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CH202E The Church in the Modern World

Lecture 2-1: The War That Discredited Holy War

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Contents 33
CH202E The Church in the Modern World
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What Modern Church History Is, and Why It Is Worth Studying
  1. Introduction: What Modern Church History Is, and Why It Is Worth Studying
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Protestant Orthodoxy and the Puritan Movement
  1. Lecture 1-1: Building the System: Lutheran and Reformed Orthodoxy
  2. Lecture 1-2: Arminius, Dort, and the Doctrine of Grace
  3. Lecture 1-3: The Puritans: Holiness, Conscience, and the Crown
  4. Lecture 1-4: The Westminster Assembly and its Catechisms
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: The Thirty Years War and the Making of Denominations
  1. Lecture 2-1: The War That Discredited Holy War
  2. Lecture 2-2: Westphalia — A Peace Nobody Loved
  3. Lecture 2-3: Denominations — A Word for People You Cannot Destroy
  4. Lecture 2-4: An Errand into the Wilderness
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: Pietism and the Great Awakening
  1. Lecture 3-1: The Revolt Against Cold Orthodoxy: Spener and Francke
  2. Lecture 3-2: Zinzendorf, Herrnhut and the Moravian Missions
  3. Lecture 3-3: John Wesley and the Methodists: Grace and Holiness
  4. Lecture 3-4: The First Great Awakening in North America
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: The Enlightenment and the Challenge of Liberal Theology
  1. Lecture 4-1: The Age of Reason and the Scientific Revolution
  2. Lecture 4-2: Deism and the Search for a God Nobody Has to Fight About
  3. Lecture 4-3: Biblical Criticism and the Quest for the Historical Jesus
  4. Lecture 4-4: Schleiermacher and the Liberal Century
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: The Missionary Century
  1. Lecture 5-1: William Carey and the Invention of the Missionary Society
  2. Lecture 5-2: Hudson Taylor, the China Inland Mission and the Cost of Going Inland
  3. Lecture 5-3: David Livingstone — Explorer, Abolitionist, Failed Pastor
  4. Lecture 5-4: Missions and Empire — The Argument That Will Not Settle
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: Two World Wars and Neo-Orthodoxy
  1. Lecture 6-1: 1914 — The Year the Future Stopped Working
  2. Lecture 6-2: Barth's Romans and the Theology of the Word
  3. Lecture 6-3: The German Christians, the Confessing Church, and Barmen
  4. Lecture 6-4: Bonhoeffer — Costly Grace and Guilty Hands
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Pentecostalism and the Charismatic Renewal
  1. Lecture 7-1: Azusa Street, 1906
  2. Lecture 7-2: Spirit Baptism and Tongues: An Experience Becomes a Doctrine
  3. Lecture 7-3: The Second Wave: Renewal Inside the Old Churches
  4. Lecture 7-4: Why the South Grew
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Ecumenism and Global Christianity
  1. Lecture 8-1: Edinburgh 1910 and the Making of the World Council of Churches
  2. Lecture 8-2: The Second Vatican Council, 1962–1965
  3. Lecture 8-3: Lausanne 1974 — Evangelism, Justice, and What the Covenant Settled
  4. Lecture 8-4: Where the Church Is Now — and How Four Centuries Got Us Here

Jump to the key points ↓

24 min

On 23 May 1618, in the Bohemian Chancellery at Prague Castle, a delegation of Protestant noblemen put two Catholic imperial governors and their secretary out of a third-floor window. All three men survived — they landed on a slope, and depending on who told the story afterwards they were saved by a heap of refuse or by the Virgin Mary. It is the most famous window in European history, and it is a poor place to start, because it explains almost nothing.

What it did was set light to something already prepared. Sixty-three years earlier the Empire had settled its confessional problem in a way that solved it for one generation and stored it up for the next. This lecture is about what happened when the store went off, and about what four centuries of Christians have taken from it: not a conclusion about which side was right, but a suspicion of the whole idea that the question could be settled that way.

A caution before we begin. This war is remembered as the religious war, the one that proves what confessional certainty does when it is armed. That memory is doing real work — it is one of the load-bearing stories of the modern secular West — and it is only half accurate. Religion was genuinely at stake, and the war would not have started without it. It was also, from about 1630, a contest between the House of Habsburg and the House of Bourbon in which a cardinal of the Roman church paid Lutheran soldiers to kill Catholics. Both things are true. An account that drops either one is not a simplification; it is a different war.

What these 24 minutes give you

  • Explain what the Peace of Augsburg settled and what it left unsettled, and how the Defenestration of Prague turned a constitutional crisis into a general war.
  • Describe what the war did to the population and the economy of central Europe, and explain why disease and hunger, not battle, did most of the killing.
  • Explain, using French policy under Richelieu, why the war cannot be described as a religious war alone — and what that ambiguity did to ordinary people's confidence in religious causes.
  • State the question that the collapse of just-war reasoning left for the church, and say why the doctrine's survival on paper did not answer it.

Where do wars and fightings among you come from? Don’t they come from your pleasures that war in your members?" — James 4:1

World English Bible

James is writing to congregations, not to armies, and it is worth resisting the easy application. His point is not that all wars have squalid motives. It is that a community which believes it is fighting over the truth should check first whether it is in fact fighting over something it wants. That question is uncomfortable in exactly the way this lecture is uncomfortable.

1. A settlement that worked, and then stopped working

The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 ended the first round of German religious warfare with a rule that everyone could operate: cuius regio, eius religio — the prince chooses, and the territory follows. Subjects who could not accept their prince's confession were permitted to sell up and leave.

It is easy to be superior about this. It was, by the standards of 1555, a real achievement, and it held for two generations. But it had three faults, and all three matter.

It recognised two confessions, and Europe soon had three. Augsburg covered Catholics and adherents of the Augsburg Confession. Calvinism, which had barely existed in Germany in 1555, spread rapidly afterwards — the Palatinate went Reformed in 1563 — and had no legal standing at all. A growing body of people were, in imperial law, nobody.

It made religion a property question. Because the confession of a territory followed its ruler, and because vast quantities of land in the Empire belonged to bishoprics and abbeys, every conversion of a prince and every secularisation of a monastery moved assets. The ecclesiastical reservation clause tried to stop this by requiring a bishop who converted to resign his lands. Nobody obeyed it consistently, and each violation was a grievance stored for later.

It settled nothing about truth. This is the point the lecture turns on. Augsburg did not say that both confessions were acceptable to God. It said that the Empire would stop asking. Both sides signed while continuing to teach that the other was in grave error, and their theologians spent the following sixty years — the period covered by lecture 1-1 — refining exactly why. When a legal truce covers a conviction that has not changed, the truce lasts precisely as long as the balance of power that produced it.

By 1617 the balance was shifting. Ferdinand of Styria, a Habsburg educated by Jesuits and personally committed to restoring Catholic worship in his lands, was designated to inherit Bohemia — a kingdom that was largely Protestant and that held, in the Letter of Majesty of 1609, a written imperial guarantee of religious freedom. When churches on disputed land were closed, the Bohemian estates concluded that the guarantee was worthless. Hence the window.

2. What the war actually did

The Bohemians elected a Protestant king, Frederick V of the Palatinate. He lasted a winter — hence "the Winter King" — and was destroyed at the White Mountain outside Prague in November 1620, in a battle lasting about two hours. Had the war ended there it would be a footnote.

It did not end there, because each victory pulled in a new party frightened by it. Denmark intervened in 1625 and was beaten. Sweden intervened in 1630 and was not. France intervened openly in 1635. Spain fought throughout. What had begun as a revolt in one kingdom became a war fought from the Baltic to Lombardy for a generation, and the reason it lasted so long is structural: no participant was strong enough to win outright, and each was strong enough to make peace on the other's terms unacceptable.

The armies were, for the most part, military enterprises. A commander like Wallenstein — himself a Bohemian Protestant convert to Catholicism, who made a fortune from the confiscated estates of the losers of 1620 — raised troops on credit and repaid them from the territory he occupied, by a system of levies called Kontribution that was extortion with paperwork. Where the levy failed, the army took what it needed. This is the mechanism behind the war's reputation: armies that could not be paid had to be fed, and feeding them stripped the countryside of seed grain and draft animals.

The consequences followed from that, and they were not chiefly military.

  • Hunger. A district stripped in autumn does not sow in spring. Famine trailed the armies by a season.
  • Disease. Typhus, dysentery and plague moved with troops and with refugees, and killed far more people than combat did. This is the ordinary pattern of pre-modern war, and here it operated for thirty years without a break.
  • Flight. Whole populations moved, repeatedly, which spread the disease further.

The numbers require care, because inflated ones have been repeated for four centuries. Older accounts claim that the German lands lost between a third and a half of their people. Careful modern work — Peter Wilson's is the standard — puts the overall loss for the Empire at roughly a fifth of its population, something like four to five million deaths from all causes, with enormous regional variation: some districts of Württemberg, Pomerania and Mecklenburg did lose half or more, while Hamburg and much of the north-west were barely touched. The honest statement is that this was among the worst demographic catastrophes in European history and that the "one third to one half" figure describes the worst-hit regions rather than the Empire.

One episode fixed the war in memory. In May 1631 the imperial army under Tilly took Magdeburg, a large Lutheran city, and in the fire and slaughter that followed something in the order of twenty thousand people died — most of the population. Whether the fire was set deliberately, by the attackers, or by the defenders to deny the city, was disputed at the time and is disputed still. What is not disputed is the flood of pamphlets that followed, on both sides, and what they did to the imaginative temperature of the war. "Magdeburg quarter" entered the language as a phrase for no quarter at all.

3. The complication: a cardinal pays for Lutheran armies

Now the part that the tidy version leaves out.

In 1629 the Emperor Ferdinand II, having won, issued the Edict of Restitution. It ordered the return of every ecclesiastical property secularised since 1552 — two archbishoprics, a dozen bishoprics, and hundreds of monasteries. Legally he had a case: the Augsburg settlement said as much, and it had been ignored for eighty years. Politically it was a catastrophe. It turned every Protestant prince in the Empire, including those who had stayed loyal, into a party with everything to lose, and it alarmed the Catholic princes too, who could see an Emperor using a confessional argument to strip territories at will. Note what this shows: the confessional motive was real. Ferdinand did not have to issue the Edict, and issuing it cost him the war.

At the same moment, France was governed by Armand-Jean du Plessis, Cardinal Richelieu, chief minister to Louis XIII. In 1628, after a fourteen-month siege, Richelieu had taken La Rochelle from the Huguenots and stripped French Protestants of the fortified towns granted them by the Edict of Nantes. He was not a friend of the Reformed faith.

In January 1631, by the Treaty of Bärwalde, this same cardinal contracted to pay Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden — the Lutheran king whose army had just landed in Germany — one million livres a year to make war on the Emperor. In 1635 France entered the war directly, on the Protestant side, against Catholic Spain and the Catholic Emperor. The Pope's own troops were not involved; the Papacy under Urban VIII, itself wary of Habsburg power in Italy, gave the Habsburgs no meaningful support and was widely suspected of preferring the French.

Why? Because France was surrounded. Habsburg Spain lay to the south, the Spanish Netherlands to the north, the Empire to the east, and the corridor between the Spanish and Austrian branches ran along France's frontier. From a French desk in 1630, Habsburg encirclement was the threat to national existence, and the confession of the men who would help break it was a secondary matter. This is raison d'état — the doctrine that the interest of the state is a sufficient reason, and answers to no higher court.

Do not, however, run the correction too far in the other direction. It is now fashionable to say the Thirty Years War was "not really about religion", and that is as wrong as the story it replaces. Religion decided who could trust whom, who could be recruited, which grievances counted as intolerable, and what a peace could contain. The Bohemian revolt was over churches. The Edict of Restitution was over church property. Sweden's intervention had Lutheran motives alongside Baltic ones, and Gustavus meant both. What the French case demonstrates is not that religion was absent but that it was not sovereign — that when a confessional commitment and a dynastic interest pulled in opposite directions, states could be relied upon to follow the interest, and to keep the confessional language.

Religion or politics?

This is a point where readers will not agree. Older Protestant accounts treat Richelieu's policy as a scandal exposing Catholic cynicism; older Catholic accounts point out, correctly, that Protestant Saxony changed sides twice and that Lutheran Sweden was funded to invade a Catholic empire by a Catholic state, which makes the cynicism general rather than confessional. A third group of historians now argues that "religious war" is the wrong frame altogether for a conflict over imperial constitutional law. The position taken here is the middle one, and it is a position: religion supplied the fault lines and the language, dynastic interest supplied much of the timing and the alliances, and neither is reducible to the other.

4. What broke

did not collapse in 1648. It is in the textbooks; it is in Catholic moral theology and in Protestant ethics; it is the basis of the modern law of armed conflict. On paper it survived intact.

What it lost was its capacity to be believed. A doctrine of restraint is only as good as the restraint it produces, and for thirty years it produced almost none that anyone could see. Chaplains on both sides preached that their cause was just, in the same weeks and using the same categories. When two sides deploy an identical moral vocabulary to authorise the same behaviour, an observer does not conclude that one of them is misapplying the doctrine. The observer concludes that the doctrine does no work.

That is the disillusionment this lecture is named for, and it is worth being exact about its shape. It was not, in the seventeenth century, a loss of Christian faith. Ordinary Europeans in 1650 were not less religious than in 1610. What eroded was something narrower and, in the long run, more consequential: confidence that religious truth could be established by force, and that the people urging force were doing so for the reasons they gave. Three things followed from that erosion, and the rest of this chapter follows all three.

Some concluded that the confessions must simply agree to stop killing each other, whatever anyone still privately believed — that is Westphalia, and lecture 2-2. Some concluded that the differences must be sorted into those worth dividing over and those not — that is denominationalism, and lecture 2-3. And some concluded that Europe was beyond repair and the pure church would have to be built somewhere else — that is New England, and lecture 2-4.

A fourth conclusion, drawn by a minority at the time and by a great many people a century later, was that the whole apparatus of revealed religion was the problem. That road runs to chapter 4, and it is worth naming here that the Enlightenment's case against Christian claims was not built only out of philosophy. It was built partly out of Magdeburg.

There is one more thing to say, and it belongs to the small print of the period rather than its headlines. Through all of this, people went on caring for each other in ways the treaties do not record. Anabaptist and Mennonite communities, who had no legal standing to lose and no armies to gain, held to non-resistance and were plundered by both sides for it. Parish clergy stayed with towns they could have left. Whatever else the century proved, it did not prove that Christian charity had stopped. It proved that Christian charity was not what the war was being fought with.


A War That Kept Changing Its Reasons Four phases, 1618–1648 — and the confessional line breaking down as it goes Phase What happened What it did to the religious story Bohemian 1618–1625 Churches closed despite the Letter of Majesty; defenestration; Frederick V elected and destroyed at the White Mountain, 1620. Still legible as a confessional revolt. Both sides believe it. Danish 1625–1629 Christian IV beaten; Wallenstein's enterprise armies live off the land; Edict of Restitution (1629) claws back church property to 1552. Confessional motive at its clearest — and it costs the Emperor the war he had won. Swedish 1630–1635 Gustavus Adolphus lands; Magdeburg burns, c. 20,000 dead, 1631; Sweden is paid to fight by France (Bärwalde, January 1631). A Catholic cardinal funds a Lutheran army. The story stops being about doctrine. French 1635–1648 France enters openly against Spain and the Emperor; the war becomes Bourbon against Habsburg, fought on German ground. Catholic against Catholic, with Protestant allies on both sides. Raison d'état. The killing was mostly not done by soldiers Armies fed by stripping the land; famine came the next season, typhus and plague with the refugees. Just war survived as a doctrine. What it lost was the power to make anyone stop.

Diagram 1. Summary table

Stage Event Theological consequence
The fuse Augsburg (1555) settles two confessions; Calvinism spreads into the gap; Prague, 1618 A legal truce over an unchanged conviction lasts only as long as the balance of power
The ruin Enterprise armies, Kontribution, Magdeburg 1631; roughly a fifth of the Empire dead The church could bless the war and could not restrain it
The turn Edict of Restitution 1629; Bärwalde 1631; France enters openly 1635 Confession real but not sovereign — where interest and creed diverged, states followed interest
The residue Just war intact on paper, discredited in practice Not loss of faith, but loss of confidence that truth can be settled by force

5. Going to the Sources

  • The Peace of Augsburg (1555) — short, and available in translation. Read the ecclesiastical reservation clause and ask yourself who is expected to enforce it.
  • The Bohemian Letter of Majesty (1609) — the guarantee that was broken. It is worth seeing how strong the wording is, because that is why its violation mattered so much.
  • The Edict of Restitution (1629) — the single document that best shows the confessional motive still driving policy eleven years into the war.
  • The Treaty of Bärwalde (1631) — a contract between a Catholic cardinal and a Lutheran king. Note the clause requiring Gustavus to respect Catholic worship where he conquers.
  • Hans Jakob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen, Simplicissimus (1668) — a novel, not a document, but written by a man who was taken by soldiers as a boy. The early chapters are the war from underneath.
  • Jacques Callot, The Miseries and Misfortunes of War (1633) — eighteen etchings. Look at the one called The Hanging Tree.

In short

  • The Peace of Augsburg (1555) let each prince choose his territory's religion, but it covered only two confessions, turned religion into a property question, and settled nothing about truth. The Defenestration of Prague (1618) set light to these tensions.
  • The war lasted thirty years because no side could win outright. Armies lived off the land, and hunger, disease and flight killed more people than battle. Modern work puts the loss at about a fifth of the Empire.
  • It was not only a religious war. Cardinal Richelieu paid Lutheran Sweden to fight the Catholic Emperor, so religion supplied the fault lines while state interest drove many alliances.
  • Just-war doctrine survived on paper but lost credibility, because both sides used the same moral language to justify the same conduct.
  • The lecture names three responses: agree to stop fighting (Westphalia), sort doctrines worth dividing over (denominations), or build a pure church elsewhere (New England).

Topic: This lecture describes the Thirty Years War, why it started and spread, what it did to central Europe, and how it damaged confidence in holy war.

Remember: Religion was real in this war but not sovereign: when creed and state interest pulled apart, states followed interest and kept the religious language.

Caution: Do not say the war was "not really about religion", and do not say it was only about religion. The lecture holds both are true, and notes that readers differ on how to frame it.

One line to carry into ministry: Before saying you are fighting for the truth, check whether you are in fact fighting for something you want.

Review every summary in this course →

Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • Augsburg settled the conflict by agreeing to stop asking which side was right. What is gained and what is lost when a community handles a disagreement that way? Name something your own church or denomination has settled by not asking.
  • Ferdinand II issued the Edict of Restitution when he was winning, and it cost him the war. What does that suggest about the relation between religious conviction and political judgement — in his situation, and in ours?
  • State the strongest case for Richelieu's policy as he would have stated it. Then say what you think it cost him, and whether a Christian statesman can make that trade.
  • Just war theory survived this war intact as a doctrine while losing its power to restrain anyone. Is there a doctrine in your tradition today that is in that condition — formally held, practically inert? How would you tell?

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What next

The lecture ends here. What follows was written by its readers.