Lecture 4-3: The Moral Argument
Contents 37
- Lecture 1-1: The Meaning and Mandate of Apologetics
- Lecture 1-2: Faith and Reason Across Church History
- Lecture 1-3: The Apologist's Character
- Lecture 2-1: What Is Truth?
- Lecture 2-2: Revelation and Reason
- Lecture 2-3: The Postmodern Challenge to Truth
- Lecture 3-1: Classical Apologetics
- Lecture 3-2: Evidential Apologetics
- Lecture 3-3: Presuppositional Apologetics
- Lecture 3-4: Reformed Epistemology
- Lecture 4-1: The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- Lecture 4-2: The Teleological Argument (Fine-Tuning)
- Lecture 4-3: The Moral Argument
- Lecture 4-4: Objections and Responses
- Lecture 5-1: How the Canon Formed
- Lecture 5-2: Manuscript Evidence and Textual Criticism
- Lecture 5-3: Archaeology and Historical Corroboration
- Lecture 6-1: The Quest for the Historical Jesus
- Lecture 6-2: Jesus's Self-Understanding
- Lecture 6-3: Lewis's Trilemma and Its Critics
- Lecture 7-1: The Death of Jesus
- Lecture 7-2: The Minimal Facts Approach
- Lecture 7-3: Alternative Theories and Their Failure
- Lecture 8-1: The Logical Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-2: The Evidential Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-3: The Cross as God's Answer
- Lecture 9-1: Four Models for Relating Science and Faith
- Lecture 9-2: The Spectrum of Christian Views on Origins
- Lecture 9-3: Design Arguments and Their Scientific Critics
- Lecture 10-1: Religious Pluralism's Philosophical Claims
- Lecture 10-2: Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism Compared
- Lecture 10-3: The New Atheism and Secular Objections
- Lecture 10-4: Engaging Other Religions and Worldviews Respectfully
The first two arguments in this chapter reasoned from the physical universe - its beginning, its finely tuned constants - toward a cause with certain properties. This lecture reasons from something much closer to everyday experience: the fact that people everywhere, across radically different cultures, treat some things as genuinely right and others as genuinely wrong, and act as though this is a discovery about reality rather than merely a personal preference or a social convention. The moral argument asks what best explains that fact.
The argument has a long history, but its most widely read popular statement is C.S. Lewis's opening chapters of Mere Christianity, and this lecture builds around Lewis's presentation before setting it in more formal terms and addressing its oldest and sharpest philosophical objection, the Euthyphro dilemma.
What these 19 minutes give you
- State the moral argument in standard form: objective moral values and duties exist; objective moral values and duties are best explained by a transcendent moral lawgiver; therefore a transcendent moral lawgiver exists.
- Summarize C.S. Lewis's argument in *Mere Christianity* for a "Law of Human Nature" that people know and regularly fail to keep, and explain what Lewis takes this to show.
- State the Euthyphro dilemma fairly, in both its ancient and its modern forms, and explain the classical theist response that God's own unchanging nature, rather than his arbitrary will, is what grounds the good.
- Connect Romans 2:14-15's language of a law "written in their hearts" to the argument's first premise, and explain what that passage does and does not claim.
(for when Gentiles who don't have the law do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are a law to themselves, in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience testifying with them, and their thoughts among themselves accusing or else excusing them)
He has shown you, O man, what is good. What does Yahweh require of you, but to act justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with your God?
Romans 2:14-15 (World English Bible)
Paul is describing Gentiles who never received the Mosaic law and yet act, at least sometimes, in ways that align with it - evidence, he argues, that some moral knowledge is available to every person, "written" on the heart rather than delivered only through Israel's specific revelation. This is close to, but not identical with, the 's first premise: Paul is making a theological claim about universal moral awareness and accountability, while the philosophical argument in this lecture will argue for objective moral facts on independent grounds and only afterward note that Paul's picture fits naturally with the conclusion.
Micah 6:8 (WEB)
Micah assumes that "what is good" is something that can be shown and known, not invented - a settled content available to "man" in general, not a private construction each person builds for themselves. The specific triad the verse names - justice, mercy, and humility before God - anticipates a point this lecture makes about the moral argument's classical theist answer to the Euthyphro dilemma: goodness is not an arbitrary decree but is bound up with the character of God himself, in whom justice and mercy are not in competition.
1. Lewis's argument: the Law of Human Nature
C.S. Lewis opens Mere Christianity not with a doctrine but with an observation drawn from ordinary quarreling. People say things like "How'd you like it if anyone did the same to you?" or "That's my seat, I was there first" or "Give me a bit of your orange, I gave you a bit of mine" - and the person being addressed almost never replies "To hell with your standard." Instead, Lewis notices, they nearly always try to show that what they did does not actually break the standard, or that there was a special excuse this time. Both parties, in other words, appeal to some shared standard of fair behavior that they expect the other to recognize as binding - they argue about whether the standard was violated, not about whether there is a standard at all.
Lewis calls this shared standard the "Law of Human Nature" (or, in his sometimes more technical vocabulary, the Tao, borrowing the term in his later work The Abolition of Man to name the same cross-cultural moral core). Two observations follow, in his presentation. First, people everywhere seem to know this law, in broad outline, even when they disagree about specific applications - honesty, fairness, courage, and loyalty to one's group are recognized across wildly different cultures and eras, even though particular customs vary (Lewis specifically distinguishes moral disagreement about details from moral relativism about the whole, arguing that real disagreement about how a shared standard applies actually presupposes the standard, rather than disproving it). Second, and just as important for Lewis's larger argument in the book, everyone regularly fails to live up to the standard they themselves recognize - which he takes as evidence that morality is something people discover and are answerable to, not something they simply invent and can therefore adjust at will to excuse themselves.
Lewis's own next step - not part of the moral argument proper, but part of his larger case in Mere Christianity - is that this combination (a real law, and a universal, admitted failure to keep it) is itself significant: it points to something behind the universe that cares how we behave, and to a human need for rescue from that failure that mere effort cannot supply. This lecture focuses on the moral-argument portion of that reasoning; the fuller theological payoff belongs to systematic theology courses elsewhere in this school's curriculum.
2. The argument in standard form
Contemporary philosophers, including William Lane Craig, typically present the moral argument in a form close to this:
- If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
- Objective moral values and duties do exist.
- Therefore, God exists.
Objective and duty
Two terms need to be defined carefully. "Objective" here means true independent of what any individual person or culture believes or feels - if it is objectively true that torturing a child for entertainment is wrong, it would remain wrong even if every person on earth, or every culture throughout history, believed otherwise. This is distinct from moral values simply being widely shared or strongly felt; the claim is about a fact's status, not about how many people agree with it. "Moral duties" adds a further element beyond values: not just that some things are good or bad, but that people are actually obligated to pursue the good and avoid the bad - that morality makes a binding claim on behavior, not merely a description of what is admirable.
Premise two is defended largely by appeal to widely shared moral intuitions that are difficult to abandon even in the course of argument - most people, on reflection, are more confident that gratuitous cruelty to an innocent child is really wrong than they are confident in any philosophical argument that might be given for moral relativism or anti-realism. Premise one is the more contested premise, and it is defended by arguing that a purely naturalistic account of the universe - matter, energy, and their impersonal interactions, ungoverned by any transcendent purpose - has no obvious resource from which a binding moral obligation, rather than a mere descriptive fact about human psychology or evolutionary history, could arise. A transcendent, personal moral lawgiver, by contrast, is argued to supply exactly what a binding obligation requires: a person, with authority over creatures made by and for a purpose, whose own character sets the standard.
3. The Euthyphro dilemma, stated fairly
The oldest and sharpest objection to any theory grounding morality in God goes back to Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks whether something is pious because the gods love it, or whether the gods love it because it is pious. Applied to the moral argument, the dilemma runs: is an act good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is already good?
Both horns create a problem for theism, if left unanswered. If something is good only because God commands it - if God's bare will, with no further reason, makes an act right - then morality looks arbitrary: God could, in principle, have commanded cruelty, and cruelty would then have been good, which strikes nearly everyone, including most theists, as an unacceptable result. If, on the other hand, God commands something because it is already good - because goodness is a standard existing independently of God, which God merely recognizes and reports - then goodness turns out not to depend on God after all, and the moral argument's premise one (that God is what objective morality depends on) collapses.
4. The classical theist answer: God's nature, not God's will, grounds the good
The classical response, developed at length by philosophers including Robert Adams and William Alston, and consistent with older theological tradition running through Aquinas, rejects the dilemma's assumption that there are only two options. It offers a third: the good is grounded neither in God's arbitrary commands nor in a standard independent of and above God, but in God's own unchanging nature or character. On this view, God does not invent goodness by decree, and God does not consult an external moral law; rather, God's own nature - which is, among other things, essentially loving, just, and faithful - simply is the standard by which goodness is measured, in something like the way a perfect meter-standard, once it existed, would not be measured against some further external ruler but would simply be what "one meter" means.
On this account, God cannot arbitrarily command cruelty and have it become good, because commanding cruelty would be inconsistent with God's own essential, unchanging nature - it is not a live possibility any more than a triangle having four sides is a live possibility, given what a triangle is. And goodness is not independent of God, because on this view there simply is no standard of goodness floating free of any mind or nature at all; the good just is a description of God's own character, reflected imperfectly in creatures made in his image. This is the answer the moral argument, in its classical form, relies on, and it is worth stating carefully, since a student who only knows "God commands it, so it's good" has not yet met the strongest form of the theist position and will be caught by the dilemma's first horn in an actual conversation.
Is God's nature enough?
It is fair to note that this third option is itself debated among philosophers, including some theist philosophers, who worry that grounding goodness in God's "nature" merely relocates rather than resolves the difficulty (what makes God's nature good, rather than some other possible nature?). The classical answer to that further worry is that the question assumes goodness is a separate property being measured against God's nature, when the claim is instead an identity claim - that God's nature simply is what "goodness" refers to, the way "water" simply is what H₂O refers to rather than H₂O merely satisfying some independent definition of wateriness.
6. Further Reading
- C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (HarperOne, 2001; originally 1952), Book I.
- Mark D. Linville, "The Moral Argument," in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, edited by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
- Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1999).
- John E. Hare, The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God's Assistance (Oxford University Press, 1996).
- William Lane Craig and Erik J. Wielenberg, A Debate on God and Morality: What Is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties?, edited by Adam Lloyd Johnson (Routledge, 2021).
- Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford University Press, 2003).
In short
- C.S. Lewis starts from ordinary quarrels. People appeal to a shared standard, the "Law of Human Nature," and argue about whether it was broken. Everyone also fails to keep it.
- In standard form: if God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist; they do exist; so God exists. "Objective" means true whatever any person or culture believes.
- Premise two rests on strong intuitions, such as the wrongness of cruelty to an innocent child. Premise one is more contested, since a purely naturalistic account seems to lack a source for binding obligation.
- The Euthyphro dilemma asks whether something is good because God commands it, or God commands it because it is good. The first horn seems arbitrary; the second makes goodness independent of God.
- The classical answer, from Robert Adams and William Alston, grounds the good in God's unchanging nature. Some philosophers, including some theists, say this only moves the problem back.
Topic: This lecture presents the moral argument for God, through C.S. Lewis and the standard form, and answers the Euthyphro dilemma.
Remember: The argument claims that objective moral values and duties are best explained by a transcendent moral lawgiver, and that goodness is grounded in God's own unchanging nature.
Caution: Romans 2:14-15 makes a theological claim about universal moral awareness; it does not itself prove the philosophical premise. The "God's nature" answer is still debated.
One line to carry into ministry: Do not say only "it is good because God commands it"; explain that goodness reflects God's own loving, just and faithful character.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Lewis notices that people quarreling almost never deny that there is a shared standard - they argue about whether it was broken. Think of a recent disagreement you witnessed or took part in. Does it fit Lewis's pattern?
- State the difference between a moral value being "widely shared" and a moral value being "objective." Why does the moral argument specifically need the stronger claim?
- Restate the Euthyphro dilemma's two horns in your own words. Before reading this lecture's answer, which horn did you find more troubling, and why?
- The classical theist answer says goodness is identical with God's own nature, not measured against it. Does this fully answer the worry that God's nature could itself have been different? Explain your own assessment, including where you remain uncertain.
- Romans 2:14-15 says Gentiles without the Mosaic law still show "the work of the law written in their hearts." How is this claim different from - and how does it support - the moral argument's premise that objective moral values and duties exist?