Lecture 4-1: Legal Hebrew: Casuistic and Apodictic Formulations
Contents 37
- Lecture 1-1: What This Course Assumes, and What It Is For
- Lecture 1-2: How to Work Through a Verse Without Drowning
- Lecture 1-3: The Tools on Your Desk: Lexicon, Grammar, Concordance, Apparatus
- Lecture 2-1: The Shape of a Hebrew Sentence: Word Order and the Narrative Chain
- Lecture 2-2: Reading Genesis 22:1-14
- Lecture 2-3: Repetition, Wordplay, and What Translation Cannot Carry
- Lecture 3-1: The Verb System in Action: Aspect, Sequence, and the Perfect Problem
- Lecture 3-2: Reading 1 Samuel 17 as Connected Discourse
- Lecture 3-3: Direct Speech, Particles, and the Texture of Dialogue
- Lecture 4-1: Legal Hebrew: Casuistic and Apodictic Formulations
- Lecture 4-2: Reading Deuteronomy 6:4-9
- Lecture 4-3: Motive Clauses and the Rhetoric of Command
- Lecture 5-1: Parallelism, and Why It Is Not Repetition
- Lecture 5-2: Reading Psalm 23 and Psalm 1
- Lecture 5-3: Poetic Vocabulary, Rare Words, and the Limits of the Lexicon
- Lecture 6-1: Prophetic Forms: Oracle, Woe, Vision Report
- Lecture 6-2: Reading Amos 5:18-27
- Lecture 6-3: When the Text Is Hard: Corruption, Conjecture, and the Apparatus
- Lecture 7-1: Koine on the Page: Mark's Sentences and Why They Read as They Do
- Lecture 7-2: Reading Mark 4:35-41
- Lecture 7-3: Aspect Over Time: The Present, Aorist and Imperfect at Work
- Lecture 8-1: A More Literary Koine: Luke's Preface and the Septuagintal Style
- Lecture 8-2: Reading Luke 15:11-24
- Lecture 8-3: Participles: The Engine of Greek Narrative
- Lecture 9-1: Reading a Letter as Argument: Connectives and Signposts
- Lecture 9-2: Reading Galatians 2:15-21
- Lecture 9-3: Cases in Dispute: The Genitive and What Hangs on It
- Lecture 10-1: Long Sentences: Subordination, Anacoluthon, and Keeping the Thread
- Lecture 10-2: Reading Romans 3:21-26
- Lecture 10-3: Conditional Sentences, Questions, and the Diatribe
- Lecture 11-1: Simple Vocabulary, Difficult Meaning: The Johannine Style
- Lecture 11-2: Reading John 1:1-14
- Lecture 11-3: The Article, and What It Does and Does Not Prove
A reader who arrives in Deuteronomy straight from Genesis or 1 Samuel usually finds the first few chapters easy and then, somewhere in chapter 12 or 15, finds the ground giving way. The vocabulary is not the problem; legal Hebrew uses a smaller and more repetitive stock of words than narrative does. The problem is that the reading strategy built up over three chapters of narrative stops working. There is no chain of events to follow. Sentences do not advance a story, so the question "what happened next" — which is what carries a reader through Genesis 22 — has nothing to attach to. And the verb forms that meant one thing in narrative are doing something else here.
This lecture supplies the replacement strategy. Legal Hebrew has shapes of its own, they are few, they repeat, and they are recognisable at a glance once you know them. There are two principal ones. The first states a situation and then states what follows from it: casuistic formulation, from the Latin casus, "case." The second addresses somebody directly and tells them what to do or not do, with no condition attached: apodictic formulation, from a Greek word meaning "demonstrative, showing forth" — a term of art, not a description, and one worth holding loosely for reasons this lecture will come to. Learning to see which shape you are in is the single most useful thing you can do for your reading speed in Deuteronomy, and it is also the beginning of a serious question: whether these two shapes come from two different places, two different institutions, two different histories.
The lecture also has to deal with two things that will bother you if nobody points them out. One is that a verb form you learned in narrative as the driver of a chain of past events — weqatal, a perfect with prefixed wa- — turns up all over the legal sections meaning "you shall." The other is that Deuteronomy keeps switching between addressing "you" singular and "you" plural, sometimes within a single verse, and English hides this completely because English has one word for both. That switching, the Numeruswechsel, has been used for a century and a half as evidence for the literary growth of the book, and it has been argued with equal seriousness that it is nothing of the kind.
What these 35 minutes give you
- Identify a casuistic law in Hebrew by its opening particle and two-part structure, and mark where the condition ends and the consequence begins.
- Identify an apodictic command and say which negative particle it uses and what that particle contributes.
- State Albrecht Alt's division of Israelite law, the social settings he inferred from it, and at least two substantial criticisms that have been brought against it by name.
- Explain the normative use of *weqatal* in legal Hebrew and say why it is not simply the narrative *weqatal* with a different translation.
- Describe the *Numeruswechsel* in Deuteronomy, set out the two main explanations of it with their advocates, and say what evidence would count for and against each.
If your brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman, is sold to you, and serves you six years; then in the seventh year you shall let him go free from you. — Deuteronomy 15:12
World English Bible
When you let him go free from you, you shall not let him go empty. — Deuteronomy 15:13
WEB
You shall remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and Yahweh your God redeemed you. Therefore I command you this thing today. — Deuteronomy 15:15
WEB
You shall not deprive the foreigner or the fatherless of justice, nor take a widow’s clothing in pledge; — Deuteronomy 24:17
WEB
Therefore love the foreigner; for you were foreigners in the land of Egypt. — Deuteronomy 10:19
WEB
Those five verses supply every construction this lecture describes. Have them open in Hebrew as well as English; almost every example below is drawn from them, and the point of the lecture is that the shapes recur, so a small sample is enough.
1. The casuistic sentence: a situation, then a consequence
Here is Deuteronomy 15:12, the whole verse:
כִּי־יִמָּכֵר אָחִיךָ הָעִבְרִי אוֹ הָעִבְרִיָּה וַעֲבָדְךָ וּבַשָּׁנָה הַשְּׁבִיעִת תְּשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ מֵעִמָּךְ
ki-yimmakher lekha achikha ha-ivri o ha-ivriyyah, wa'avadkha shesh shanim, uva-shanah hash-shevi'it teshallechennu chofshi me'immakh
"when your brother, the Hebrew man or the Hebrew woman, is sold to you, and has served you six years — then in the seventh year you shall send him out free from you"
The sentence divides in two, and the division is marked, not left to inference.
The condition (the protasis — the "if" half of a conditional sentence). It opens with כִּי (ki), here in its conditional or temporal use, followed immediately by a verb in the prefix conjugation: (yimmakher). That verb is a niphal, the stem that in Hebrew often expresses a passive or a reflexive: "is sold," or possibly "sells himself." Note straight away what the niphal gives and what it withholds. It tells you the brother is the one who ends up sold. It does not tell you who sold him — whether he was sold by a creditor, by his family, or by himself under the pressure of debt. Translations that write "sells himself to you" have made a decision the Hebrew stem leaves open, and translations that write "is sold to you," as WEB does, have declined to make it. Both are honest; only one is cautious.
The condition then continues with וַעֲבָדְךָ (wa'avadkha, "and he has served you"), and here is the first thing to notice about legal Hebrew. That is a weqatal — the perfect form with a prefixed conjunction. In narrative you learned that the wayyiqtol chain carries the sequence and that weqatal does something else. In law, the weqatal is the workhorse of both halves of the sentence: it continues the condition here, and in a moment it will carry the consequence. The form does not tell you which half you are in. The structure does.
The consequence (the apodosis — the "then" half). It begins with a fronted time phrase, וּבַשָּׁנָה הַשְּׁבִיעִת (uva-shanah hash-shevi'it, "and in the seventh year"), and then the verb: תְּשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ (teshallechennu). Take that word apart. The root is (shlch), "send"; the stem is piel, which here has the sense "send away, release"; the form is second person masculine singular prefix conjugation, "you shall send"; and fused onto the end is an object suffix, ־, "him." One Hebrew word, four pieces of information, and a complete clause. Legal Hebrew is full of these, and reading them fluently — rather than stopping to decompose each one — is most of what makes the difference between labouring through a chapter and reading it.
The next verse shows the same structure in miniature, with a sub-case introduced by the same particle:
וְכִי־תְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ חָפְשִׁי מֵעִמָּךְ לֹא תְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ רֵיקָם
wekhi-teshallechennu chofshi me'immakh, lo teshallechennu reqam
"and when you send him out free from you, you shall not send him out empty-handed"
The condition is now expressed with the same verb that stood in the consequence of verse 12, which is how Deuteronomy hooks one provision onto another. And the consequence is a prohibition: לֹא (lo) plus the prefix conjugation.
The particles: כִּי and אִם. Beginners' grammars often teach a tidy rule: כִּי introduces the main case, and אִם (im) introduces a sub-case within it. The rule is a real generalisation and it is worth knowing, because it holds through long stretches of the Code in Exodus 21-22, where a main case opens with כִּי and a series of variations follow with אִם. But look at Deuteronomy 15. The main case in verse 12 opens with כִּי. The sub-case in verse 16 — what happens if the servant refuses release — opens like this:
וְהָיָה כִּי־יֹאמַר אֵלֶיךָ לֹא מֵעִמָּךְ
wehayah ki-yomar elekha lo etse me'immakh
"and it shall be, when he says to you, 'I will not go out from you' —"
That is a sub-case, and it uses כִּי, not אִם. The generalisation is a tendency across the corpus, not a rule that Deuteronomy obeys. This is worth pausing on as a matter of method. Elegance is a warning sign in the description of a language: when a grammar offers you a clean one-to-one assignment of forms to functions, the honest question is not "how do I remember this" but "where does it break." Here it breaks in the first chapter of Deuteronomy where you look for it. Keep the tendency; do not use it as a diagnostic.
One further detail in that verse: וְהָיָה (wehayah, "and it shall be") is a weqatal of the verb "to be," used as a bare marker that a new condition is starting. It carries almost no meaning of its own. English translations often drop it; WEB writes "It shall be, if he tells you," which keeps it.
2. The apodictic command: no condition at all
Now Deuteronomy 24:17:
לֹא וְלֹא
lo tatteh mishpat ger yatom, welo tachavol beged almanah
"you shall not bend the justice of a resident foreigner or an orphan, and you shall not take in pledge the garment of a widow"
There is no condition. There is no case. There is a person addressed — "you," second masculine singular — and a thing that person is not to do, stated flatly and without limit of time or circumstance. That is the apodictic shape.
Three grammatical observations.
First, the negative. Hebrew has two main negatives for verbs, and they are not interchangeable. לֹא (lo) with the prefix conjugation states a general, standing prohibition: this is not done, ever. אַל (al) with the short prefix form (the jussive) forbids a particular act here and now — as in Deuteronomy 1:21, אַל־תִּירָא וְאַל־תֵּחָת (al-tira we'al-techat, "do not be afraid and do not be dismayed"), spoken to people at a specific moment. Legal prohibitions in Deuteronomy overwhelmingly use לֹא. That distribution is itself evidence about what kind of speech these sentences are: not advice for an occasion but a standing rule. Do not overstate it — לֹא has other uses, and a single instance proves nothing — but across a corpus the pattern is real and countable.
Second, the verb form. תַטֶּה (tatteh) is a hiphil (causative stem) of the root (nth), "stretch, extend, turn aside"; with מִשְׁפָּט (mishpat, "judgement, justice, case") as its object it is the standard idiom for perverting a legal decision. The metaphor is spatial: justice is a straight line and you are not to bend it. That metaphor is live in Hebrew and dead in English, which is why translations reach for "deprive of justice" (WEB), "pervert justice," or "subvert the rights of."
Third, and the point of the whole lecture: the same command can be cast either way. Compare the second half of that verse with a nearly identical provision two verses further on, at Deuteronomy 24:19, which begins with כִּי and lays out a case: when you reap your harvest and forget a sheaf in the field, you shall not go back for it. Same subject matter — the protection of the foreigner, the orphan and the widow — one cast as a bare prohibition and one cast as a case. The shapes are not partitioned by topic.
Positive apodictic commands use weqatal. Deuteronomy 15:15 opens with וְזָכַרְתָּ (wezakharta, "and you shall remember"); 6:5 with וְאָהַבְתָּ (we'ahavta, "and you shall love"); 10:19 with וַאֲהַבְתֶּם (wa'ahavtem, "and you shall love," plural). Each is a perfect-form verb with prefixed wa-, and each has the force of a command. This is the usage the next section takes up.
3. Alt's division and what became of it
The terms casuistic and apodictic did not come from nowhere. They were given their currency by Albrecht Alt, in a monograph of 1934, Die Ursprünge des israelitischen Rechts ("The Origins of Israelite Law"). Alt did two things. He classified: he sorted the legal material of the into the conditional case laws on one side and the direct commands and prohibitions on the other. And then he inferred: the casuistic laws, he argued, are Israel's inheritance from the settled legal culture of Canaan and the wider ancient Near East, adopted along with the land; the apodictic laws are distinctively Israelite, arising out of the covenant and belonging to a cultic setting — a periodic ceremony in which the commands were proclaimed aloud to the assembled people.
It is difficult to overstate how influential the second half of that argument was. It supplied a linguistic-looking basis for a theological claim — that Israel's law was formally as well as materially unlike its neighbours' — and it was repeated in commentaries and textbooks for decades.
Where the two forms began
This is a point where readers will not agree, and the disagreement is instructive because of where it falls. Almost nobody disputes that the two formulations exist and can be told apart; that is an observation about grammar, and it is why this lecture teaches them. What has been steadily dismantled is the inference from form to setting.
Erhard Gerstenberger, in Wesen und Herkunft des "apodiktischen Rechts" (1965), attacked the covenant-ceremony hypothesis directly. He argued that the second-person prohibition is not a distinctively cultic or covenantal form at all but the ordinary shape of instruction within a family or clan — the way an tells a household what is done and not done — and that its home is therefore in everyday ethical formation rather than in a . Gerhard Liedke, in Gestalt und Bezeichnung alttestamentlicher Rechtssätze (1971), took apart the classification itself, showing that Alt's two boxes are neither exhaustive nor internally uniform: there are participial laws ("whoever does X shall be put to death"), there are relative-clause laws, there are prohibitions with motive clauses attached and prohibitions without, and lumping them all under one label conceals more than it reveals. Others have pointed out that apodictic-looking formulations are not in fact absent from non-Israelite material — instructions, treaty stipulations and wisdom texts across the ancient Near East contain plenty of direct second-person commands — which undercuts the claim of distinctiveness at its foundation.
Where does that leave a reader? With the descriptive distinction intact and the historical superstructure removed. When you meet a ki-clause in Deuteronomy you are in a case; when you meet a bare לֹא plus prefix form you are in a command; those are facts about the sentence in front of you. Whether the sentence came from a Canaanite court or an Israelite hearth or a covenant festival is a separate question, answered by other kinds of evidence, and answered less confidently now than in 1934. Notice the pattern, because it recurs throughout this course: a formal observation is sound, an inference from the form to a social setting is built on top of it, the inference becomes the thing everybody remembers, and the inference is what later work erodes.
4. The verbs of legal Hebrew
Three points, each of which adjusts something you learned for narrative.
(a) Weqatal as the normative form. In narrative, a perfect-form verb prefixed with wa- most often continues a sequence into future or habitual time, or follows an imperative. In legal and hortatory prose it does the work of a command. וְאָהַבְתָּ (we'ahavta) is formally "and you have loved"; it functions as "and you shall love." The standard reference grammars treat this under the heading of the weqatal's modal or volitional uses — Waltke and O'Connor at §32.2.1-2, Joüon-Muraoka at §119 — and both are careful to present it as one use among several rather than as the meaning of the form.
Why does it matter that the form is a perfect at all? Two answers are on offer, and they follow the larger dispute set out in lecture 3-1. On a tense-based account, the prefixed wa- converts the past-referring perfect into a future, which is why an older grammatical tradition called it the "waw conversive." On an aspect-based or discourse-based account, nothing is converted: the form marks a situation as a whole, bounded event, and its temporal reference and its modal force come from the sequence it stands in. You do not need to decide between these to read the text. You do need to know that "waw conversive" is a label from one theory and not a neutral description, so that you are not surprised when a modern grammar refuses to use it.
(b) The infinitive absolute as intensifier. Deuteronomy 15:14 opens:
לוֹ
ha'aneq ta'aniq lo
"you shall surely furnish him" — more literally, "furnishing you shall furnish him"
Two forms of the same root stacked together: an infinitive absolute followed by a finite verb. The construction is common in Hebrew of every genre and is usually described as emphatic, though what exactly it emphasises — the certainty of the action, its completeness, the speaker's insistence — is not uniform across occurrences, and reference grammars hedge accordingly. In legal contexts it tends to mark a provision the drafter expects to be evaded. WEB renders it "You shall furnish him liberally," folding the emphasis into an adverb; other versions use "surely." Both are reasonable; there is no English construction that does what the Hebrew does.
(c) Object suffixes and the density of legal Hebrew. Legal sentences pile pronominal suffixes onto verbs and prepositions: תְּשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ ("you shall send him out"), מֵעִמָּךְ ("from with you"), וַעֲבָדְךָ ("and he has served you"). A word of three or four consonants can be a clause. When a legal sentence resists you, the most common cause is not an unknown word but an unrecognised suffix, and the fastest remedy is to strip the suffix off, identify the stem, and put it back.
5. The Numeruswechsel: when "you" changes number
Read Deuteronomy 6:4-9 in Hebrew and every second-person form is singular. Read 10:19 and it is plural:
וַאֲהַבְתֶּם אֶת־הַגֵּר כִּי־גֵרִים בְּאֶרֶץ
wa'ahavtem et-hagger, ki-gerim heyitem be'erets mitsrayim
"and you (pl.) shall love the resident foreigner, for you (pl.) were resident foreigners in the land of Egypt"
Set that beside 6:5, וְאָהַבְתָּ (we'ahavta), "and you (sg.) shall love," and the same verb in the same book addresses Israel in two different numbers. English cannot show this at all: "you" is "you." A reader of the English does not know the shifts are there.
They are frequent — they occur many dozens of times in Deuteronomy, sometimes across a chapter boundary, sometimes within a single verse — and they have been the subject of one of the longest-running arguments in the study of the book. The German term Numeruswechsel, "change of number," is standard in the literature in any language.
This is a point where readers will not agree.
The source-critical explanation is the older one. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Willy Staerk and Carl Steuernagel independently proposed that the singular and plural addresses represent two originally distinct editions or layers of the book, later interwoven, and that the number is therefore a tool for separating them. The argument has an obvious attraction: it uses a formal feature that is objectively observable and not a matter of taste, and it promised a criterion less subjective than vocabulary or theme.
The rhetorical explanation came to dominance largely through Norbert Lohfink, whose Das Hauptgebot (1963) — a study of Deuteronomy 5-11 — argued that the shifts function within the text rather than betraying its prehistory. On this account Deuteronomy addresses Israel now as a single corporate body and now as a collection of individuals, and moves between the two for rhetorical effect, at moments of appeal, at transitions, and where a general statement narrows onto the individual hearer. Georg Braulik developed the same line in detailed analyses of the book's structure. On this reading the number shift is a device of a preacher, and a source critic who cuts along it is cutting a sermon in half.
What would count as evidence? Several things, and none of them decisive on its own.
- If the number shifts coincided consistently with other seams — vocabulary changes, doublets, breaks in argument — that would favour a source explanation. Sometimes they do; often they do not, and it is the "often not" that has weighed most against a mechanical use of the criterion.
- If a shift fell where a rhetorical purpose is visible — narrowing from the nation to the hearer at a moment of appeal — that favours Lohfink. This too holds in many places and not in others.
- And there is a text-critical caution that is easy to overlook and that a language course should raise. The number of a verb is not always identically transmitted. The , the Samaritan Pentateuch and the Deuteronomy manuscripts from Qumran sometimes read a different number from the at particular points, often smoothing a shift away. That means an argument built on the exact distribution of numbers in the Masoretic Text is building on a text whose details are, in places, contested. It does not dissolve the phenomenon — the shifts are far too many and too well attested for that — but it should make anyone cautious about arguments that turn on a single verse.
A working position for a reader, offered as a working position and not a result: notice the shifts, because they are there and your English will not show them; ask in each case whether a rhetorical function is visible; and do not use the number by itself to carve the book up. That last is not a claim that the book has no literary history. It is a claim about how much weight one grammatical feature can carry.
The table is arranged by what you see first when your eye lands on a clause, because that is the order in which you actually read: the head of the clause tells you what kind of sentence you are in, and everything after it is easier once you know. The warning at the bottom is not a formality. Each row is a statement about frequency in a corpus, and every one of them has exceptions that a reader will meet within a chapter or two.
6. Further Reading
- Albrecht Alt, "The Origins of Israelite Law," in Essays on Old Testament History and Religion, trans. R. A. Wilson (Blackwell, 1966; German original 1934). Read the primary text rather than summaries of it; the argument is more careful than its reputation.
- Erhard S. Gerstenberger, Wesen und Herkunft des "apodiktischen Rechts", WMANT 20 (Neukirchener, 1965), and Gerhard Liedke, Gestalt und Bezeichnung alttestamentlicher Rechtssätze, WMANT 39 (Neukirchener, 1971). The two principal revisions of Alt; both are discussed at length in English-language handbooks if the German is out of reach.
- Norbert Lohfink, Das Hauptgebot: Eine Untersuchung literarischer Einleitungsfragen zu Dtn 5-11, AnBib 20 (Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1963), and Georg Braulik, The Theology of Deuteronomy, trans. Ulrika Lindblad (BIBAL, 1994). The rhetorical account of the number shifts.
- Bruce K. Waltke and M. O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (Eisenbrauns, 1990), §§32.2 (weqatal), 34.4 (negation), 35.3.1 (infinitive absolute), 38.2 (conditional sentences). The fullest treatment in English of every construction in this lecture.
- Paul Joüon and T. Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 2nd rev. ed. (Pontifical Biblical Institute, 2006), §§119, 123, 160, 167. Compare with Waltke-O'Connor at each point; where they differ, the difference is usually a difference of theory.
- Wilhelm Gesenius, Hebrew Grammar, ed. E. Kautzsch, trans. A. E. Cowley, 2nd English ed. (Clarendon, 1910), §§107-110, 113. Old, still cited, and useful precisely because it represents the tense-based description against which later grammars define themselves.
- Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 2nd ed. (Scholars Press, 1997). Read the Laws of Hammurabi §§1-20 alongside Deuteronomy 15 and notice how similar the casuistic sentence shape is across the languages.
- Bernard M. Levinson, Deuteronomy and the of Legal Innovation (Oxford University Press, 1997). On how Deuteronomy reworks earlier legal material; presupposes the formal analysis taught here.
In short
- Deuteronomy 15:12's casuistic condition opens with כִּי plus the niphal prefix verb יִמָּכֵר ("is sold"), which reports that the brother ends up sold without saying who sold him — a deliberate gap that some translations close and WEB leaves open.
- The consequence in the same verse, תְּשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ ("you shall send him out"), packs root, stem, person/number and a fused object suffix into one word, showing why stripping the suffix is usually the fastest way through a hard legal sentence.
- Deuteronomy 24:17 is apodictic: לֹא (lo) with the prefix conjugation states a standing, unconditional prohibition, which is why legal codes favor it over אַל (al) plus the jussive, the form used for an occasion-specific command like Deuteronomy 1:21's "do not be afraid."
- Albrecht Alt's 1934 division tied casuistic law to Canaanite/ANE legal culture and apodictic law to an Israelite covenant ceremony; Gerstenberger traced the apodictic prohibition to ordinary clan instruction instead, and Liedke showed Alt's two categories are not exhaustive (participial laws, relative-clause laws) or uniform.
- The Numeruswechsel — Deuteronomy 6:4-9 addressing "you" singular against 10:19's plural וַאֲהַבְתֶּם — has been read as evidence of separate literary layers (Staerk, Steuernagel) or as deliberate rhetorical movement between nation and individual (Lohfink, Braulik), complicated further by the Septuagint, Samaritan Pentateuch and Qumran sometimes transmitting a different number than the Masoretic Text.
If you remember nothing else from this lecture: Legal Hebrew has two recognizable shapes — a כִּי-clause stating a condition and consequence (Deuteronomy 15:12's yimmakher ... teshallechennu), and a bare לֹא-prohibition with no condition at all (Deuteronomy 24:17's lo tatteh mishpat). Alt once tied these shapes to two different origins, Canaanite case law and Israelite covenant ceremony, but Gerstenberger and Liedke dismantled the inference from form to setting even though the formal distinction itself still holds. Layered onto both shapes is the Numeruswechsel, the shift between singular and plural "you" that English cannot show — compare 6:5's we'ahavta with 10:19's wa'ahavtem — which some read as a seam between literary sources and others read as a preacher's rhetorical device, and which even the ancient versions do not transmit consistently.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Reading exercise. Work through Deuteronomy 15:1-18 in Hebrew and divide it into individual laws. For each, write down (a) casuistic or apodictic, (b) the particle at its head, (c) the number of the second-person forms. Where your division disagrees with the verse numbering, say what misled the versification.
- Reading exercise. Find three laws anywhere in Deuteronomy 21-25 that Liedke's objection would apply to — that is, laws that fit neither of Alt's two boxes cleanly. Describe the shape of each in your own words. Do not try to invent a third category; describe what is there.
- Alt argued from the form of a law to the institution that produced it. Set out that argument as a series of steps, and identify precisely which step Gerstenberger denies and which step Liedke denies. Are they attacking the same step?
- Deuteronomy 15:12 uses the *niphal* יִמָּכֵר. Suppose a commentator writes that "the Hebrew makes clear that the man sold himself into debt slavery." What would you say to that, and what evidence would actually be needed to establish the claim?
- §4 says that "*waw* conversive" is a label from one theory rather than a neutral description. Look up the *weqatal* in two reference grammars of different dates and compare how each names and describes it. What does the difference in terminology commit each author to?
- Take the *Numeruswechsel* argument as it stands in §5 and design a test. What would you have to count, over what corpus, to make the source-critical explanation or the rhetorical explanation more probable than the other? Then say honestly whether your test could be carried out, and what would frustrate it.