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STEL2E Modern Theology

Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine

Contents 40
STEL2E Modern Theology
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What Is Modern Theology, and Why Study It?
  1. Introduction: What Is Modern Theology, and Why Study It?
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: The Enlightenment Challenge
  1. Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
  2. Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
  3. Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: Nineteenth-Century Liberal Theology
  1. Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
  2. Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
  3. Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: Neo-Orthodoxy — Barth and Brunner
  1. Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
  2. Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
  3. Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: Existentialist and Hermeneutical Theology
  1. Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
  2. Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
  3. Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: Christian Realism and Public Theology
  1. Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
  2. Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: Secularization and Bonhoeffer's Legacy
  1. Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
  2. Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
  3. Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Rethinking God — Process and Open Theism
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
  2. Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
  3. Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Hope, the Cross, and Catholic Renewal
  1. Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
  2. Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
  4. Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
Chapter 9 · Chapter 9: The Trinitarian Renaissance
  1. Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
  2. Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
  3. Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
Chapter 10 · Chapter 10: Liberation, Black, and Global Theologies
  1. Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
  2. Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
  3. Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
Chapter 11 · Chapter 11: Postmodernism, Postliberalism, and Pluralism
  1. Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
  2. Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
  3. Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
  4. Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
Chapter 12 · Chapter 12: Evangelical Theology and the Contemporary Frontier
  1. Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
  2. Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
  3. Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
  4. Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis

Jump to the key points ↓

18 min

Kant closed off one path to knowing God and tried to open another through moral reason. G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), writing a generation later and initially trained in theology himself, took the conversation in a different direction again - not by asking what reason can know about a timeless God, but by arguing that reality itself, including Spirit (Geist) and the religious doctrines through which Spirit expresses itself, is fundamentally historical: it does not sit finished above history, waiting to be discovered, but unfolds progressively through history's actual course, including through the historical development of Christian doctrine. This lecture covers Hegel's account of that unfolding and why it left many of his readers - admirers and critics alike - looking at Christian doctrine differently than before: not as a timeless deposit handed down unchanged, but as something with its own history, and therefore something that could, in principle, still be developing.

Hegel considered himself, by his own account, a defender of Christian faith and claimed his philosophy provided its fullest, most rationally adequate articulation to date - a claim this lecture takes seriously rather than dismissing, even though many of Hegel's readers, then and since, have doubted the Christianity that emerges from his system is recognizably the same faith confessed in the creeds. That very disagreement - was Hegel Christianity's philosophical vindicator or its dissolver into something else entirely - is itself part of what makes Hegel's legacy for theology so consequential, and this lecture states both readings rather than adjudicating between them.

What these 18 minutes give you

  • Explain, in outline, Hegel's account of absolute idealism and Spirit (*Geist*) unfolding progressively through history via a dialectical process.
  • Describe how Hegel understood religious doctrine, including Christian doctrine, to be one of the forms through which Spirit comes to know itself in history.
  • Explain why this account made doctrine look, to many readers, like a developing human product rather than a timeless deposit - and why Hegel himself did not see it that way.
  • State the disagreement over whether Hegel's system vindicates or dissolves orthodox Christian doctrine, and why competent readers land on both sides.
  • Explain why Hegel's historicizing move sets up the crisis of historicism that chapter 2 inherits.

Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever.

For I, Yahweh, don't change; therefore you, sons of Jacob, are not consumed.

Hebrews 13:8 (World English Bible)

Few verses state a claim more directly opposed, on its face, to a fully historicized account of doctrine than Hebrews 13:8. If Jesus Christ himself is unchanging across all of time, then whatever develops in Christian doctrine's historical expression, the object that doctrine is trying to describe - who Christ actually is - is not itself a developing, historically conditioned thing. Hegel would not necessarily have denied this verse; he would likely have argued that Spirit's eternal, unchanging truth is precisely what unfolds progressively into ever-fuller historical and doctrinal expression, so that the historical development is development of an unchanging truth's self-disclosure, not development in the truth itself. Whether that distinction actually holds up, or whether it quietly makes the "unchanging truth" so abstract that Hebrews 13:8's plain claim about the person of Christ gets lost inside it, is exactly the question this lecture leaves for the reader to weigh.

Malachi 3:6 (WEB)

Malachi grounds Israel's continued existence in God's own changelessness - if God were subject to the kind of development and alteration creatures undergo, the relationship itself would have no stable ground to stand on. Read alongside Hegel's account of Spirit's historical unfolding, this verse names the stakes plainly: if doctrine about God is simply one more historically developing human product, has something essential about God's own claimed unchangeableness been quietly relocated into a claim about human understanding of God instead - and is that relocation a clarification or a loss? This lecture states the question without resolving it, since the theologians in chapters 2 and 3 spend a great deal of their own energy trying to answer exactly this.

1. From Kant's boundary to Hegel's history

Hegel inherited Kant's philosophy as his starting point but rejected one of its central conclusions. Where Kant had drawn a firm boundary around what reason could know - phenomena, yes; noumena, no - Hegel argued that this boundary was itself a kind of philosophical mistake, freezing what should be understood as a moving, developing process into a fixed and final limit. For Hegel, reality is not a static collection of things some of which reason can reach and some of which it cannot; reality is itself a process of development, and reason's job is to trace that development rather than to map a permanent boundary around it.

Geist

Hegel called the whole of reality, understood this way, Geist - usually translated "Spirit" or "Mind," though neither English word captures the term fully. Geist, for Hegel, is not simply a synonym for "God" in the traditional sense, nor simply a synonym for human consciousness; it is closer to the total, self-developing rational structure of reality itself, of which human thought, history, art, religion, and philosophy are all expressions at different stages of development. This lecture states Hegel's central and most difficult claim as plainly as it can be stated: Geist comes to full self-knowledge only progressively, through a long historical process, and that process - not a timeless, already-complete truth sitting outside history - is where ultimate reality actually consists.

2. The dialectic: how development happens

The mechanism Hegel proposed for this development is his famous dialectic, often summarized (more simply than Hegel's own technical vocabulary, but usefully) as a movement from an initial position (a thesis), through the tensions and contradictions that position generates when pushed to its logical limits (producing an opposing antithesis), toward a resolution that preserves what was true in both while overcoming their one-sidedness (a synthesis) - which then itself becomes a new starting point for the same process to repeat at a higher level. Applied to the history of philosophy, religion, and culture, Hegel used this pattern to explain why ideas that once seemed adequate get superseded: not because they were simply wrong, but because pushing them to their logical conclusion reveals tensions only a further, more developed position can resolve.

Religion, for Hegel, is one of the major forms - alongside art and philosophy - through which Geist represents its own truth to itself at a given historical stage, and Hegel considered Christianity the highest of the historical religions, because in the doctrine of the Christianity represents, in the form of a specific historical narrative, the truth Hegel's own philosophy states abstractly: that the infinite (Geist, or God) and the finite (the world, or humanity) are not, in the end, absolutely separate, but are united - in Christ's case, in the single historical figure of Jesus, whom Christian doctrine confesses as both fully God and fully human. Hegel argued that Christianity grasps this truth in representational form (Vorstellung) - through image, narrative, and doctrine - while philosophy, his own philosophy specifically, grasps the identical truth in fully rational, conceptual form (Begriff). On Hegel's own account, then, philosophy does not correct or replace Christian doctrine; it translates the same truth Christian doctrine already holds into its fullest, most adequate expression.

3. Why doctrine started to look like a developing human product

Whatever Hegel's own intention, this account had a consequence that proved enormously significant for the theologians who came after him, whether they had read Hegel closely or only absorbed the historicizing habit of mind he had helped make current. If Christian doctrine is one of the historical forms through which Geist's self-development becomes visible, then the specific doctrinal formulations of any given era - the Nicene settlement on Christ's divinity, the of the two natures, the Reformation's account of - can be studied as products of their historical moment, shaped by the philosophical and cultural resources available at the time, rather than as timeless truths simply received complete from revelation and merely restated, unchanged, generation after generation. A doctrine could now be asked not only "is this true?" but "what historical development produced this particular formulation, and could a further development produce a different, perhaps better, one?"

It is worth stating carefully, and without softening it into something it is not, that this was not Hegel's own stated aim. Hegel considered his system a vindication of Christian doctrine's rational content, not a demotion of doctrine to "merely human" status - in his account, the historical process by which doctrine develops just is how Geist (which Hegel identified, at least in some sense, with the God Christian doctrine confesses) comes to full self-consciousness. But many of Hegel's readers, including students who split into what historians call "Right Hegelian" and "Left Hegelian" camps almost immediately after his death, drew very different conclusions from the same system. Right Hegelians tended to read Hegel as compatible with, even a philosophical ally of, orthodox Christian doctrine. Left Hegelians - including figures like David Friedrich Strauss and Ludwig Feuerbach, writing in the decade after Hegel's death - read the same historicizing logic as evidence that religious doctrine, including the doctrine of the incarnation Hegel had prized so highly, was itself best explained as a product of human historical and psychological development, with no need for a transcendent Geist behind it at all.

4. An honest disagreement, not a settled verdict

Two readings of Hegel

This lecture states the resulting disagreement plainly rather than resolving it, in keeping with this course's approach to history of doctrine generally. Was Hegel a genuine, if unusual, defender of Christian orthodoxy, offering philosophy's fullest possible vindication of doctrines like the and the incarnation? Or did his system, whatever his personal intention, supply the historicizing logic that made doctrine's dissolution into "merely human, merely historical product" not just possible but close to inevitable once his more skeptical students worked out its implications? Serious scholars of Hegel have defended both readings, and this course does not adjudicate between them - what matters for the chapters that follow is that Hegel made available, for the first time with this much philosophical weight behind it, a way of thinking about doctrine as something with its own developmental history. Ernst Troeltsch's crisis of historicism (chapter 2) and, in a very different way, the Trinitarian renaissance's own historical self-awareness (chapter 9) both inherit a habit of mind Hegel did more than any other single figure to establish, whichever reading of Hegel's own intentions one ultimately finds more persuasive.

1-3 — Hegel's dialectic and its fork One system, two readings of what it means for doctrine Thesis A doctrinal position Antithesis Its internal tensions surface Synthesis New, higher-stage doctrine Hegel's own view: doctrine's history IS Geist coming to self-knowledge "Right Hegelian" reading The system vindicates orthodox doctrine philosophically - development of an unchanging truth's self-disclosure. "Left Hegelian" reading Doctrine dissolves into a merely human, historical-psychological product (Strauss, Feuerbach) - no transcendent Geist required.

6. Further Reading

  • G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart, one-volume edition (Oxford University Press, 2006).
  • Peter C. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford University Press, 2005).
  • Cyril O'Regan, The Heterodox Hegel (State University of New York Press, 1994).
  • Terry Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
  • Walter Jaeschke, Reason in Religion: The Foundation of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, trans. J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson (University of California Press, 1990).

In short

  • Hegel rejected Kant's fixed boundary. For him reality is a developing process, which he called Geist (Spirit or Mind), and it comes to full self-knowledge only through history.
  • The dialectic describes how this happens: a thesis meets its tensions (antithesis) and is resolved in a synthesis that becomes a new starting point.
  • Hegel saw Christianity as the highest historical religion. The incarnation shows in story form (representation) what his philosophy states in concepts: the infinite and the finite are united.
  • This made doctrine look like something with its own history, open to the question of what produced a given formulation. Hegel himself meant it as a defence of Christian doctrine.
  • His students split. Right Hegelians saw an ally of orthodoxy. Left Hegelians such as Strauss and Feuerbach saw doctrine as a human product. Scholars still defend both readings of Hegel.

Topic: This lecture explains Hegel's view that reality and doctrine develop through history, and why readers disagreed about whether this defended or dissolved orthodoxy.

Remember: Hegel gave theologians a habit of asking how a doctrine developed historically, and that habit leads straight into the crisis of historicism in chapter 2.

Caution: Hegel did not intend to reduce doctrine to a merely human product. The lecture does not decide whether his system defends or dissolves Christian orthodoxy.

One line to carry into ministry: Studying how a doctrine developed is not the same as denying that it is true, but ask what is left unchanging about God and Christ.

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Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • In your own words, explain what Hegel meant by Geist unfolding through history via the dialectic, and why he considered Christianity's doctrine of the incarnation the highest expression of that process available in "representational" form.
  • Hegel considered his system a philosophical vindication of Christian doctrine, yet his own students split into readings that vindicated orthodoxy and readings that dissolved it. What do you think made the same system open to such different conclusions?
  • Hebrews 13:8 declares Christ unchanging across all time. Explain how a Hegelian could try to reconcile that verse with a historically developing account of doctrine, and then evaluate: does the reconciliation actually work, or does it change what the verse is claiming?
  • Malachi 3:6 grounds Israel's continued existence in God's own changelessness. If doctrine about God is treated as historically developing, what (if anything) about God himself must a theologian still insist is not developing, in order to avoid the conclusion Malachi 3:6 is meant to rule out?
  • This lecture states that Hegel's historicizing move "sets up" chapter 2's crisis of historicism. Based on this lecture alone, what problem do you predict a fully historicized account of doctrine will eventually run into?

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What next

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