Lecture 4-4: Objections and Responses
Contents 37
- Lecture 1-1: The Meaning and Mandate of Apologetics
- Lecture 1-2: Faith and Reason Across Church History
- Lecture 1-3: The Apologist's Character
- Lecture 2-1: What Is Truth?
- Lecture 2-2: Revelation and Reason
- Lecture 2-3: The Postmodern Challenge to Truth
- Lecture 3-1: Classical Apologetics
- Lecture 3-2: Evidential Apologetics
- Lecture 3-3: Presuppositional Apologetics
- Lecture 3-4: Reformed Epistemology
- Lecture 4-1: The Kalam Cosmological Argument
- Lecture 4-2: The Teleological Argument (Fine-Tuning)
- Lecture 4-3: The Moral Argument
- Lecture 4-4: Objections and Responses
- Lecture 5-1: How the Canon Formed
- Lecture 5-2: Manuscript Evidence and Textual Criticism
- Lecture 5-3: Archaeology and Historical Corroboration
- Lecture 6-1: The Quest for the Historical Jesus
- Lecture 6-2: Jesus's Self-Understanding
- Lecture 6-3: Lewis's Trilemma and Its Critics
- Lecture 7-1: The Death of Jesus
- Lecture 7-2: The Minimal Facts Approach
- Lecture 7-3: Alternative Theories and Their Failure
- Lecture 8-1: The Logical Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-2: The Evidential Problem of Evil
- Lecture 8-3: The Cross as God's Answer
- Lecture 9-1: Four Models for Relating Science and Faith
- Lecture 9-2: The Spectrum of Christian Views on Origins
- Lecture 9-3: Design Arguments and Their Scientific Critics
- Lecture 10-1: Religious Pluralism's Philosophical Claims
- Lecture 10-2: Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism Compared
- Lecture 10-3: The New Atheism and Secular Objections
- Lecture 10-4: Engaging Other Religions and Worldviews Respectfully
The first three lectures of this chapter presented three theistic arguments in their strongest form. A course that stopped there would be doing its students a disservice, because none of these arguments is regarded as settled or uncontested, even among careful, informed philosophers who have spent careers on the questions involved. This lecture turns the same scrutiny applied to the kalam argument's premises and the fine-tuning argument's likelihood reasoning back onto the arguments themselves, taking up the two most serious alternative explanations - the multiverse for fine-tuning, and evolutionary accounts for morality - and closing with a direct acknowledgment that atheist philosophers continue to contest these arguments' premises on their merits, not merely dismiss them.
This lecture also gives the chapter's overall principle its fullest statement: these arguments are modest, they argue for particular attributes rather than for the whole biblical God, and using them honestly means being as clear about their limits as about their strengths.
What these 18 minutes give you
- State the multiverse hypothesis as an alternative explanation for fine-tuning, and explain at least two of its own unresolved questions - what would generate a multiverse, and whether it can be tested even in principle.
- Summarize at least one naturalistic account of the origin of morality (evolutionary ethics) and state the theist response to it fairly.
- Describe, with a specific example, how a serious atheist philosopher such as Graham Oppy contests one of these arguments' premises rather than dismissing the arguments outright.
- Explain, using this chapter's own principle, why a cumulative case built from several modest arguments is a different - and in some ways stronger - kind of case than claiming any single argument as a complete proof.
For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse.
He who implanted the ear, won't he hear? He who formed the eye, won't he see? He who disciplines the nations, won't he punish? He who teaches man knows.
Romans 1:20 (World English Bible)
Paul's claim here is bold and needs to be handled with the same care this lecture applies to the arguments themselves: he says God's power and divine nature are "clearly seen" in creation, to the point that unbelief is "without excuse." This is a strong theological claim about what makes available to every observer. It is not, however, a claim that every specific philosophical argument for God's existence is beyond honest objection - Paul is describing what creation itself discloses, not adjudicating a modern academic debate between William Lane Craig and Graham Oppy about the kalam argument's premises. This lecture tries to hold both things at once: creation genuinely testifies to God, and serious, honest people still argue about how to formalize and defend that testimony philosophically.
Psalm 94:9-10 (WEB)
The psalmist uses a simple but forceful pattern of reasoning: whatever capacity a creature has must, in some sense, be present in - or accounted for by - whatever made that capacity possible in the first place. Applied to this lecture's topic, the same shape of reasoning appears in the (a moral sense in creatures needs an adequate source) and in versions of the fine-tuning argument that ask what could account for a universe capable of producing minds able to investigate it. The psalm's confidence is worth holding alongside this lecture's honesty about ongoing philosophical debate: the psalmist is not naive about objections, but he is not paralyzed by them either.
1. The multiverse as an alternative to design
The most widely discussed naturalistic alternative to the fine-tuning argument's design inference is the multiverse hypothesis: the proposal that our universe is only one among an enormous, perhaps infinite, number of universes, each with its own randomly set physical constants, generated by some deeper physical process such as eternal cosmic inflation. If enough universes exist with enough variation in their constants, the reasoning goes, it becomes unsurprising that at least one of them - ours - happens to have life-permitting values, in the same way it is unsurprising that if enough lottery tickets are sold, someone wins, even though any individual ticket's odds are vanishingly small. On this view, fine-tuning is not evidence of design at all; it is a selection effect - we could only ever find ourselves in one of the rare universes capable of supporting observers, however that universe came to have its particular settings.
This is a serious proposal, defended by physicists including Alexander Vilenkin and popularized by figures such as Max Tegmark, and it deserves to be presented in its own strongest form rather than dismissed. It also carries real unresolved questions that a fair lecture has to name. First, what generates the multiverse itself, and does that generating mechanism - the inflationary field and its own physical laws, on most versions - require its own explanation, potentially pushing the fine-tuning question back a level rather than answering it? Philosopher John Leslie, whose earlier work anticipated much of the design-versus-multiverse debate, and Robin Collins both argue that many multiverse-generating mechanisms themselves require a certain amount of "tuning" to work, which risks reintroducing the very problem the multiverse was proposed to solve. Second, most multiverse proposals are not currently testable even in principle - other universes, on most models, are causally disconnected from ours, meaning no observation from within our universe could confirm or falsify their existence, which raises a real question about whether the hypothesis is scientific in the way the cosmological observations supporting the Big Bang itself are. This is not a knockdown objection - untestable proposals are not automatically false - but it does mean the multiverse cannot simply be assumed to be the more "scientific" of the two options without further argument.
2. Evolutionary ethics as an alternative to a moral lawgiver
The most developed naturalistic response to the moral argument comes from evolutionary ethics: the proposal that the moral sense described in 4-3 - the strong, apparently universal conviction that some things are really right and really wrong - is adequately explained as a product of natural selection, favoring social behaviors like cooperation, reciprocity, and care for offspring because those behaviors improved the survival and reproduction of ancestral populations, without requiring that the resulting moral beliefs be objectively true in any further sense.
Philosopher of biology Michael Ruse has stated this view with unusual bluntness: he has argued that morality is, in an important sense, an illusion "put in place by our genes to make us good cooperators" - useful for survival, but not a discovery about any mind-independent moral reality. A related and more technical argument, developed by philosopher Sharon Street, is the "evolutionary debunking argument": if our moral beliefs were shaped by natural selection for survival value rather than for tracking objective moral truth, then even if objective moral truths existed, there would be no reason to expect our evolved moral intuitions to reliably track them - the selection pressure and the truth-tracking would be two entirely separate things that just happened, if realism is true, to coincide by luck.
Theist philosophers have responded on two fronts. First, some argue that an evolutionary account of why we believe certain things are moral is compatible with those things also being objectively moral - explaining how a belief-forming mechanism arose does not automatically show the belief is false, any more than explaining how the human eye evolved shows that trees do not really exist. Second, and more pointedly, several philosophers, including Craig, argue that evolutionary accounts explain, at most, why creatures might believe certain behaviors are advantageous or feel compelling, but do not explain why any behavior is actually, objectively binding - why a person genuinely ought to act a certain way, rather than merely feeling an evolved impulse to do so. On this reply, evolutionary ethics may successfully explain moral psychology - the fact that humans have moral feelings and beliefs - while leaving the separate philosophical question of objective moral obligation, which is what the moral argument's second premise actually claims, essentially untouched.
This is a genuine, ongoing philosophical dispute, not a settled matter either way, and students should be able to state Ruse's and Street's positions in a form their own holders would recognize as fair before offering the theist reply.
3. A direct acknowledgment: serious philosophers still contest these arguments
Reasonable disagreement
It would be dishonest for this chapter to close without naming, directly, that thoughtful, technically skilled philosophers who do not believe in God continue to find these arguments unpersuasive - not out of ignorance or bad faith, but because they judge specific premises to be inadequately supported. Graham Oppy, an atheist philosopher whose work engages theistic arguments in unusually careful technical detail, has written extensively arguing, among other things, that the kalam argument's case against an actual infinite (examined in 4-1) does not succeed in ruling out a beginningless universe, and that competing cosmological models consistent with an eternal universe remain live options in physics rather than settled failures. Oppy has made similar moves against versions of the fine-tuning and moral arguments, generally arguing not that theists have made an obvious logical error, but that at some specific premise, equally rational people can and do reasonably disagree given the actual state of the evidence - a position sometimes called being in a state of reasonable "disagreement" rather than one side simply being irrational.
Naming this is not a concession that these arguments fail. It is a statement about how careful philosophical argument actually works at its best: premises are weighed, not merely asserted, and a student who has only ever heard these arguments presented as obviously decisive has not yet met them in their real intellectual environment, where thoughtful people continue to examine and dispute specific steps.
4. The chapter's principle, restated
Each argument in this chapter, taken alone, supports a narrower conclusion than "the Christian God exists": a beginningless, powerful first cause; an intelligent designer of physical constants; a transcendent ground of objective morality. None of them, individually, establishes the , the , or the resurrection. But their combined weight is not simply additive in a trivial sense - a cumulative case, built from several independent lines of argument that each point in a broadly theistic direction, is harder to dismiss with a single objection than any one argument taken alone, because a critic has to answer each line separately rather than finding one weak link that brings down the whole case. This course's approach, consistent with the classical and cumulative-case methods introduced in chapter 3, is to present these arguments honestly - strengths and live objections both - and let a student weigh the cumulative result rather than being handed a single argument oversold as a knockdown proof.
6. Further Reading
- Graham Oppy, Arguing about Gods (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- Graham Oppy, The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
- Michael Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy, 2nd edition (Prometheus Books, 1998).
- Sharon Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value," Philosophical Studies 127, no. 1 (2006): 109-166.
- John Leslie, Universes (Routledge, 1989).
- William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
In short
- The multiverse hypothesis says many universes exist, so a life-permitting one is unsurprising. Open questions: what generates it, which may itself need tuning (John Leslie, Robin Collins), and whether it is testable.
- Evolutionary ethics says our moral sense came from natural selection. Michael Ruse calls morality a useful illusion, and Sharon Street argues evolved intuitions would not reliably track objective truth.
- Theists reply that explaining how a belief arose does not show it is false. Craig adds that evolution explains moral feelings, not why anyone is truly obligated.
- The atheist philosopher Graham Oppy argues the case against an actual infinite does not rule out a beginningless universe. He says reasonable people can weigh the evidence differently.
- Each argument supports only a narrow conclusion, not the Trinity or the resurrection. Together they form a cumulative case that is harder to dismiss with one objection.
Topic: This lecture gives the main objections to the fine-tuning and moral arguments and restates the chapter's principle of modest, honest apologetics.
Remember: A cumulative case built from several modest arguments is harder to dismiss with one objection than any single argument oversold as a complete proof.
Caution: Naming serious objections is not conceding that the arguments fail. Untestable ideas like the multiverse are not automatically false, and the disputes here are not settled.
One line to carry into ministry: Present arguments for God honestly, with their strengths and their live objections, and respect that thoughtful people weigh the same evidence differently.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- State the multiverse hypothesis in your own words, as if explaining it to someone who has never heard of it, and then name one genuine unresolved question about it that this lecture raises.
- Michael Ruse describes morality as an evolutionary "illusion" useful for cooperation. What is the theist reply to this, and do you find the reply fully satisfying? Where, if anywhere, do you still feel uncertain?
- This lecture names Graham Oppy as an atheist philosopher who contests these arguments' premises rather than dismissing them outright. Why does the lecture treat this as important to state directly, rather than leaving students to assume all serious philosophers who study these arguments carefully end up agreeing with them?
- Explain, in your own words, why a "cumulative case" built from several modest arguments can be stronger than any single argument claimed as a complete proof - and also explain one limitation of cumulative-case reasoning that a careful student should keep in mind.
- Looking back across all four lectures in this chapter, which argument did you find most persuasive, and which objection in this lecture gave you the most to think about? Be specific about why.