Lecture 3-2: Evidential Apologetics
Contents 37
- Lecture 1-1: The Meaning and Mandate of Apologetics
- Lecture 1-2: Faith and Reason Across Church History
- Lecture 1-3: The Apologist's Character
- Lecture 2-1: What Is Truth?
- Lecture 2-2: Revelation and Reason
- Lecture 2-3: The Postmodern Challenge to Truth
- Lecture 3-1: Classical Apologetics
- Lecture 3-2: Evidential Apologetics
- Lecture 3-3: Presuppositional Apologetics
- Lecture 3-4: Reformed Epistemology
- Lecture 4-1: The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- Lecture 4-2: The Teleological Argument (Fine-Tuning)
- Lecture 4-3: The Moral Argument
- Lecture 4-4: Objections and Responses
- Lecture 5-1: How the Canon Formed
- Lecture 5-2: Manuscript Evidence and Textual Criticism
- Lecture 5-3: Archaeology and Historical Corroboration
- Lecture 6-1: The Quest for the Historical Jesus
- Lecture 6-2: Jesus's Self-Understanding
- Lecture 6-3: Lewis's Trilemma and Its Critics
- Lecture 7-1: The Death of Jesus
- Lecture 7-2: The Minimal Facts Approach
- Lecture 7-3: Alternative Theories and Their Failure
- Lecture 8-1: The Logical Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-2: The Evidential Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-3: The Cross as God's Answer
- Lecture 9-1: Four Models for Relating Science and Faith
- Lecture 9-2: The Spectrum of Christian Views on Origins
- Lecture 9-3: Design Arguments and Their Scientific Critics
- Lecture 10-1: Religious Pluralism's Philosophical Claims
- Lecture 10-2: Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism Compared
- Lecture 10-3: The New Atheism and Secular Objections
- Lecture 10-4: Engaging Other Religions and Worldviews Respectfully
The previous lecture described a method that insists on two careful steps in order: theism first, then Christianity. Evidential apologetics asks a pointed question about that order: why wait? If the historical evidence for Jesus's resurrection is strong enough to stand on its own, an apologist does not need to first win a separate philosophical argument that some god or other exists. The resurrection, argued well, is itself evidence both that God exists and that Christianity is true - one case, not two.
This is the evidential method: a one-step, cumulative-case approach that builds directly from historical and empirical evidence, especially the resurrection, without requiring bare theism to be established first as a separate prior stage. John Warwick Montgomery, a lawyer and theologian, argued through the second half of the twentieth century that the resurrection should be examined by the ordinary rules of historical and legal evidence, the same rules used to evaluate any other claimed event from the ancient world. Gary Habermas has spent much of his career doing exactly that at length, cataloguing and weighing the historical data for Jesus's resurrection - work this course returns to directly in chapter 7's "minimal facts" approach, which Habermas also pioneered.
What these 15 minutes give you
- Explain the "one-step, cumulative-case" structure of evidential apologetics and how it differs from classical apologetics' two-step order.
- Describe why the resurrection functions, on this method, as evidence for both God's existence and Christianity's truth at once, rather than as a second-stage argument built on a prior case for theism.
- Explain the difference between deductive certainty and inductive probability, and why evidentialists are content to argue inductively.
- Name Montgomery and Habermas as representative evidentialists and state, in outline, what each contributed to the method.
Now faith is assurance of things hoped for, proof of things not seen.
To these he also showed himself alive after he suffered, by many proofs, appearing to them over a period of forty days, and speaking about God's Kingdom.
Hebrews 11:1 (World English Bible)
This verse is sometimes misread by critics of evidential apologetics as proof that biblical faith has nothing to do with evidence - "things not seen," taken to mean things without grounds. The Greek word rendered "assurance" here (hypostasis) carries a stronger sense than a mere feeling of confidence; it points toward something with real substance or standing under it. Read this way, the verse does not oppose faith to evidence so much as describe faith as well-founded confidence about realities that are not, themselves, currently visible - which is compatible with, rather than opposed to, an evidentialist's claim that this confidence can be reasonably grounded in things that were seen and can still be historically investigated, chiefly the events surrounding Jesus's resurrection.
Acts 1:3 (WEB)
Luke's own vocabulary here matters for this lecture specifically: "many proofs" (tekmēriois in the Greek, a term used in ancient rhetoric and law for the strongest class of evidence, not a loose synonym for "hints") describes a resurrected Christ demonstrated to his followers across an extended forty-day period, not a single ambiguous appearance. Luke is not asking his readers to take the resurrection on bare assertion; he is describing repeated, extended evidence to his followers, over time - precisely the kind of claim evidential apologetics argues can be investigated using the ordinary tools of historical inquiry.
1. One step, not two
Where classical apologetics insists on establishing theism first and Christianity second, evidential apologetics collapses the two steps into one. The evidentialist's claim is that the historical evidence surrounding Jesus - above all the resurrection - is strong enough, examined on its own terms, to establish both that a God exists who acts in history and that this specific set of Christian claims about Jesus is true. There is no need, on this view, to win a separate debate about the before the resurrection can count as evidence; if a dead man was credibly raised, that fact alone already implies a being with power over death, which does most of the work classical apologetics assigns to step one, while simultaneously supplying the specifically Christian content classical apologetics assigns to step two.
This does not mean evidentialists reject the theistic arguments of chapter 4 as false or worthless - many evidential apologists use them as supporting evidence within a larger cumulative case. The difference is architectural: those arguments are treated as contributing weight to one integrated case, not as a separate, logically prior stage that must be secured before historical evidence can be introduced.
2. Cumulative case: many strands, one rope
"Cumulative case" is the method's own name for how its evidence functions together. No single piece of evidence - the empty tomb alone, or the disciples' transformed willingness to suffer alone, or the early creed Paul quotes in 1 Corinthians 15 alone - is treated as a knockdown proof by itself. Each piece, examined honestly, might in isolation admit of some alternative explanation. The evidential claim is that the combination, several independent strands converging on the same conclusion, is considerably stronger than any one strand alone - closer to a rope made of many fibers than to a chain that snaps if any single link fails. Chapter 7 works through exactly this kind of cumulative case for the resurrection in detail; this lecture only names the method, without repeating that argument here.
3. Montgomery: evidence by the court's own rules
John Warwick Montgomery, trained as both a historian and a lawyer, made the case through the 1960s and beyond that the resurrection should be tried by the same evidentiary standards used for any other historical claim, or indeed in an actual court of law: the reliability of the witnesses, the proximity of the sources to the events, the absence of a credible motive to fabricate, and the coherence of the testimony under the kind of scrutiny cross-examination provides. His well-known argument sets out the case in stages roughly like this: the New Testament documents are reliable historical sources by ordinary standards of (chapter 5 covers this ground independently); those documents record Jesus's own unambiguous claims to deity and predictions of his own resurrection; those documents also record that this predicted resurrection did, in fact, occur, attested by numerous witnesses; therefore Jesus's claims about himself carry the weight of a divine attestation, since God does not raise false claimants from the dead. Montgomery's contribution was less any single new argument than the discipline of treating the resurrection as an ordinary - if extraordinary in its content - historical and legal question, answerable by evidence rather than dismissed in advance as the kind of thing evidence cannot address.
4. Habermas: the evidence, catalogued and weighed
Gary Habermas has devoted much of a long academic career to doing, at scale, what Montgomery argued should be done: gathering and evaluating the historical data surrounding Jesus's death and reported resurrection appearances, including a large-scale survey of scholarly literature - across a wide range of theological starting points, not only conservative Christian ones - to identify which specific facts about the resurrection are granted by the great majority of scholars who study the subject. That "minimal facts" method, developed further with Mike Licona, is covered fully in chapter 7; this chapter simply notes that it belongs squarely within the evidential tradition this lecture describes: it starts directly from historical data, aims to persuade without requiring the audience to have first accepted a separate philosophical argument for theism, and is content with an inductive rather than a deductive conclusion.
5. Inductive probability, not deductive certainty
This last point deserves its own attention because it distinguishes evidential apologetics' logical shape from a mathematical proof. A deductive argument, if its premises are true and its logic valid, guarantees its conclusion - there is no room left for the conclusion to be false. An inductive argument, by contrast, moves from evidence to a conclusion that is probable, sometimes highly probable, but not logically guaranteed; new evidence could in principle shift the conclusion. Evidential apologists are explicit and unembarrassed about arguing inductively: they claim that the resurrection is the best explanation of the available historical data, not that it is logically inescapable from that data the way a mathematical theorem is inescapable from its axioms. This is also why chapter 7 treats rival explanations - the swoon theory, the hallucination theory, and others - at length: an inductive, best-explanation argument has to show that its explanation beats real rivals, not merely that a rival explanation is imaginable.
Is probability enough?
This is a point where readers will not agree. Some apologists - both classical and presuppositional - regard evidential apologetics' willingness to rest an entire case on historical probability as its central weakness: probability, however high, is not the same as certainty, and a skeptic can always, in principle, hold out for more evidence. Evidentialists reply that this expectation is misplaced for any historical claim whatsoever - no event in ancient history, including events no one seriously disputes, is known with strict deductive certainty, so holding the resurrection to a stricter standard than ordinary historical inquiry uses elsewhere is not fairness but a moving goalpost. This course leaves that exchange open rather than adjudicating it.
6. Further Reading
- Gary R. Habermas and Michael R. Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Kregel Publications, 2004).
- John Warwick Montgomery, History and Christianity (Bethany House, 1986 reprint).
- Craig L. Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, 2nd edition (IVP Academic, 2007).
- N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Fortress Press, 2003).
- Steven B. Cowan, ed., Five Views on Apologetics (Zondervan, 2000).
In short
- Evidential apologetics is a one-step, cumulative-case method. The resurrection, argued from history, is evidence both that God exists and that Christianity is true.
- Evidentialists do not reject the theistic arguments of chapter 4. They treat them as adding weight to one case, not as a separate first stage.
- A cumulative case works like a rope of many fibers. No single strand is a knockdown proof, but several strands pointing the same way are stronger together.
- John Warwick Montgomery argued that the resurrection should be tested by ordinary historical and legal standards. Gary Habermas catalogued and weighed the historical data, including a "minimal facts" approach.
- The argument is inductive: it gives a best explanation, not a guaranteed conclusion. Some critics call this a weakness, while evidentialists say no ancient event has deductive certainty.
Topic: This lecture explains evidential apologetics, which builds one cumulative historical case for the resurrection, as shown by Montgomery and Habermas.
Remember: Evidentialists argue that the resurrection is the best explanation of the historical data, and that one combined case does the work of both classical steps.
Caution: The case is probable, not logically certain. The lecture leaves open whether that standard is a weakness or a fair standard for history.
One line to carry into ministry: Be honest that historical arguments give strong reasons, not mathematical proof, and let the evidence work as a whole.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- How does evidential apologetics' "one step" differ from classical apologetics' "two steps"? Why might a working apologist prefer one order over the other in a particular conversation?
- Hebrews 11:1 uses a word ("assurance," *hypostasis*) that suggests something with real substance underneath it. How does this reading change, or not change, the common idea that "faith" and "evidence" are opposites?
- Acts 1:3 describes "many proofs" over "forty days" rather than a single brief appearance. Why might that detail matter for an evidential case specifically?
- Explain in your own words the difference between an inductive "best explanation" argument and a deductive proof. Is it a weakness that evidential apologetics settles for the former, or simply honest about what historical argument can deliver?
- The lecture compares a cumulative case to "a rope made of many fibers" rather than "a chain." What is the difference, and why does it matter for how a single weak piece of evidence should be handled?