Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
Contents 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
Chapter 1 left Immanuel Kant's critique standing largely unanswered: the traditional proofs for God's existence could not survive as knowledge claims about how reality actually is, only, at most, as postulates required by moral reasoning. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), a Reformed pastor and theologian working in Berlin, is usually credited - including by theologians who go on to reject nearly everything else he argued - as the first to offer a full theological answer to that critique rather than simply ignoring it or restating pre-Kantian arguments as though nothing had happened. His answer, worked out first in the 1799 On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers and then systematically in The Christian Faith (1821-22, revised 1830-31), was to stop grounding religion in either doctrine or metaphysics and to ground it instead in a distinct kind of immediate self-awareness he called the "feeling of absolute dependence" (schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl).
This move is why Schleiermacher is so often called, including in this course, the beginning of "modern" theology - not because he was the first modern person to write theology, but because he is the first major theologian to build a complete system on the premise that Kant's critique of speculative metaphysics had to be accepted as basically correct, and that theology's job was to find solid ground somewhere the critique did not reach, rather than to keep arguing metaphysics on Kant's own contested terms. Understanding what he actually said - and what several generations of critics, including chapter 3's Karl Barth, said was lost by saying it - is necessary for understanding almost everything else in this course, since a great deal of later modern theology can be read as either an extension of Schleiermacher's move or a direct reaction against it.
What these 24 minutes give you
- State Schleiermacher's central claim - that religion's foundation is the "feeling of absolute dependence," not doctrine or metaphysical knowledge - in his own terms, and explain what work "feeling" (*Gefühl*) is doing in that phrase.
- Explain why Schleiermacher considered this move immune to Kant's critique of pure reason, and in what specific sense it makes no metaphysical knowledge-claim.
- Describe how *The Christian Faith* re-derives Christian doctrines (sin, redemption, the person of Christ) as descriptions of religious self-consciousness rather than as revealed propositions about God's inner being.
- Summarize the two strongest lines of criticism against Schleiermacher's method - that it collapses theology into anthropology, and that it cannot distinguish Christian faith's specific content from religious feeling in general - and identify at least one Schleiermacher scholar's response to each.
- Explain why this chapter calls Schleiermacher's move a "relocation" rather than a retreat, and what new problem that relocation created for the next generation of liberal theologians.
For in him we live, and move, and have our being. As some of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring.
As the deer pants for the water brooks, so my soul pants after you, God. My soul thirsts for God, for the living God. When shall I come and appear before God?
Acts 17:28 (World English Bible)
Paul's speech on the Areopagus, addressed to a Gentile audience with no shared scriptural starting point, appeals to a kind of universal, pre-doctrinal awareness of dependence on God - "in him we live, and move, and have our being" - that Paul treats as available even to hearers who have never read Israel's scriptures. Schleiermacher's defenders have pointed to exactly this verse as evidence that Scripture itself recognizes a form of God-consciousness prior to and beneath explicit doctrinal content, which is part of what makes Schleiermacher's project harder to dismiss as simply a modern invention foreign to the biblical text. His critics reply that Paul's very next move in the same speech is to preach the resurrection of Jesus Christ as a specific, doctrinally loaded historical claim (Acts 17:31) - he does not stop at general dependence and call it sufficient. Both halves of that speech matter for evaluating Schleiermacher fairly: he was not wrong that Scripture recognizes something like a universal creaturely awareness of God, but whether that awareness alone can carry the weight of specifically Christian doctrine is exactly the question this lecture leaves open for the student.
Psalms 42:1-2 (WEB)
The psalmist's language here is affective before it is doctrinal - panting, thirsting, longing to appear before God - and Schleiermacher would have recognized this psalm as evidence for his claim that religion begins in a mode of feeling and longing that precedes systematic reflection about God's attributes. It is worth noting, in fairness to Schleiermacher, that this psalm was written by someone who already held a great deal of doctrinal content about the God he thirsted for; the feeling described here is not free-floating, but the feeling of a particular people toward a particular named God with a particular history of action. Whether Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence" can be that specific, or whether it necessarily describes something more generic, is a question this lecture returns to below.
1. The problem Schleiermacher inherited
By the time Schleiermacher began writing, Kant's first Critique had done its philosophical work: the traditional theistic proofs - ontological, cosmological, teleological - had all been shown, to the satisfaction of most philosophically literate readers, to overreach what pure reason could actually establish. Kant's own proposed rescue, discussed in lecture 1-2, grounded religion in practical reason and morality instead - God as a postulate required for moral life to make coherent sense, rather than an object of theoretical knowledge. Many of Schleiermacher's own educated contemporaries in Berlin, the "cultured despisers" his 1799 Speeches were addressed to by name, had concluded from all this that religion itself was an outgrown, pre-critical stage of human development, something a sophisticated modern person had simply moved past.
Schleiermacher's Speeches answer that dismissal directly, and his strategy is worth stating precisely because it is often summarized too quickly. He does not argue that Kant was wrong about the limits of theoretical reason - he broadly accepts them. He argues instead that religion was never, at its root, a form of theoretical knowledge or a system of moral rules in the first place, and that both religion's cultured despisers and its confused theological defenders had made the same mistake: treating religion as if it were a competitor to metaphysics or to ethics, arguing on the same turf and therefore vulnerable to the same Kantian critique. Religion, Schleiermacher insists, is its own distinct mode of human experience - "intuition and feeling" (Anschauung und Gefühl) - irreducible to either metaphysical belief or a code of conduct, and therefore not a target Kant's critique of speculative reason was ever actually aimed at.
2. The feeling of absolute dependence
By the time Schleiermacher wrote The Christian Faith two decades later, he had refined "feeling" into a more precise technical term: the "feeling of absolute dependence." This is worth unpacking carefully, because in ordinary English "feeling" suggests something passing and emotional - a mood - and that is not quite what Schleiermacher means. He is naming something closer to a structural, ever-present mode of self-consciousness: in every moment of ordinary experience, a person is aware of themselves both as somewhat free and active (able to act on the world) and as somewhat dependent and passive (acted upon by the world). Schleiermacher's claim is that beneath both of these lies a third, more basic awareness - a feeling of being absolutely, not merely relatively, dependent, an awareness that one's very existence, not merely one's circumstances, rests on something outside and beyond the whole system of finite, interacting causes. That absolute dependence, present as the co-determinant of every self-conscious moment whether a person notices it or not, is what Schleiermacher identifies as, in its most fundamental form, "God-consciousness," and it is this - not an argument, not a doctrine, not a rule - that he takes to be religion's actual root, in Christianity and, in principle, in every other religious tradition as well.
The philosophical payoff of this move is exactly what makes it Schleiermacher's answer to chapter 1's Kantian crisis. A feeling, on Schleiermacher's account, is not a claim about how the external world is structured; it is a report of one's own immediate self-consciousness. Kant's critique targets claims to theoretical knowledge about objects, including a metaphysically construed God, that outrun what experience can verify. A feeling of absolute dependence, by contrast, makes no assertion about God's nature, attributes, or existence considered as an external metaphysical object - it reports something about the structure of the human subject's own self-awareness. Schleiermacher believed this let him affirm that religion has a real, universal, and undeniable basis in human experience without ever entering the territory Kant had closed off. Whatever one concludes about whether the strategy succeeds, it is a serious and internally consistent piece of philosophical theology, not merely a retreat into vague sentiment, and treating it as the latter is the caricature this course warns against.
3. Redescribing doctrine from the inside
The Christian Faith's method follows directly from this foundation, and it is the part of Schleiermacher's project that later critics, including Barth, found most objectionable. Rather than beginning with propositions about God's being and then asking what a Christian should believe about them, Schleiermacher proposes to derive Christian doctrine by systematically describing the actual religious self-consciousness of the Christian community - what he calls, more fully, "the feeling of absolute dependence, as conditioned by the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth." Doctrines, on this account, are not first-order claims about God's inner nature dropped from outside history into human minds; they are the church's disciplined, second-order descriptions of its own distinctive religious self-consciousness, the specific shape that God-consciousness takes once it has been shaped by Christ.
Concretely, this reshapes several classical doctrines in ways worth naming precisely rather than caricaturing. Sin, for Schleiermacher, is described primarily as an arrest or obstruction of the feeling of absolute dependence by the flesh - the God-consciousness present in principle in every person failing to achieve dominance over sensuous, self-interested consciousness - rather than being defined first and primarily by a specific act of Adam's imputed to all his descendants in a legal or forensic sense. Redemption is the communication of Christ's own perfectly unobstructed God-consciousness to the believer through incorporation into the community he founded, an account that emphasizes Christ's continuous influence on the believer's own consciousness. And Schleiermacher's Christology, notoriously, locates Christ's uniqueness in the absolute, unbroken potency of his God-consciousness - "the constant potency of his God-consciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in Him," in his own phrase - rather than in the classical Chalcedonian language of two natures, one divine and one human, united in one person, which Schleiermacher judged to be borrowed metaphysical vocabulary rather than a direct report of Christian religious experience. It is important, in fairness, to note that Schleiermacher did not intend this as a demotion of Christ; he consistently describes Jesus as utterly unique, the only person in whom God-consciousness has ever been perfectly and unbrokenly present, which he considered the substantive content behind the church's confession of Christ's divinity even where he declined to state it in Chalcedonian terms.
4. What critics said was lost
Is feeling enough?
This is a point where readers will not agree. The core criticism, stated by defenders of more classical approaches to doctrine both in Schleiermacher's own century and afterward, is that grounding theology in religious self-consciousness makes theology, at bottom, a branch of anthropology - a careful, sophisticated description of human religious experience - rather than a discipline whose primary subject matter is God as God actually is, independent of and prior to any human awareness of God. Karl Barth, whose own theology in chapter 3 is built almost entirely as a rejection of this move, argued that Schleiermacher's method effectively makes theology answerable to the human religious subject rather than to God's own free self-revelation, and that this ordering - starting from human consciousness and working toward God, rather than starting from God's self-disclosure and working toward the human response - is precisely backward. A second, related criticism presses the point chapter 1's principle for this chapter names directly: if religious feeling in general, present in some form across all human religious traditions, is theology's actual foundation, what secures anything as distinctively Christian rather than merely, generically, religious? Schleiermacher's own answer - that Christian faith is God-consciousness specifically as conditioned by Jesus's redeeming influence - is a serious answer, not silence, but it does not fully satisfy critics who ask why redemption through Christ specifically, rather than some other historical mediator of heightened God-consciousness, should be considered necessary rather than one contingent, historically available occasion among others.
Schleiermacher's modern defenders, notably scholars working in the tradition of Friedrich Schleiermacher studies represented by writers such as Richard Crouter and B. A. Gerrish, respond that this criticism sometimes reads Schleiermacher through Barth's own polemical lens rather than on Schleiermacher's own terms, and that Schleiermacher's account of Christ's unique and unrepeatable God-consciousness is doing more theological work - securing Christ's uniqueness, not just his usefulness - than the "merely one occasion among others" caricature allows. It is fair to both sides to say that this dispute over how much specifically Christian content Schleiermacher's method can secure remains open in the secondary literature, and this course does not resolve it for the student.
5. A relocation, not a retreat, and its unfinished problem
Schleiermacher's move deserves to be understood, first, on its own terms: a serious philosophical response to a serious philosophical challenge, offered by someone who wanted Christian faith to remain intellectually credible to educated people who had absorbed Kant's critique and could not simply set it aside. Whatever a reader ultimately concludes about whether the feeling of absolute dependence can bear the doctrinal weight Schleiermacher places on it, dismissing the Speeches and The Christian Faith as a mere capitulation to fashionable philosophy misreads a project that its author understood as an act of theological rescue, not surrender.
But the criticism above points to a real, unresolved question this chapter's next lecture inherits directly. If Schleiermacher has secured religion's universal basis in feeling but left it genuinely unclear what, if anything, is distinctively and necessarily Christian about Christian faith - as opposed to Christianity simply being one especially advanced instance of a universal religious phenomenon - then the next generation of liberal theologians faced a task Schleiermacher's system had not completed: naming something concretely, historically, and distinctively Christian that Kant's critique still could not touch. Albrecht Ritschl and Adolf von Harnack, taken up in lecture 2-2, answered that need not by returning to feeling but by relocating the foundation again - this time into the recoverable ethical content of Jesus's own historical teaching, read as the distinguishable, non-negotiable "essence" of Christianity beneath layers of later doctrinal development.
6. Further Reading
- Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (T&T Clark, 1928; based on the 2nd German edition of 1830-31).
- Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans. Richard Crouter (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- Richard Crouter, Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- B. A. Gerrish, A Prince of the Church: Schleiermacher and the Beginnings of Modern Theology (Fortress Press, 1984).
- Karl Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Eerdmans, 1982).
In short
- Schleiermacher is usually called the first to answer Kant fully. He accepted Kant's limits on theoretical reason and argued that religion was never a form of metaphysical knowledge or a moral code.
- He placed religion's root in the "feeling of absolute dependence," a constant self-awareness that one's very existence rests on something beyond all finite causes. He called this God-consciousness.
- Because feeling reports the self's awareness and makes no claim about God as an external object, he thought it was beyond Kant's critique.
- In The Christian Faith he redescribed doctrine as the church's description of its own God-consciousness shaped by Jesus. Sin is an obstructed God-consciousness. Christ's uniqueness is the unbroken power of his God-consciousness, stated without Chalcedon's two-natures language.
- Critics, including Barth, said this makes theology a branch of anthropology and cannot secure what is distinctively Christian. Defenders such as Crouter and Gerrish reply that Barth's lens distorts Schleiermacher. The dispute remains open.
Topic: This lecture presents Schleiermacher's answer to Kant, which grounds religion in the feeling of absolute dependence, and the criticisms of that move.
Remember: Schleiermacher moved theology's foundation from proofs and doctrines to the believer's own God-consciousness. This is a serious relocation of the foundation, not a retreat.
Caution: The lecture says he did not mean to demote Christ, and it does not settle whether his method can secure what is specifically Christian.
One line to carry into ministry: Faith includes lived awareness of God, but ask whether that awareness alone can carry the specific content of Christian teaching about Christ.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- In your own words, explain why Schleiermacher believed grounding religion in "feeling" made it immune to Kant's critique of theoretical knowledge. Do you find that specific philosophical move persuasive, independent of whether you agree with Schleiermacher's conclusions?
- Acts 17:28 speaks of a universal human awareness of "living and moving and having our being" in God. Does this verse support Schleiermacher's claim that religion has a universal, pre-doctrinal root - and does Paul's next move in the same speech (preaching the resurrection) complicate that support?
- Barth's criticism is that Schleiermacher's method starts from the human religious subject and works toward God, rather than starting from God's self-revelation and working toward the human response. State this criticism as precisely as you can, and then state, as fairly as you can, how a defender of Schleiermacher might respond.
- This lecture argues that Schleiermacher's redescription of sin, redemption, and the person of Christ was not intended as a demotion of any of these doctrines. After reading his redefinitions above, do you find that intention persuasive, or do you think something essential is lost regardless of Schleiermacher's own intent?
- The lecture ends by saying Schleiermacher left open the question of what, if anything, is distinctively Christian rather than generically religious about Christian faith. Before reading lecture 2-2, what answer would you propose to that question?