Lecture 2-2: Westphalia — A Peace Nobody Loved
목차 33
- Lecture 1-1: Building the System: Lutheran and Reformed Orthodoxy
- Lecture 1-2: Arminius, Dort, and the Doctrine of Grace
- Lecture 1-3: The Puritans: Holiness, Conscience, and the Crown
- Lecture 1-4: The Westminster Assembly and its Catechisms
- Lecture 2-1: The War That Discredited Holy War
- Lecture 2-2: Westphalia — A Peace Nobody Loved
- Lecture 2-3: Denominations — A Word for People You Cannot Destroy
- Lecture 2-4: An Errand into the Wilderness
- Lecture 3-1: The Revolt Against Cold Orthodoxy: Spener and Francke
- Lecture 3-2: Zinzendorf, Herrnhut and the Moravian Missions
- Lecture 3-3: John Wesley and the Methodists: Grace and Holiness
- Lecture 3-4: The First Great Awakening in North America
- Lecture 4-1: The Age of Reason and the Scientific Revolution
- Lecture 4-2: Deism and the Search for a God Nobody Has to Fight About
- Lecture 4-3: Biblical Criticism and the Quest for the Historical Jesus
- Lecture 4-4: Schleiermacher and the Liberal Century
- Lecture 5-1: William Carey and the Invention of the Missionary Society
- Lecture 5-2: Hudson Taylor, the China Inland Mission and the Cost of Going Inland
- Lecture 5-3: David Livingstone — Explorer, Abolitionist, Failed Pastor
- Lecture 5-4: Missions and Empire — The Argument That Will Not Settle
- Lecture 6-1: 1914 — The Year the Future Stopped Working
- Lecture 6-2: Barth's Romans and the Theology of the Word
- Lecture 6-3: The German Christians, the Confessing Church, and Barmen
- Lecture 6-4: Bonhoeffer — Costly Grace and Guilty Hands
- Lecture 7-1: Azusa Street, 1906
- Lecture 7-2: Spirit Baptism and Tongues: An Experience Becomes a Doctrine
- Lecture 7-3: The Second Wave: Renewal Inside the Old Churches
- Lecture 7-4: Why the South Grew
The negotiations that ended the Thirty Years War began in 1643 and finished in October 1648. They took five years, and one reason is that the parties would not meet. Catholic delegations sat at Münster; Protestant delegations sat at Osnabrück, twenty-five miles away; imperial mediators rode between the two towns. Before substance could be discussed, months went on questions of precedence — who entered a room first, whose carriage yielded, what titles appeared in what order — because a delegate who conceded a title conceded a claim.
This is not a comic detail. It is the shape of the settlement in miniature. Westphalia was not a reconciliation. It was a set of arrangements by parties who still regarded each other as being in serious religious error, and who had concluded that they could not remove each other at a price they were able to pay. What they produced was durable precisely because it did not require anyone to change their mind.
This lecture asks what the treaty actually did, what its "toleration" covered, and how it differs from the religious freedom a modern reader assumes when hearing the word. The difference is not a technicality. Getting it right is what keeps the chapter's principle from becoming either cynicism or flattery.
이 22분으로 얻는 것
- Describe what the Peace of Westphalia changed in the political and legal order of the Empire, including the recognition of the Reformed confession, and identify what the treaty is often wrongly credited with.
- Explain how the settlement entrenched the territorial state church, and state both the loss and the gain that followed for the churches.
- Distinguish toleration of necessity from a rights-based freedom of religion, naming who was covered by the first and who was not.
- Explain how the discrediting of confessional warfare pushed theologians toward a distinction between fundamental articles and adiaphora, and describe the resistance that attempt met.
If it is possible, as much as it is up to you, be at peace with all men." — Romans 12:18
World English Bible
Notice how heavily qualified Paul's sentence is. Twice he limits it — if it is possible, and as much as it is up to you. He is not describing a peace that both parties want. He is describing what you do when the other party may not cooperate and the outcome is not in your control. That is a more useful text for 1648 than any hymn to Christian unity.
1. What the treaty did
The Peace of Westphalia is two treaties — the Treaty of Osnabrück, between the Emperor and Sweden with the Protestant estates, and the Treaty of Münster, between the Emperor and France — signed on 24 October 1648. Its religious provisions are the ones this course cares about, and there are four worth knowing.
Calvinism became legal. The Reformed confession was recognised alongside Catholic and Lutheran, ending ninety years in which a large and growing body of German Christians had no standing in imperial law. This was the treaty's most straightforwardly religious achievement, and it was won by Reformed states that had fought for it.
A date replaced an argument. The most ingenious clause in the settlement is the Normaljahr, the "normal year". Whatever confession lawfully held a given church, endowment or right on 1 January 1624 held it permanently. Not the confession that ought to hold it; not the confession that held it before the Reformation; the one that held it on a Tuesday in 1624. Every party could see that the date was arbitrary. That was the point. An arbitrary rule can be applied; a principled rule would have had to be argued, and arguing it was what they had been doing for thirty years.
The prince's power to convert his subjects was curtailed. Under Augsburg a ruler could impose his own confession on a territory he acquired or on his people if he converted. Westphalia largely stopped this: the Normaljahr fixed the confessional map, and a ruler who changed faith no longer dragged his subjects with him. Subjects of the "wrong" confession received the right to emigrate (ius emigrandi) with their property, and in many cases a right to private household devotion (devotio domestica) — worship at home, not in public, with no church building and no clergy.
Certain institutions were made bi-confessional. The imperial courts were required to be staffed evenly, and in matters touching religion the imperial diet was to proceed not by majority but by itio in partes — the two confessional bodies separating, deliberating apart, and settling by agreement between them. A permanent minority had been given a permanent veto.
Add these together and you have something clear-eyed. The Empire had stopped trying to become confessionally uniform. It had built machinery for permanent disagreement instead.
2. What the treaty is wrongly credited with
Here the lecture has to correct a story you will meet everywhere, including in textbooks of international relations, where "the Westphalian system" is standard vocabulary.
The story says that in 1648 the medieval order of pope and emperor was abolished and replaced with the modern system of sovereign states, each supreme within its borders and none subject to a higher religious authority. It is a beautiful account. It is also, in the strong form, an invention — argued most forcefully by the historian Andreas Osiander, and now widely accepted, that the "Westphalian sovereignty" narrative was constructed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and read back into documents that say no such thing. The treaties do not mention sovereignty as a general principle. The Empire was not dissolved; it went on functioning, with an emperor, a diet and courts, until Napoleon ended it in 1806. The imperial estates gained the right to make alliances, but explicitly not against the Emperor.
Recall the trap from lecture 2-1, and apply it here: when a historical connection is very elegant, suspect that it is yours and not history's. What can be said with confidence is more modest and still substantial. The papacy's capacity to shape the political order of Europe was visibly gone, because the parties disposed of church property and church rights without it and then ignored its protest. Religious uniformity had ceased to be a realistic aim of government in central Europe. Those two things are enough. They do not need the myth.
Rome's protest deserves to be stated properly, because it is usually reported as sour grapes. In November 1648 Innocent X issued the brief Zelo Domus Dei, declaring the religious provisions null, void and without force. His objection was not simply that Protestants had gained. It was that a treaty between princes had permanently transferred property and jurisdiction belonging to the church, without the church's consent, and had made a lay political body the judge of ecclesiastical rights. Whatever one concludes, that is a coherent position, and any Catholic reader will recognise it as the obvious one. The powers had it entered on the record that the protest would have no effect, and it had none. That fact — a papal condemnation formally noted and openly disregarded — tells you more about 1648 than any clause in the treaty.
3. The state church, and what toleration meant
The settlement's practical effect on church life was to entrench the territorial church: a church whose boundaries are the state's boundaries, whose ministers are trained and often paid under the state's supervision, and whose confession is a fact of public order.
This had two faces, and the lecture is not going to pick one.
What it cost. A church that depends on the state acquires the state's interests. Appointments become patronage. Preaching learns what may not be said. becomes indistinguishable from social conformity, and membership becomes a civil status held by everyone born in the territory, which makes it nearly meaningless as a description of belief. The German state churches went into the eighteenth century very well organised and very cold, which is precisely the condition that produces the reaction studied in chapter 3.
What it bought. It also ended the killing, funded parishes and schools in ruined districts, and created a legal space in which more than one confession could exist in the same without either destroying the other. For the generation that had lived through the war, that was not a small thing, and it is condescending to pretend they should have wanted something finer.
Old toleration, new freedom
Now the word itself. Toleration in 1648 was not what a modern reader means by religious freedom, and the difference has three parts.
- It protected confessions, not consciences. The unit was a recognised body with a legal status, not the individual believer. What the treaty secured was the standing of the Lutheran, Reformed and Catholic churches in specified places, not the right of a person to believe as they saw fit.
- It covered three confessions and no others. , Mennonites, Schwenkfelders, anti-Trinitarians and Jews received nothing. Those groups continued under the disabilities they already had, and in the Anabaptist case those disabilities had included execution within living memory. When you read that 1648 established toleration in Europe, ask immediately: for whom?
- It rested on calculation, not conviction. Nobody at Münster held that error has rights. They held that suppressing error had turned out to cost more than the Empire could pay. The Latin tag tolerantia had always meant enduring something you disapprove of; it did not yet mean respecting something you disagree with.
It is also worth resisting a Protestant-progress version of this history, in which toleration marches steadily forward from 1648. It did not. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's Warsaw Confederation had granted broader confessional peace in 1573, and Poland later restricted it. The Dutch Republic practised extensive de facto toleration before Westphalia without ever legislating it. In France, thirty-seven years after Westphalia, Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes and drove out the Huguenots. England's Toleration Act of 1689 excluded Catholics and anti-Trinitarians by design. Toleration in Europe advanced unevenly, was reversed repeatedly, and was granted in most places for the same reason it was granted in 1648.
4. Sorting the doctrines: fundamental articles and adiaphora
If a state can no longer settle a doctrinal question by force, the question does not disappear. It moves. And one thing theologians did with it, in the decades either side of the peace, was to ask a question the previous century had not needed: how much of this do we have to agree on?
The framework was not new. The distinction between what is necessary for salvation and what is adiaphora — indifferent, neither commanded nor forbidden — goes back through the Reformers to the ancient church, and the Lutheran adiaphoristic controversy of the 1540s had already fought over it. What is new after the war is the weight the distinction is asked to carry: not just what a church may permit, but what Christians may divide over.
Two names are worth carrying away.
Rupertus Meldenius, an otherwise obscure figure, wrote a tract during the war — around 1627 — pleading for an end to theological invective, in which appears the sentence that became the motto of the whole later movement: in necessariis unitas, in non necessariis libertas, in utrisque caritas — in necessary things unity, in unnecessary things liberty, in both charity. It is worth knowing where this came from. It is often attributed to Augustine, who did not write it, and it is often credited to the Pietists of the next generation, who spread it. It was written in the middle of the Thirty Years War by a man watching Lutherans destroy each other in print while the country burned.
Georg Calixt, professor at Helmstedt, went further and paid for it. He proposed that the basis of Christian unity be the together with the consensus of the church's first five centuries — the consensus quinquesaecularis — and that Lutherans, Reformed and Catholics all held enough of that to be recognised as churches. The response was ferocious. Abraham Calov and the Wittenberg faculty accused him of "", meaning the mixing of truth with error, and the resulting controversy ran for decades. Calixt died in 1656 under formal suspicion of heresy.
Notice what that episode demonstrates. The attempt to distinguish essentials from non-essentials was not a soft option or a lowering of standards; it was regarded by serious theologians as an attack on the confession, and they had an argument. If you decide in advance which doctrines you will not divide over, you have decided in advance which doctrines you will not defend. Calov's question to Calixt — who decides what is fundamental, and by what authority? — has never been fully answered, and lecture 2-3 will show what happened when nobody in particular was answering it.
Two conclusions, then, and they pull against each other. The distinction between fundamental and secondary doctrine is the intellectual condition of everything this chapter goes on to describe: denominational coexistence, later ecumenical dialogue, the possibility of a Catholic and a Baptist recognising each other as Christians. And it is a tool with no handle, capable of shrinking the essentials until nothing is worth defending, or of quietly filing under "secondary" whatever it is currently expensive to insist on.
The peace of 1648 was made by people who were tired. That is the plain truth of it, and this course does not intend to dress it up. But it is also true that they built machinery which stopped a war that theology had not been able to stop, and that Christians who had spent thirty years killing each other lived beside each other afterwards for a long time. Charity would have been better. Exhaustion is what was available, and it saved lives that charity had not.
Diagram 1. Summary table
| Toleration of necessity (1648) | Modern freedom of religion | |
|---|---|---|
| What is protected | A recognised confession in a specified place | The conscience of a person, anywhere |
| Who benefits | Catholics, Lutherans, Reformed | Anyone, including the unbeliever |
| The ground | The cost of suppression exceeds the gain | A right that the state does not grant and may not remove |
| What it assumes about the other | Still in error; endured, not respected | May be mistaken; entitled either way |
| What it produced | Coexistence, and a very cold state church | Coexistence, and a genuinely voluntary church |
5. Going to the Sources
- The Treaty of Osnabrück (1648), especially Article V — the religious settlement, with the Normaljahr and the emigration provisions. Read it and count how many times a theological reason is given. The answer is instructive.
- Innocent X, Zelo Domus Dei (1648) — short. Read the Catholic objection in its own words before deciding what to make of it.
- The Peace of Augsburg (1555) — read beside Osnabrück to see exactly what changed in ninety-three years.
- Georg Calixt, on the consensus quinquesaecularis — the proposal that unity be built on the first five centuries, and the beginning of the syncretistic controversy.
- The Edict of Nantes (1598) and its Revocation (1685) — the two together are the clearest evidence that toleration in this period was reversible.
핵심 요약
- The treaties of 1648 made Calvinism legal, fixed church ownership by the "normal year" of 1 January 1624, curtailed a prince's power to convert his subjects, and made some institutions bi-confessional.
- The treaty did not create modern sovereign states or end the Empire, which lasted until 1806. Innocent X declared its religious terms void, and the protest was openly disregarded.
- Toleration then protected three confessions, not individual consciences, and rested on calculation, not conviction. Anabaptists, Mennonites, Schwenkfelders, anti-Trinitarians and Jews received nothing.
- Territorial state churches cost the churches independence and warmth, yet they ended the killing and funded parishes and schools.
- Meldenius ("in necessary things unity") and Calixt (the Apostles' Creed and the first five centuries) sought to sort essentials from adiaphora. Calov replied by asking who decides what is fundamental.
Topic: This lecture explains what the Peace of Westphalia did, what its toleration covered, and how it pushed theologians to distinguish essential from secondary doctrines.
Remember: Westphalia built machinery for permanent disagreement among three confessions without asking anyone to change their mind, and exhaustion achieved what charity had not.
Caution: Toleration in 1648 was not modern religious freedom, and the treaty is wrongly credited with creating the modern system of sovereign states.
One line to carry into ministry: When you decide which doctrines you will not divide over, also ask who decides what is fundamental, and whether convenience is deciding it.
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묵상 및 토론
- The *Normaljahr* settled ownership by an arbitrary date rather than by an argument about who was right. Where might a church today be better served by an arbitrary rule everyone can apply than by a principle everyone will contest? Where would that be a failure of nerve?
- State Innocent X's objection to the treaty as strongly as you can. Was he wrong, or was he right and outvoted?
- The lecture argues that the territorial state church bought peace at the price of a church nobody had to choose. Is your own church's position in society closer to being bought or to being chosen — and what would show the difference?
- Calov asked Calixt who decides what counts as a fundamental article. Give your answer, and then test it: name one doctrine you regard as non-essential that a Christian you respect regards as essential.