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PT738E Privacy and Confidentiality in Ministry

Lecture 4-1: Accounts, Passwords and Devices

Contents 31
PT738E Privacy and Confidentiality in Ministry
Chapter 0 · Introduction: Held in Trust
  1. Introduction: Held in Trust
Chapter 1 · Week 1: Entrusted Words
  1. Lecture 1-1: Secrets, Shame, Gossip and Trust in Scripture
  2. Lecture 1-2: Confidence in the Traditions, and Where It Stops
  3. Lecture 1-3: What a Church Holds, and What Can Hurt
  4. Lecture 1-4: When the Community Must Know, and When It Must Not
  5. Lecture 1-5: Practice Lab, Map What Your Community Holds
Chapter 2 · Week 2: Collecting, Keeping, Using, Letting Go
  1. Lecture 2-1: Collect Less, and Say Why
  2. Lecture 2-2: Consent When the Asker Holds Authority
  3. Lecture 2-3: Keeping It: Places, Keys and Who Needs to See
  4. Lecture 2-4: Using, Sharing, Letting Go
  5. Lecture 2-5: Practice Lab, Fix One Form
Chapter 3 · Week 3: Notes, Prayer Requests and People at Risk
  1. Lecture 3-1: Writing Notes About People, and Not Writing Them
  2. Lecture 3-2: Prayer Requests and the Circle Around a Person
  3. Lecture 3-3: Children, Young People and Vulnerable Adults
  4. Lecture 3-4: When Exposure Can Endanger
  5. Lecture 3-5: Practice Lab, Rewrite the Note and the Request
Chapter 4 · Week 4: Digital Safety
  1. Lecture 4-1: Accounts, Passwords and Devices
  2. Lecture 4-2: Group Chats, Social Media, Livestreams, Cameras and Photographs
  3. Lecture 4-3: Choosing Tools and Vendors, the Questions to Ask
  4. Lecture 4-4: Volunteers, Borrowed Devices and Handing Over Access
  5. Lecture 4-5: Practice Lab, Audit One Day of Access
Chapter 5 · Week 5: When It Goes Wrong, and When Hands Change
  1. Lecture 5-1: When Something Goes Wrong: The First Hours
  2. Lecture 5-2: Speaking to the People Who Were Hurt
  3. Lecture 5-3: Hands Changing: Pastors, Leaders, Splits and Closures
  4. Lecture 5-4: Leaving, Moving, Dying, Asking: Requests About a Person's Record
  5. Lecture 5-5: Practice Lab, The First Hour and the Handover List
Chapter 6 · Week 6: Policy and Culture
  1. Lecture 6-1: Writing a Plain Policy
  2. Lecture 6-2: Teaching and Culture: Making It Ordinary
  3. Lecture 6-3: Different Places, Different Rules: How to Ask
  4. Lecture 6-4: Known and Kept: A Theology of Being Held
  5. Lecture 6-5: Practice Lab, My Rule and Our One Page

Jump to the key points ↓

28 min

A church today is held together by accounts. There is an email address for the office, a login for the program that keeps the membership list, a place in the cloud where the bulletin and the youth photographs are kept, a payment service for gifts, a messaging group for the choir. Behind each account is a password, and behind each password is a person who may or may not still be serving. Most of what a church holds about people is now behind a few doors, and this lecture is about the doors.

The central claim of this course is that what people entrust to a church is theirs, and the church is its keeper. A keeper looks after doors. It is easy to imagine that the danger to the people on your lists is a clever stranger. This chapter rests on a plainer observation: much of the harm that comes to people from the information a church holds comes from ordinary lapses. A password that was reused. A phone that was left on a bus. A volunteer who moved away and still has the keys. A message that looked like the pastor's and was not. Careful habits, clear roles and a few good questions protect more than any clever tool.

Two limits are stated once, here. This lecture is not a security audit; it cannot tell you whether your particular setup is safe, and a person qualified in this field should look at any place that holds sensitive information. And it is not legal advice: what you must do when something is lost differs from place to place, and the later chapter on incidents returns to that. Everything below is about defence. It teaches how to protect doors, not how doors are opened.

What these 28 minutes give you

  • Explain why one password reused across accounts is dangerous to the people whose information sits behind them.
  • Choose a way of keeping long, different passwords, either a password manager or a paper method kept safely.
  • Describe what a second step at sign-in is for, and who the recovery options for an account really point to.
  • Carry out the first steps when a device is lost or stolen.
  • Recognise the signs of a deceptive message and confirm a request by another route.
  • Use a checklist to remove a person's access when they leave a role.

A prudent man sees danger, and hides himself; but the simple pass on, and suffer for it. — Proverbs 22:3

World English Bible

Watch therefore, for you don’t know in what hour your Lord comes. — Matthew 24:42

WEB

But know this, that if the master of the house had known in what watch of the night the thief was coming, he would have watched, and would not have allowed his house to be broken into. — Matthew 24:43

WEB

He who is faithful in a very little is faithful also in much. He who is dishonest in a very little is also dishonest in much. — Luke 16:10

WEB

The proverb does not praise fear. It praises the person who looks ahead and acts while there is still time. The "simple" in this verse are not stupid; they go on without looking, and others may suffer with them. In an office where the people who would suffer are members who trusted the church with their stories, foresight is a form of care.

Jesus is speaking about readiness for his return, and the passage must not be pulled out of that setting. Still, the picture he uses is an ordinary one that his hearers knew: a householder is expected to keep watch over what has been entrusted to him, and a house that is not watched is one that can be entered. We borrow the picture of an everyday habit of watchfulness; we do not claim that the passage is about computers.

Small things are not small to the person whose story is in them. A church that is careful with a password is practising, in a small way, the faithfulness it hopes to show in larger matters.

1. One key that opens everything

Start with a picture. Imagine that the office of a church has a single key, and that the same key opens the front door, the cupboard where the registers are kept, the room where the counselling notes are held, and the safe. Now imagine that a copy of that key was given years ago to a volunteer who has moved away, and that nobody remembers who else was given one. Nobody would call this a careful arrangement.

A reused password is that key. Suppose the office volunteer uses the same password for the church email, for her own shopping account and for an old online forum. Companies that hold shopping accounts and forums are sometimes careless or are themselves wronged by others, and when a password becomes known in one place, people who wish to misuse it may try it at other places. The volunteer has done nothing visibly wrong, and the church's membership program is now as well protected as the weakest place she ever used that password. The people who bear the cost are not the volunteer. They are the members whose addresses, notes and photographs were behind the door.

This is why the first habit of digital care is not a clever product but a simple rule: every account that matters has its own password, and no password is used twice. Everything else in this section serves that rule.

2. Long, different, and written down somewhere safe

Many of us were taught to make a password hard by adding capital letters and symbols to a short word. That advice is old and it is tiring. What helps more is length and difference. A password made of several unrelated words strung together is easier for a person to remember than a short jumble, and it is harder for a program to guess. What matters is that the words are really unrelated: not a line of a hymn, not the name of the church and the year, not anything another person could guess by knowing you.

But if every account has its own long password, no one can remember them all. There are two honest solutions.

The first is a password manager. That is a kind of program that stores all your passwords in one protected place, which you open with one strong password of your own, and that fills the others in for you. The idea is to remember one thing well and let the tool hold the rest. Its weakness is also plain: if you lose the one password that opens it, or if someone learns it, the whole store is affected. So the one password must be strong, must be told to no one, and a trusted person should know how to recover access if you are suddenly unable to serve. Choose such a tool using the questions in a later lecture of this chapter.

The second is a paper method. It suits a small church, a place with an unreliable internet connection, or a minister who does not trust a program with such a task. You write the passwords in a small notebook and keep the notebook as carefully as you keep the key to the register cupboard: locked away, not in the office drawer with the stamp pad, not on a note stuck to the screen. A paper list is a perfectly good method if it is truly kept safe. Its dangers are loss and fire, and the answer to both is that a second trusted person knows where a sealed copy is kept. A paper list that lives in a bag beside a phone is no better than no protection at all.

Neither method is more spiritual than the other. The question to ask is: if this one thing were lost tomorrow, would the church be locked out, and would anyone else be able to walk in?

3. A second step at sign-in

A password is something you know. A second step at sign-in adds something you have, so that knowing the password alone is not enough. After you type the password, the service asks for one more proof: a short code sent to a phone, a code made by a small program on a phone, or a small physical key you plug in or hold near. The point is simple. If a password has been learned by the wrong person, the door still does not open without the second proof.

Use it on the accounts that matter most: the email that other accounts depend on, the place where the membership records live, anything that handles gifts. It is a small trouble at each sign-in, and it makes ordinary lapses much less costly. It is not magic. A second step can be a nuisance for an older volunteer who does not own a phone. In that case do not drop the protection; ask what else the service offers, and let the decision about that account be made by the person responsible, not left to each user to improvise.

4. Recovery: who the safety net points to

Every account has a way back in for people who have forgotten the password. This recovery is a second door, and it is often forgotten. Usually it points to an email address or a phone number. Ask of each important account: whose address or number is this recovery attached to?

An invented case shows why. (An invented case.) A small parish set up an account for its newsletter years ago. The volunteer who set it up used her own mobile number for recovery. She has since left the parish, changed her number and moved to another city, and the number now belongs to a stranger. If the parish forgets its password, the code goes to the stranger. If a stranger discovers the account and asks for a reset, the code goes to the stranger too. Nobody did anything wrong. The recovery option simply points to a person who is no longer in the story.

The remedy is a habit rather than a tool. Once a year, and every time a person leaves, look at the recovery details of the important accounts and make sure they point to a role the church controls (an office address, a number held by the responsible person), not to a private phone of a person who may not stay.

5. Updates, and a locked device

Programs and phones receive updates, and many of those updates close weaknesses that have been found. An office computer that never takes updates is like a house where a known broken lock is never mended. You do not need to understand the repair. You need a habit: allow updates, and give a named person the job of noticing when a machine has been left behind. Old devices that can no longer be updated should not be the ones that hold the most sensitive information.

A device that holds, or can reach, church information should lock itself when it is not used, and should ask for a code, a pattern or a fingerprint to wake. A phone left on a table in a hall, open, with the church's messaging app showing, is an open drawer of the membership list. A short lock time is a kindness to the people whose messages are on it.

A word about shared accounts. Many small churches have one login for the office computer, or one email account used by three volunteers, because it is simple. The simplicity has a price. When something goes wrong, nobody can say who did what. When one of the three leaves, the password must be changed and the other two must be told, and often are not. A shared account also cannot be switched off for one person only. Where you can, give each person their own sign-in and let them each be added and removed separately. Where a shared account cannot be avoided, keep a short written note of who has it and change the password whenever that list changes.

6. If a device is lost or stolen

A phone is left in a taxi. A laptop is taken from a car. A tablet used at the youth meeting does not come back from the weekend. These things happen to careful people. What matters is the next hour.

The first step is to tell the responsible person quickly. This is the one that people are most tempted to delay, because they are ashamed. A volunteer who feels that she will be blamed waits a day to see whether the phone turns up, and in that day nobody can protect the people whose messages were on it. A church that wants its people to speak up quickly has to make speaking up safe. The later lecture on handing over access returns to this.

The second step is to change the passwords of the accounts that were signed in on that device, beginning with the email, since other accounts can be reset through it. The third is to use any remote lock or remote erase that the device offers, if it was switched on beforehand, and to sign the lost device out of the accounts it was using. The fourth is to write down, while it is fresh, what was on the device and who could be affected. Do not try to solve the whole matter alone, and do not delete or tidy anything that might help someone understand what happened. The ordering of a response to an incident is the subject of a later chapter.

These steps depend on a preparation. A device that was never locked, never set up for remote lock, and never listed on any record cannot be protected afterwards. A small notebook that lists "the devices that hold church information, and who has each" costs very little.

7. Messages that are not what they seem

Many ordinary lapses start with a message that pretends to be someone it is not. This lecture does not describe how such messages are made, and a church worker does not need that. What helps is knowing the signs and having one habit.

The signs are few and plain. The message presses you to hurry: this must be done today, the pastor is waiting, the account will be closed. It asks for something that is normally handled differently: money, gift cards, a login, a code that was just sent to your phone. It changes a payment detail: please send the contractor's money to this new account. It comes from someone you know, but from a number or an address you have not seen before: Pastor here, this is my new number. It makes you feel that questions would be disrespectful. Any one of these signs is a reason to stop. Several together are a strong reason.

The habit is to confirm by another route. If a message that seems to be from the pastor asks the treasurer to move money, the treasurer does not reply to the message. She telephones the pastor on the number she already has, or asks in person, and asks plainly: did you send this? If an email from the denominational office asks for the membership list, the administrator asks the office by a number she already holds. This costs a minute. It protects against a whole family of tricks without anyone having to understand any of them.

There is a pastoral point here. In a church, authority is respected, and a request from a pastor can feel impossible to question. A congregation that has said openly, "if I ever ask you for money or a code by message, call me first, and I will thank you," has taken away the pressure that these messages rely on. The pastor who says that sentence out loud protects every volunteer who serves under him. If the message turns out to be real, nothing is lost but a minute. If you have already responded to a message and now fear you were deceived, say so at once; the ones who are hurt most by silence are the people whose information is at stake.

8. Removing access when people leave

The most common weakness in a church is not a weak password. It is an old key in a pocket. People come and go: a youth worker for two years, a treasurer who moves, a student who helped during the summer, a volunteer who left after a disagreement. If access is given generously and withdrawn rarely, the number of people who can reach the church's information grows without anyone deciding it.

A short checklist belongs in every church, on paper, kept where the person responsible can find it:

  • Remove the person from the membership program and from the shared storage, or change their level of access.
  • Change any password they knew, including shared ones.
  • Remove their phone number and address from the recovery details of any account.
  • Remove them from messaging groups and mailing lists that carry sensitive material.
  • Ask them to return keys, devices and papers, and to delete any church information from their own phone or computer.
  • Remove their name from the account of the payment service, and tell the bank or service where that is needed.
  • Write down the date and who did it.

The checklist should be done in the same week, ideally the same day. It is not an accusation. A leaving volunteer is most often a friend, and the checklist can be presented as part of saying thank you: "This is what we do for everyone, and it protects you as well as the people we serve."

9. A small church with one volunteer who does everything

An invented case. (An invented case.) Ruth keeps the accounts of a small assembly. She is also the person who set up the email, the cloud storage and the group chat, because she was the only one who was not afraid of them. All the passwords are in her head. Last winter she was ill for three weeks and no one could pay the electricity bill, send a notice or reach the membership list.

Ruth is a gift to the congregation, and the arrangement is a danger to her and to them. If she is ill, the church is locked out. If she is deceived by a message, no one else sees it. If she wished to step down, handing over would be a crisis. The remedy is not distrust. It is a second trusted holder: another person, chosen by the leaders, who knows where the sealed copy of the passwords is kept and how to use it, and who can check that the important accounts have a second step and a recovery option that does not depend on Ruth's own phone. It is also a written rule, in half a page, about who may see what. The church should write the rule down, and the person responsible should read it together with Ruth, so that she does not feel that she is under suspicion.

The small church and the large one differ in scale, not in principle; the habit is the same.

Diagram 1. One key opens many doors, and a leaving checklist

Doors, keys and the people who leave One reused password, one password per door, and what to do when someone goes One password everywhere Church email, member list, gifts and a private forum all share one key. When it leaks in the weakest place, every door behind it is open to the wrong hand. The members bear the cost. A different password per door Long, made of unrelated words, kept in a manager or a locked paper notebook. A second step on the important ones. Recovery points to a role, not a person. When a person leaves, the same week 1 Remove or reduce their access to the member program and shared storage. 2 Change every password they knew, including shared ones. 3 Take their phone or address out of recovery details. 4 Remove them from groups and lists; ask for keys, devices and papers back. 5 Write down the date and who did it. Say thank you.

In short

  • Many harms to the people a church holds information about come from ordinary lapses: reused passwords, lost phones, old access, a message that was not what it seemed.
  • Each important account needs its own long password. A manager or a locked paper notebook can hold them.
  • A second step at sign-in means a stolen password alone does not open the door. Check where recovery really points.
  • When a device is lost, say so quickly, change the passwords of what was on it, lock it remotely if you can, and write down what it held.
  • Signs of a deceptive message are pressure to hurry, a request for money or codes, and changed details. Confirm by another route.
  • When a person leaves, remove their access the same week with a written checklist.
Front Back
Topic The doors to a church's information: accounts, passwords and devices, and who holds the keys.
Remember One password per account, a second step on the important ones, recovery pointing to a role, and the leaving checklist done the same week.
Caution A shared account hides who did what, and a lost phone reported late cannot be protected. A message that presses you to hurry is a sign to stop and confirm.
One line to carry into ministry Keep the doors well: the people whose stories are behind them did not choose to depend on our habits.
Review every summary in this course →

Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • Think of the accounts your community depends on, as categories only (the email, the storage, the member list, the payment service). For which of them could you say today, without looking, who can sign in?
  • Why might a password manager suit one community and a locked paper notebook another? What would each community have to be sure of before choosing?
  • The lecture says a recovery option "points to a person who is no longer in the story". Where might that be true in places you know, and who would be the right person to look?
  • Why is it harder in a church than in an office to question a message that seems to come from the pastor? What would the pastor have to say aloud to make it easier?
  • A volunteer loses a phone and does not report it for two days because she is ashamed. What in the community's habits caused the delay, and what would change it?
  • Who is the second trusted holder in a community like Ruth's, and what would make the arrangement feel like care to her, not suspicion?

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What next

The lecture ends here. What follows was written by its readers.