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STEL1E Christian Apologetics

Lecture 10-3: The New Atheism and Secular Objections

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Contents 37
STEL1E Christian Apologetics
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What Apologetics Is, and Why It Matters
  1. Introduction: What Apologetics Is, and Why It Matters
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Foundations of Apologetics
  1. Lecture 1-1: The Meaning and Mandate of Apologetics
  2. Lecture 1-2: Faith and Reason Across Church History
  3. Lecture 1-3: The Apologist's Character
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: Truth, Reason, and Revelation
  1. Lecture 2-1: What Is Truth?
  2. Lecture 2-2: Revelation and Reason
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Postmodern Challenge to Truth
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: Four Approaches to Defending the Faith
  1. Lecture 3-1: Classical Apologetics
  2. Lecture 3-2: Evidential Apologetics
  3. Lecture 3-3: Presuppositional Apologetics
  4. Lecture 3-4: Reformed Epistemology
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: Arguments for God's Existence
  1. Lecture 4-1: The Kalam Cosmological Argument
  2. Lecture 4-2: The Teleological Argument (Fine-Tuning)
  3. Lecture 4-3: The Moral Argument
  4. Lecture 4-4: Objections and Responses
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: The Reliability of Scripture
  1. Lecture 5-1: How the Canon Formed
  2. Lecture 5-2: Manuscript Evidence and Textual Criticism
  3. Lecture 5-3: Archaeology and Historical Corroboration
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: Jesus Christ — History and Identity
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Quest for the Historical Jesus
  2. Lecture 6-2: Jesus's Self-Understanding
  3. Lecture 6-3: Lewis's Trilemma and Its Critics
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: The Resurrection
  1. Lecture 7-1: The Death of Jesus
  2. Lecture 7-2: The Minimal Facts Approach
  3. Lecture 7-3: Alternative Theories and Their Failure
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: The Problem of Evil and Suffering
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Logical Problem of Evil
  2. Lecture 8-2: The Evidential Problem of Evil
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Cross as God's Answer
Chapter 9 · Chapter 9: Science and Faith
  1. Lecture 9-1: Four Models for Relating Science and Faith
  2. Lecture 9-2: The Spectrum of Christian Views on Origins
  3. Lecture 9-3: Design Arguments and Their Scientific Critics
Chapter 10 · Chapter 10: World Religions and a Secular Age
  1. Lecture 10-1: Religious Pluralism's Philosophical Claims
  2. Lecture 10-2: Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism Compared
  3. Lecture 10-3: The New Atheism and Secular Objections
  4. Lecture 10-4: Engaging Other Religions and Worldviews Respectfully
Chapter 11 · Chapter 11: Cultural Apologetics and the Apologetic Life
  1. Lecture 11-1: Cultural Apologetics - Story, Art, and Imagination
  2. Lecture 11-2: Identity, Meaning, and the Secular Age
  3. Lecture 11-3: Conclusion - The Apologetic Life

Jump to the key points ↓

19 min

The "new atheism" is the name commonly given to a wave of bestselling, deliberately confrontational atheist writing that began in the mid-2000s, led chiefly by the biologist Richard Dawkins (The God Delusion, 2006) and the essayist and journalist Christopher Hitchens (God Is Not Great, 2007), alongside the philosopher Daniel Dennett and the neuroscientist Sam Harris. What distinguished this movement from earlier academic atheism was less its arguments, most of which have older philosophical roots, than its tone and its audience: these were popular, widely read books that treated religious belief not merely as mistaken but as actively harmful, and argued for saying so publicly and without the usual social deference to religious sensibility.

This lecture engages three arguments this movement pressed with particular force - the "who made God" regress objection, religion's historical association with violence, and the claim that natural explanation is now sufficient without remainder - on their strongest form, together with a distinct but related problem: the self-referential difficulty facing strict scientism, the claim that only scientifically verifiable statements are meaningful or true.

What these 19 minutes give you

  • State the "who made God" regress objection in its strongest form and explain the classical theist response to it.
  • State the religion-and-violence objection fairly, including genuine historical cases, and explain why the response to it requires more than simply pointing to secular atrocities.
  • State the claim that natural explanation is now sufficient without remainder, and explain the distinction between methodological and metaphysical naturalism that bears on it.
  • State the self-referential problem facing strict scientism and explain why it is a logical rather than merely a rhetorical objection.

The fool has said in his heart, “There is no God.” They are corrupt. They have done abominable works. There is no one who does good.

The fool has said in his heart, “There is no God.” They are corrupt, and have done abominable iniquity. There is no one who does good.

Psalms 14:1 (World English Bible)

This verse needs handling with real care, because it is easy to hear as a blanket personal insult toward atheists, which would be exactly the kind of straw-manning this course warns against throughout. Two things are worth noting from the text itself. First, "fool" (Hebrew nabal) in the Psalms is a moral and covenantal category more than an intellectual-capacity one - it describes someone who lives as though God's reality carries no practical claim on how they act, not someone incapable of clever argument; the new atheist writers, whatever else is true of them, are plainly not lacking in intelligence or rhetorical skill, and the psalm is not making that claim. Second, the psalm's immediate next line moves straight to corrupt behavior ("they have done abominable works"), suggesting the psalmist has in view a practical, lived denial of God's moral claims at least as much as a considered philosophical position - which is a different target than the sincere, often ethically serious atheist philosopher this lecture will engage on the merits of specific arguments.

Psalms 53:1 (WEB)

Psalm 53 restates Psalm 14 almost word for word, with small variations, later in the Psalter - itself a signal that the point being made was considered important enough to state twice. The same caution applies here as above: this lecture's task is to engage the strongest form of specific arguments made by specific thinkers, not to substitute a scriptural label for that engagement.

1. "Who made God?"

The regress objection, in its simplest popular form, runs: if everything needs a cause or an explanation, then God needs one too - and if God does not need one, why assume the universe does? Dawkins presses a more developed version of this in The God Delusion: any being complex and intelligent enough to design and create a universe like this one would itself have to be at least as complex as what it created, which means positing God as an explanation for the universe's order does not actually explain anything - it just pushes the very same problem back one step, to an even more complex, equally unexplained entity.

The classical theist response, already developed in chapter 4's treatment of the kalam , is that this objection misstates what theists actually claim causes require. The kalam argument's first premise is not "everything that exists has a cause," but "everything that begins to exist has a cause" - and has never held that God began to exist. On the classical account defended since Aquinas, God is not a very large, very complex being who happens to exist without a cause attached (which would indeed look like special pleading); God is, by definition and by philosophical argument, a metaphysically necessary, eternal, uncaused being - the kind of thing a causal chain has to terminate in rather than continue through, in the same way chapter 4's argument against an infinite causal regress already argued some terminus is philosophically required. Dawkins's complexity point has independent force worth taking seriously - it does press theists to explain why God, unlike the universe, should not be considered a complex entity in need of explanation - and philosophers of religion have written at length in response, generally arguing that the relevant notion of simplicity in classical theism concerns God's mode of existence (not composed of separable parts, not dependent on anything prior) rather than the informational complexity Dawkins has in mind when speaking of complex organisms. Whether that response fully satisfies the objection is itself debated among philosophers on both sides, and stating it honestly means not overclaiming a clean victory.

2. Religion and violence

Hitchens's central charge in God Is Not Great, captured in its subtitle ("How Religion Poisons Everything"), and pressed across the wider new atheist movement, is that religion has been a uniquely destructive historical force - citing, among other episodes, the , the Inquisition, European wars of religion, and contemporary religious terrorism. Taking this seriously means not minimizing the historical record: these episodes are real, well documented, and indefensible by any Christian standard, and a Christian apologist who simply denies or downplays them has failed the argument before it starts.

The response this lecture offers has two parts, and both matter. The first is comparative and historical rather than exculpatory: the twentieth century's most lethal ideologically driven violence - under Stalin's Soviet Union, Mao's China, and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, among others - was carried out by explicitly atheist, anti-religious regimes, at a human cost that by most historians' estimates exceeds the combined toll of the religious violence named above. This comparison does not excuse religious violence; it does show that removing religion does not, by itself, remove the human capacity for ideologically justified mass violence, which undercuts the specific claim that religion is a uniquely or primarily explanatory cause of large-scale atrocity. The second part is more internal to Christian self-examination: much of the violence committed in Christianity's name involved the fusion of religious authority with state political power in ways the New Testament itself does not endorse and, in places, explicitly opposes - Jesus's rebuke to Peter for drawing a sword in his defense ("all those who take the sword will die by the sword," Matthew 26:52) sits in real tension with later Christian violence carried out in his name, a tension serious Christian historians and theologians have written about at length rather than explained away. A fair engagement with this objection names both the historical reality Hitchens points to and the more complicated picture - comparative, historical, and internally self-critical - that a full accounting actually requires.

3. The sufficiency of natural explanation

A third, quieter but arguably more consequential claim runs through much new atheist writing: that natural, scientific explanation is now sufficient, in principle if not yet in every completed detail, to account for everything real, leaving no explanatory role for God to play - not as a conclusion science itself has reached, exactly, but as a confident extrapolation from science's long track record of successfully replacing supernatural explanations with natural ones.

This claim needs a distinction chapter 9 already introduced: methodological naturalism (the working assumption, within science specifically, that natural causes are what science investigates and natural explanations are what a scientific method can in principle discover) is a sound and widely shared operating principle, used by believing and unbelieving scientists alike, and nothing in this course disputes it. Metaphysical naturalism (the further claim that nothing beyond the natural, physical world exists at all) is a distinct philosophical position that does not follow automatically from methodological naturalism's success within science - a scientist can consistently believe that science, by its own working rules, only investigates natural causes, while also believing that natural causes are not the only kind of cause there is. The sufficiency claim, stated carefully, is really a claim that metaphysical naturalism has effectively been established by methodological naturalism's track record - and that further, larger step is a philosophical argument, not itself a scientific finding, open to philosophical evaluation rather than settled by pointing to science's success on its own more limited terms.

4. Scientism and its self-referential problem

Related to, but distinct from, the sufficiency claim is a stronger position sometimes explicit and sometimes only implicit in popular new atheist writing: scientism, the claim that only scientifically verifiable statements are meaningful or true - that anything not confirmable by scientific method (including much of ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics, along with all religious claims) is, strictly, meaningless or at best a matter of mere preference.

This specific claim faces a logical problem that has a well-known history: an earlier and more rigorously stated version of the same idea, the verification principle advanced by the logical positivist philosophers of the early twentieth century (notably associated with A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, 1936), held that a statement is meaningful only if it is either true by definition or empirically verifiable. Critics noticed almost immediately that the verification principle itself is neither true by definition nor empirically verifiable by any experiment - it is a philosophical claim about meaning, not a scientific finding - which means the principle fails its own test for meaningfulness. Logical positivism as a movement did not survive this objection intact; most philosophers, including many committed to a broadly naturalistic worldview, now regard strict verificationism as a failed project for exactly this reason. The same self-referential problem applies directly to scientism in its contemporary popular form: "only scientifically verifiable statements are meaningful or true" is itself a philosophical claim about the nature of truth and meaning, not a statement scientific method could verify or falsify by experiment - which means, by its own stated standard, the claim disqualifies itself.

This is a logical point, not a rhetorical one, and it is worth being precise about its scope. It does not show that science is untrustworthy, or that most scientific claims are false, or that religious claims are therefore true - none of that follows. What it shows is narrower: that the specific philosophical claim "only scientific statements are meaningful or true" cannot be true, because if it were, the sentence stating it would itself be meaningless by its own rule. Any honest account of knowledge has to make room for non-scientific but meaningful claims - including logical, mathematical, ethical, and metaphysical claims, and including the claim of scientism itself, stated as the philosophical position it actually is rather than as a finding of science.

The debate continues

This is a point where readers will not agree. Serious philosophers on both sides of this chapter's questions continue to debate how much work the classical theist response to the regress objection actually does, how the historical ledger on religious versus secular violence should properly be weighed, and how far methodological naturalism's success should be allowed to shift confidence toward metaphysical naturalism even without a further evaluation. This lecture states these as live, contested arguments because they are - not as arguments this course has already settled in advance of the evidence.

New atheism — three objections, engaged at their strongest Dawkins, Hitchens, and the scientism self-reference problem "Who made God?" Dawkins A complex designer needs explaining as much as the universe does Response: God is necessary, uncaused — not another contingent thing Religion and violence Hitchens Crusades, Inquisition, religious wars, terrorism are real and indefensible Response: secular ideologies also killed at comparable or greater scale Natural explanation suffices popular new atheism Science keeps replacing supernatural explanations with natural ones Response: methodological ≠ metaphysical naturalism Scientism's self-referential problem Claim: "Only scientifically verifiable statements are meaningful or true." Test: Is that claim itself scientifically verifiable? No — it is a philosophical claim about meaning. Result: by its own stated rule, the claim disqualifies itself as meaningful or true. Historical precedent: logical positivism's verification principle (A. J. Ayer, 1936) failed the same test and was abandoned by most philosophers for exactly this reason. Scope: this shows the claim is self-defeating, not that science is untrustworthy.

6. Further Reading

  • Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Houghton Mifflin, 2006).
  • Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (Twelve, 2007).
  • Alister McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath, The Dawkins Delusion? Atheist Fundamentalism and the Denial of the Divine (InterVarsity Press, 2007).
  • Keith Ward, Why There Almost Certainly Is a God: Doubting Dawkins (Lion Books, 2008).
  • Rodney Stark, For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witch-Hunts, and the End of Slavery (Princeton University Press, 2003).

In short

  • The "new atheism" is a wave of popular, confrontational books by Dawkins, Hitchens and others. It is known more for tone and audience than for new arguments.
  • To "who made God?", classical theism answers that God never began to exist. God is a necessary, uncaused being. Philosophers still debate whether this fully answers Dawkins's complexity point.
  • The lecture admits that Crusades-type violence is real and indefensible. It adds that atheist regimes also killed on a vast scale, and that much religious violence conflicts with the New Testament.
  • Methodological naturalism (science studies natural causes) is accepted. Metaphysical naturalism (nothing exists beyond nature) is a separate philosophical claim.
  • Scientism says only scientifically verifiable statements are meaningful. That claim cannot be verified scientifically, so it undermines itself, as the verification principle did.

Topic: This lecture answers three new atheist objections and the self-referential problem of scientism, at their strongest form.

Remember: The claim "only scientific statements are meaningful or true" is itself not a scientific statement, so by its own rule it cannot be true.

Caution: The scientism point does not show that science is untrustworthy or that religious claims are true. Philosophers still disagree about the regress answer, the violence ledger and naturalism.

One line to carry into ministry: Do not use Psalm 14:1 as an insult. Admit real religious wrongs, and meet atheist arguments at their strongest.

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Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • State Dawkins's "who made God" objection in your own words, and then state the classical theist response. Where do you think the strongest remaining tension lies?
  • Why does this lecture insist that pointing to secular atrocities is only part of a fair response to the religion-and-violence objection, not the whole response?
  • Explain the difference between methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism. Why does the distinction matter for evaluating the claim that natural explanation is now "sufficient"?
  • Walk through the self-referential problem facing scientism step by step. Why is this a logical objection rather than simply a matter of disagreeing with the claim's content?
  • Psalm 14:1 and Psalm 53:1 are easy to misuse as a blanket dismissal of atheists. How does this lecture try to use them more carefully, and do you think it succeeds?

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What next

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