Lecture 8-1: The Logical Problem of Evil
Contents 37
- Lecture 1-1: The Meaning and Mandate of Apologetics
- Lecture 1-2: Faith and Reason Across Church History
- Lecture 1-3: The Apologist's Character
- Lecture 2-1: What Is Truth?
- Lecture 2-2: Revelation and Reason
- Lecture 2-3: The Postmodern Challenge to Truth
- Lecture 3-1: Classical Apologetics
- Lecture 3-2: Evidential Apologetics
- Lecture 3-3: Presuppositional Apologetics
- Lecture 3-4: Reformed Epistemology
- Lecture 4-1: The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- Lecture 4-2: The Teleological Argument (Fine-Tuning)
- Lecture 4-3: The Moral Argument
- Lecture 4-4: Objections and Responses
- Lecture 5-1: How the Canon Formed
- Lecture 5-2: Manuscript Evidence and Textual Criticism
- Lecture 5-3: Archaeology and Historical Corroboration
- Lecture 6-1: The Quest for the Historical Jesus
- Lecture 6-2: Jesus's Self-Understanding
- Lecture 6-3: Lewis's Trilemma and Its Critics
- Lecture 7-1: The Death of Jesus
- Lecture 7-2: The Minimal Facts Approach
- Lecture 7-3: Alternative Theories and Their Failure
- Lecture 8-1: The Logical Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-2: The Evidential Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-3: The Cross as God's Answer
- Lecture 9-1: Four Models for Relating Science and Faith
- Lecture 9-2: The Spectrum of Christian Views on Origins
- Lecture 9-3: Design Arguments and Their Scientific Critics
- Lecture 10-1: Religious Pluralism's Philosophical Claims
- Lecture 10-2: Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism Compared
- Lecture 10-3: The New Atheism and Secular Objections
- Lecture 10-4: Engaging Other Religions and Worldviews Respectfully
Of all the objections to Christian belief, the problem of evil is probably the one every believer meets outside the classroom — from a grieving friend, from a news report, from their own life. This lecture takes up the oldest and philosophically sharpest form of that objection: the claim that the mere existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an all-powerful, all-good God. If that claim were true, no further evidence would even be needed — theism would be self-contradictory, like a squared circle.
We will look first at the argument's classical statement, traditionally associated with the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341–270 BC), and then at the response most philosophers, including most philosophers who are not themselves theists, now regard as decisive against the logical version specifically: Alvin Plantinga's free will defense. It is important to be precise about what this lecture claims and does not claim. Solving the logical problem does not make suffering feel less terrible, and it does not by itself answer the harder question of why this much evil, which is the subject of 8-2. It answers a narrower question: is theism self-contradictory? The philosophical consensus, across a wide range of starting points, is no.
What these 20 minutes give you
- State the logical problem of evil in Epicurus's classic form and explain precisely what a "logical" (as opposed to evidential) version of the problem claims.
- Explain Plantinga's free will defense and why a mere *possibility* is enough to answer a claim of strict logical contradiction.
- Distinguish a *defense* (which aims only to show no contradiction) from a *theodicy* (which aims to give the actual reason), and explain why this distinction matters.
- Describe why many philosophers, including a number of atheist philosophers, now regard the logical problem as answered, while the broader problem of evil remains very much alive.
Romans 8:28 — "We know that all things work together for good for those who love God, to those who are called according to his purpose." (World English Bible)
Genesis 3:1–6, on the first human choice against God, read across the lecture as our primary text on what it means for God to create beings genuinely free to choose against him. Verses will be cited individually below.
1. Epicurus's dilemma
The oldest recorded version of the problem is usually attributed to Epicurus, though it survives only because the later Christian writer Lactantius quoted it centuries afterward in order to answer it — a reminder that this objection is not a modern invention aimed specifically at Christianity, but an ancient question aimed at theism as such. In its classic shape, it runs as a set of exhaustive alternatives:
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?
The force of the dilemma is its apparent tightness. It looks as though there is no fourth option: either God lacks power, lacks goodness, or evil should not exist. Since evil plainly does exist, something in the traditional concept of God — , omnibenevolence, or the reality of evil itself — has to give.
Philosophers have since sharpened this into what is usually called the logical problem of evil: the claim that the following three statements cannot all be true at once —
- An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists.
- Evil exists.
- A wholly good, omnipotent God would eliminate evil so far as he is able.
If (1), (2), and (3) really are jointly inconsistent — if no possible circumstance could make all three true together — then theism is not merely improbable, it is necessarily false, on the same logical footing as "this triangle has four sides." That is a very strong claim, and it is worth being precise that it is what the logical version asserts. It is stronger than saying evil makes God's existence unlikely — that weaker, evidential claim is the subject of 8-2.
2. What a logical contradiction actually requires
This is a point where careful readers sometimes move too fast. To show that (1)–(3) are logically inconsistent, it is not enough to show that God has not in fact given us a reason he permits evil, or even that we cannot imagine what such a reason might be. A strict logical contradiction requires showing that no possible situation could make all three statements true together — that they exclude each other the way "married" and "bachelor" do, by the very meaning of the terms involved. Statement (3) in particular is doing heavy, hidden work: it assumes that a wholly good, all-powerful being would eliminate every instance of evil it is able to eliminate, with no exceptions and no morally relevant trade-offs. That assumption needs its own defense — it is not self-evidently true the way "2+2=4" is.
This is the door through which the philosophical response walks.
3. Plantinga's free will defense
Defense and
Alvin Plantinga, in God, Freedom, and Evil (1974) and more technically in The Nature of Necessity (1974), offered what philosophers call a defense rather than a theodicy — and the distinction matters enough to state plainly before going further:
- A theodicy attempts to say what God's actual reason for permitting evil is.
- A defense attempts only to show that theism is not logically self-contradictory, by describing a scenario that is merely possible — one that need not be true, or even probable, so long as it is coherent.
Plantinga's argument, compressed to its core, runs as follows. A world containing creatures who are genuinely, significantly free — free with respect to morally significant choices — is more valuable than a world of otherwise identical creatures who lack that freedom, because only free creatures can love, in any sense worth the name, rather than merely behave as they were programmed to behave. But freedom of this kind is only genuine if it can be exercised wrongly. A being that is incapable of choosing evil is, to that extent, not free in the relevant sense. So it is at least possible that God, wanting a world containing free creatures capable of real moral good, could not have created such a world without creatures who were also capable of moral evil — and further possible that, of the free creatures God could have created, every one of them would, in at least some circumstance, freely choose wrongly. Plantinga calls this last, more technical claim transworld depravity: the thesis that it is possible every creaturely essence God could instantiate suffers from at least one circumstance of free wrongdoing in every world in which that creature is significantly free. If transworld depravity is even possibly true of every free creature God might have created, then it is possible that God could not have created a world with moral good but no moral evil — not because God's power is limited, but because the combination "significantly free creatures who never do wrong" may not be a coherent object of creation at all, any more than "a square circle" is.
Notice what this argument needs, and what it does not need. It does not need to be true that transworld depravity actually affects every possible creature — Plantinga is not claiming to know that. It needs only to be possible, because the claim under attack (that 1–3 above are logically inconsistent) is a claim about what is possible, and one clear possible scenario is enough to break it. This is why a defense can succeed at a much lower evidential bar than a theodicy would need.
4. Why this is now widely regarded as decisive — for the logical problem specifically
The philosophical reception of Plantinga's argument has been unusually one-sided for a debate this old. The philosopher of religion William Rowe — whose own, different argument against God's existence is the subject of the next lecture — wrote that "some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God... But so contending, as most philosophers now recognize, is a mistake." The atheist philosopher J. L. Mackie, who had been among the sharpest twentieth-century defenders of the logical problem, later conceded in The Miracle of Theism (1982) that the free will defense succeeds in showing that theism is not strictly self-contradictory.
This is a point where readers should notice what has, and has not, been conceded. What is widely granted is narrow: theism is not logically inconsistent merely because evil exists — the combination is possible. What is not granted, by Mackie or by most contemporary atheist philosophers, is that theism is therefore probable, or that the amount and kind of evil actually found in the world raises no difficulty for belief in God. That harder, evidential question is exactly where 8-2 begins. A student who finishes this lecture thinking "the problem of evil has been solved" has overshot what the argument delivers.
5. Genesis 3 as the primary case in view
Genesis 3:1–6 gives the biblical narrative's own account of a free creature choosing wrongly, and it repays a slow reading precisely because it does not explain evil away or reduce the choice to inevitability.
Genesis 3:1 — "Now the serpent was more subtle than any animal of the field which Yahweh God had made. He said to the woman, 'Has God really said, "You shall not eat of any tree of the garden?"'" (World English Bible)
The serpent's opening move is not a direct denial of God's word but a subtle overstatement of it — turning a single prohibited tree into "any tree," which invites the woman to correct an exaggeration and, in doing so, to begin negotiating the command's actual boundary.
Genesis 3:2–3 — "The woman said to the serpent, 'We may eat fruit from the trees of the garden, but not the fruit of the tree which is in the middle of the garden. God has said, "You shall not eat of it, neither shall you touch it, lest you die."'" (WEB)
Genesis 3:4–5 — "The serpent said to the woman, 'You won't surely die, for God knows that in the day you eat it, your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.'" (WEB)
The serpent's second move directly contradicts God's stated consequence and recasts obedience as God withholding something good rather than protecting something good.
Genesis 3:6 — "When the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took some of its fruit, and ate; and she gave some to her husband with her, and he ate it, too." (WEB)
Two things are worth noting for this lecture's purposes rather than for a full doctrine of sin, which belongs elsewhere in the curriculum. First, the text presents the choice as genuinely a choice — the woman deliberates, weighs the fruit's apparent goods, and acts; nothing in the narrative removes her agency or makes the outcome mechanically necessary. Second, the text does not explain why God permitted the possibility of this choice at all; it simply narrates that the possibility existed and was exercised wrongly. That silence is not evasion — it is exactly the kind of question a free will defense is built to answer at the level of possibility, without claiming to know God's actual reasons in full, which remain God's to disclose or not.
6. Romans 8:28 — a claim to hold carefully
Romans 8:28 — "We know that all things work together for good for those who love God, to those who are called according to his purpose." (WEB)
This verse is easy to misuse in exactly the direction this lecture has been warning against. It does not say that every individual evil is, considered by itself, good, or that its purpose will always be visible to the sufferer. Read in context, Paul is making a claim about God's sovereign faithfulness across the whole arc of a believer's life — closer to a promise that evil will not have the final word than to a claim that each evil, examined on its own, secretly is not evil at all. Care with this verse matters pastorally as well as exegetically, and 8-3 returns to why.
6. Further Reading
- Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Eerdmans, 1974).
- Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford University Press, 1974), ch. 9.
- J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God (Oxford University Press, 1982).
- Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger, Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2013), ch. 6.
- Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed., The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana University Press, 1996), introduction.
In short
- The logical problem of evil, traditionally linked to Epicurus, claims that an all-powerful, all-good God and the existence of evil cannot both be true. If so, theism would be necessarily false.
- A real logical contradiction must show that no possible situation allows all the claims to be true together. The hidden assumption is that a good God would remove every evil he can.
- Alvin Plantinga's free will defense says it is possible that God could not create free creatures who love, without allowing the possibility of wrongdoing. Only a possible scenario is needed to answer a charge of contradiction.
- A defense shows no contradiction. A theodicy tries to give God's actual reason. Many philosophers, including J. L. Mackie, granted that the free will defense answers the logical problem.
- Only the logical problem is answered. The evidential question, how likely God is given the evil we see, remains open (8-2). Romans 8:28 must be read with care.
Topic: The logical problem of evil, Epicurus's classic form of it, and Plantinga's free will defense as an answer to it.
Remember: A defense needs only a possible scenario to show that God and evil are not logically contradictory. It does not claim to know God's actual reasons.
Caution: Do not conclude that the problem of evil is solved. Only the logical version is answered, and the harder question of how much evil there is remains.
One line to carry into ministry: Do not use Romans 8:28 as a quick fix. Hold it as a promise that evil will not have the last word.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Epicurus's dilemma presents four options as exhaustive. Plantinga's defense does not deny any of the four premises directly — so where exactly does his argument find room to answer the dilemma?
- Why is it enough, for Plantinga's purposes, that transworld depravity be merely *possible* rather than actually true? What would change if his argument needed to establish that it is actually true?
- A friend says to you, "If God can't stop evil, he's not really all-powerful, and if he could but won't, he's not really good — so which is it?" Using only what this lecture covers, how would you respond in your own words, being careful not to overclaim?
- What is lost, philosophically or pastorally, in treating a *defense* as though it were a *theodicy* — that is, telling a suffering person "here is God's actual reason" when what you actually have is only "here is a possible reason"?
- Read Genesis 3:1–6 again. What does the narrative include, and what does it deliberately leave unexplained, about why God permitted this choice to be possible?