Lecture 10-1: Religious Pluralism's Philosophical Claims
Contents 37
- Lecture 1-1: The Meaning and Mandate of Apologetics
- Lecture 1-2: Faith and Reason Across Church History
- Lecture 1-3: The Apologist's Character
- Lecture 2-1: What Is Truth?
- Lecture 2-2: Revelation and Reason
- Lecture 2-3: The Postmodern Challenge to Truth
- Lecture 3-1: Classical Apologetics
- Lecture 3-2: Evidential Apologetics
- Lecture 3-3: Presuppositional Apologetics
- Lecture 3-4: Reformed Epistemology
- Lecture 4-1: The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- Lecture 4-2: The Teleological Argument (Fine-Tuning)
- Lecture 4-3: The Moral Argument
- Lecture 4-4: Objections and Responses
- Lecture 5-1: How the Canon Formed
- Lecture 5-2: Manuscript Evidence and Textual Criticism
- Lecture 5-3: Archaeology and Historical Corroboration
- Lecture 6-1: The Quest for the Historical Jesus
- Lecture 6-2: Jesus's Self-Understanding
- Lecture 6-3: Lewis's Trilemma and Its Critics
- Lecture 7-1: The Death of Jesus
- Lecture 7-2: The Minimal Facts Approach
- Lecture 7-3: Alternative Theories and Their Failure
- Lecture 8-1: The Logical Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-2: The Evidential Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-3: The Cross as God's Answer
- Lecture 9-1: Four Models for Relating Science and Faith
- Lecture 9-2: The Spectrum of Christian Views on Origins
- Lecture 9-3: Design Arguments and Their Scientific Critics
- Lecture 10-1: Religious Pluralism's Philosophical Claims
- Lecture 10-2: Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism Compared
- Lecture 10-3: The New Atheism and Secular Objections
- Lecture 10-4: Engaging Other Religions and Worldviews Respectfully
Every religious tradition a student is likely to meet makes claims that, taken at face value, conflict with the claims of the others. Christianity holds that God became human once, in Jesus of Nazareth, and rose from the dead. Islam holds that God is one in a way that rules out incarnation entirely, and that Jesus was a prophet, not God in the flesh. Theravada Buddhism, in its classical form, does not affirm a creator God at all. These are not small differences in emphasis; taken literally, they cannot all be true at once. Religious pluralism is the philosophical position that tries to hold all of these traditions in equal honor without declaring any one of them simply right and the others simply wrong - and the most influential contemporary version of that attempt is the philosopher John Hick's "pluralistic hypothesis."
This lecture states Hick's proposal in its own terms, as carefully and fairly as it can be stated, before turning to the standard philosophical criticism of it: that the hypothesis, for all its appeal to open-mindedness, is not actually neutral among religions - it quietly assumes and asserts a specific, substantive claim of its own, one that every major tradition, including Christianity, would reject if stated in its own terms.
What these 18 minutes give you
- State John Hick's "pluralistic hypothesis" accurately, including its distinction between an unknowable "Real" and the various traditions' culturally shaped responses to it.
- Explain why Hick's hypothesis is attractive to many people encountering religious diversity for the first time.
- State the standard philosophical critique of religious pluralism: that it is not neutral among religions but asserts its own substantive theological judgment.
- Distinguish religious pluralism (the philosophical position covered in this lecture) from simple religious tolerance or civility, which this course affirms without qualification.
There is salvation in none other, for neither is there any other name under heaven, that is given among men, by which we must be saved!
For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus,
Acts 4:12 (World English Bible)
Peter speaks these words to the same Jewish council he and John had just been arrested for preaching before, immediately after healing a lame man "in the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth" (Acts 4:10). The claim is about a specific name and a specific event - not a general religious sentiment, but the concrete conviction of the earliest apostolic preaching, delivered under real legal pressure rather than as a comfortable theory. This is the kind of exclusive claim religious pluralism has to explain away rather than simply honor, since it is not a vague spiritual impression but a specific historical assertion made by the people closest to the events themselves.
1 Timothy 2:5 (WEB)
Paul's language here is worth noticing carefully: "one mediator" sits beside "one God," as though the two claims stand or fall together. The verse will return in the next lecture, where it becomes central to comparing exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism as three different ways of taking this same claim seriously. Here, it simply establishes that the New Testament's own language about Jesus is not incidentally exclusive - the exclusivity is built into how the earliest Christians described what Jesus was for humanity's relationship with God, not added later by less generous readers.
1. Hick's pluralistic hypothesis
John Hick began his career defending a fairly traditional Christian position and moved, over several decades and largely through his encounter with devout, morally serious people of other faiths while living in the religiously diverse city of Birmingham, England, toward the position for which he is now best known. His mature statement of it, especially in An Interpretation of Religion (1989), is called the pluralistic hypothesis.
Hick's proposal borrows a distinction from the philosopher Immanuel Kant between a thing as it is in itself (the noumenon) and a thing as it appears to a particular observer, shaped by that observer's own perceptual and conceptual apparatus (the phenomenon). Applied to religion, Hick proposes that there is one ultimate transcendent reality - he calls it simply the Real - which is in itself beyond the reach of any human concept, whether personal or impersonal, whether "God," "Brahman," "Allah," "the Tao," or "Nirvana." Each of the major world religious traditions, on this account, represents an authentic but culturally and historically conditioned human response to an encounter with the Real, filtered through that tradition's own concepts, categories, and religious experience. A Christian genuinely encounters something real when she prays to the Trinitarian God; a Muslim genuinely encounters something real in submission to Allah; a Hindu bhakti devotee genuinely encounters something real in devotion to Krishna. None of them, on Hick's account, encounters the Real as it actually is - because on Hick's account nothing about the Real in itself can be directly known - but all of them encounter it authentically, through the particular lens their tradition provides.
Hick supports this with two main lines of argument. The first is roughly moral: the great world religions, whatever their doctrinal differences, appear to produce saints, transform lives, and orient people toward compassion and away from self-centeredness in recognizably similar ways, which Hick takes as evidence that something real and valuable is happening in all of them rather than only in one. The second is what might be called an argument from accident of birth: the religion a person holds is overwhelmingly predicted by where and to whom that person was born - a fact Hick argues should make any single tradition cautious about claiming to be the sole authentic response to ultimate reality, since had the same person been born elsewhere, they would very likely hold, with equal sincerity, a different tradition's account instead.
The hypothesis is genuinely attractive, and it is worth saying plainly why, since a fair statement of a position includes understanding its appeal. It seems to honor the sincerity and moral seriousness so visible in devout people of other faiths, without requiring the conclusion that they are simply and entirely mistaken about the most important thing in their lives. It offers an explanation for religious diversity that does not require billions of people deluded. And it fits an intuition many people already hold, prior to any philosophical argument, that a genuinely loving God would not organize reality so that the overwhelming majority of humanity, through no fault of its own, ends up following the wrong religion by accident of geography.
2. The standard critique: pluralism is not neutral
The most widely made philosophical criticism of Hick's hypothesis, raised by philosophers and theologians from several traditions, is that it does not actually do what it claims to do. Hick presents the pluralistic hypothesis as a neutral, generous framework that stands above the particular traditions and honors all of them equally. But look again at what the hypothesis actually asserts: that no tradition's literal, specific claims about the nature of ultimate reality - not Christianity's claim that this reality is a who became incarnate in Jesus, not Islam's claim that this reality is a strict, undivided unity who did no such thing, not classical Buddhism's position that talk of a personal ultimate reality is itself a category mistake - are actually correct as stated. On Hick's account, every tradition that makes a specific, literal claim about what ultimate reality is like is, strictly speaking, wrong to make that claim in that form; all such claims must be reinterpreted as culturally conditioned metaphor pointing at something the traditions themselves cannot directly describe.
That is not neutrality among the traditions. It is a specific, substantive philosophical and theological position - one closer, in its actual content, to certain streams of Vedantic or mystical thought than to the historic self-understanding of Christianity, Islam, or several other traditions Hick means to include - and it is being imposed on all of them from outside, by a framework none of the traditions themselves originated or would recognize as accurately describing their own central claims. A Christian who affirms the is not merely offering one culturally conditioned metaphor among equally valid others, on her own tradition's own terms; she is asserting that God really did become human in a particular first-century Jewish man, at a particular time and place, in a way that is either true or false as a claim about reality. Hick's hypothesis does not honor this claim; it quietly tells the Christian she is mistaken about what she is actually claiming, and then offers a reinterpretation more comfortable to religious pluralism than to Christianity's own historic self-understanding. The same is true, from the other direction, for the Muslim insistence that God did not become incarnate at all, or for the classical Buddhist reluctance to describe ultimate reality in personal terms in the first place - each tradition's own specific content is set aside in favor of Hick's framework, in the name of respecting all of them equally.
This is sometimes summarized as the charge that Hick's pluralism is not really a pluralism of religions at all, but a single new, substantive theological position - one more view among the views, competing with the others rather than standing impartially above them - dressed in the language of open-minded neutrality. The philosopher Alvin Plantinga, whose work on properly basic belief appeared in chapter 3, has pressed a version of this objection specifically: Hick's hypothesis asks each tradition to treat its own most central claims as something other than what the tradition itself takes those claims to be, which is a very different thing from simply respecting religious diversity.
3. What this critique does and does not establish
It is worth being precise about what this argument accomplishes and what it does not. The critique does not, by itself, prove that Christianity's specific claims are true and every other tradition's specific claims are false; it is a critique of Hick's particular philosophical proposal, not a positive case for exclusive Christian truth (that case is built across other chapters of this course, particularly chapters 4 through 7). What the critique does establish is narrower but important: religious pluralism cannot present itself as the neutral, humble alternative to making any exclusive religious claims at all, because the pluralistic hypothesis is itself an exclusive claim - a specific view about the nature of ultimate reality and the status of every tradition's own self-understanding - argued for on its own philosophical grounds, and open to being argued against on the same terms.
None of this requires uncharitable engagement with people of other faiths, and the difference between this philosophical critique and mere dismissiveness matters enough that it is the whole subject of 10-4. Rejecting Hick's specific hypothesis is entirely compatible with (and, this course would argue, is actually a precondition for) taking other traditions' own claims seriously enough to engage them on their own terms, rather than flattening them into one preferred metaphor.
Value in Hick
This is a point where readers will not agree. Some Christian theologians, particularly in dialogue-oriented and some ecumenical circles, find real value in aspects of Hick's project even while rejecting his conclusion, arguing that it usefully highlights how much of religious language is genuinely shaped by culture and historical location. Others regard the hypothesis as incompatible with historic Christian faith at almost every point of contact. This course states the standard critique because it represents the dominant response across the traditions its students come from, but it does not require a single verdict on Hick's entire body of work.
6. Further Reading
- John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (Yale University Press, 1989).
- Alvin Plantinga, "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," in The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith, ed. Thomas D. Senor (Cornell University Press, 1995).
- Harold Netland, Encountering Religious Pluralism: The Challenge to Christian Faith and Mission (InterVarsity Press, 2001).
- Gavin D'Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity (T&T Clark, 2000).
- Paul R. Eddy, John Hick's Pluralist Philosophy of World Religions (Wipf and Stock, 2002).
In short
- John Hick's "pluralistic hypothesis" says one ultimate "Real" exists beyond all human concepts. Each major religion is an authentic but culturally shaped response to it.
- Hick argues that the religions produce saints and compassion in similar ways, and that a person's religion mostly depends on where they were born.
- The hypothesis attracts people because it honors devout believers of other faiths without calling them deluded.
- The standard critique says it is not neutral. It declares every tradition's literal claims about ultimate reality, such as the incarnation, to be only metaphor.
- This makes pluralism one substantive theological position competing with the others. The critique does not prove Christianity true, and it does not permit uncharitable treatment of other faiths.
Topic: This lecture explains John Hick's pluralistic hypothesis about the world religions and the standard philosophical criticism that it is not neutral.
Remember: Pluralism is not a neutral view above the religions. It makes its own claim about ultimate reality and about what every tradition's teaching really means.
Caution: The critique only answers Hick's proposal. It does not prove Christian claims by itself, and Christians disagree about the value of parts of Hick's project.
One line to carry into ministry: Take other people's beliefs seriously enough to engage what they actually claim, instead of flattening all faiths into one preferred picture.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- In your own words, state Hick's distinction between "the Real" and the various traditions' responses to it. What work is this distinction doing for his argument?
- Why might someone find Hick's hypothesis appealing even before hearing any philosophical criticism of it? Try to state the appeal as someone drawn to it would state it.
- Explain the standard critique: why is the pluralistic hypothesis not, on inspection, neutral among the religions it claims to honor equally?
- Does rejecting Hick's specific hypothesis require dismissing other religions as worthless or their adherents as insincere? Why or why not?
- Acts 4:12 and 1 Timothy 2:5 both make specific, exclusive claims. How would Hick's framework need to reinterpret these verses for them to fit the pluralistic hypothesis? Do you find that reinterpretation persuasive as a reading of what the verses themselves say?