits it: if the sun has risen, the killing is bloodguilt. That is not a penalty for theft. It is a narrow allowance for defence when the intruder cannot be seen and the householder cannot know what he faces, and it is deliberately withdrawn as soon as there is light.

This is one of the sharper contrasts in the whole comparison, and it runs opposite to the direction people often expect. On property offences the Covenant Code is markedly less severe than its neighbours.

5. Slavery

No honest comparison can leave this out, and none should soften it. The Covenant Code assumes slavery and regulates it; it does not abolish it. Exodus 21:2 opens the whole casuistic section with it:

“If you buy a Hebrew servant, he shall serve six years and in the seventh he shall go out free without paying anything. — Exodus 21:2 (WEB)

Two comparative points, and one limit on both.

The first is the term. Hammurabi's collection includes a debt-service limit of three years, after which release follows in the fourth — actually shorter than the Covenant Code's six. So a claim that Israel invented a term limit on debt-slavery is simply false, and it should not be made. What differs is that in Exodus the six-year limit is stated at the head of the collection as a general rule for the Hebrew slave, rather than as one provision among many about distraint for debt.

The second is the treatment of the runaway. Hammurabi's collection prescribes death for anyone who harbours a fugitive slave or helps one escape, and rewards for return. Deuteronomy 23:15-16, in Israel's later collection, forbids returning an escaped slave to his master and requires that he be allowed to live where he chooses. This is a genuine and striking reversal, and it is among the strongest examples of divergence in the corpus — though it belongs to Deuteronomy rather than to the Covenant Code, and the Covenant Code itself says nothing on the point.

The limit on both: Exodus 21:20-21 provides that a master who beats a slave to death is to be punished, but that if the slave survives a day or two there is no punishment, "for he is his property." Exodus 21:26-27 requires release for a slave whose eye or tooth the master destroys. These provisions restrain an owner's power and simultaneously confirm that the power exists. It is possible to say both things at once, and a lecture that says only one of them is misleading its students. Restraint is not abolition, and the text does not claim to be abolition.

6. Lex talionis: what "eye for eye" is doing

The Latin phrase lex talionis means "the law of retaliation in kind." Its biblical formula appears three times — Exodus 21:23-25, Leviticus 24:19-20, Deuteronomy 19:21 — and it has parallels in Hammurabi's collection, where the eye of an awilum who blinds an equal is destroyed in turn.

The formula is misread in two opposite directions. One misreading treats it as evidence of a vengeful legal culture, an incitement to reprisal. The other treats it as a piece of primitive brutality that later ethics superseded. The comparative and internal evidence supports a different account, and it is worth being precise about the argument.

The argument runs as follows. In a society without a monopoly on force, injury is answered by the injured party's family, and the natural dynamic of feud is escalation: a tooth answered by a life, a life answered by a household. Lamech's boast in Genesis 4:23-24, that he has killed a man for wounding him and will be avenged seventy-sevenfold, states the escalating pattern exactly, and states it as something monstrous. Against that background, a formula specifying that the response shall be an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth is a ceiling: it caps the response at the value of the injury, and it caps it identically for the powerful and the weak. The phrase "and nothing more" is not in the text, but it is what a proportionality rule does.

Two qualifications keep this from becoming too tidy. First, the ceiling reading is an inference from function, not a statement the text makes about itself; the text gives the formula without explaining its purpose. Second, the question of whether talion was applied literally is a separate question, and it is disputed. Rabbinic interpretation, developed at length in the Talmud (Bava Kamma 83b-84a), holds that monetary compensation was intended and argues the case from the text; some modern scholars agree that the formula functioned as a measure of value rather than a prescription for mutilation, while others hold that literal application was at least envisaged. Note also that Exodus 21:26-27, only a few verses later, does prescribe a non-equivalent remedy — freedom, not a corresponding injury — when a master destroys a slave's eye. What one concludes about literal application does not decide the ceiling argument either way, and the two questions should be kept apart.

7. The goring ox, and the problem of close parallels

Return to Exodus 21:28-32. The Laws of Eshnunna (paragraphs 53-55) and Hammurabi (250-252) handle the same case with the same structure: an ox that gores, a distinction between a first incident and an animal known to be dangerous whose owner was warned, and separate provision for a slave victim at a fixed price. The parallel is close in sequence and in substance. The differences are also specific: in Exodus the animal itself is stoned and its flesh may not be eaten, which has no Mesopotamian counterpart and looks like a distinct evaluation of the killing of a human being; the negligent owner in Exodus faces death, with a ransom permitted in verse 30, where Hammurabi's negligent owner pays silver; and Exodus's fixed slave price of thirty shekels is higher than Hammurabi's twenty.

Copying or shared law

This is a point where readers will not agree. Some scholars take parallels of this closeness to require literary dependence. David P. Wright, in Inventing God's Law (2009), has argued the strongest recent version: that the Covenant Code was composed as a direct and systematic revision of the Laws of Hammurabi, following its sequence, in the Neo-Assyrian period when the Babylonian text was being copied in scribal circles. Wright's case rests on the order in which topics appear as much as on individual rulings, and it should be engaged rather than waved off. Others — Bruce Wells has made the case in detail against Wright — argue that the parallels are better explained by a common legal tradition circulating across the region, that the sequence correspondences are less exact than Wright's presentation suggests, and that direct textual dependence requires evidence of a kind that is not present. Westbrook's shared-common-law model supports this second line. A third group is unwilling to decide, holding that the evidence underdetermines the question. The honest report is that this is unresolved among specialists who agree on almost all the comparative data.

8. The alien, the widow, the orphan

One more comparison, because it shows what the formal difference between the two law-forms actually does. Protection of the weak is a standard theme of Mesopotamian royal ideology. Hammurabi's prologue and epilogue claim that he acted so that the strong should not oppress the weak and so that justice should be done for the orphan and the widow; similar claims appear for Ur-Namma and Lipit-Ishtar. The theme is not Israel's invention, and it is a mistake to present it as one.

The differences are in placement and voice. In the Mesopotamian collections the concern for the weak sits mostly in the frame — the king's self-description — rather than in the rulings themselves. In Exodus 22:21-24 it is a command in the body of the collection, given in the second person, and it is enforced by the one who gives it: "they cry at all to me, I will surely hear their cry." And the motivation is not the honour of a king but the addressee's own memory of being an alien in Egypt. The three differences — where it sits, who speaks it, and what it appeals to — reinforce each other, which is exactly the kind of convergence that makes an argument stronger and also the kind a cautious reader should check rather than admire.

Two Legal Forms, and Four Points of Comparison The Covenant Code (Exodus 21-23) beside the Mesopotamian collections Casuistic (case law) "If a bull gores a man... then..." Third person, conditional, impersonal Exodus 21:1-22:17 — and Hammurabi, Eshnunna, Lipit-Ishtar, in the same form Apodictic (direct command) "You shall not wrong an alien" Second person, unconditional Exodus 22:18-23:19 — far more prominent here than in the neighbouring collections Point of comparison Mesopotamian collections Covenant Code Injury penalties and social class Graded: awilum, mushkenum, wardum draw different penalties Talion stated without class grading (but see 21:32) Property offences Death for several: temple theft, burglary, looting at a fire Multiple restitution; sale to work off the debt (22:1-4) The goring ox Eshnunna 53-55, Hammurabi 250-252: warned owner pays silver Ox stoned, flesh not eaten; owner liable to death, 21:28-32 Concern for the weak Present, but in the royal prologue and epilogue A command in the body, in the second person (22:21-24) Slavery is regulated in both, not abolished in either; Hammurabi's debt-service limit is shorter than Exodus 21:2's six years.

The bottom bar carries a fact that spoils the pattern of the four rows above it, which is why it is on the diagram. A comparison chart that includes only the rows favouring one side is an argument dressed as a summary.

6. Further Reading

  • Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 2nd ed. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997). The standard English translation of Ur-Namma, Lipit-Ishtar, Eshnunna, Hammurabi, the Middle Assyrian Laws, and the Hittite laws; the indispensable primary source.
  • Raymond Westbrook, ed., A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2003). The fullest statement of the shared-legal-tradition model, with chapters by specialists on each period.
  • Bernard S. Jackson, Wisdom-Laws: A Study of the Mishpatim of Exodus 21:1-22:16 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). A detailed study of the Covenant Code's casuistic core that argues against reading it as statutory law and disputes several standard claims about its distinctiveness.
  • David P. Wright, Inventing God's Law: How the Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the Laws of Hammurabi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). The strongest recent case for direct literary dependence.
  • Bruce Wells, "The Covenant Code and Near Eastern Legal Traditions: A Response to David P. Wright," Maarav 13 (2006). The principal published critique of Wright's thesis; read alongside Wright rather than instead of him.
  • Moshe Greenberg, "Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law," in Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume, ed. Menahem Haran (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1960). The classic argument that biblical law rests on distinct postulates about the value of life.
  • Joe M. Sprinkle, 'The Book of the Covenant': A Literary Approach (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994). Reads Exodus 20:22-23:33 as a coherent literary composition rather than a collection of independent rulings.
  • Christopher J. H. Wright, Old Testament Ethics for the People of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004). A theological and ethical treatment of Israel's law, including its economic and social provisions, from within a Christian framework that engages the comparative material seriously.

In short

  • The Laws of Hammurabi, found at Susa in 1901, are framed by a prologue and epilogue in the king's own voice; court records never cite the collections as legal authority, which is why Westbrook reads them as customary law made illustrative and others read them as royal propaganda or scribal-school literature rather than statute books judges applied.
  • Albrecht Alt's 1934 distinction between casuistic law ("if a bull gores...," shared in form and often content with Hammurabi and Eshnunna) and apodictic law ("you shall not wrong an alien") survives even though his claim that apodictic law was distinctively Israelite did not; apodictic law is simply far more prominent in Exodus 21-23 than in the Mesopotamian collections.
  • Hammurabi grades injury penalties by class — awilum, mushkenum, wardum — while Exodus 21:23-25's talion formula is stated without class distinction; but Exodus 21:32, which prices a gored slave's life at thirty shekels, shows the Covenant Code does not avoid pricing a person entirely, so Greenberg's "life cannot be priced" claim only holds for free persons.
  • Hammurabi imposes death for numerous property offenses (temple theft, burglary, looting at a fire); the Covenant Code instead uses multiple restitution — double, or four-to-five-fold for a slaughtered animal (Exodus 22:1-4) — making it markedly less severe than its neighbors on property, the opposite of what is often assumed.
  • Hammurabi's debt-slavery term of three years is actually shorter than the six years of Exodus 21:2, so Israel did not invent the term limit; the real reversal is Deuteronomy 23:15-16, which forbids returning a runaway slave where Hammurabi prescribes death for harboring one — though that provision belongs to Deuteronomy, not the Covenant Code itself.

If you remember nothing else from this lecture: The Covenant Code (Exodus 21-23) shares its casuistic legal form and specific rulings — most strikingly the goring-ox case of Exodus 21:28-32, paralleled almost clause for clause in Eshnunna and Hammurabi — with a wider Near Eastern legal tradition that likely functioned as scholarly and royal literature more than as statutes courts cited. Where it differs is instructive rather than incidental: its apodictic commands ("you shall not wrong an alien," Exodus 22:21) are far more prominent than in Hammurabi, its talion formula (Exodus 21:23-25) states one standard for free persons where Hammurabi grades by class (awilum, mushkenum, wardum) — though Exodus 21:32 still prices a slave's life at thirty shekels — and its property law prefers restitution to Hammurabi's frequent death penalty. Slavery is regulated, not abolished, in both traditions, and Hammurabi's three-year debt-service term is actually shorter than the six years of Exodus 21:2; the sharpest reversal, Deuteronomy 23:15-16's protection of the runaway slave against Hammurabi's death penalty for harboring one, belongs to a different Israelite collection entirely.

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Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • If Mesopotamian law collections were not statute books that judges cited, what does that change about how the Covenant Code should be compared with them? Does it make the comparison stronger, weaker, or different in kind?
  • Alt's distinction between casuistic and apodictic law survived; his historical explanation of where each came from did not. What does that pattern suggest about how to use a scholarly distinction whose origin story has been abandoned?
  • Exodus 21:32 prices a slave's life at thirty shekels, in a collection that elsewhere declines to price a free person's injury. How should a reader hold those two facts together without explaining either away?
  • This lecture argues that `lex talionis` functions as a ceiling on retaliation. Suppose that is right. Does it make the formula easier or harder to defend as a moral principle? What would you say to a reader who finds the ceiling reading to be special pleading?
  • Deuteronomy 23:15-16 forbids returning a runaway slave; Hammurabi prescribes death for harbouring one. Reversals this direct are rare in the comparative material. Is a single sharp reversal stronger evidence of a distinct moral vision than many small differences, or weaker?
  • Wright argues the Covenant Code directly revised Hammurabi; Wells argues for a shared tradition. Both work from the same evidence. What kind of new evidence, if any, would be capable of settling the question?

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