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STEL6E AI and the Human Person: Image of God, Personhood, Transhumanism

Lecture 3-2: The Idea of Person: A Short History

Contents 31
STEL6E AI and the Human Person: Image of God, Personhood, Transhumanism
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What Is a Person, When Machines Talk?
  1. Lecture 0: Introduction: What Is a Person, When Machines Talk?
Chapter 1 · Week 1: Reading the Image
  1. Lecture 1-1: Why Does AI Make Us Ask What a Person Is?
  2. Lecture 1-2: Reading the Image: What We Have and How We Relate
  3. Lecture 1-3: Reading the Image: Task and Christ
  4. Lecture 1-4: Worth Without Ability
  5. Lecture 1-5: Practice Lab: The Measures I Carry
Chapter 2 · Week 2: Mind, Consciousness and Soul
  1. Lecture 2-1: Body and Mind: An Old Argument
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Puzzle of Consciousness and the Machine
  3. Lecture 2-3: What Is a Soul?
  4. Lecture 2-4: Freedom and the Will
  5. Lecture 2-5: Practice Lab: What I Know About My Own Mind
Chapter 3 · Week 3: Intelligence, Person, Moral Status
  1. Lecture 3-1: Is Intelligence the Same as Personhood?
  2. Lecture 3-2: The Idea of Person: A Short History
  3. Lecture 3-3: Moral Status: Who Is Within Our Care?
  4. Lecture 3-4: How We Treat What We Cannot Classify
  5. Lecture 3-5: Practice Lab: Whom Do I Treat as a Person?
Chapter 4 · Week 4: Relationship, Care, Friendship, Grief
  1. Lecture 4-1: The Answering Machine and the Human Heart
  2. Lecture 4-2: Friendship and Love in Christian Thought
  3. Lecture 4-3: Grief and Memory: Words in a Lost Voice
  4. Lecture 4-4: Presence That Costs
  5. Lecture 4-5: Practice Lab: Who Is Beside Me?
Chapter 5 · Week 5: Work, Calling and Human Worth
  1. Lecture 5-1: Measured by Use, Received as Gift
  2. Lecture 5-2: Calling in Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox Voices
  3. Lecture 5-3: Making, Creating and the Worth of the Maker
  4. Lecture 5-4: Learning as Becoming
  5. Lecture 5-5: Practice Lab: What I Was Given, What I Do
Chapter 6 · Week 6: Enhancement, Immortality, Resurrection
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Old Dream, in New Words
  2. Lecture 6-2: Finitude and the Body: Is a Limit a Curse?
  3. Lecture 6-3: Resurrection and the Upload Story
  4. Lecture 6-4: Living as Creatures in Hope
  5. Lecture 6-5: Practice Lab: My One Page on the Human Person

Jump to the key points ↓

24 min

The word person feels simple. We use it every day. But it has a history, and the history is surprising: a large part of it was written by Christians arguing about who God is. When we ask whether a machine could be a person, we are using a word that the church helped to shape. It is worth knowing where the word came from, because the old arguments contain two different pictures of what a person is, and the two pictures lead to different answers.

This lecture tells that history briefly and only as far as we are sure of it. It then sets two pictures side by side: a person as a list of properties (a being that has reason, will and self-awareness) and a person as one who is addressed (one who is called, known and met). Neither picture is the whole of any tradition. Each shows something, and each has a weak point.

What these 24 minutes give you

  • Explain how the word *person* entered Christian thought through arguments about the Trinity and about Christ.
  • State the definition of Boethius in plain words and say what it stresses.
  • Describe, as each would describe itself, the Western stress on the individual and the Eastern stress on communion, without ranking them.
  • Explain Kant's idea of a person as an end in itself.
  • Compare "person as a list of properties" with "person as one who is addressed", naming the strength and the weak point of each.

that they may all be one; even as you, Father, are in me, and I in you, that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that you sent me." — John 17:21

World English Bible

The Word became flesh, and lived among us. We saw his glory, such glory as of the one and only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth." — John 1:14

WEB

But now thus says Yahweh who created you, Jacob, and he who formed you, Israel: “Don’t be afraid, for I have redeemed you. I have called you by your name. You are mine." — Isaiah 43:1

WEB

In John 17, Jesus prays that his followers may be one as he and the Father are one. In John 1:14, the Word becomes flesh and lives among us. In Isaiah 43:1, God speaks to a people by name: you are mine. None of these is a definition of a person. Each shows persons in a relation: to one another, to God, and to those who are called. The church's long discussion of the word grew out of passages like these.

1. Where the word began

In ordinary Latin, persona was the word for a role or a character, and it is often said to have first meant the mask worn by an actor on the stage. We should hold that origin lightly, since the history of the word is argued by scholars. What matters for us is the later use. When Christians began to think hard about how to speak of God and of Christ, they needed words, and the word persona was one of those they took up.

The problem they faced was this. The Scriptures speak of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, and they also say that the Lord is one. How can that be said without saying three gods, and without saying that the Father, Son and Spirit are only three masks of a single being?

An early Latin writer, Tertullian (around the year 200), spoke of one substance and three persons. In the Greek-speaking East, in the fourth century, the three great Cappadocian Fathers (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa) worked out the language that became standard: one being or essence, shared by three hypostases. The Greek word hypostasis is usually translated "person" here, though the two words do not match exactly, and writers still discuss how far they overlap. The point to keep is that the word person was given its weight by being used of God, in a relation of the Three to one another.

This matters. The first persons that Christian thought learned to speak of were not individuals standing alone. The Father is the Father only in relation to the Son. The Son is the Son only in relation to the Father. The language of person began as the language of relation.

A second dispute pushed the word further. The church also needed to say how Jesus Christ can be fully God and fully human in one person. In the fifth century the councils spoke of one person in two natures. Here "person" named who the one is, and "nature" named what the one is. So from early on the word had a double use: it said who someone is, as distinct from what kind of being someone is.

2. Boethius: person as an individual of a rational nature

Around the year 500, the Roman writer Boethius, who worked in Latin, gave a definition that became very influential in the West. It can be put in plain words like this: a person is an individual being of a rational nature. He wrote it while discussing the person of Christ.

Notice each part. Individual means that a person is a distinct someone, not a shared quality like "humanity". Rational nature means a kind of being that can think and understand. The definition was meant to cover God, angels and human beings, and it was meant to be brief.

Later writers took it up. In the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas discussed it when he wrote about the divine persons, and he adjusted it for the case of the : in God, he taught, a person is a relation that stands on its own. So even the great medieval user of Boethius kept the relational side that the first Christian thinkers had found.

The definition has a strength: it names the individual, the someone, as distinct from a quality. It also has a risk, and the risk is the one we met in lecture 3-1. If rational nature is part of the definition, it is tempting to read the definition as a test: reason, then person. Boethius himself was not setting out to build a test for who may count, but the form of the definition makes the test easy to build, and later readers have sometimes built it.

3. Two emphases: the individual and communion

Traditions have drawn out the history in different ways. We describe them as their own writers would, and in broad strokes.

The Western emphasis. Western thought, in both its Catholic and Protestant forms, has often spoken of the person as an individual: a distinct someone with a conscience, a will and rights that others must respect. This emphasis has served well in protecting the single person against the crowd and the state. Western teachers did not forget relation: Augustine thought of the Trinity as persons in relation, and Aquinas, as we saw, called the divine persons relations. Catholic teaching has also long insisted that a human person is made for community. It is fairer to say that the West starts from the individual and then asks how individuals are joined, than to say it ignores communion.

The Eastern emphasis. Orthodox writers have often said that the person is first known in communion. A person is not an individual who then enters relations, but someone who comes to be in relation, as the Father, Son and Spirit are persons in their mutual love. In the twentieth century, Orthodox theologians such as John Zizioulas developed this at length, and spoke of being as communion. The human person, on this view, is truly a person when he or she is open to others and to God, and is damaged when shut up in isolation. The stress falls on the person as called into a shared life, which is the sense of the Orthodox word : becoming sharers in God's life.

Neither emphasis is the neutral one. A Western teacher might worry that the Eastern language could let the single person disappear into the group. An Eastern teacher might worry that the Western language leaves the person alone and cut off. Each would also reply that he or she has considered the worry. We do not need to decide here. We need only notice that the same history has produced two ways of starting.

4. Kant: the person as an end in itself

In the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant, in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), put the idea of the person in new terms. He said, in summary, that rational beings are persons because they can set ends and give themselves moral law, and that a person must never be treated merely as a means to someone else's ends, but always also as an end in itself. Things have a price, he said: they can be exchanged for something of equal value. A person has a dignity, which has no price and cannot be replaced.

This is one of the most powerful sentences in modern ethics, and Christians and non-Christians alike have used it. It gives a clear test for much wrongdoing: am I using someone merely as a tool? It is also a useful guard in the age of machines, since it warns us against treating human beings as parts of a mechanism.

Note, though, that Kant's route to dignity runs through reason: the person is a rational agent who can govern himself or herself by law. So Kant carries the strength and the risk of Boethius in a modern form. The strength is a very firm refusal to put a price on a person. The risk is the same old one: if the ground is rational self-rule, what of those who cannot yet or can no longer govern themselves? Many who follow Kant have replied that the dignity belongs to the human kind and not to each person's present powers. Whether that reply fits Kant's own ground is argued among scholars. We will not settle it, and it is better to say so than to claim that it is settled.

5. Two pictures: a list, and an address

We can now gather the history into two pictures. They are simplified, and no tradition holds only one.

Picture one: a person as a list of properties. A person is a being that has certain things: reason, a will, self-awareness, memory across time, the ability to plan. To decide whether something is a person, you check the list.

Strengths. It is clear and testable. It explains why we hold persons responsible and why we think they can make promises. It gives a way to talk across religions and cultures, since it does not start from belief in God. It is an honest attempt to say what is special about us.

Weak points. Lists tend to be drawn up by the people who pass them. Where the list is put decides who is in, and history shows that the list has often been put so as to exclude. A list also makes personhood depend on powers that rise and fall. And a list gives no reason why a being that ticks every box should be treated with love, only that it should be classed. If a machine one day ticked every box, we would face the question of what the list really measured.

Picture two: a person as one who is addressed. A person is someone to whom a word can be spoken, who can answer, and who is known and called. The root of this picture is in the Bible, where God speaks to a people and calls them by name.

In Isaiah 43:1 God speaks to Israel: I have called you by your name. You are mine. The text does not tell Israel what powers it has. It tells Israel who it is, because of who is speaking. In John 17:21 persons are spoken of in a shared life, and in John 1:14 God addresses humanity in the most direct way by becoming one of us.

Strengths. It matches the way the Bible talks. It does not make personhood depend on performance: a baby is addressed, called by name, long before she can answer. It fits the Eastern stress on communion and finds support in some Western thinkers too. It keeps the focus on the someone and not on the checklist.

Weak points. It can seem vague. Who counts as addressed? If a person is made a person by being addressed by other human beings, then the person no one speaks to, whether abandoned, forgotten or lonely, would seem to lose standing, and that is a dreadful result. Defenders reply that the one who addresses is God, and that no human being can take the address away. That reply is strong for those who believe, but it leaves the picture hard to use for those who do not share the belief, and hard to apply to cases where the Christian answer is not agreed, such as a machine. The picture also does not by itself tell us what to do when we are unsure whether someone is there to be addressed.

6. The three layers

Following the method of this course, we separate three layers.

  • What the text says. John 17:21 pictures a unity among persons modelled on the unity of Father and Son. John 1:14 says that the Word became flesh and lived among us. Isaiah 43:1 shows God a people by name. The text does not define person, and it does not mention machines.
  • A tradition's reading. Many Christians, East and West, have found in the Trinity a picture of persons who exist in relation. The Western church also gave the individual a very firm protection, and the Eastern church gave communion a very firm place. Both read the passages above as saying that to be a person is not to be alone.
  • Our judgement today. We judge that the best account of the word has room for both pictures. The list picture reminds us that persons are someone and can be responsible. The address picture reminds us that persons are not made by their powers and are never to be treated as mere things. We hold this as a judgement and not a command of the text.

This is a point where readers will not agree. Some hold that personhood is basically a matter of what a being is like in itself, whatever any other being does about it, and they fear that any account built on being addressed makes a person's standing depend on others. Others hold that personhood is basically a matter of relation, and that the picture of a lone mind with properties is a late and thin one, which cannot explain why a baby, a stranger or a person at the end of life is someone. Each side is protecting something that must not be lost: the first, the security of the person whom no one addresses; the second, the whole human way of being a person among persons. The course asks only that you can say each position fairly and name its weak point, as we have tried to do here.

7. What this history gives to our question

The history does not tell us whether a machine could be a person. It does tell us three useful things.

First, the word person came from a relation in God, and it was never meant to be the name of a prize for good performance. Second, the word has carried two jobs from the beginning: it says who someone is, and it marks off a kind of being. Third, both pictures that grew out of it are needed, and either alone leads into trouble. If you hear someone say that the question of the machine is settled by a definition, you may gently ask which picture the definition has chosen, and what it leaves out.


Diagram 1. The word person, from argument to two pictures

The word person: a short route Born in arguments about God and Christ; later turned to human beings Trinity Tertullian; the Cappadocians One being, three persons Person as relation Christ One person, two natures Who vs. what kind of being Person as a who Boethius About the year 500 Individual of a rational nature Person as individual Kant 1785 An end, never merely a means Dignity, not price Picture one: a list of properties Check: reason, will, self-awareness, memory Strength: clear, testable, explains responsibility Weak point: the line is set by those who pass it; worth rises and falls with powers Picture two: one who is addressed Called by name, known, met (Isaiah 43:1) Strength: not tied to performance Weak point: who does the addressing? Vague where belief in God is not shared Neither picture is the whole of any tradition. Each guards what the other can lose. A definition that settles the machine question has chosen one of them.

In short

  • The word person gained its weight in Christian arguments about the Trinity and about Christ, as a word of relation and of who someone is.
  • Boethius defined a person as an individual of a rational nature; the definition names the someone and invites a test by reason.
  • Western teaching often starts from the individual and Eastern teaching from communion; each has a safeguard and a worry about the other.
  • Kant called the person an end in itself, with a dignity that has no price, but his ground is rational self-rule.
  • "Person as a list of properties" is clear but draws lines that can exclude; "person as one who is addressed" is not tied to performance but can be vague.
  • A definition that claims to settle the machine question has already chosen one picture and left something out.
Front Back
Where person gained its weight In arguments about the Trinity and about Christ: one being in three persons, one person in two natures.
Boethius's definition A person is an individual of a rational nature.
Kant on the person An end in itself, never merely a means; a dignity with no price.
Two pictures A list of properties (clear, but draws lines) and one who is addressed (not tied to performance, but can be vague).

One sentence to remember The word person began as a word of relation, and a good account of it keeps both the someone and the address.

This week's action Listen for the word person in your own speech this week and ask whether you are using the list picture or the address picture.

Review every summary in this course →

Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • The first persons that Christians learned to speak of were the Father, the Son and the Spirit, in relation to one another. How might that origin change the way you hear the word *person* in everyday speech?
  • What does Boethius's definition protect, and what does it make easy to misuse?
  • How would a Western teacher and an Orthodox teacher each describe the person? What might each worry about in the other's way of starting?
  • Kant said that a person is an end and never merely a means. Where do you see human beings used merely as a means in ordinary life?
  • The "address" picture of the person has a weak point: who does the addressing? How might a believer answer, and why might that answer be hard to use in a shared public conversation?

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What next

The lecture ends here. What follows was written by its readers.