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CH202E The Church in the Modern World

Lecture 8-4: Where the Church Is Now — and How Four Centuries Got Us Here

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CH202E The Church in the Modern World
제 0 장 · Introduction: What Modern Church History Is, and Why It Is Worth Studying
  1. Introduction: What Modern Church History Is, and Why It Is Worth Studying
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: Protestant Orthodoxy and the Puritan Movement
  1. Lecture 1-1: Building the System: Lutheran and Reformed Orthodoxy
  2. Lecture 1-2: Arminius, Dort, and the Doctrine of Grace
  3. Lecture 1-3: The Puritans: Holiness, Conscience, and the Crown
  4. Lecture 1-4: The Westminster Assembly and its Catechisms
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: The Thirty Years War and the Making of Denominations
  1. Lecture 2-1: The War That Discredited Holy War
  2. Lecture 2-2: Westphalia — A Peace Nobody Loved
  3. Lecture 2-3: Denominations — A Word for People You Cannot Destroy
  4. Lecture 2-4: An Errand into the Wilderness
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: Pietism and the Great Awakening
  1. Lecture 3-1: The Revolt Against Cold Orthodoxy: Spener and Francke
  2. Lecture 3-2: Zinzendorf, Herrnhut and the Moravian Missions
  3. Lecture 3-3: John Wesley and the Methodists: Grace and Holiness
  4. Lecture 3-4: The First Great Awakening in North America
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: The Enlightenment and the Challenge of Liberal Theology
  1. Lecture 4-1: The Age of Reason and the Scientific Revolution
  2. Lecture 4-2: Deism and the Search for a God Nobody Has to Fight About
  3. Lecture 4-3: Biblical Criticism and the Quest for the Historical Jesus
  4. Lecture 4-4: Schleiermacher and the Liberal Century
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: The Missionary Century
  1. Lecture 5-1: William Carey and the Invention of the Missionary Society
  2. Lecture 5-2: Hudson Taylor, the China Inland Mission and the Cost of Going Inland
  3. Lecture 5-3: David Livingstone — Explorer, Abolitionist, Failed Pastor
  4. Lecture 5-4: Missions and Empire — The Argument That Will Not Settle
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: Two World Wars and Neo-Orthodoxy
  1. Lecture 6-1: 1914 — The Year the Future Stopped Working
  2. Lecture 6-2: Barth's Romans and the Theology of the Word
  3. Lecture 6-3: The German Christians, the Confessing Church, and Barmen
  4. Lecture 6-4: Bonhoeffer — Costly Grace and Guilty Hands
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: Pentecostalism and the Charismatic Renewal
  1. Lecture 7-1: Azusa Street, 1906
  2. Lecture 7-2: Spirit Baptism and Tongues: An Experience Becomes a Doctrine
  3. Lecture 7-3: The Second Wave: Renewal Inside the Old Churches
  4. Lecture 7-4: Why the South Grew
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: Ecumenism and Global Christianity
  1. Lecture 8-1: Edinburgh 1910 and the Making of the World Council of Churches
  2. Lecture 8-2: The Second Vatican Council, 1962–1965
  3. Lecture 8-3: Lausanne 1974 — Evangelism, Justice, and What the Covenant Settled
  4. Lecture 8-4: Where the Church Is Now — and How Four Centuries Got Us Here

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34분

The introduction to this course opened with two ratios. In 1900, about four Christians in every five lived in Europe or North America. By 2020, about two in every three did not.

This lecture is about that sentence: whether it is true, what exactly it measures, when the change happened, what it has already altered, and what it has conspicuously failed to alter. It is also the last lecture of the course, so its final section does something the others have not attempted — it asks how the four centuries you have studied produced this particular result.

Two warnings, because this is the easiest lecture in the course to write badly.

Numbers about religion are estimates, not counts. Nobody audits the church. The figures below come mainly from the demographers at the World Christian Encyclopedia and from national survey series, and they are the best available; they are also built on self-identification, on censuses that ask the question differently in different countries, and in some places on informed guesswork. Where a figure is genuinely contested, this lecture says so rather than picking the impressive one.

And a shift in numbers is not by itself a verdict. A church that is growing is not thereby faithful, and a church that is shrinking is not thereby apostate. Chapter 6 of this course was about a shrinking church that told the truth at considerable cost, and chapter 7 was about a growing one that took decades to be taken seriously. Growth and truth are different variables. This lecture describes where people are.

이 34분으로 얻는 것

  • Describe the shape and timing of decline in the Western churches, distinguishing the countries where it was sudden from those where it was gradual or has not happened, and state why historians disagree about its date.
  • Say where Christian growth went instead, in what forms, and identify which of the standard figures are solid and which are weak.
  • Explain what changes when most Christians in the world are not Western — for who decides, for what counts as an urgent question, for whose theology is read — and what has not changed, because institutions and money did not move with the people.
  • Assess what follows for mission now that sending and receiving no longer map onto North and South, and state the risks the newly central churches face.

After these things I looked, and behold, a great multitude, which no man could number, out of every nation and of all tribes, peoples, and languages, standing before the throne and before the Lamb, dressed in white robes, with palm branches in their hands." — Revelation 7:9

World English Bible

A word about how not to use this verse. It is regularly quoted as though John had foreseen the demographic shift this lecture describes, and that reading should be refused. Revelation 7 is a vision of the end, not a forecast of the twenty-first century, and a church that reads its own growth statistics back into apocalyptic prophecy has learned nothing from chapter 4 of this course.

What the verse does supply is a measure. It says that the redeemed community, seen whole, is drawn from every nation, tribe, people and language, and that no one can number it. Set beside that, any period in which the church is overwhelmingly the property of one civilisation looks like an interruption rather than a norm — including the four centuries this course has covered.

1. Part one: the decline, and when it actually happened

Start with the fact that "the West secularised" is too coarse to be useful. The timing differs by country by a margin of decades, and the differences are the interesting part.

The sharpest case is Quebec. In the 1950s Quebec was among the most observant Catholic societies in the world; weekly Mass attendance is generally estimated at eighty-five to ninety per cent, and the church ran the schools, the hospitals and much of the welfare system. During the Révolution tranquille of the 1960s the provincial state took over those institutions, and attendance collapsed — to a small fraction of its former level within roughly a generation, and to single figures in the decades since. No war, no persecution, no theological controversy that ordinary people followed. A society changed its mind about an institution in about fifteen years.

The Netherlands is the other classic case, and it moved on a similar timetable: a country organised into Catholic and Protestant pillars, each with its own schools, newspapers, unions and broadcasters, dismantled that structure from the 1960s onwards, and religious affiliation fell faster than in almost any comparable society.

Britain declined earlier and more slowly, but the 1960s are still the break. Church of England Sunday attendance was in the millions in the interwar period; average weekly attendance is now in the region of a few hundred thousand. What historians argue about is when the decisive break came. The older secularisation thesis, associated with Bryan Wilson and defended more recently by Steve Bruce, treats it as a long erosion beginning with industrialisation and urbanisation — churchgoing gradually squeezed out by science, mobility and the differentiation of modern life. Callum Brown, in The Death of Christian Britain (2001), argued against that: the statistics show no long slide but a cliff beginning around 1963, and the mechanism was cultural rather than intellectual — the collapse of a particular model of pious femininity through which Christian identity had been transmitted in families. Hugh McLeod, in The Religious Crisis of the 1960s, agrees on the timing and gives a broader account of the causes. This is a live scholarly dispute and you should not be given a tidy resolution of it.

The United States is the case that broke the rule. If secularisation were simply what happens to a society as it modernises, the wealthiest and most technologically advanced country of the twentieth century should have gone first. It did not. American religious participation held up through the decades when European participation was falling, which is why Grace Davie's suggestion that Europe is the exception rather than the rule has been so widely taken up. Only from the 1990s did American figures move: the share of Americans reporting no religion rose from a low single-digit percentage in the early 1970s to something around a quarter to thirty per cent by the 2020s, depending on the survey. That is a substantial change, and it is thirty years later than Quebec's and by a different mechanism.

So the honest summary is this. The Western decline is real, it is uneven, and it is best dated to a cluster of changes in the 1960s in north-western Europe and Quebec, with the English-speaking New World following a generation later and southern and eastern Europe on schedules of their own. Note what that timing rules out: it is too late for the Enlightenment to be the direct cause, and it is too fast for gradual intellectual erosion to be the whole mechanism. Whatever happened, it happened to families and habits before it happened to arguments.

2. Part two: where the growth went

Africa is the clearest and best-documented case. Around 1900 the number of Christians on the continent is usually estimated at something under ten million, roughly a tenth of the population. It is now in the region of seven hundred million, approaching half the continent, and Africa passed Europe as the continent with the largest Christian population during the 2010s. That growth is partly conversion — including large-scale movement out of traditional religions — and partly the simple fact that African populations have grown enormously and Christian families have shared in that growth. Both mechanisms are real and it is a mistake to credit only the first.

Latin America grew differently: not more Christians, but a different distribution of them. The region was already overwhelmingly Catholic. What changed from the mid-twentieth century is the growth of Pentecostal and independent churches, most dramatically in Brazil, Guatemala and Chile, so that a region with one church now has two large ones and a great deal of movement between them. Chapter 7 of this course covered where that form of Christianity came from.

Asia is the most varied and the least reliably measured. South Korea's Protestant growth in the second half of the twentieth century was extraordinary and has since levelled off, with the country's religiously unaffiliated share now rising. The Philippines remains overwhelmingly Catholic. India's Christian population is a small percentage of an enormous total, and is concentrated regionally.

Why China numbers vary

China deserves a paragraph of its own, as a warning about numbers. Estimates of the Chinese Christian population have ranged from roughly forty million to well over a hundred million, and the spread is not a matter of rounding. It reflects the difficulty of counting people who worship in unregistered congregations in a state that has an interest in the answer. One widely reported projection in the 2010s suggested China might have the world's largest Christian population by the 2030s; more recent survey work suggests growth has slowed or plateaued, and the regulatory tightening from 2018 onwards has made the environment harder. If you take one methodological lesson from this lecture, take this one: when a source gives you a confident single figure for Christians in China, distrust the source rather than the church.

Growth also went sideways, not only southwards. The largest single congregations in western Europe now include churches founded by African pastors for African congregations — Kingsway International Christian Centre in London, founded by the Nigerian pastor Matthew Ashimolowo, is the standard example, and the Redeemed Christian Church of God, also Nigerian in origin, now operates thousands of parishes outside Nigeria. This is the phenomenon usually called reverse mission, and it is real. It also needs a qualification that its enthusiasts often omit: researchers working on these congregations, Afe Adogame among them, have repeatedly found that they grow mainly among diaspora populations and have had limited success reaching the host society. A Nigerian church in Peckham is a serious fact about world Christianity. It is not yet evidence that Britain is being re-evangelised.

3. Part three: what changes, and what does not

Who decides changes. The clearest illustration is the Anglican Communion, and it is worth using precisely because the substantive dispute inside it is one this course is not adjudicating. At the Lambeth Conference of 1998, Resolution I.10 on human sexuality passed by a large majority, and it passed because African and Asian bishops — representing, by then, the great majority of practising Anglicans — voted for it against the position held by much of the Communion's historic leadership. In 2008 a large group of those bishops declined to attend Lambeth and met at Jerusalem instead as GAFCON. Whatever you think about the question at issue, the procedural fact is the one this lecture is pointing at: the old centre discovered that it could be outvoted, and had no mechanism for that discovery. Comparable arithmetic is now visible in the Catholic Church, where the growth of the episcopate in Africa and Asia is beginning to change what a synod sounds like.

Which questions count as urgent changes. Philip Jenkins argued in The Next Christendom (2002) that the emerging majority churches read the Bible with a different set of concerns in the foreground: healing, spirits, dreams, poverty, martyrdom, the direct action of God in the material world. A German or American academic tradition that had spent two centuries deciding what in Scripture a modern person could still believe found itself addressing readers for whom that was not the question. Jenkins has been criticised, reasonably, for projecting demographic trends too confidently and for treating "the global South" as more uniform than it is, and he has revised some of his figures. The core observation has held up better than the projections.

Whose theology gets read is where the change has been slowest, and this is the honest part of the lecture. The people moved. The institutions did not. The largest seminaries, endowments, publishing houses, journals, doctoral programmes and mission budgets remain overwhelmingly in North America and Europe. John Mbiti made the point in the 1970s in a form that has not been superseded: the church has become universal in extent, but theological traffic still runs mostly in one direction, and the churches of the South know the theology of the North far better than the North knows theirs. A student in Nairobi will read Barth. A student in Tübingen will very likely not read Bediako.

Two theologians are worth naming for what they add to this.

Lamin Sanneh, in Translating the Message, argued that the decisive act of the missionary movement was not preaching but translation. Christianity, unlike some other missionary faiths, has no sacred language; it has always been carried in translation, and to translate Scripture into a local language a missionary had to decide which local word for God would carry the weight — thereby conceding that the local culture already possessed the vocabulary for the holy. Sanneh's conclusion is deliberately provocative and directly relevant here: vernacular translation, undertaken for missionary reasons, handed receiving peoples the means of becoming independent of the missionaries. Once the Bible speaks Yoruba, the Yoruba church does not require an Englishman to interpret it. Chapter 5 of this course covered missions and empire and the argument about complicity; Sanneh's point is not a rebuttal of that argument but a separate observation about mechanism, and it should not be used to tidy the earlier chapter up.

Andrew Walls supplied the frame that makes the whole pattern intelligible. Christian history, he argued, is serial rather than progressive: it has no permanent centre, and its heartlands have moved — Jerusalem, then the Hellenistic Mediterranean, then Northern Europe, then the Atlantic world, now Africa, Asia and Latin America — with each transfer accompanied by decline in the old centre. On Walls's account the present shift is not an anomaly requiring explanation. It is the fourth or fifth instance of the ordinary pattern, and the two centuries in which Christianity looked like a European religion were the anomaly.

Test the pattern

Be careful with that argument. It is elegant, and elegance is a warning sign. Walls's serial pattern explains the present shift beautifully — which is a reason to check whether it is doing work or merely providing comfort to a declining West. It does not, for instance, tell you anything about whether any particular decline was avoidable, and it can be used to make institutional failure sound like .

4. Part four: what follows for mission

The practical consequences are already visible, and three of them matter.

Sending is no longer a Northern activity. South Korea, Brazil, Nigeria, India and the Philippines are all substantial sending countries; Korea is routinely described as second only to the United States in missionaries sent, though every such figure is self-reported by agencies and should be treated with the caution this lecture has been recommending throughout. Non-Western missionaries also work under constraints their Western predecessors did not face: weaker currencies, harder visa regimes, and less institutional support if things go wrong.

Partnership has a money problem that goodwill does not solve. When one partner holds the funding and the other holds the members, the language of partnership can conceal an old asymmetry. This is exactly what John Gatu's moratorium proposal of 1971, discussed in lecture 8-3, was aimed at, and it has not been resolved — it has been renamed. Any Western church entering a relationship with a Southern one should be able to say what happens to the relationship if the money stops.

And the newly central churches face their own version of every test in this course. The prosperity gospel, named as a distortion by the Cape Town Commitment in 2010, spreads fastest in exactly the places where the church is growing fastest. Churches that have become numerically dominant in their societies acquire political weight, and the history you have studied is not encouraging about what churches do with political weight. Nigeria, Brazil and Korea have each seen versions of the church–state entanglement that chapters 1 and 2 of this course examined in Europe. There is no reason built into the numbers to expect the new centres to handle power better than the old ones did. Anyone who tells you the Southern church is spiritually purer is making a claim about human nature that the previous seven chapters do not support.

5. The end of the course: how four centuries produced this

Return to the two ratios. Four in five in 1900; two in three the other way by 2020. Here is an argument about how the history in this course produced them. It is an argument, not a summary, and you are invited to disagree with it.

Chapters 1 and 2 removed the church's coercive power in Europe. The confessional age hardened doctrine into rival systems, and the wars that followed were settled not by theology but by exhaustion — with the result that the state, and not the church, became the guarantor of peace. Toleration was born of that exhaustion, and toleration means that religion becomes something a person may decline. A voluntary faith can spread anywhere. It can also be put down at home, and eventually was.

Chapter 3 built the delivery mechanism. Pietism and the awakenings produced the voluntary society — a body of ordinary Christians who could organise, raise money and send people without waiting for a state or a bishop. Every missionary society of the nineteenth century is a child of that invention.

Chapter 4 taught the church to argue instead of command. The Enlightenment did not defeat Christianity; it forced it to state its claims as claims. That skill served it well abroad, where it had no power to command anyway, and it left the European churches exposed at home when their arguments stopped persuading.

Chapter 5 put the message on the ship — and, in translating it, gave it away. The missionary century is inseparable from empire, and this course has not softened that. But the work translators did for missionary reasons had a consequence they did not intend: it made the faith speak in languages the senders did not control, and a faith that speaks your language does not need its foreign sponsor.

Chapter 6 destroyed the model. Two European wars, fought by the most Christianised and best-educated societies on earth, ended any plausible claim that Christian civilisation and European civilisation were the same thing — and that claim collapsed as fast in Lagos and Delhi as it did in Berlin. Decolonisation followed within twenty years, and the churches that had been founded from Europe had to become something else or disappear.

Chapter 7 supplied the form that could grow without any of it. Pentecostal and independent Christianity needed no seminary, no endowment, no imported clergy and no building. It grew fastest precisely where the transplanted institutions were weakest, which is why the map of twentieth-century growth so often looks like the inverse of the map of missionary infrastructure.

And chapter 8 is what the old centre did about it. Edinburgh, the World Council of Churches, Vatican II and Lausanne are four serious attempts, from four different quarters, to organise a Christianity that was already ceasing to be Western — and every one of them was, by the end, being argued with by people from the churches it had been designed to organise. Edinburgh had seventeen delegates from Asia and Africa; Lausanne had a Latin American plenary speaker telling the Americans their gospel had absorbed their culture, and rewrote its own founding document under that pressure.

So the conclusion this course ends on is not that the church is dying, and not that it is triumphing. Both readings require you to be standing in one place and to mistake that place for the world.

The claim is narrower. For about four centuries, one civilisation held the Christian faith together with wealth, learning and coercive power, and came to assume that the three arrived as a set. This course has been the story of those three coming apart. The learning survived the loss of the power. The faith survived the loss of both, and turned out to be portable in a way that nobody in Geneva or Rome or Edinburgh had planned for — because it had been translated, because it had been made voluntary, and because it had been carried by people who were not in charge.

That is the sense in which the opening principle of this whole course was meant. Modern church history is the story of a church losing its power and finding out what it actually believed — and the last chapter of that story, so far, is that what it believed turned out to be more easily held by people who never had the power in the first place.

Revelation 7:9 is not a demographic prediction. But it does describe a company drawn from every nation and language that no one can number — and it is worth noticing that for most of the period this course covers, the church could have been numbered, and would have fitted comfortably inside one continent's idea of itself.


How the Centre Moved — a Chain, Not an Event Each chapter of this course removed something the Western church had assumed was permanent 1900 about 4 in 5 Christians live in Europe or N. America the 1960s break Quebec, the Netherlands, Britain — the US 30 yrs later 2020 about 2 in 3 Christians live outside the West Ch 1–2 — coercion goes. Toleration born of exhaustion makes faith something you may decline. Ch 3 — the mechanism. Awakenings invent the voluntary society, which can send without a state. Ch 4 — argument replaces command. Portable abroad; exposed at home when it stops persuading. Ch 5 — translation. Carried by empire; but a Bible in Yoruba needs no English interpreter. Ch 6 — the model dies. Two wars end the claim that Christian and European civilisation are one thing. Ch 7 — a form that needs no infrastructure. It grows where the transplanted institutions are weakest. Ch 8 — the old centre organises what it no longer controls — and is argued with. The money, the seminaries and the publishing houses did not move when the people did. That gap, not the demography, is the unfinished business.

Diagram 1. Summary table

Region What happened How solid is the evidence
Quebec Mass attendance collapsed from near-universal to a small minority within roughly a generation, from the 1960s Strong; well documented, and the fastest case on record
North-west Europe Sharp fall from the 1960s; the Netherlands and Britain on similar timetables Strong on the trend; contested on the cause and the exact date
United States Held up until the 1990s, then a rapid rise in the religiously unaffiliated Strong; and it is the case that broke the classic secularisation thesis
Africa From well under ten million Christians in 1900 to around seven hundred million; passed Europe in the 2010s Strong on the direction; estimates vary at the margins
Latin America Already Catholic; the change is the growth of Pentecostal and independent churches Strong
China Estimates range from around forty million to well over a hundred Weak. Treat any confident single figure with suspicion
Western Europe, diaspora churches Large African-founded congregations; "reverse mission" Real, but reaching mainly diaspora, not the host society

5. Going to the Sources

  • Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo, World Christian Encyclopedia, 3rd edition — the standard reference behind most of the figures above. Read its methodological introduction before you quote any of its numbers; it is unusually honest about its own uncertainty.
  • Lamin Sanneh, Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Culture — the translation argument in full. Chapters 1 and 5 carry the case.
  • Andrew F. Walls, The Missionary Movement in Christian History — the essays on the serial expansion of Christianity and on the pilgrim and indigenising principles. Short, and the frame most used by everyone working in this field.
  • Callum Brown, The Death of Christian Britain against Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West — read the two accounts of the same statistics and decide which mechanism the evidence actually supports.
  • The Cape Town Commitment (2010), part II — for what a global evangelical body was willing to say about prosperity teaching in the churches that were growing fastest.
  • The Lambeth Conference 1998, Resolution I.10, and the GAFCON Jerusalem Statement (2008) — read both documents, whatever your view of the question, and observe how each describes the authority of the other.
  • John Mbiti, "Theological Impotence and the Universality of the Church" (1974) — a few pages, and still the sharpest statement of the one-way traffic problem.

핵심 요약

  • Western decline is real but uneven. It clusters in the 1960s in Quebec, the Netherlands and Britain, and came later in the United States. Historians disagree on dates and causes.
  • Growth moved to Africa, Latin America and Asia. Africa is the best documented. China's figures vary widely, so distrust any confident single number. Reverse mission is real but mostly reaches diaspora communities.
  • Who decides has changed, as the Anglican Lambeth votes show. Whose theology is read has changed least. Mbiti, Sanneh and Walls help explain the shift.
  • Sending is no longer only Northern. Partnership still has a money problem, and newly central churches face the same tests of power and prosperity teaching as older ones.
  • The lecture argues, and invites disagreement, that four centuries separated the faith from wealth, learning and coercive power. It does not claim the church is dying or triumphing.

Topic: This final lecture describes where Christians now live, what the shift has changed and not changed, and how the course's history led here.

Remember: Christianity's centre has moved from Europe and North America. Walls calls its history serial rather than progressive, with heartlands that move over time.

Caution: Religious numbers are estimates, and growth is not proof of faithfulness. The lecture does not say the Southern church is purer or that the West is finished.

One line to carry into ministry: In any partnership, be able to say what happens to the relationship if the money stops.

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  • The Quebec collapse took about fifteen years and involved no theological controversy that ordinary people followed. What does that suggest about where Christian identity was actually being transmitted — and about what your own congregation is relying on without knowing it?
  • Callum Brown dates the British break to the 1960s; the older secularisation thesis dates it to industrialisation. What kind of evidence would settle the disagreement? Would it change what a church should do now?
  • Sanneh argues that translation, undertaken for missionary purposes, gave receiving churches independence from the missionaries. Does that mitigate the account of missions and empire in chapter 5, or is it simply a separate fact? Defend your answer.
  • Walls's serial pattern explains the present shift very neatly. Name one thing it fails to explain, and say whether the failure matters.
  • Most Christians are now in the South; most of the money, seminaries and publishing remain in the North. Suppose that gap closed over the next fifty years. Name one thing that would visibly change in a theological education like this one — and one thing that would not.
  • This lecture argues that there is no reason to expect the new centres to handle power better than the old ones did. Look back over the seven chapters before this one and decide whether the evidence supports that claim, or whether the course has been too pessimistic about human institutions throughout.

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