Lecture 8-1: The Enlightenment's Challenge and the Rise of Liberal Theology
Contents 33
- Lecture 1-1: What "History of Doctrine" Is, and What Newman and Pelikan Add to It
- Lecture 1-2: Three Theories of How Doctrine Develops
- Lecture 1-3: How the New Testament Canon Was Formed
- Lecture 1-4: Creeds Before the Creeds — The Rule of Faith
- Lecture 2-1: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
- Lecture 2-2: From Nicaea to Constantinople — The Cappadocian Settlement
- Lecture 2-3: The Filioque and Medieval Trinitarian Theology
- Lecture 2-4: Post-Reformation Challenges and the Twentieth-Century Trinitarian Revival
- Lecture 3-1: Before Chalcedon: What Each Side Was Trying to Save
- Lecture 3-2: After Chalcedon: The Definition That Did Not End the Argument
- Lecture 3-3: Medieval to Reformation Christology
- Lecture 3-4: Modern Christology
- Lecture 4-1: The Pelagian Controversy
- Lecture 4-2: Grace in the Medieval Church
- Lecture 4-3: The Reformation and Justification by Faith
- Lecture 4-4: The Arminian Controversy
- Lecture 5-1: The Donatist Controversy and Augustine's Answer
- Lecture 5-2: Medieval Ecclesiology — Seven Sacraments and the Rise of Papal Primacy
- Lecture 5-3: The Reformation Splits Over the Lord's Supper
- Lecture 5-4: The Marks of the Church and Modern Ecumenism
- Lecture 6-1: Theopneustos — The Early Church's Doctrine of Inspiration
- Lecture 6-2: Scripture and Tradition in the Medieval Church — A Dispute About the Dispute
- Lecture 6-3: Sola Scriptura and Trent's Answer — What Each Side Actually Claimed
- Lecture 6-4: Scripture Under Modern Criticism, and the Contemporary Inerrancy Debate
- Lecture 7-1: The Earliest Millennium — Papias, Justin, and Irenaeus
- Lecture 7-2: Augustine and the Church-Age Reading
- Lecture 7-3: Puritan Hope and the Rise of Postmillennialism
- Lecture 7-4: Dispensationalism and the Modern Landscape
Every doctrine this course has traced so far won its final form under a specific kind of pressure: a council had to decide between two readings of Scripture, or a Reformation-era debate had to decide between two readings of a council. The Enlightenment put a different kind of pressure on doctrine altogether — not "which reading of the inherited authorities is correct," but "why should any inherited authority, correctly read or not, still bind a rational person's belief at all?" That is a harder question for doctrine to answer, because it does not contest a conclusion; it contests the kind of reason a conclusion is allowed to rest on.
This lecture traces how that pressure produced, by the early nineteenth century, an entire theological method built to answer it: Friedrich Schleiermacher's relocation of doctrine's ground from revealed authority to religious self-consciousness. You have already met the specific cost that move had for the doctrine of the Trinity (2-4). This lecture completes the picture with the two things 2-4 did not have room for: the wider Enlightenment argument that made Schleiermacher's move look necessary to the theologians who followed it, and what the same method did to a different doctrine entirely — the atonement — once a full generation of liberal Protestant theologians after Schleiermacher applied it there.
What these 21 minutes give you
- State the Enlightenment's central challenge to inherited doctrinal authority in its own strongest form, not as a caricature of shallow rationalism.
- Explain what Friedrich Schleiermacher meant by grounding theology in the "feeling of absolute dependence," and why that move counted as a genuine alternative foundation for doctrine rather than merely an attack on it.
- Trace what nineteenth-century liberal Protestant theology, working from Schleiermacher's method, did to the doctrine of the atonement — specifically the rise of moral-influence and moral-example readings of the cross, and their relationship to the models chapter 3 already traced.
- Explain why this lecture's account of "liberal theology" is a description of a specific historical method with a specific history, not a slur, and why serious theologians on more than one side of later disputes have claimed or rejected the label for different reasons.
For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse." — Romans 1:19-20
World English Bible
Paul's claim here is a claim about natural knowledge of God — that something real about God is available to unaided human reason and conscience, prior to and apart from , sufficient to leave a rejecting world "without excuse." Every figure in this lecture takes some position on how far that claim can be pushed. The Enlightenment pushed it further than Paul's own argument allows, treating reason's access to God as sufficient on its own terms, without needing revelation to complete or correct it. Schleiermacher pushed it in a different direction again, relocating the starting point from reason's arguments about God to religious feeling's immediate awareness of God. Both moves can claim some kinship with this text. Neither is a plain restatement of it, and this lecture's task is to show you exactly where each one goes further than Romans 1 itself does.
1. The Enlightenment's challenge, stated fairly
"The Enlightenment" names a loose, international movement of thought across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — Descartes and Spinoza on the continent, Locke and Hume in Britain, Kant closing the century in Königsberg — united less by a shared doctrine than by a shared confidence: that human reason, disciplined by evidence and freed from unexamined authority, is competent to judge any claim presented to it, including claims that had previously been accepted simply because a church or a text said so. Stated at its strongest, and not as a caricature of arrogance, the Enlightenment challenge to Christian doctrine ran like this: a claim is credible in proportion to the evidence a reasonable, honest inquirer could independently verify for it, and a claim's age, its institutional backing, or the number of people who have always believed it are not, by themselves, evidence of anything. Miracles reported centuries ago by interested parties, a doctrine's technical vocabulary developed by councils operating under political pressure, a of Scripture settled by processes chapter 1 already showed you were neither simple nor undisputed at the time — none of these, on Enlightenment terms, could any longer function as a self-authenticating authority. Each had to earn its credibility the same way any other claim about the world does.
Immanuel Kant gave this challenge its most philosophically rigorous form. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant argued that human reason's proper competence is limited to the world of possible experience, and that traditional metaphysical arguments for God's existence, the soul's immortality, and similar claims — however venerable — cannot actually deliver the certain knowledge they claim to, because they reach past what any possible experience could verify. Kant did not conclude that religion was therefore worthless; his later Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1793) relocated religion's proper ground to practical, moral reason instead — what a rational moral agent must presuppose in order for the moral life to make sense — rather than to metaphysical speculation or historical revelation. The effect, whatever Kant's own intent, was to make doctrines resting on claimed historical revelation (the , the resurrection, the 's inner life) look, to an entire generation of German theological students trained on Kant, like exactly the kind of claim reason could no longer certify.
2. Why this was a crisis for doctrine specifically
Notice what this challenge does that earlier controversies in this course did not: Arius disputed a reading of Scripture; Pelagius disputed a reading of grace; even the Reformation, radical as it was, disputed which authority correctly interpreted an agreed deposit of revelation. The Enlightenment challenge disputes whether "revelation," considered as a category of knowledge distinct from and superior to ordinary rational and empirical inquiry, is a coherent source of certain knowledge at all. A theologian who took this challenge seriously — and a great many serious, believing theologians did, rather than simply capitulating to unbelief — faced a real dilemma: defend doctrine by the old methods and risk sounding, to an educated contemporary audience, like someone still arguing from authority in an age that had learned not to; or find some new ground for doctrine that could survive Enlightenment scrutiny without simply abandoning Christian faith. Friedrich Schleiermacher's entire theological project is best understood as the most influential nineteenth-century attempt at the second path.
3. Schleiermacher's move, in its own strongest form
You met Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) in 2-4 for what his relocation of doctrine's starting point did to the Trinity specifically. Here is the fuller shape of the move itself, stated as its own coherent proposal rather than only as a demotion of one later doctrine.
Schleiermacher's earliest major work, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (1799), was addressed directly to an educated Berlin audience that had, in large numbers, concluded religion was simply beneath serious intellectual people — precisely the audience the Enlightenment challenge had produced. Schleiermacher's argument to them was not "your reasons for dismissing religion are mistaken on their own terms." It was that they had misidentified what religion actually is. Religion, Schleiermacher argued, is neither a set of metaphysical claims to be adjudicated by speculative reason (the target Kant had already dismantled) nor a code of moral rules (which ethics can supply without religion's help). Religion is, at its root, a distinct kind of immediate awareness — a "feeling," though Schleiermacher's German term Gefühl carries more the sense of an immediate, pre-reflective intuition than an emotion in the casual English sense — of one's own total, absolute dependence on something beyond oneself, a dependence unlike any dependence one thing in the world has on another thing in the world. In his mature systematic work, The Christian Faith (1821-22, revised 1830), Schleiermacher built an entire doctrinal system outward from this single starting point: Christian doctrines are not, on this account, direct metaphysical reports about God's inner being, discoverable by speculation or transmitted by a revelation whose authority you either accept or reject wholesale. They are second-order descriptions of the specifically Christian shape this universal feeling of absolute dependence takes once it has been decisively awakened and shaped by Jesus Christ, whom Schleiermacher describes as possessing an utterly unclouded "God-consciousness" that his community, through him, comes to share.
The strength of this move, on its own terms, is real and worth stating before naming its cost: Schleiermacher did not think he was abandoning Christian faith or diluting it into generic religiosity. He believed he had found the one ground the Enlightenment challenge could not touch, because it was not a claim about metaphysics or history that reason could contest — it was a description of an immediate experience every serious religious person could, in principle, recognize as their own. Whether that ground can actually carry the specific, historically particular claims Christian doctrine has always made (that God became a specific man, at a specific time, and rose from a specific tomb) is the question the rest of this chapter, and the rest of the twentieth century, spent arguing about.
4. What the method did to the atonement
Chapter 3 traced Christ's person through the councils and the Reformation without needing, at that point, to take up what those same centuries had said about why his death saves — a separate strand of doctrine usually called atonement theology, which the church has never resolved into a single required formula the way it resolved Christ's person at Chalcedon. Several models had circulated since the patristic period and through the medieval and Reformation eras: a ransom or model (Christ's death and resurrection as a decisive victory over sin, death, and the powers that held humanity captive, prominent in the early church and revived in twentieth-century scholarship by Gustaf Aulén); Anselm's satisfaction model (Cur Deus Homo, 1098, arguing sin incurs a debt of honor to God that only a God-man can adequately pay); and the Reformation's model, sharpening satisfaction into the specific claim that Christ bore the actual legal penalty for sin in the sinner's place. What all three share, however much they differ from each other, is an objective claim: something actually changes in the relationship between God and humanity because of what Christ's death accomplished, independent of whether any individual sinner ever hears about it or responds to it.
Liberal Protestant theology, working from Schleiermacher's method, produced a genuinely different kind of account, usually traced to a medieval precedent in Peter Abelard (1079-1142) but developed into a full modern doctrine chiefly by Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) and, in its most influential English-language form, by Hastings Rashdall's The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology (1919). On this moral-influence (sometimes moral-example) account, the cross saves not by paying a debt, satisfying an offended honor, or averting a legal penalty — categories these theologians increasingly regarded as borrowed, unnecessarily, from law courts and feudal social structures rather than drawn from the substance of the gospel itself — but by revealing, with unmatched and history-transforming clarity, the depth of God's love for sinful humanity, a revelation whose actual saving effect is the changed heart it produces in those who behold it. On Schleiermacher's own terms this is not an arbitrary substitution: if doctrine's proper content is what a fully God-conscious life makes available to the believing community's own consciousness, then a legal transaction accomplished apart from and prior to any human response fits that framework only awkwardly, while a moral revelation that must be beheld and inwardly appropriated to do its saving work fits it naturally. Ritschl went further still, relocating sin itself away from an inherited guilt requiring payment and toward a social condition — estrangement within the "Kingdom of God" understood chiefly as an ethical community — that the moral force of Christ's life and death addresses directly.
Give this account its own strongest case before naming what its critics, at the time and since, have said it costs. Liberal theologians pressing the moral-influence account were not simply looking for a way to avoid an unpleasant doctrine; many of them found penal substitution's picture of a Father who must be legally satisfied before he can forgive genuinely difficult to reconcile with a gospel whose whole thrust, on their reading, is God's free, prior, unearned initiative in love — and they could point to real texts (1 John 4:9-10's grounding of love's demonstration in the sending of the Son) that a purely transactional reading can seem to underread. The standard criticism, made at the time by conservative contemporaries and repeated by many since, is that a purely moral-influence account struggles to explain why the cross specifically, rather than any sufficiently moving act of self-sacrificial love, would be uniquely necessary — a question the objective models were built precisely to answer, and one this course does not resolve for you here, since chapter 3 did not adjudicate among the objective models either.
5. Going to the Sources
- Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (1799), Speech II — the clearest short statement of what Schleiermacher thought religion actually is, addressed to the same educated skeptics the Enlightenment challenge had produced.
- Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Preface to the second edition — Kant's own famous statement that he found it "necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith," the single sentence that best summarizes his effect on the theology that followed him.
- Hastings Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology (1919), Lecture I — the fullest and most systematic English-language statement of the moral-influence account this lecture describes.
In short
- The Enlightenment asked why any inherited authority should bind belief at all. At its strongest, it said a claim is credible by the evidence an honest inquirer can verify, not by age or backing.
- Kant limited reason to possible experience and grounded religion in practical moral reason. This made doctrines resting on historical revelation look uncertifiable to many students.
- Schleiermacher answered by grounding doctrine in the "feeling of absolute dependence," given Christian shape by Christ's God-consciousness. He saw this as a real foundation, not an attack.
- Liberal theology, through Abelard, Ritschl and Rashdall, developed the moral-influence view: the cross saves by revealing God's love and changing hearts, not by paying a debt.
- Critics ask why the cross specifically is needed on that view. The lecture does not resolve this, and "liberal" names a historical method, not a slur.
Topic: This lecture traces how the Enlightenment challenged doctrinal authority, how Schleiermacher rebuilt doctrine on religious feeling, and what liberal theology did to the atonement.
Remember: Schleiermacher moved doctrine's ground from revealed authority to religious self-consciousness, and the moral-influence view of the cross follows naturally from that method.
Caution: The lecture does not say these theologians abandoned faith or looked for ways to avoid hard doctrine. It also does not choose among atonement models.
One line to carry into ministry: Answer honest doubters by stating their challenge in its strongest form first, and treat "liberal" as a description of a method, not an insult.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Schleiermacher believed he had found a ground for doctrine the Enlightenment challenge could not touch. Do you think an appeal to immediate religious feeling actually escapes that challenge, or does it just relocate the same evidentiary question to a different kind of claim?
- This lecture asks you to give the moral-influence account of the atonement its own strongest case before naming what critics say it costs. Having read both, what do you think a moral-influence theologian would say is actually gained by leaving behind the objective, transactional models chapter 3 traced?
- Romans 1:19-20 grounds a real natural knowledge of God in creation itself. Where would you say the Enlightenment's confidence in unaided reason and Schleiermacher's appeal to immediate feeling each go further than that text, and where might each still be compatible with it?
- This lecture treats "liberal theology" as the name of a specific historical method — grounding doctrine in universal religious experience rather than external revealed authority — rather than as a general insult. Having read the method stated in its own terms, does that change how you would use the label in conversation?