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STEL1E Christian Apologetics

Lecture 3-4: Reformed Epistemology

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Contents 37
STEL1E Christian Apologetics
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What Apologetics Is, and Why It Matters
  1. Introduction: What Apologetics Is, and Why It Matters
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Foundations of Apologetics
  1. Lecture 1-1: The Meaning and Mandate of Apologetics
  2. Lecture 1-2: Faith and Reason Across Church History
  3. Lecture 1-3: The Apologist's Character
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: Truth, Reason, and Revelation
  1. Lecture 2-1: What Is Truth?
  2. Lecture 2-2: Revelation and Reason
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Postmodern Challenge to Truth
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: Four Approaches to Defending the Faith
  1. Lecture 3-1: Classical Apologetics
  2. Lecture 3-2: Evidential Apologetics
  3. Lecture 3-3: Presuppositional Apologetics
  4. Lecture 3-4: Reformed Epistemology
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: Arguments for God's Existence
  1. Lecture 4-1: The Kalam Cosmological Argument
  2. Lecture 4-2: The Teleological Argument (Fine-Tuning)
  3. Lecture 4-3: The Moral Argument
  4. Lecture 4-4: Objections and Responses
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: The Reliability of Scripture
  1. Lecture 5-1: How the Canon Formed
  2. Lecture 5-2: Manuscript Evidence and Textual Criticism
  3. Lecture 5-3: Archaeology and Historical Corroboration
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: Jesus Christ — History and Identity
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Quest for the Historical Jesus
  2. Lecture 6-2: Jesus's Self-Understanding
  3. Lecture 6-3: Lewis's Trilemma and Its Critics
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: The Resurrection
  1. Lecture 7-1: The Death of Jesus
  2. Lecture 7-2: The Minimal Facts Approach
  3. Lecture 7-3: Alternative Theories and Their Failure
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: The Problem of Evil and Suffering
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Logical Problem of Evil
  2. Lecture 8-2: The Evidential Problem of Evil
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Cross as God's Answer
Chapter 9 · Chapter 9: Science and Faith
  1. Lecture 9-1: Four Models for Relating Science and Faith
  2. Lecture 9-2: The Spectrum of Christian Views on Origins
  3. Lecture 9-3: Design Arguments and Their Scientific Critics
Chapter 10 · Chapter 10: World Religions and a Secular Age
  1. Lecture 10-1: Religious Pluralism's Philosophical Claims
  2. Lecture 10-2: Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism Compared
  3. Lecture 10-3: The New Atheism and Secular Objections
  4. Lecture 10-4: Engaging Other Religions and Worldviews Respectfully
Chapter 11 · Chapter 11: Cultural Apologetics and the Apologetic Life
  1. Lecture 11-1: Cultural Apologetics - Story, Art, and Imagination
  2. Lecture 11-2: Identity, Meaning, and the Secular Age
  3. Lecture 11-3: Conclusion - The Apologetic Life

Jump to the key points ↓

17 min

All three methods covered so far assume that belief in God needs an argument to be rational - they disagree about which argument, and about how many steps, but not about whether some argument is required. Reformed epistemology, developed chiefly by the philosopher Alvin Plantinga from the 1980s onward, challenges that shared assumption directly. Plantinga's claim is that belief in God can be properly basic - rationally held without first being inferred as the conclusion of any argument at all, in the same way ordinary, obviously rational beliefs like "the external world exists" or "my memory is generally reliable" or "other people have minds like mine" are held, without most people ever constructing an argument for them first.

This is not a claim that arguments for God are worthless - Plantinga himself has produced original work in natural theology, and nothing in Reformed epistemology forbids using the arguments covered in chapters 3 and 4. The claim is narrower and, in its own way, more radical: belief in God does not need an argument to be rational, because it can be formed directly, the way perceptual beliefs are, through a faculty built for exactly that purpose - which Plantinga develops from John Calvin's own idea, already met in chapter 1, of a built-in sensus divinitatis, a "sense of divinity" that under the right circumstances produces belief in God directly rather than by inference.

What these 17 minutes give you

  • Define "properly basic belief" and give two everyday examples of beliefs commonly held this way.
  • State Plantinga's central claim: that belief in God can be properly basic rather than requiring prior inference from evidence.
  • Explain how Plantinga's model connects to and extends Calvin's *sensus divinitatis* from chapter 1.
  • State the "Great Pumpkin" objection and summarize Plantinga's reply to it.

because that which is known of God is revealed in them, for God revealed it to them.

The heavens declare the glory of God. The expanse shows his handiwork.

Romans 1:19 (World English Bible)

Reformed epistemology reads this verse somewhat differently than the presuppositionalist reading in the previous lecture emphasized, though the two are not incompatible. Where 3-3 stressed the suppression that follows this knowledge (v. 21), this lecture highlights the verse's account of how the knowledge arrives in the first place: not through a chain of inference the person works out, but as something "revealed in them" directly - language that fits naturally with Plantinga's claim that belief in God can be produced immediately by a God-given cognitive faculty, rather than only ever reached by constructing and evaluating an argument.

Psalms 19:1 (World English Bible)

The psalm describes an experience many readers recognize: standing under an open sky and sensing, without running through a formal argument first, that something beyond the visible world stands behind what is seen. Reformed epistemology treats this kind of immediate, non-inferential awareness as exactly the sensus divinitatis at work - not proof by itself, in the sense of a philosophical demonstration, but a properly basic belief triggered, as beliefs about an external world are triggered by seeing it, by the right circumstances: here, the sight of the heavens themselves.

1. What "properly basic" means

Beliefs held without argument

In ordinary epistemology (the study of how beliefs are justified), some beliefs are held because they are inferred from other beliefs - "the streets are wet, therefore it probably rained" infers a wet-streets belief from a rain belief. Other beliefs, though, do not seem to work this way at all. When someone sees a tree in front of them, they do not typically reason their way to "there is a tree here" from more basic premises; the belief simply arises, directly and immediately, from the experience of seeing. Philosophers call beliefs of this kind basic - not built on other beliefs as their foundation - and a basic belief is properly basic when it is formed reliably, under the right conditions, by a properly functioning belief-forming faculty (in this case, ordinary vision, functioning as it should, in circumstances where it can be trusted).

Belief in other minds - that the people around us have inner thoughts and feelings, and are not simply elaborate automatons - is a favorite example in this literature, because almost no one arrives at it by argument. People simply find themselves believing it, immediately, on the basis of ordinary interaction, and this belief is treated by virtually everyone as thoroughly rational despite resting on no explicit inference at all. The reliability of memory works the same way: a person trusts a clear memory of breakfast this morning without first constructing an argument for memory's general trustworthiness. Plantinga's claim is that belief in God, for many believers, works the same way structurally - not argued to, but occasioned directly by certain kinds of experience (the created world, a sense of moral obligation, an awareness of guilt and forgiveness, worship, reading Scripture) operating on a cognitive faculty built for exactly this purpose.

2. Plantinga's model and Calvin's sensus divinitatis

Plantinga develops this claim explicitly from Calvin, whose sensus divinitatis chapter 1 already introduced as part of Calvin's account of the . Where chapter 1 treated Calvin's idea mainly as marking a limit on unaided reason after , Plantinga extends the same concept into a full model of religious epistemology: humans possess a God-given cognitive faculty - not literally a sixth sense, but a disposition of the mind and will - that, when functioning as it was designed to under the right triggering circumstances (Romans 1:19's created world is a paradigm example), produces belief in God directly, the same way properly functioning vision produces belief in the tree standing in front of a person. On this model, a believer who simply finds herself believing in God - through worship, through Scripture, through creation, without ever constructing the kalam - is not thereby believing less rationally than a philosopher who arrives at the same belief by chapter 4's careful, multi-step arguments. Both, on Plantinga's account, can be equally warranted, provided the relevant faculty is functioning properly in an environment for which it was designed.

This is also where Reformed epistemology's place among this chapter's four methods becomes clearest: it does not compete with the theistic arguments of chapter 4 so much as relativize their necessity. Those arguments remain useful - they can strengthen an already-warranted belief, or help someone whose sensus divinitatis is, for whatever reason, not functioning as it should - but Plantinga denies that they are required for belief in God to be rational in the first place.

3. The "Great Pumpkin" objection

The most famous challenge to Plantinga's model has an almost comic name: the Great Pumpkin objection, after the character in Charles Schulz's Peanuts comic strip who sincerely, but (within the strip's own joke) mistakenly, believes a "Great Pumpkin" will rise from the most sincere pumpkin patch each Halloween. The objection runs like this: if belief in God can be properly basic without argument, what, in principle, stops belief in the Great Pumpkin - or astrology, or any other claim someone happens to find themselves believing - from claiming the same status? If "properly basic" is available to any belief a person sincerely holds without argument, the category threatens to become meaningless, granting rational cover to obviously false or arbitrary beliefs alongside belief in God.

Plantinga's reply distinguishes two different questions the objection tends to run together. The first is whether a belief can be properly basic in principle - a structural question about how beliefs are formed. The second is whether this particular belief actually is properly basic - a substantive question about whether the relevant cognitive faculty exists, functions reliably, and is triggered appropriately. Plantinga's answer is that belief in the Great Pumpkin fails the second test, not the first: there is no serious reason to think humans possess a reliable, properly functioning "Great Pumpkin faculty" analogous to memory, perception, or (on Plantinga's Reformed-theological premises) the sensus divinitatis - the Great Pumpkin belief, unlike belief in God, has no comparable case, from within a coherent worldview, that it tracks anything real. Whether this reply fully closes the objection remains debated even among philosophers sympathetic to Reformed epistemology, since it requires granting, at least for the sake of argument, that Calvin's account of the sensus divinitatis is itself true - a premise a genuine skeptic has, of course, not yet accepted.

4. Warrant, not merely justification

One further technical point belongs here for students who go on to read Plantinga directly: his mature work (especially Warranted Christian Belief, 2000) develops a specific philosophical notion he calls warrant - roughly, whatever it is that turns a true belief into knowledge - and argues that Christian belief, if true, likely has warrant of exactly this properly-basic kind. This technical apparatus goes well beyond what this lecture can cover, but the core, non-technical claim already stated above - that belief in God does not require prior argument to be rational - is the piece this course expects every student to carry forward.

Debate over this model

This is a point where readers will not agree. Classical and evidential apologists, while often respectful of Plantinga's philosophical rigor, worry that Reformed epistemology, taken on its own, gives an apologist little to say to someone whose sensus divinitatis, on the model's own terms, simply is not producing belief - Plantinga's model explains why a believer's faith can be rational without argument, but by the same token offers a skeptic no obvious reason to expect the same experience, and no argument to supply in its absence. Presuppositionalists, meanwhile, find genuine common ground with Reformed epistemology's rejection of a strict evidentialist requirement, while still pressing their own, more confrontational claim that unbelief is an active suppression (3-3) rather than simply a faculty not yet triggered. This course names the disagreement and, as with the rest of this chapter, does not resolve it.

Chapter 3 — four apologetic methods compared Named without a winner declared Classical (3-1) Aquinas, Craig, Geisler Theism first, then Christianity Two careful steps, in order Evidential (3-2) Montgomery, Habermas One cumulative case, resurrection central Inductive, best explanation Presuppositional (3-3) Van Til, Schaeffer No neutral ground; God is presupposed Transcendental argument Reformed epist. (3-4) Plantinga Belief can be properly basic No argument strictly required Shared conclusion, different routes All four agree the Christian faith can be reasonably held and reasonably defended. They disagree about where an argument must start, and whether one is even required before belief is rational. Working apologists in every tradition use more than one.

6. Further Reading

  • Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press, 2000).
  • Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
  • Kelly James Clark, Return to Reason: A Critique of Enlightenment and a Defense of Reason and Belief in God (Eerdmans, 1990).
  • James K. Beilby, ed., Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (Cornell University Press, 2002).
  • Steven B. Cowan, ed., Five Views on Apologetics (Zondervan, 2000).

In short

  • The three earlier methods assume belief in God needs an argument. Alvin Plantinga says it can be "properly basic": rationally held without being inferred from other beliefs.
  • Ordinary beliefs work this way too, such as seeing a tree or trusting memory. A basic belief is "properly" basic when a properly functioning faculty forms it reliably in the right conditions.
  • Plantinga builds on John Calvin's sensus divinitatis ("sense of divinity"). Creation, worship or Scripture can produce belief in God directly, so a believer without arguments is not less rational.
  • The Great Pumpkin objection asks what stops any sincere belief claiming this status. Plantinga replies that no reliable "Great Pumpkin faculty" exists, unlike memory or the sensus divinitatis.
  • Whether this reply works is debated, since it assumes Calvin's account. Classical and evidential apologists, and presuppositionalists, respond differently, and the course does not resolve it.

Topic: This lecture presents Plantinga's Reformed epistemology, which holds that belief in God can be rational without being the conclusion of an argument.

Remember: A belief can be "properly basic," formed directly by a properly functioning faculty, as with perception and memory. Plantinga says belief in God can be like this, through Calvin's sensus divinitatis.

Caution: Plantinga does not say arguments for God are worthless. He says they are not required for rationality. His reply to the Great Pumpkin objection is still debated, because it assumes Calvin's account.

One line to carry into ministry: A person's simple, direct faith in God need not be called irrational for lacking arguments, though arguments can still strengthen faith or help someone who finds belief hard.

Review every summary in this course →

Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • Give your own example, different from the ones in the lecture, of an everyday belief you hold that seems to be "properly basic" rather than inferred from an argument.
  • How does Plantinga's model extend Calvin's *sensus divinitatis* from chapter 1 beyond how it was used there?
  • State the Great Pumpkin objection in your own words, and then state Plantinga's reply. Does the reply fully satisfy you? Why or why not?
  • If belief in God can be rational without argument, does this make chapters 3 and 4's arguments for God pointless? Explain your reasoning.
  • Looking back across all four lectures in this chapter, which method's account of how faith and reason relate feels closest to your own experience of coming to believe (or of doubting)? You are not required to pick only one.

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What next

The lecture ends here. What follows was written by its readers.