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CH202E The Church in the Modern World

Lecture 6-1: 1914 — The Year the Future Stopped Working

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CH202E The Church in the Modern World
제 0 장 · Introduction: What Modern Church History Is, and Why It Is Worth Studying
  1. Introduction: What Modern Church History Is, and Why It Is Worth Studying
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: Protestant Orthodoxy and the Puritan Movement
  1. Lecture 1-1: Building the System: Lutheran and Reformed Orthodoxy
  2. Lecture 1-2: Arminius, Dort, and the Doctrine of Grace
  3. Lecture 1-3: The Puritans: Holiness, Conscience, and the Crown
  4. Lecture 1-4: The Westminster Assembly and its Catechisms
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: The Thirty Years War and the Making of Denominations
  1. Lecture 2-1: The War That Discredited Holy War
  2. Lecture 2-2: Westphalia — A Peace Nobody Loved
  3. Lecture 2-3: Denominations — A Word for People You Cannot Destroy
  4. Lecture 2-4: An Errand into the Wilderness
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: Pietism and the Great Awakening
  1. Lecture 3-1: The Revolt Against Cold Orthodoxy: Spener and Francke
  2. Lecture 3-2: Zinzendorf, Herrnhut and the Moravian Missions
  3. Lecture 3-3: John Wesley and the Methodists: Grace and Holiness
  4. Lecture 3-4: The First Great Awakening in North America
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: The Enlightenment and the Challenge of Liberal Theology
  1. Lecture 4-1: The Age of Reason and the Scientific Revolution
  2. Lecture 4-2: Deism and the Search for a God Nobody Has to Fight About
  3. Lecture 4-3: Biblical Criticism and the Quest for the Historical Jesus
  4. Lecture 4-4: Schleiermacher and the Liberal Century
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: The Missionary Century
  1. Lecture 5-1: William Carey and the Invention of the Missionary Society
  2. Lecture 5-2: Hudson Taylor, the China Inland Mission and the Cost of Going Inland
  3. Lecture 5-3: David Livingstone — Explorer, Abolitionist, Failed Pastor
  4. Lecture 5-4: Missions and Empire — The Argument That Will Not Settle
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: Two World Wars and Neo-Orthodoxy
  1. Lecture 6-1: 1914 — The Year the Future Stopped Working
  2. Lecture 6-2: Barth's Romans and the Theology of the Word
  3. Lecture 6-3: The German Christians, the Confessing Church, and Barmen
  4. Lecture 6-4: Bonhoeffer — Costly Grace and Guilty Hands
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: Pentecostalism and the Charismatic Renewal
  1. Lecture 7-1: Azusa Street, 1906
  2. Lecture 7-2: Spirit Baptism and Tongues: An Experience Becomes a Doctrine
  3. Lecture 7-3: The Second Wave: Renewal Inside the Old Churches
  4. Lecture 7-4: Why the South Grew
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: Ecumenism and Global Christianity
  1. Lecture 8-1: Edinburgh 1910 and the Making of the World Council of Churches
  2. Lecture 8-2: The Second Vatican Council, 1962–1965
  3. Lecture 8-3: Lausanne 1974 — Evangelism, Justice, and What the Covenant Settled
  4. Lecture 8-4: Where the Church Is Now — and How Four Centuries Got Us Here

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24분

Before the war, educated Europeans did not merely hope that things were getting better. They believed it the way we believe in gravity — as a background fact that needed no argument. Infant mortality was falling, literacy was rising, anaesthetics existed, slavery had been abolished across most of the world within living memory. Progress looked less like a political programme than like a description of reality.

Theology went along, and it did so for good reasons that this lecture will state fairly before it states the cost. Then, in fifty-two months, the most educated societies on earth killed about ten million of each other's young men using the products of their own laboratories, and the churches of every belligerent nation blessed the effort.

This lecture is about the gap between those two facts. It is not about theologians being stupid. It is about a theology that had built its whole account of God around what human beings were becoming, and then met, at close range, what human beings were.

이 24분으로 얻는 것

  • Describe how confidence in historical progress and liberal theology reinforced each other before 1914, and state the strongest version of that theology's own case.
  • Explain how the kingdom of God came to be understood as a moral and social achievement within history, and what that reading gained and lost.
  • Explain why the killing of 1914–18 was experienced as a specifically modern catastrophe rather than a relapse into barbarism, and why the churches' conduct made it a theological crisis and not only a moral one.
  • State precisely which claims the war actually undermined and which it left untouched, and trace the theological logic that led from that reckoning towards a theology of revelation.

Then he answered and spoke to me, saying, “This is Yahweh’s word to Zerubbabel, saying, ‘Not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit,’ says Yahweh of Armies." — Zechariah 4:6

World English Bible

Zerubbabel is trying to rebuild a temple with almost no resources, in a ruined city, under a foreign empire. The verse is not a rebuke of human effort — Zerubbabel is told to keep building. It is a correction of where the outcome comes from. Read it against a generation that had a great deal of might and power, and that used it to level a continent.

1. The world that was about to end

In 1910 the British writer Norman Angell published a book arguing that a major European war had become economically impossible: the great powers' finances were so interlinked that a war would ruin the winner as thoroughly as the loser. He was not a crank. The book sold in the hundreds of thousands and was translated across Europe. Its argument was not that people had become good. It was that they had become rational, and that rationality now pointed away from war.

That is the mood. Historians later called the period the Belle Époque, the beautiful era, which is a name given by people who knew how it ended. At the time, its inhabitants would have said something less romantic and more confident: that the direction of history was now known.

They had evidence. Between 1850 and 1910 European life expectancy rose substantially. Anaesthesia, antisepsis and the germ theory of disease arrived within a single lifetime. The transatlantic telegraph, the railway and the steamship shrank the world. The transatlantic slave trade had been suppressed, chattel slavery abolished in the British Empire in 1833 and in the United States in 1865. Literacy in western Europe passed ninety per cent. The franchise widened decade by decade.

If you had been asked in 1900 to defend the claim that history moves forward, you would not have needed philosophy. You would have needed a list.

2. How theology joined the argument

Nineteenth-century Protestant theology in Germany had already made two decisions that fitted this world well.

It had taken history seriously. The historical-critical study of Scripture — which chapter 4 covers — insisted that the Bible be read as a set of documents produced by particular people at particular times. This was not vandalism; it was scholarship, and it produced genuine knowledge that nobody now works without. But it also meant theology had learned to look for God inside history rather than above it.

It had located religion in human experience. Friedrich Schleiermacher had grounded religion in the feeling of absolute dependence — a move made to defend faith against Enlightenment critics who dismissed it as bad metaphysics. Albrecht Ritschl and his successors developed a theology centred on the kingdom of God understood as a moral community, and on the ethical significance of Jesus.

Adolf von Harnack gave the position its most famous popular statement. In What Is Christianity?, lectures delivered in Berlin in 1899–1900 to students from every faculty, he reduced the message of Jesus to three things: the fatherhood of God and the infinite value of the human soul; the coming of the kingdom of God; and the higher righteousness and the commandment of love.

Take that seriously before you criticise it. Harnack was not a shallow man — he was among the greatest historians of early Christianity who has ever lived, and his editions and histories are still used. His three points were an attempt to say what in Christianity could still be believed by an educated European who could not swallow a miracle, and to save that person for the church rather than lose them to it. That is a pastoral motive, not a cynical one.

And it had a doctrine of the kingdom that could be acted on. In the United States, Walter Rauschenbusch's Christianity and the Social Crisis (1907) turned this theology towards the tenements, the sweatshops and the child labourers of industrial cities. The Social Gospel put churches into the fight over the working week and the factory floor at a time when much respectable Christianity found reasons not to.

A common caricature

Here a common caricature needs correcting. The Social Gospel is often described as believing that humanity would build the kingdom by moral improvement. Rauschenbusch himself wrote at length about what he called the kingdom of evil and about "super-personal forces" of evil embedded in institutions — a considerably darker anthropology than the caricature allows. He expected resistance and expected it to be vicious.

Still, the centre of gravity had moved. Across this whole family of theology, the kingdom of God had become something enacted in history through human moral agency, with God as its ground and its ally. Salvation had become, in large part, a project.

What the trade was. Every theology buys something and pays for it. This one bought a Christianity that an educated modern could hold without dishonesty, and that had something concrete to say about factories and slums. It paid by weakening the vocabulary for anything that human moral agency cannot fix. It is easy to be superior about this from a century away. Ask instead what your own theology has quietly stopped being able to say.

3. Fifty-two months

The war did not feel like a relapse into savagery. That is the point most worth grasping, and it is why the phrase "rational barbarism" is worth keeping.

Everything that made the killing possible was a modern achievement. The rail networks that allowed millions to be mobilised in days were the same networks that had knit Europe together. The chemical industry that made German agriculture the most productive in Europe made the chlorine gas released at Ypres on 22 April 1915. Fritz Haber, who directed that first large-scale gas attack, had already invented the process for fixing atmospheric nitrogen that has since kept several billion people fed; he received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1918. The same man, the same science, the same year.

The numbers are worth holding as numbers. On the first day of the Battle of the Somme, 1 July 1916, the British Army took around 57,000 casualties, of whom roughly 19,000 were killed — in one day, on a front of a few miles. Verdun ran for ten months and cost the two armies something in the order of 700,000 casualties for a shift in the line that a walker could cross in an afternoon. Total military deaths for the war are usually put near ten million, with civilian deaths from war-related causes as high again.

And the churches went with their armies. In every belligerent country, clergy preached the national cause. German pastors spoke of the war as a purification. British and French pulpits described a crusade. The Kaiser's slogan Gott mit uns was stamped on belt buckles. Chaplains on both sides told men that God was on their side, and both sides were told by the same denominations.

The document that mattered for this chapter. On 4 October 1914 an appeal titled "To the Civilised World!" appeared over the names of ninety-three German scientists, artists and scholars. It denied that Germany had caused the war, denied that its troops had violated Belgian neutrality unjustly, and denied the reports of atrocities in Belgium — several of which were, in fact, true. Harnack signed it. So did Max Planck, Wilhelm Röntgen and Gerhart Hauptmann.

For a young Swiss pastor in the village of Safenwil, reading it, the significance was not political. It was that men who had taught him how to read the New Testament had put their names to a defence of their nation's war, and had not noticed any tension. We will come to Karl Barth in the next lecture. Notice for now what he saw: not that his teachers were wicked, but that their theology had no independent place to stand.

4. What the war actually refuted — and what it did not

This is the part of the lecture that most needs care, because the sweeping version is easier to write and is false.

What it did refute. The claim that history has a reliable direction of moral improvement, discoverable by looking at the last hundred years. And, more sharply, the claim that a theology grounded in the moral consciousness of a culture can stand over against that culture when the culture goes to war. That second failure is the specifically theological one. If God is known chiefly through the highest values of a civilisation, then when that civilisation mobilises, God mobilises with it. There is no leverage.

What it did not refute. It did not disprove historical criticism of the Bible; the war has nothing to say about whether Isaiah had one author. It did not disprove that Christian faith has ethical and social consequences, which no serious theology denies. It did not show that Jesus is uninterested in factory conditions. And it did not show that human beings are incapable of good — it showed something more specific and more disturbing, that the same capacities produce both the hospital and the gas.

And it did not happen everywhere. In German-speaking Europe the loss of confidence was rapid and near-total among younger theologians. In Britain and the United States it was not. American remained buoyant through the 1920s; the sharpest American critic of its optimism, Reinhold Niebuhr, made his case in the 1930s and made it mainly on the evidence of industrial Detroit and the Depression, not the trenches. In Britain the war produced a great deal of grief and a good deal of theology about the suffering of God, but no comparable rupture. When you read that the war destroyed liberal theology, ask: where?

Too tidy a story

Here is where this lecture is most at risk of tidiness. The line "the guns fired and liberal theology died" is memorable, and it is roughly a third true. It is a story German theologians told about themselves afterwards, and it flattered them, because it made an intellectual defeat look like an act of God. Historians of the period are steadily less impressed by it. Keep the connection, but keep it loose: the war did not refute a set of propositions. It removed the plausibility of a mood.

5. From ruin to revelation: the theological logic

If the failure was that theology had no place to stand outside the culture, then the repair had to be a place to stand.

That is the whole logic of what follows in this chapter, and it can be stated in one move. If God is known through the highest reaches of human religious and moral experience, then human religious and moral experience sets the limits of what God can say. God cannot contradict us, because God is reached by extending us. Take the same premise into 1914 and God has no way to say no to the war, because the war was what the culture wanted.

So the younger theologians reached for a God who is not an extension of anything human — who addresses human beings from outside, who can therefore judge them, and who can therefore also forgive them. Note that both halves depend on the same move. A God who cannot stand over against you also cannot rescue you; that God can only agree with you.

That is what H. Richard Niebuhr meant in the sentence that has become the standard summary of the whole quarrel, written in 1937 about American liberalism: "A God without wrath brought men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross." It is a polemic, and like all good polemics it is unfair — but it names the missing element exactly.

6. What to carry out of this lecture

Two things, and they pull against each other.

The first: a theology organised around human possibility will be silent at exactly the moment it is most needed. Not wrong — silent. It will still have things to say about improvement, and nothing to say to a man in a trench.

The second, which is the harder one: the correction has its own costs, and the rest of this chapter will show them. A theology of the wholly other God can become a theology with nothing to say about factory conditions after all — and Barth's own students would spend decades arguing about whether it did. The Christian task is not to swing from one to the other every hundred years. It is to hold a doctrine of God that can both judge a culture and send you back into it.


Before 1914 and After 1918 — the shift, and its limits A change of starting point, not a refutation of a list of propositions BEFORE — theology of culture AFTER — theology of the Word Human being what we are Capable of moral completion through education and reform Capable of the laboratory and the gas alike — not evil, but not self-correcting God where God is met Within history and culture, at the height of moral feeling Wholly other — addressing us from outside, and so able both to judge and to save The kingdom how it comes Built inside history by moral and social effort God's act, breaking in — which the church announces rather than constructs Authority what settles it Reason, conscience and the moral sense of the culture The Word of God, which the church receives and cannot manufacture The war did not disprove historical criticism, or Christian social action, or human capacity for good. It showed that a theology reached by extending the culture cannot say no to that culture. And it happened in Germany first.

Diagram 1. Summary table

Before the war — theology of culture After the war — theology of the Word
Human being Capable of moral completion through education and reform Capable of the laboratory and the gas alike; not evil, but not self-correcting
God Met within history and culture, at the height of moral feeling Wholly other, addressing from outside, able both to judge and to save
Kingdom of God Built inside history by moral and social effort God's act, announced by the church rather than constructed by it
Authority in theology Reason, conscience, the moral sense of the culture The Word of God, received and not manufactured
Its strongest case Kept educated moderns inside the church, and put churches into the fight over slums and child labour Gave the church a place to stand when the culture demanded a blessing
Its characteristic failure Silence at the point of ruin; no leverage against the nation at war A tendency to have nothing left to say about the slums

5. Going to the Sources

  • "To the Civilised World!" (An die Kulturwelt!), October 1914 — the manifesto of the ninety-three, widely available in English. Two pages. Read the list of signatures, then the four denials, and ask what a theology would need in order to refuse to sign.
  • Adolf von Harnack, What Is Christianity? (1900), lectures 3 and 4 — the case for the ethical reading of Jesus, in the words of its ablest advocate. Do not read a summary of it; read him.
  • Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (1917), chapters 9–11 on the kingdom of evil — written during the war, and much darker than the Social Gospel's reputation.
  • Wilfred Owen, "Dulce et Decorum Est" and "The Parable of the Old Man and the Young" — the second rewrites Genesis 22 so that Abraham kills Isaac anyway. Poetry is a source; this is what the theology looked like from inside the trench.
  • H. Richard Niebuhr, The Kingdom of God in America (1937), final chapter — where the famous one-sentence indictment of liberal theology occurs, in its context, which is more careful than the quotation.

핵심 요약

  • Before 1914, educated Europeans treated progress as a plain fact, and they had a list of evidence for it: falling mortality, rising literacy, new medicine, abolished slavery.
  • Liberal Protestant theology fitted this mood. Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Harnack and Rauschenbusch located God in history and human experience and made the kingdom a moral and social task. Its motives were pastoral.
  • The war was experienced as a modern catastrophe, built from rail networks and chemistry. Churches in every belligerent nation blessed it, and the manifesto of the ninety-three German scholars, Harnack among them, defended Germany.
  • The war did not refute historical criticism or Christian social action. It exposed that a theology grounded in a culture's values cannot stand against that culture. It also did not hit every country equally.
  • Younger theologians turned toward a God who speaks from outside human experience, who can therefore judge and also forgive. This correction has its own costs, which the rest of the chapter explores.

Topic: This lecture explains how confidence in progress shaped liberal theology before 1914, and how the war exposed its weakness.

Remember: A theology that reaches God by extending human moral experience has no place to stand when a culture goes to war. That is why a theology of revelation seemed necessary.

Caution: The lecture does not say the war disproved liberal theology wholesale. It says the story is only roughly a third true, and that the shock was strongest in German-speaking Europe.

One line to carry into ministry: Ask what your own church is so sure of that it works as background, and whether your theology could still say no to your nation.

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  • State Harnack's account of Christianity so that Harnack would accept your statement of it. Only then say what you think it could not do in 1914. Which task was harder?
  • The lecture claims that a God reached by extending human moral experience cannot contradict human moral experience. Test the claim: can you construct a counter-example — a theology grounded in experience that still managed to say no to its own nation?
  • Chlorine gas and nitrogen fertiliser came from the same man in the same decade. What does a doctrine of sin need to look like in order to describe that accurately, without describing science as evil?
  • What is your own church currently confident about in the way Europe was confident about progress in 1910 — so confident that it functions as background rather than as a claim?

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