FREE

Course certificates are free until March 31, 2027.

CH102E Medieval Church History

Lecture 2-1: From Just War to Holy War

Jump to the key points ↓

18 min

On 27 November 1095, in a field outside Clermont in central France, Pope Urban II preached a sermon. We do not have its text. We have five accounts, all written afterwards by men who wanted the crusade to have been a good idea, and they do not agree.

What is certain is the effect. Within months tens of thousands of people had sewn cloth crosses onto their clothing and set out to walk two thousand miles to Jerusalem.

This lecture asks two questions about that. First, what made Europe ready to go? Second, and more important for a theology course, what had to change in Christian thinking before a pope could preach a war as an act of devotion? The answer to the second is precise, and it can be dated. Augustine, in the fifth century, had taught the West that war is sometimes a tragic necessity and never a merit. By 1095 fighting had become something you could do for the good of your soul.

That is not a small drift. It is a reversal, and it took six hundred years.

What these 18 minutes give you

  • Explain the internal European causes of the crusades — population pressure, a surplus warrior class, and a newly confident reforming papacy — and the external ones, the Seljuk advance and the Byzantine appeal.
  • State Augustine's just war criteria and identify exactly what the idea of holy war added to them.
  • Describe Urban's appeal at Clermont as an armed pilgrimage, and explain what the pilgrimage framing did.
  • Analyse the mixed motives — devotion, land hunger, papal ambition, a European sense of Christendom — without reducing the crusades to any one of them.

But I tell you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who mistreat you and persecute you." — Matthew 5:44

World English Bible

This verse was not unknown in 1095. It was read in every church. What this lecture has to explain is how a church that read this text every year came to preach what it preached — because "they had not read the Sermon on the Mount" is not an available answer.

1. A continent with too much of everything

Start with the material facts, because the theology did not operate in a vacuum.

Europe was growing. From roughly the year 1000, better ploughs, three-field rotation and a warmer climate produced more food, and more food produced more people. The population of Western Europe may have doubled between 1000 and 1300. Land did not double.

Europe had a surplus of armed men with nothing to inherit. The knightly class had settled on primogeniture — the eldest son takes the estate — which produced generation after generation of younger sons who were trained to fight, entitled by birth, and landless. They fought each other. Local warfare was endemic enough that the church had spent a century trying to contain it with the Peace of God and the Truce of God, movements that attempted to place certain people and certain days off-limits to violence.

Hold those two facts together and something uncomfortable comes into view. The church had been trying for a hundred years to stop knights from fighting, and in 1095 it found them something to fight. Several contemporaries said so approvingly.

And the papacy was newly confident. As lecture 1-4 described, the reform movement had produced a papacy that believed it could direct the affairs of Christendom. Urban II was a reform pope, and a crusade was, among other things, a demonstration that the pope could summon the armies of Europe when no king could.

2. The Eastern appeal, and what was actually asked for

Now the external cause, which is often told badly in both directions.

In 1071 the Byzantine army was destroyed by the Seljuk Turks at Manzikert, and Anatolia — the empire's heartland for recruitment and food — was largely lost within a decade. The emperor Alexios I Komnenos wanted it back.

In 1095 Alexios sent envoys to Urban asking for military help. What he asked for was mercenaries. He wanted Western troops under Byzantine command, to be paid and directed by him, to recover Anatolia. He did not ask for an independent army of tens of thousands with its own leadership, its own objectives and a religious mandate to take Jerusalem — a city that had been in Muslim hands for four and a half centuries and was not Byzantine territory.

What arrived was the second thing. That mismatch poisoned relations between crusaders and Byzantines from the start, and it leads directly to 1204.

Two popular accounts

This is a point where readers will not agree. One popular account presents the as unprovoked Western aggression against a peaceful world; another presents them as a legitimate defensive response to centuries of Islamic conquest. Both are too simple. Islamic expansion had indeed taken Syria, Egypt, North Africa, Spain and Sicily from Christian rule, and the Seljuk advance was real and recent. But the First Crusade did not defend threatened territory; it marched past what was threatened to conquer a city no living Western Christian had ever ruled. Defensive framing does not survive contact with the itinerary.

3. Augustine's just war — and what it refused to say

Here is the theological heart of the lecture.

Augustine wrote about war reluctantly, as a man conceding something rather than commending it. His account, developed by later lawyers, set conditions:

  • Legitimate authority. War may be waged only by a proper public authority, not by private persons pursuing private grievances.
  • Just cause. It must respond to a real wrong — an attack, a seizure, a wrong left unrighted.
  • Right intention. The aim must be the restoration of peace, not glory, hatred or plunder.

Notice what this framework is designed to do. It restricts. Every criterion is a limit; each one narrows the range of permissible violence. And notice what Augustine never says: he never says that fighting is good for the soldier's soul. In his account the Christian who kills in a just war has done something permitted, regrettable and in need of penance. Killing remained a sin requiring confession even when the war was just — early medieval penitentials routinely assigned penance to soldiers after a battle, including a victorious one in a just cause.

That is the position the West held. War is a tragic necessity. It is never a .

4. The step that was taken at Clermont

Holy war reverses the last part. In a holy war, fighting is not merely permitted; it is itself a religious act, and it earns the fighter spiritual reward.

The change did not happen all at once at Clermont. It had been building. Popes had blessed banners and offered spiritual benefits to those who fought Muslims in Spain and Normans in Italy. Gregory VII had floated the idea of a papal army in the East. But 1095 is the moment it becomes public, universal and enormously popular.

Urban's offer, as far as we can reconstruct it, was this: whoever goes to Jerusalem out of devotion, and not for money or honour, may count the journey as full satisfaction of all the penance he owes. For a knight who had spent his adult life accumulating penance he could never work off — a knight is a professional at the very act the church assigns penance for — this was an extraordinary offer. His trade had become his cure.

The crucial framing device was pilgrimage. Crusaders were not soldiers in a new sense; they were pilgrims who happened to be armed. They "took the cross" as a vow, they wore it as a pilgrim's badge, they enjoyed a pilgrim's legal protections for property and family at home, and — like pilgrims — they were going to Jerusalem. There was no word for "crusade" at the time. Contemporaries called it a journey, an expedition, a pilgrimage.

That framing did the theological work. Pilgrimage was already an established penitential act. Attach an army to it and the army inherits its merit.

Do not miss what has happened. Augustine's framework asked "under what conditions may this evil be permitted?" The new framework asks "how much good does this earn?" The questions point in opposite directions, and once you are asking the second one, the restrictions in the first have nothing left to restrain.

5. Why so many people went

It will not do to reduce this to cynicism. Jonathan Riley-Smith and others have worked through the charters crusaders left behind — the documents recording how they raised the money — and the picture has changed considerably. Going on crusade was ruinously expensive. A knight typically had to mortgage or sell land, often to a monastery, to fund an expedition from which most did not return and from which few came home richer. As an investment scheme it was catastrophic.

So the motives were genuinely mixed, and the honest list is long:

  • Devotion and fear. These were people who believed in hell, believed they had earned it, and had been offered a way out.
  • The pull of Jerusalem itself, the centre of the medieval map and of the imagination.
  • Land and plunder — real for some, especially the younger sons, and realised by very few.
  • Loyalty and shame. Crusading ran in families and in lordships; when your lord took the cross, you went.
  • A new sense of Christendom — of Latin Europe as a single people with a shared cause, an idea the crusades did much to create.

The uncomfortable conclusion is that the crusades were popular because they were sincere. A purely cynical enterprise could not have moved that many people that far at that cost. The problem was not that the piety was fake. The problem was what the piety had been told to do.

6. What actually happened here

A church that read Matthew 5:44 every year came to preach armed pilgrimage, and it did so without ever repealing Augustine. Nothing was formally rescinded. The just war criteria stayed in the textbooks and stayed in force. What changed was the addition of a category the old framework had no defence against: the idea that this particular war was not merely permitted but positively meritorious.

Zeal aimed outward and zeal aimed inward come from the same energy — and this lecture has shown the outward road being built. The same generation that heard Urban at Clermont also produced the men and women of lecture 2-3, who heard the same call to be serious and answered it by giving away everything they owned.

The next lecture follows the road built here to its destination, and counts what it cost.


From Just War to Holy War Nothing was repealed. One category was added, and it changed the question. AUGUSTINE — just war CLERMONT 1095 — holy war The question it asks Under what conditions may this evil be permitted? The question it asks How much good does this act earn? Criteria Legitimate authority · just cause · right intention. Every one of them a limit. Machinery The vow · the cross sewn on · a pilgrim's legal protections · penance remitted in full. The soldier afterwards Does penance. Killing is still sin. The soldier afterwards Has done penance. The killing was it. The hinge: pilgrimage was already a penitential act. Attach an army to it, and the army inherits the merit. A framework of limits has no defence against a claim of merit.

Diagram 1. Summary table

Just war (Augustine) Holy war (Clermont)
Status of fighting A permitted evil A meritorious act
Function of the doctrine To restrict violence To mobilise and reward it
Authority Legitimate public authority The pope, directly
Reward None; penance still owed Full remission of penance owed
Framing Civil defence of order Armed pilgrimage; the vow and the cross
What restrains it The three criteria Little — merit outbids limit

5. Going to the Sources

  • The five accounts of Urban's sermon at Clermont (Fulcher of Chartres, Robert the Monk, Baldric of Dol, Guibert of Nogent, and the Gesta Francorum) — read two of them side by side and notice how differently the same speech is remembered.
  • Anna Komnene, The Alexiad, Books X–XI — the Byzantine emperor's daughter on the crusaders' arrival. Cool, sceptical, and written by someone who watched them come.
  • Augustine, City of God, Book XIX, chapters 5–7 — the reluctance in the original. Read it and then read Clermont.
  • The Gesta Francorum — an anonymous participant's account of the First Crusade, written by someone who was there and thought it was wonderful.

In short

  • Europe was ready: population grew, landless younger sons of knights fought each other despite the Peace of God, and a confident reforming papacy wanted to show it could summon armies.
  • Emperor Alexios asked for mercenaries under Byzantine command. What arrived was an independent army with a religious aim of taking Jerusalem. That mismatch poisoned relations and leads to 1204.
  • Augustine's just war criteria are legitimate authority, just cause and right intention. They restrict violence, and he never said fighting benefits the soldier's soul.
  • At Clermont in 1095, Urban II offered that going to Jerusalem out of devotion counted as full satisfaction of owed penance. Calling it armed pilgrimage gave the army a pilgrim's merit.
  • The question changed from "when may this evil be permitted?" to "how much good does this earn?" The old limits stayed on paper with little left to restrain.
  • Motives were mixed: devotion, fear of hell, Jerusalem, land, loyalty and a sense of Christendom. Crusading was ruinously expensive, and the lecture argues it was popular because it was sincere.

Topic: This lecture explains what made Europe ready for the First Crusade and how Christian thinking moved from just war to holy war.

Remember: Augustine treated war as a tragic necessity, never a merit. Holy war made fighting itself a meritorious act, and that reversal took about six hundred years.

Caution: The lecture rejects both the picture of unprovoked Western aggression and the picture of pure self-defence. It also warns against reducing the crusades to cynicism or to any single motive.

One line to carry into ministry: Be wary of any teaching that turns a permitted evil into a source of spiritual reward.

Review every summary in this course →

Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • The church spent a century trying to stop knights fighting, then gave them a war. Is that a betrayal of the Peace of God movement, or a channelling of it? Argue both.
  • Augustine's criteria were never repealed. Explain how a doctrine can be left formally intact and made ineffective at the same time. Can you think of a modern parallel?
  • The lecture argues the crusades were popular *because* they were sincere. What follows from that for how we judge sincere religious enthusiasm in our own time?
  • Alexios asked for mercenaries and received an army with its own agenda. How much of the later disaster follows from that first mismatch, and how much from the theology of 2-1?

Sign in to write and keep your answers

What next

The lecture ends here. What follows was written by its readers.