Lecture 8-2: The Evidential Problem of Evil
Contents 37
- Lecture 1-1: The Meaning and Mandate of Apologetics
- Lecture 1-2: Faith and Reason Across Church History
- Lecture 1-3: The Apologist's Character
- Lecture 2-1: What Is Truth?
- Lecture 2-2: Revelation and Reason
- Lecture 2-3: The Postmodern Challenge to Truth
- Lecture 3-1: Classical Apologetics
- Lecture 3-2: Evidential Apologetics
- Lecture 3-3: Presuppositional Apologetics
- Lecture 3-4: Reformed Epistemology
- Lecture 4-1: The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- Lecture 4-2: The Teleological Argument (Fine-Tuning)
- Lecture 4-3: The Moral Argument
- Lecture 4-4: Objections and Responses
- Lecture 5-1: How the Canon Formed
- Lecture 5-2: Manuscript Evidence and Textual Criticism
- Lecture 5-3: Archaeology and Historical Corroboration
- Lecture 6-1: The Quest for the Historical Jesus
- Lecture 6-2: Jesus's Self-Understanding
- Lecture 6-3: Lewis's Trilemma and Its Critics
- Lecture 7-1: The Death of Jesus
- Lecture 7-2: The Minimal Facts Approach
- Lecture 7-3: Alternative Theories and Their Failure
- Lecture 8-1: The Logical Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-2: The Evidential Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-3: The Cross as God's Answer
- Lecture 9-1: Four Models for Relating Science and Faith
- Lecture 9-2: The Spectrum of Christian Views on Origins
- Lecture 9-3: Design Arguments and Their Scientific Critics
- Lecture 10-1: Religious Pluralism's Philosophical Claims
- Lecture 10-2: Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism Compared
- Lecture 10-3: The New Atheism and Secular Objections
- Lecture 10-4: Engaging Other Religions and Worldviews Respectfully
The last lecture ended by drawing a careful line: most philosophers, believer and unbeliever alike, now agree that the mere existence of evil does not make theism logically self-contradictory. But that agreement leaves the harder question untouched. Even if theism is possible given evil, is it still probable given the specific evil we actually observe — including suffering that seems to serve no purpose anyone can identify, that falls on the innocent, that is prolonged, and that (in the case of animal suffering) occurs where no soul-building or moral choice is even available? This is the evidential problem of evil, and it is a different, harder objection than the one 8-1 addressed.
This lecture presents its sharpest contemporary form, developed by the philosopher William Rowe, and then presents two live Christian responses to it — skeptical theism and John Hick's soul-making theodicy — as a genuine, ongoing disagreement among believing philosophers, not a settled matter with one correct answer and one straw man.
What these 21 minutes give you
- State William Rowe's evidential argument from evil, including his concept of "gratuitous" or "pointless" suffering and why it is offered as evidence rather than as proof.
- Explain skeptical theism's reply (our inability to see a purpose is not evidence there is none) and identify its own most common criticism.
- Explain John Hick's soul-making theodicy and how it differs in structure and aim from Plantinga's free will defense in 8-1.
- Explain why this lecture treats skeptical theism and soul-making theodicy as two live options within Christian philosophy rather than declaring one the winner.
Job 38:1–4 and Isaiah 55:8–9, read together as the Old Testament's own most direct engagement with the limits of human understanding in the face of unexplained suffering — cited in full below.
1. From logical to evidential: what changed
8-1 showed that evil does not make God's existence impossible. William Rowe's argument, first published in "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism" (1979), grants that point explicitly and moves the objection onto different ground. Rowe is not claiming a contradiction. He is making an evidential claim, structured roughly as follows:
- There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good, or permitting some equal or worse evil.
- An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent any such suffering it could prevent without losing a greater good.
- Therefore, there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
The premise doing the real work is (1), and Rowe's most famous illustration of it — sometimes called "Rowe's fawn" — is worth stating carefully because its force depends on its specifics: in some forest, a fawn is badly burned in a natural, humanly uncaused forest fire and lies in agony for days before dying, unseen by any person, its suffering witnessed and used by no one. Rowe's claim is not that we can prove this suffering served no greater purpose — that would overclaim, since we cannot inspect the entire causal and moral structure of the universe to check. His claim is weaker and, he argues, more damaging precisely because it is weaker: cases like this one make it reasonable to believe, even though not certain, that at least some suffering is genuinely gratuitous — serving no purpose that outweighs it — and that this counts as real evidence against theism, in the same way a large body of unexplained data counts as evidence against a scientific theory even without disproving it outright.
This is a point worth marking clearly. Rowe himself, notably, did not regard his own argument as a proof of atheism, and later in his career described his position as "friendly atheism" — the view that a theist can hold their belief rationally even while Rowe believes the evidence weighs against it. That is an unusually generous move for a philosopher making a case against a position, and it signals something about the kind of argument this is: cumulative and probabilistic, not a knockdown proof like a logical contradiction would be.
2. Skeptical theism
The response most widely associated with contemporary analytic philosophy of religion — developed by philosophers including Stephen Wykstra and William Alston — is called skeptical theism. Its core move targets Rowe's premise (1) directly, and it is best stated as a question about what we are actually entitled to infer from our own inability to see a reason.
Wykstra's version, sometimes called the "noseeum" argument (from "no-see-um," a colloquial name for a biting insect too small to spot), runs like this: our failure to discern a God-justifying reason for some instance of suffering is evidence there is no such reason only if, were such a reason to exist, we would be the kind of observers likely to discern it. But given the plausible gap between an infinite, omniscient mind's grasp of the full moral and causal structure of the world and a finite human mind's grasp of even a small slice of it, we have little reason to expect that we would discern God's reasons even if they exist. Not seeing a reason, in other words, is weak evidence there is no reason, in roughly the way a child's failure to see why a parent forbids something is weak evidence the parent has no good reason.
The standard criticism of skeptical theism, pressed forcefully within Christian philosophy itself (not only by atheist critics), is that it proves too much. If our moral perception is really that unreliable regarding God's reasons for permitting evil, some critics ask, what confidence can we have in any of our moral judgments about what God would or would not do — including the judgments that ground God "good" in the first place, or judgments used elsewhere in this course, such as the 's confidence that objective moral values exist and are knowable (4-3)? Skeptical theists have offered replies to this "proves too much" worry — typically by distinguishing our reliable grasp of broad moral categories (that gratuitous cruelty is wrong) from our unreliable grasp of God's specific reasons in any one case — but the objection has enough force that skeptical theism remains a genuinely contested position within Christian philosophy, not a settled consensus.
3. John Hick's soul-making theodicy
A different, older response comes from the philosopher and theologian John Hick, developed most fully in Evil and the God of Love (1966). Where skeptical theism argues we cannot know God's reasons, Hick's soul-making offers a positive candidate reason, drawing on a tradition Hick traced back to the early church father Irenaeus rather than to Augustine.
Hick's argument begins from a claim about what kind of world would actually be suited to producing the sort of moral and spiritual character Christianity holds up as the goal of human life — courage, compassion, patience, faith exercised under real uncertainty rather than none. A world engineered so that no real risk, no real difficulty, and no real cost ever attached to virtue, Hick argues, could produce at best a shallow, untested goodness — creatures who are harmless because nothing ever threatened them, not creatures who are good because they chose good under real pressure. "Soul-making," on this view, requires an environment with genuine epistemic distance from God (so that faith is a real act rather than a forced conclusion) and genuine hardship (so that virtue is exercised rather than merely possessed). Suffering, on this account, is not gratuitous even when its particular purpose is invisible to us, because its general purpose — the only kind of environment in which souls of the relevant sort could be made — is visible in outline, even if no single instance of suffering can be individually justified.
Hick's theodicy faces its own serious objections, which a fair presentation has to include. First, it struggles with suffering that appears to destroy rather than build character — a person crushed rather than strengthened by trauma, a child who dies too young for any soul-making to occur at all. Second, it struggles with the sheer scale and distribution of suffering: even granting that some difficulty is necessary for growth, why this much, and why so unevenly, with some lives receiving far more than any soul-making purpose seems to require and others (by ordinary standards) almost none? Hick's own answer leans on an eschatological hope — that the process of soul-making is not completed in this life and that no soul is ultimately lost to unredeemed suffering — a move that some Christian philosophers find theologically underdeveloped and that itself moves outside the paper's narrower philosophical argument into a claim about universal final salvation Hick held that most of the Christian tradition, across Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant lines, does not share.
4. Holding the disagreement honestly
Two ways to answer
This is a point where readers will not agree. Skeptical theism and soul-making theodicy are not variations on the same idea; they are structurally different strategies, and thoughtful Christian philosophers who share every other commitment in this course divide over which is the more adequate response to Rowe. Skeptical theism's strength is philosophical modesty — it claims only what it needs to claim, and does not pretend to know what it does not know. Its weakness, as noted above, is the worry that the same modesty undercuts our confidence in other things we want to affirm about God's character. Soul-making theodicy's strength is that it offers a substantive, positive account rather than only a rebuttal — something a suffering person can actually be told. Its weakness is that the account strains, sometimes visibly, against cases of suffering that look less like refinement than destruction.
This course does not resolve the disagreement, and a claim that it does would itself be a further instance of the trap named in Chapter 1: elegance — picking the one answer that ties the argument up neatly — is a warning sign more often than a discovery. What both positions share, and what genuinely does answer Rowe's argument at least in part, is the recognition from 8-1 that a possible justifying reason is compatible with the reason being entirely invisible to us — the difference between them is whether that invisibility is the whole answer (skeptical theism) or whether a candidate reason can still be named in outline (soul-making).
5. Job 38 and Isaiah 55 — Scripture's own answer to the demand for an explanation
It is worth noticing, before moving to 8-3, that the book of Job stages something very close to this debate almost three thousand years before Rowe and Wykstra. Job's friends offer confident, tidy theodicies — Job must be suffering because of hidden sin — and the book's own verdict on those friends, delivered later in the same book, is that they spoke wrongly of God. When God finally answers Job, the answer is not a theodicy at all — not an explanation of why Job suffered.
Job 38:1–2 — "Then Yahweh answered Job out of the whirlwind, 'Who is this who darkens counsel by words without knowledge?'" (World English Bible)
Job 38:3–4 — "'Brace yourself like a man, for I will question you, then you answer me! Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth? Declare, if you have understanding.'" (WEB)
God's response to Job is a series of questions establishing the vast gap between Job's finite vantage point and the scope of what God actually holds together — closer in shape to skeptical theism's argument than to a soul-making explanation, though the book of Job predates both by millennia and should not be read as endorsing either modern position as such. What the book does not do is give Job the reason for his suffering (the reader knows it, from chapters 1–2, but Job himself is never told). And yet the book does not end there either — Job is restored, and the narrative's final judgment is that Job, unlike his friends, "spoke rightly" of God, even in his complaints. This is worth pausing on: the book of Job commends honest lament over confident explanation.
Isaiah 55:8–9 — "'For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways,' says Yahweh. 'For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.'" (WEB)
Used carefully, this passage is not a blank check to dismiss every hard question with "God's ways are mysterious" — that move, applied indiscriminately, would make theism unfalsifiable in an unhealthy way, and a course that has spent three chapters insisting on evidence and argument should not reach for it as an escape hatch here. Its actual force is narrower and closer to Wykstra's point: it names a real, structural gap between infinite and finite understanding, which is exactly the premise skeptical theism needs — and which soul-making theodicy also implicitly relies on, since it too admits it cannot justify every individual instance, only the general shape of the environment.
6. Further Reading
- William L. Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1979): 335–341.
- Stephen J. Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance,'" International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): 73–93.
- John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, rev. ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010 [1966]).
- Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed., The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana University Press, 1996).
- Michael Bergmann, "Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument from Evil," Noûs 35, no. 2 (2001): 278–296.
In short
- William Rowe's evidential argument grants that evil does not make God impossible. It claims that some suffering, such as a fawn dying alone in a forest fire, seems pointless, and this counts as evidence against God. Rowe called himself a "friendly atheist."
- Skeptical theism (Stephen Wykstra, William Alston) replies that failing to see a reason is weak evidence there is none, because finite minds would not expect to grasp God's reasons.
- Critics, including Christian philosophers, say skeptical theism proves too much, since it may weaken our confidence in other moral judgments about God.
- John Hick's soul-making theodicy offers a positive reason: a world with real hardship and distance from God is needed to form real character. It struggles with suffering that destroys, and with how much suffering there is.
- Job 38:1-4 and Isaiah 55:8-9 show a gap between God's understanding and ours. The lecture does not name a winner between the two replies.
Topic: Rowe's evidential argument from evil and two Christian replies, skeptical theism and Hick's soul-making theodicy.
Remember: The evidential problem is about probability, not contradiction. Thoughtful Christian philosophers disagree on whether to answer it by admitting what we cannot see or by naming a possible purpose.
Caution: Isaiah 55:8-9 is not a blank check to wave away hard questions with "God's ways are mysterious." Hick's hope for universal salvation is not shared by most of the tradition.
One line to carry into ministry: Job's book praises honest lament over confident explanation, so let sufferers speak honestly instead of handing them a tidy theory.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Why does Rowe describe his argument as offering *evidence* against theism rather than a *proof*? What difference does that distinction make to how a Christian should respond to it?
- State the "noseeum" argument in your own words. What would have to be true about human and divine cognition for the argument to work, and is that assumption plausible?
- The lecture raises the objection that skeptical theism "proves too much." Try to state that objection more fully than the lecture did, and then try to state the skeptical theist's best reply.
- Hick's soul-making theodicy explains suffering that builds character better than it explains suffering that seems only to destroy. Pick a real or hypothetical case of the second kind and evaluate how well Hick's own reply (an eschatological hope beyond this life) addresses it.
- Job is never told, within the book, why he suffered — yet the book presents Job as having "spoken rightly" of God. What does that suggest about the relationship between having an intellectually satisfying answer and responding well to suffering? (Hold this question; 8-3 returns to it directly.)